William Hasselberger

In this paper I analyze philosophically the dominant conception of happiness operative in the increasingly popular global movement to empirically define, measure, and promote human happiness: the idea of “subjective psychological wellbeing” (SWB). SWB is presented as an ethically and metaphysically neutral “scientific” view of the human good or wellbeing, grounded purely in empirical psychology, survey data, and neuroscientific findings about the brain mechanisms involved in happiness. I argue that this conception of happiness actually rests upon highly controversial philosophical (non-empirical) presuppositions about the nature of human agency, pleasure, emotion, and the experience of value. I then draw upon phenomenology, the philosophy of emotion, and ethics to argue that this particular conception of happiness, while perhaps suitable for certain limited purposes, is highly problematic when given the leading normative role by the happiness science movement, particularly as a guiding aim of individual decision-making and public policy interventions.

In this essay I ague that the mainstream ‘Standard Story’ of action – according to which actions are bodily motions with the right internal mental states as their causal triggers (e.g., ‘belief-desire-pairs’, ‘intentions’) – gives rise to a deeply problematic conception of inter-subjective action-understanding. For the Standard Story, since motivating reasons are internal mental states and bodily motions are not intrinsically intentional, an observer must ascribe internal states to others to make rational sense of their outwardly observable bodily motions. I argue this is both phenomenologically distorted and requires, on pain of infinite regress, a deeper, non-inferential, practical-perceptual form of understanding: ‘knowledge-how’, in a broadly Rylean sense. Recognizing the irreducible role of practical-perceptual knowledge-how in inter-subjective understanding, I argue, undermines core assumptions of the Standard Story concerning what an agent can directly perceive in interacting...

“Morality algorithms” (e.g., the “death algorithm” of self-driving cars) are part of an effort to codify moral norms in algorithms. They raise two questions. First, can algorithms capture the structure of moral reasoning and ethical judgment? From an Aristotelean perspective, many “inputs” to moral deliberation are simply not quantifiable, including relevant features of a situation, the context, and the proper criterion of moral judgment. Second, should we rely on algorithmic decision-aids? Exploring the “outputs” reveals the crucial difference between performing an activity either formulaically or the basis of understanding what is good, worthwhile, or justified. Reflection on these questions reveals a practical, and not merely philosophical, problem with “morality algorithms.”