The article briefly discusses most of Tyler Burge's published work, stressing interconnections, a... more The article briefly discusses most of Tyler Burge's published work, stressing interconnections, and discusses as well a small proportion of the secondary literature on Burge.
The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge from the period 1986-1999. It also responds ... more The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge from the period 1986-1999. It also responds to critical discussions of this work.
The paper critically discusses Jerry Fodor's (2015) recent criticism of Tyler Burge's _Origins of... more The paper critically discusses Jerry Fodor's (2015) recent criticism of Tyler Burge's _Origins of Objectivity_. It argues that Fodor's arguments rest upon two mistakes. First, a conflation concerning the notion of perception-as. And second, completely ignoring the possibility that some representational content might be nonconceptual.
The paper is an examination of Tyler Burge’s notion of epistemic entitlement. It begins with cons... more The paper is an examination of Tyler Burge’s notion of epistemic entitlement. It begins with consideration of a recent attempt to understand entitlement, including the ways in which it differs from the more traditional notion of justification (Casullo 2007). The paper argues that each of Casullo’s central contentions rests upon confusion. More generally, the paper shows that Casullo’s interpretation tries to force Burge’s work into a framework that is not suited for it; and that the interpretation also suffers from not being even minimally informed about the actual character of Burge’s epistemological views. The paper’s second half explains the distinction between entitlement and justification, including ways in which Burge’s understanding of the relevant notions has changed over time.
Graham (2012) largely takes over Tyler Burge's general epistemological framework, but provides a ... more Graham (2012) largely takes over Tyler Burge's general epistemological framework, but provides a competing explanation for our entitlement to rely upon our perceptual competencies. Graham believes that our perceptual belief-forming systems have a specifically biological function, and that it is in virtue of fulfillment of this function that perceptual entitlement accrues to the relevant class of beliefs. In this response I contrast Graham's purported explanation with Burge's own; I point out that there is a clear incoherence in Graham's argument in his paper; and I investigate ways in which the incoherence might be resolved. In conclusion it is argued that, even setting aside the explicit contradiction within his stated position, Graham radically misunderstands Burge's own account of perceptual entitlement.
The paper discusses supervenience theses, particular in relation to their use in metaethics. The ... more The paper discusses supervenience theses, particular in relation to their use in metaethics. The paper argues that most formulations of moral supervenience are false, because they illicitly assume that moral properties cannot vary independently of variations within moral agents naturalistically described. The primary thesis of the paper, however, is that Simon Blackburn's much-discussed supervenience-based argument against moral realism rests upon a tangle of confusions concerning the nature of supervenience relations. Blackburn's argument is unsound, and no threat to moral realism.
The paper is a critical study of Christopher Peacocke's book _The Realm of Reason_. The content o... more The paper is a critical study of Christopher Peacocke's book _The Realm of Reason_. The content of the paper is both exegetical and critical. In its latter capacity the paper is centrally concerned to correct Peacocke's understanding of Tyler Burge's version of rationalism; and to criticize Peacocke's position from this competing perspective.
In _Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology_, Oxford University Press., 2007
The paper is an extension of the authors' previous discussion of the implications for epistemolog... more The paper is an extension of the authors' previous discussion of the implications for epistemology of a minimally adequate account of empirical mental representation. In particular, it discusses in some detail two further associated problems: The problem of the apparently opaque relation between a thinker and the natures of her (empirical) representational mental states; and the problem of the constitutive connection between epistemic warrant and truth. The paper also connects its appropriated perspective, which largely draws upon work by Tyler Burge, to the ancient and venerable dispute between rationalism and empiricism.
The paper draws upon an account of perceptual entitlement by Tyler Burge to forge an original arg... more The paper draws upon an account of perceptual entitlement by Tyler Burge to forge an original argument for the truth of anti-individualism about the individuation of most representational mental states. The argument shows that only by acknowledging anti-individualism can one both uphold the constitutive connection between epistemic warrant and truth, on one hand, and allow for the possibility of circumscribed perceptual unreliability coeval with warrant.
The paper surveys recent work on moral explanation. It criticizes Harman's original explanationis... more The paper surveys recent work on moral explanation. It criticizes Harman's original explanationist argument against moral realism, and more generally defends the idea that moral properties do play an indispensible causal/explanatory role.
Discussion of moral explanation has reached an impasse, with proponents of contemporary ethical n... more Discussion of moral explanation has reached an impasse, with proponents of contemporary ethical naturalism upholding the explanatory integrity of moral facts and properties, and opponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting that such robustly explanatory pretensions as moral theory has be explained away. I propose that the key to solving the problem lies in the question whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that, given the truth of contemporary ethical naturalism, moral properties are causally efficacious if the properties of the special sciences are. Certain objections are rebutted involving the nature of causation, on the one hand, and putative special features of the moral realm, on the other.
The paper criticizes attempts to argue from the supervenience of one class of properties upon ano... more The paper criticizes attempts to argue from the supervenience of one class of properties upon another the identity of the former with the latter; and more generally the explanatory dispensability of supervenient classes of properties or explanatory kinds. The paper's explicit focus is work in this area by Frank Jackson and Allan Gibbard.
This chapter discusses Burge's first papers on self-knowledge, published in 1986, through the tra... more This chapter discusses Burge's first papers on self-knowledge, published in 1986, through the transitional work published in 1999. It also discusses criticisms of Burge's early work on self-knowledge.
The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge during the period 1986-1999, as well as crit... more The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge during the period 1986-1999, as well as critical treatments of that work.
