Sven G Holtsmark

ABSTRACT This is the second of a two-part article exploring the background of the Red Army’s move into Norway on 18 October 1944. Did it reflect ambitions to prepare the ground for a long-term Soviet military presence in Norway or to create leverage for political influence? It was not: crossing the border became unavoidable once the strategic aim of the offensive, to surround and then destroy the main forces of the Germans’ 19th Mountain Corps on Soviet territory, failed. The rational for the Soviet move was tactical, not strategic or political. This part follows general Meretskov’s planning for and the execution of the successive steps of the operation starting from the elaboration of the final plans in late September. The military events are related to events in Moscow, including the interaction between the Norwegians and their Soviet ally and an illuminating exchange between Stalin and Churchill on the evening of 14 October. It concludes by briefly discussing the Soviet withdrawal in September 1945.

Sporsmalet om sovjetisk deltagelse I frigjoringen av Norge 1941-1944 Hvordan forholdt den norske eksilregjeringen seg til mulighetene for sovjetisk innmarsj i Finnmark under Andre verdenskrig? Sven G. Holtsmark tar for seg den norske eksilregjeringens politikk fra 1941 til 1945, og beskriver hvordan regjeringen arbeidet med sporsmalet om frigjoringen av Finnmark, og da spesielt synet pa sovjetisk innblanding.

Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968, the Soviet bloc entered into a period of strictly limited tolerance to deviations from the Soviet model of socialism. The theory of "socialist international relations" became the theoretical rationalization of the new drive for bloc unity. Since the late 1970s, howeveer, the collapse of economic and political stability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself undermined the whole consept of chesion in the bloc. This study examines the evolution of Soviet thinking on Soviet East European relations from 1968 to late 1989, and discusses the role of the "theory" for relations between socialist states. From the early 1980s, the Soviets were forced to adjust their thinking to keep pace with developments in Eastern Europe. DUring 1989 the "theory" finally disappeared as a Soviet foreign policy instrument.

From the Editors: Due to an administrative error during the transition from the editorship of Alexander Hill to Martijn Lak, Mikhail Suprun’s article ‘The Liberation of Northern Norway in Stalin’s Post-War Strategy’ was published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Volume 33, Number 2 (2020) as sent to peer reviewers and therefore without having fully cleared the peer review process. The author of the article should have been asked to address at least the most significant of the reviewers’ concerns. The resultant exchange that follows is between one of the peer reviewers and the author of that article. Alexander Hill and Martijn Lak

It is often assumed that the Soviet Union consistently opposed Nordic military cooperation from the early 1920s to the mid 1950s. This study argues that the Soviet position was much more complex and fluid, partly due to the existence of conflicting traditions within the Soviet foreign policy establishment. While a negative attitude predominated Soviet policy, an alternative approach took a positive stand towards Nordic cooperation. The alternative approach was based on a more optimistic view of the smaller states’ ability and will to act independently on the international scene. The present study is based on Soviet sources and documents, including materials from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In this study, Sven G. Holtsmark explores the Norwegian foreign policy discussions, and the reorientation of the basic premises of Norway’s security and foreign relations, during the Second World War. Why did the policymakers in London consistently reject all ideas of regional solutions in Europe, propagating either schemes of cooperation with the western great powers or “non-alignment” in the form of Norway as a “bridge” between the East and the West?

I 1933 startet utbyggingen av den sovjetiske marinens baser i Kolafjorden. Det sovjetiske sjo-, luft- og landmilitaere naervaeret i omradet var likevel av begrenset omfang helt frem til utbruddet av den annen verdenskrig. Denne studien undersoker de ideologiske og strategiske forestillinger og krigscenarier som la til grunn for fremveksten av USSRs land- og saerlig sjomilitaere baser i Murmansk-omradet, fra tidlig pa 1920-tallet og frem til fredsslutningen med Finland i mars 1940. I forlengelsen av dette droftes forholdet mellom norske forestillinger og trusselvurderinger pa den ene siden, og sovjetisk militaer planlegging og strategisk tenkning i mellomkrigstiden pa den andre. Studien er basert pa materiale fra russiske arkiver, deriblant militaerarkivet i Moskva og marinearkivet i St. Petersburg.

Sovjetisk pengestotte til kommunistpartier og venstreorienterte bevegelser i utlandet har i hele etterkrigstiden vaert omgitt av hemmelighold. I Norge har dette vaert et betent sporsmal, og fremtredende norske kommunister har benektet at NKP mottok finansiell stotte fra Moskva. Pengeoverforingen fra Sovjet til norske kommunister er imidlertid en kjensgjerning, hevder Sven G. Holtsmark i denne studien. Han gjor rede for hvordan denne virksomheten foregikk, og hevder at tidligere NKP-ere ikke lenger har troverdighet nar de avfeier det apenbare; at slike overforinger fant sted.

