Ben-Shahar borrows from a rich private-law tradition to explore the treatment of odious debt as a... more Ben-Shahar borrows from a rich private-law tradition to explore the treatment of odious debt as a problem analogous to allocation of liability in private law. Drawing on the economic analysis of private law, it develops insights as to the structure of an optimal liability scheme. Under this approach, liability is imposed not on the basis of some intrinsic judgment as to the parties' relative blameworthiness, but rather in a forward-looking fashion, on parties who are best suited to take actions to prevent the loss. In addition, liability is imposed on a magnitude tailored to induce an optimal level of precautionary measures.
... Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Social ... more ... Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. Page 2. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569753 February 26, 2010 The Right to Withdraw in Contract ...
Page 1. ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES Omri Ben-Shahar & John AE Pottow* I. Introduct... more Page 1. ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES Omri Ben-Shahar & John AE Pottow* I. Introduction 651 II. ... 7. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. ...
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Oct 1, 1995
Crime deterrence is ordinarily regarded as a function of the magnitude of the sanctions and the e... more Crime deterrence is ordinarily regarded as a function of the magnitude of the sanctions and the enforcement measures that the government employs. This article argues that victims of crime may also be in a position to take enforcement measures that may deter crime and substitute or complement the government's effort. However, it may be difficult to synchronize the government's and the victims' efforts to reach the optimal combined enforcement, since victims' incentives to take precautions usually diverge from what is socially optimal. To ...
Ben-Shahar borrows from a rich private-law tradition to explore the treatment of odious debt as a... more Ben-Shahar borrows from a rich private-law tradition to explore the treatment of odious debt as a problem analogous to allocation of liability in private law. Drawing on the economic analysis of private law, it develops insights as to the structure of an optimal liability scheme. Under this approach, liability is imposed not on the basis of some intrinsic judgment as to the parties' relative blameworthiness, but rather in a forward-looking fashion, on parties who are best suited to take actions to prevent the loss. In addition, liability is imposed on a magnitude tailored to induce an optimal level of precautionary measures.
... Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Social ... more ... Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. Page 2. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569753 February 26, 2010 The Right to Withdraw in Contract ...
Page 1. ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES Omri Ben-Shahar & John AE Pottow* I. Introduct... more Page 1. ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES Omri Ben-Shahar & John AE Pottow* I. Introduction 651 II. ... 7. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. ...
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Oct 1, 1995
Crime deterrence is ordinarily regarded as a function of the magnitude of the sanctions and the e... more Crime deterrence is ordinarily regarded as a function of the magnitude of the sanctions and the enforcement measures that the government employs. This article argues that victims of crime may also be in a position to take enforcement measures that may deter crime and substitute or complement the government's effort. However, it may be difficult to synchronize the government's and the victims' efforts to reach the optimal combined enforcement, since victims' incentives to take precautions usually diverge from what is socially optimal. To ...
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