Peer-Reviewed Articles by Alireza Kazemi
Falsafeye-Elm (Philosophy of Science), 2024
According to the principle of indifference, we have to attribute equal probabilities to the alter... more According to the principle of indifference, we have to attribute equal probabilities to the alternatives that are equally possible. Further to be intuitive in its own right, the principle of indifference plays an important role in some of the interpretations of probability. Nonetheless, a group of paradoxes has been found against this principle which seriously challenges its consistency. In this paper, I argue that the rules that M. Baqer Sadr has developed in his "Brief Knowledge" interpretation of probability, particularly the governance principle, provide distinctive resources for offering a novel, coherent, and plausible answer to all of these paradoxes. Consequently, it not only vindicates the principle of indifference from the charge of inconsistency but also lends credence to Sadr's theory of probability.
Erkenntnis, 2024
In a recent paper in this journal, Ulf Hlobil has argued for an account of deontic notions in ter... more In a recent paper in this journal, Ulf Hlobil has argued for an account of deontic notions in terms of good reasoning. He suggests that we should first explain permissibility in terms of good practical inference and we can then explain other deontic notions based on it. I argue that this specific way of explaining deontic notions by good reasoning is unmotivated and also leads to implausible consequences. I also show that if we instead start by explaining obligation in terms of good reasoning and then explain other deontic notions based on it, these problems vanish.
Erkenntnis, 2024
I develop and defend a novel norm-based explanation of Moore’s paradox in thought, according to w... more I develop and defend a novel norm-based explanation of Moore’s paradox in thought, according to which the sheer absurdity we intuitively feel in judging an instance of Moore’s paradox stems from violating the constitutive norm of belief inexplicably, i.e., in a way that cannot be made sense of through the categories of mistake, ignorance, cheating, akrasia, and flouting. I highlight the ways my explanation is different from other normative proposals and argue that this explanation is not subject to the problems that beset other normative explanations of Moore’s paradox. The normative explanation of Moore’s paradox proposed here can also shed light on absurdity in norm-constituted practices in general.
Synthese , 2023
I argue for a commitment-discharging condition of reasoning, according to which to engage in reas... more I argue for a commitment-discharging condition of reasoning, according to which to engage in reasoning is to discharge the theoretical and practical commitments one has undertaken. I highlight the ways in which this condition is distinct from other proposals, particularly the Taking Condition, and argue that it can explain certain intuitions about reasoning that otherwise remain elusive. In particular, I argue that the commitment-discharging condition can provide a unified account of attitude-formation and premise-discharging reasoning as well as practical and theoretical reasoning. It also provides a novel way to evade the regress that bedevils many accounts of inference.
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2023
Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a s... more Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief which explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this paper takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental-cum-irreducible norms, which I call the ‘entitlement norm’, the ‘fulfillment norm’ and the ‘escapability norm’, and it is shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all of the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists.
Synthese, 2022
Full-text view-only version: https://rdcu.be/cOYcE
That it can explain the phenomenon of trans... more Full-text view-only version: https://rdcu.be/cOYcE
That it can explain the phenomenon of transparency, namely the fact that if you resolve whether p, you have thereby resolved whether to believe that p, was originally put forward as a great virtue of normativist conceptions of belief. However, non-normativists have convincingly shown that the permissive version of the truth norm of belief, which is one of the most plausible and promising versions of it, cannot in fact accommodate this phenomenon. Alarmed by this situation, in this paper I re-assess the transparency phenomenon and its relation to different versions of the truth norm of belief. I argue that, contrary to how it appears, it is not even clear that the most tenable injunctive versions of the truth norm explain this phenomenon. I then argue that the transparency phenomenon consists of two distinct aspects which should be, but have not been, distinguished. What I call the ‘question-shifting’ aspect is explained by the truth norm, irrespective of how it is formulated, while what I call the ‘answer-shifting’ aspect is explanatorily empty and does not require any explanation, be it normative or otherwise. Therefore, understood properly, explaining transparency does remain a strength of normativist accounts of belief, and has no implications for which particular formulation of the truth norm we may adopt.
Philosophical Explorations, 2021
In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that p... more In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be essential for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against the view. Second, it is shown that the committive dimension is rich and flexible enough to accommodate all the apparently problematic cases.
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health , 2021
Online version: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235255252100075X
Background
Th... more Online version: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235255252100075X
Background
The principle of maximization, which roughly means that we should save more lives and more years of life, is usually taken for granted by the health community. This principle is even more forceful in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, where we have scarce resources which can be allocated only to some patients. However, the standard consequentialist version of this principle can be challenging particularly when we have to reallocate a resource that has already been given to a patient.
Methodology
Engaging in thought experiments, conceptual analysis, providing counterexamples, and appealing to moral intuitions, we challenge the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle and make a case for adopting an alternative deontological version.