The article briefly discusses most of Tyler Burge's published work, stressing interconnections, a... more The article briefly discusses most of Tyler Burge's published work, stressing interconnections, and discusses as well a small proportion of the secondary literature on Burge.
The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge from the period 1986-1999. It also responds ... more The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge from the period 1986-1999. It also responds to critical discussions of this work.
The paper critically discusses Jerry Fodor's (2015) recent criticism of Tyler Burge's _Origins of... more The paper critically discusses Jerry Fodor's (2015) recent criticism of Tyler Burge's _Origins of Objectivity_. It argues that Fodor's arguments rest upon two mistakes. First, a conflation concerning the notion of perception-as. And second, completely ignoring the possibility that some representational content might be nonconceptual.
The paper is an examination of Tyler Burge’s notion of epistemic entitlement. It begins with cons... more The paper is an examination of Tyler Burge’s notion of epistemic entitlement. It begins with consideration of a recent attempt to understand entitlement, including the ways in which it differs from the more traditional notion of justification (Casullo 2007). The paper argues that each of Casullo’s central contentions rests upon confusion. More generally, the paper shows that Casullo’s interpretation tries to force Burge’s work into a framework that is not suited for it; and that the interpretation also suffers from not being even minimally informed about the actual character of Burge’s epistemological views. The paper’s second half explains the distinction between entitlement and justification, including ways in which Burge’s understanding of the relevant notions has changed over time.
Graham (2012) largely takes over Tyler Burge's general epistemological framework, but provides a ... more Graham (2012) largely takes over Tyler Burge's general epistemological framework, but provides a competing explanation for our entitlement to rely upon our perceptual competencies. Graham believes that our perceptual belief-forming systems have a specifically biological function, and that it is in virtue of fulfillment of this function that perceptual entitlement accrues to the relevant class of beliefs. In this response I contrast Graham's purported explanation with Burge's own; I point out that there is a clear incoherence in Graham's argument in his paper; and I investigate ways in which the incoherence might be resolved. In conclusion it is argued that, even setting aside the explicit contradiction within his stated position, Graham radically misunderstands Burge's own account of perceptual entitlement.
The paper discusses supervenience theses, particular in relation to their use in metaethics. The ... more The paper discusses supervenience theses, particular in relation to their use in metaethics. The paper argues that most formulations of moral supervenience are false, because they illicitly assume that moral properties cannot vary independently of variations within moral agents naturalistically described. The primary thesis of the paper, however, is that Simon Blackburn's much-discussed supervenience-based argument against moral realism rests upon a tangle of confusions concerning the nature of supervenience relations. Blackburn's argument is unsound, and no threat to moral realism.
The paper is a critical study of Christopher Peacocke's book _The Realm of Reason_. The content o... more The paper is a critical study of Christopher Peacocke's book _The Realm of Reason_. The content of the paper is both exegetical and critical. In its latter capacity the paper is centrally concerned to correct Peacocke's understanding of Tyler Burge's version of rationalism; and to criticize Peacocke's position from this competing perspective.
In _Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology_, Oxford University Press., 2007
The paper is an extension of the authors' previous discussion of the implications for epistemolog... more The paper is an extension of the authors' previous discussion of the implications for epistemology of a minimally adequate account of empirical mental representation. In particular, it discusses in some detail two further associated problems: The problem of the apparently opaque relation between a thinker and the natures of her (empirical) representational mental states; and the problem of the constitutive connection between epistemic warrant and truth. The paper also connects its appropriated perspective, which largely draws upon work by Tyler Burge, to the ancient and venerable dispute between rationalism and empiricism.
The paper draws upon an account of perceptual entitlement by Tyler Burge to forge an original arg... more The paper draws upon an account of perceptual entitlement by Tyler Burge to forge an original argument for the truth of anti-individualism about the individuation of most representational mental states. The argument shows that only by acknowledging anti-individualism can one both uphold the constitutive connection between epistemic warrant and truth, on one hand, and allow for the possibility of circumscribed perceptual unreliability coeval with warrant.
The paper surveys recent work on moral explanation. It criticizes Harman's original explanationis... more The paper surveys recent work on moral explanation. It criticizes Harman's original explanationist argument against moral realism, and more generally defends the idea that moral properties do play an indispensible causal/explanatory role.
Discussion of moral explanation has reached an impasse, with proponents of contemporary ethical n... more Discussion of moral explanation has reached an impasse, with proponents of contemporary ethical naturalism upholding the explanatory integrity of moral facts and properties, and opponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting that such robustly explanatory pretensions as moral theory has be explained away. I propose that the key to solving the problem lies in the question whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that, given the truth of contemporary ethical naturalism, moral properties are causally efficacious if the properties of the special sciences are. Certain objections are rebutted involving the nature of causation, on the one hand, and putative special features of the moral realm, on the other.
The paper criticizes attempts to argue from the supervenience of one class of properties upon ano... more The paper criticizes attempts to argue from the supervenience of one class of properties upon another the identity of the former with the latter; and more generally the explanatory dispensability of supervenient classes of properties or explanatory kinds. The paper's explicit focus is work in this area by Frank Jackson and Allan Gibbard.
This chapter discusses Burge's first papers on self-knowledge, published in 1986, through the tra... more This chapter discusses Burge's first papers on self-knowledge, published in 1986, through the transitional work published in 1999. It also discusses criticisms of Burge's early work on self-knowledge.
The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge during the period 1986-1999, as well as crit... more The chapter discusses Burge's work on self-knowledge during the period 1986-1999, as well as critical treatments of that work.
Uploads
Papers by Brad Majors
Drafts by Brad Majors