Strong elements of traditional Scandinavian "russophobia" continued to influence the evolution of Norwegian-Soviet relations during the second world war, even when the Norwegian government gradually redirected its official foreign policy doctrine from strong commitments to North Atlantic military cooperation towards a doctrine of "bridge-building" might be expected to have influenced Norway's relations with the Soviet Union. one of the aims of this study is to give a general presentation of Norwegian-Soviet relations during the war. On this background the study further examines how the redirectioning of Norway's foreign policy line made itself felt in the various fields of Norwegian-Soviet relations. The study tends to emphasize the continued presence of a skeptical attitude towards the Soviet Union in Norwegian government circles. This factor made itself felt when the two countries set out to lay the foundations of war-time cooperation, and also influenc...

Den aller forste utgaven av IFS Info er en samling av tekster der atte IFS-forskere presenterer sentrale perspektiver ved sin forskning, basert pa mini-foredrag holdt i anledning IFS sitt tiarsjubileum, i november 1990. Hvert innlegg er en smakebit av IFS sine viktigste interesseomrader, og belyser bakgrunn, utviklingslinjer og fremtidsperspektiver pa norsk sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk.

Rapporten består av et sentralt utvalg av den sovjetiske nordflåtens operasjonsplaner for 1939–1940. Dr. Pavel V. Petrov har hentet dokumentene fra det russiske marinearkivet i St. Petersburg . De er oversatt til norsk og annotert av professor Sven G. Holtsmark. Holtsmark og Petrov har skrevet en bredt anlagt introduksjon som tar for seg nordområdenes plass i sovjetisk militær tenkning i perioden. Arbeidet er utført som en del av forskningsprogrammet "I en verden av total krig: Norge 1939–1945", ledet av UiT Norges arktiske universitet.

1. Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning 2. Storming on to Paris: The 1961 "Buria" Exercise and the Planned Solution of the Berlin Crisis 3. War Plans under Stalin and Khrushchev: The Czechoslovak Pivot 4. The Warsaw Pact's Special Target: Planning the Seizure of Denmark 5. The Other Side of Detente: US Quest for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1974 6. Silent Allies and Hostile Neutrals: Nonaligned States in the Cold War 7. Andreas Wenger, The Politics of Military Planning: Evolution of NATO's Strategy 8. Beatrice Heuser, Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence 9. Securing Small-State Interests: Norway in NATO 10. How Strong Was the "Weakest Link"? Danish Security Policy Reconsidered 11. To Defend or Not to Defend: Drawing the Line in the Netherlands 12. Arrogant and Unilateralist: McNamara, Vietnam, and the Defense of Europe

Acknowledgements - Notes on the Contributors - Introduction: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Bloc O.A.Westad - Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the Marshall Plan K.Kratky - The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the 'Socialist Camp'-Model L.Gibianski - 1956: The Turning Point K.Kersten - Language, Politics, and Ethnicity in Moldova C.E.King - When the Mouse Challenges the Cat: Bessarabia in Post-War Soviet-Romanian Relations A.Pop - Romania and Hungary 1985-1990: the Soviet Perspective M.Hausleitner - The Kremlin's Impact on the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany (August 1989-March 1990) G.Wettig - Civil Resistance in the Soviet and East European Revolutions A.Roberts - East European Mass Media: the Soviet Role T.Goban-Klas & P.Kolsto - Conclusion: Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Her European Allies I.Neumann - Index

... 117-118. 30 PRO, FO 371/30871, C 2230/1543/62, Anthony Eden to Sir Cecil Dormer, 23 March 1942. 31 MFA Archives, 25.1/2, j . nr. ... The question 36 J. Schanche Jonassen, "Vår kamp og Nordens fremtid", printed in Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen, vol. ...

Under et møte med utenriksminister Trygve Lie i november 1944, la den sovjetiske utenrikskommissæren Vjatsjeslav M. Molotov frem et dramatisk krav: Spitsbergen skulle styres som et sovjetisk-norsk “kondominium”, mens Bjørnøya skulle overføres sovjetisk suverenitet. Forhandlingene som fulgte munnet ut i et norsk forslag av 9. april 1945 om at forsvaret av Svalbard skulle være et “fellesanliggende” mellom Norge og USSR. Forslaget ble aldri satt ut i livet, og i februar 1947 avviste Stortinget videre forhandlinger på et slikt grunnlag. Denne studien gir den første samlede oversikt over den såkalte “Svalbard-sakens” utvikling på norsk og sovjetisk side