Discussion
In certain cases, the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle is shown to yield intuitively immoral results. The deontological version of this principle is preferable because it can retain the merits of the standard consequentialist version without falling prey to its problems.
Conclusion
Compared to the standard consequentialist version, the deontological version of the maximization principle can better guide the ethical decisions of the health community, even in cases where we face a scarcity of resources.
Sophia, 2021
a full-text view-only version of the paper: https://rdcu.be/cdNI7
Abraham’s dilemma is the conjun... more a full-text view-only version of the paper: https://rdcu.be/cdNI7
Abraham’s dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called ‘accordion effect’ in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son, nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained.
Acta Analytica, 2020
A full-text view-only version: https://rdcu.be/b5op7
A number of philosophers have argued that th... more A full-text view-only version: https://rdcu.be/b5op7
A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 2020
In a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositio... more In a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.
Books by Alireza Kazemi
In S. H. Hosseini (Ed.). Philosophical Critique of Naturalism. Sharif University of Technology Press, 2021
بسیاری از فلاسفه معتقدند که حالات ذهنیِ دارای حیث التفاتی (مانند باورها، قصدها، امیال و غیره) و ه... more بسیاری از فلاسفه معتقدند که حالات ذهنیِ دارای حیث التفاتی (مانند باورها، قصدها، امیال و غیره) و همچنین محتوای مفهومی که متعلق آن هاست، ذاتاً هنجارمندند به این معنا که هنجارهای عقلانی ضرورتاً در تقویم آنها دخیلند. این رویکرد به ذهن نتایج متفاوتی در مورد متافیزیک ذهن و ارتباط آن با علوم شناختی به دنبال دارد به نحوی که تقریباً همه رویکردهای طبیعت گرایانه به ذهن را بصورت جدی به چالش میکشد. هدف این مقاله بررسی این تز و نشان دادن استلزام آن برای طبیعت گرایی درباره ذهن است. به این منظور، ابتدا معنای هنجارمندی ذاتی ذهن به طور مفصل تبیین می شود. سپس دلایل له این نگاه مورد بررسی قرار می گیرد و در نهایت استلزام این نگاه برای رویکرد طبیعت گرایانه به ذهن و همچنین جایگاه علوم شناختی در فهم ذهن مورد تحلیل قرار می گیرد. نتیجه به دست آمده این است که با پذیرش نقش ذاتی هنجارها در حالات ذهنی دارای حیث التفاتی، پروژه طبیعی سازی ذهن با شکست مواجه می شود و تبیین های علوم شناختی علیرغم موفقیتشان در حال شناساندن خود ذهن نیستند و صرفاً به کشف شرایط لازم برای تحقق ذهن می پردازند.
Teaching Documents by Alireza Kazemi
This table summarizes the two-images thesis of Sellars. Characteristic features of each image, t... more This table summarizes the two-images thesis of Sellars. Characteristic features of each image, the points of clash, Sellars' suggested reconciliations, and alternative solutions are presented in an accessible and well-organized way
I am a fan of charts. they are really illuminating in understanding ideas and memorizing them. Th... more I am a fan of charts. they are really illuminating in understanding ideas and memorizing them. This chart summarizes what I have done in my M.A. thesis; It shows the place of science in Sellars' interconnected system.
Course Syllabi by Alireza Kazemi
The syllabus of a course on philosophy of science that I taught to the Ph.D. students of analytic... more The syllabus of a course on philosophy of science that I taught to the Ph.D. students of analytic philosophy at IPM in 2023.
Cyberspace, also known as digital and virtual world, has encompassed all aspects of our lives. It... more Cyberspace, also known as digital and virtual world, has encompassed all aspects of our lives. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of internet, social media, video games, artificial intelligence, simulations, augmented realty, blockchain and big data, for our lives. Further to be a collection of new technological products, cyber space can also be considered as a new space and a new mode of living for human beings. As such, it is no surprise that there are many deep philosophical questions surrounding this newcomer to our lives. In this course, we try to engage with these philosophical questions. We examine whether digital technologies are value-neutral or value-laden. We also discuss certain frameworks that try to systematically embed human values in cyberspace technologies, including values-at-play and valuesensitive design (VSD). We also see how cyber space technologies are changing the practice of science, through big data analysis and simulations, and discuss the potential philosophical implications of these changes for science. Whether and how the experience, life, and perhaps the nature of human beings are changing due to cyberspace, are other important questions that will be addressed during the course. The metaphysics and ontology of virtual worlds and ethical frameworks for solving the moral problems in this space are the other topics that we think about during the course. The course draws on various philosophical schools and methods, including analytic philosophy, phenomenology, critical school, and existentialism. • Objectives: Upon successful completion of the course, the students would be able to critically think about the philosophical implications of information technology, including the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical aspects of virtual (digital) technologies. Students would be also able to spell out their own views on the problems with philosophical rigor.
Spring 2021, Sharif University of Technology (SUT), Tehran, Iran
Papers by Alireza Kazemi
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health
Summary Background The principle of maximization, which roughly means that we should save more li... more Summary Background The principle of maximization, which roughly means that we should save more lives and more years of life, is usually taken for granted by the health community. This principle is even more forceful in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, where we have scarce resources which can be allocated only to some patients. However, the standard consequentialist version of this principle can be challenging particularly when we have to reallocate a resource that has already been given to a patient. Methodology Engaging in thought experiments, conceptual analysis, providing counterexamples, and appealing to moral intuitions, we challenge the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle and make a case for adopting an alternative deontological version. Discussion In certain cases, the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle is shown to yield intuitively immoral results. The deontological version of this principle is preferable because it can retain the merits of the standard consequentialist version without falling prey to its problems. Conclusion Compared to the standard consequentialist version, the deontological version of the maximization principle can better guide the ethical decisions of the health community, even in cases where we face a scarcity of resources.
Sophia
Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s comman... more Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called accordion effect in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained.
Dialogue
In a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositio... more In a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.
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Peer-Reviewed Articles by Alireza Kazemi
That it can explain the phenomenon of transparency, namely the fact that if you resolve whether p, you have thereby resolved whether to believe that p, was originally put forward as a great virtue of normativist conceptions of belief. However, non-normativists have convincingly shown that the permissive version of the truth norm of belief, which is one of the most plausible and promising versions of it, cannot in fact accommodate this phenomenon. Alarmed by this situation, in this paper I re-assess the transparency phenomenon and its relation to different versions of the truth norm of belief. I argue that, contrary to how it appears, it is not even clear that the most tenable injunctive versions of the truth norm explain this phenomenon. I then argue that the transparency phenomenon consists of two distinct aspects which should be, but have not been, distinguished. What I call the ‘question-shifting’ aspect is explained by the truth norm, irrespective of how it is formulated, while what I call the ‘answer-shifting’ aspect is explanatorily empty and does not require any explanation, be it normative or otherwise. Therefore, understood properly, explaining transparency does remain a strength of normativist accounts of belief, and has no implications for which particular formulation of the truth norm we may adopt.
Background
The principle of maximization, which roughly means that we should save more lives and more years of life, is usually taken for granted by the health community. This principle is even more forceful in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, where we have scarce resources which can be allocated only to some patients. However, the standard consequentialist version of this principle can be challenging particularly when we have to reallocate a resource that has already been given to a patient.
Methodology
Engaging in thought experiments, conceptual analysis, providing counterexamples, and appealing to moral intuitions, we challenge the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle and make a case for adopting an alternative deontological version.
Discussion
In certain cases, the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle is shown to yield intuitively immoral results. The deontological version of this principle is preferable because it can retain the merits of the standard consequentialist version without falling prey to its problems.
Conclusion
Compared to the standard consequentialist version, the deontological version of the maximization principle can better guide the ethical decisions of the health community, even in cases where we face a scarcity of resources.
Abraham’s dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called ‘accordion effect’ in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son, nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained.
A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity
Books by Alireza Kazemi
Teaching Documents by Alireza Kazemi
Course Syllabi by Alireza Kazemi
Papers by Alireza Kazemi
That it can explain the phenomenon of transparency, namely the fact that if you resolve whether p, you have thereby resolved whether to believe that p, was originally put forward as a great virtue of normativist conceptions of belief. However, non-normativists have convincingly shown that the permissive version of the truth norm of belief, which is one of the most plausible and promising versions of it, cannot in fact accommodate this phenomenon. Alarmed by this situation, in this paper I re-assess the transparency phenomenon and its relation to different versions of the truth norm of belief. I argue that, contrary to how it appears, it is not even clear that the most tenable injunctive versions of the truth norm explain this phenomenon. I then argue that the transparency phenomenon consists of two distinct aspects which should be, but have not been, distinguished. What I call the ‘question-shifting’ aspect is explained by the truth norm, irrespective of how it is formulated, while what I call the ‘answer-shifting’ aspect is explanatorily empty and does not require any explanation, be it normative or otherwise. Therefore, understood properly, explaining transparency does remain a strength of normativist accounts of belief, and has no implications for which particular formulation of the truth norm we may adopt.
Background
The principle of maximization, which roughly means that we should save more lives and more years of life, is usually taken for granted by the health community. This principle is even more forceful in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, where we have scarce resources which can be allocated only to some patients. However, the standard consequentialist version of this principle can be challenging particularly when we have to reallocate a resource that has already been given to a patient.
Methodology
Engaging in thought experiments, conceptual analysis, providing counterexamples, and appealing to moral intuitions, we challenge the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle and make a case for adopting an alternative deontological version.
Discussion
In certain cases, the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle is shown to yield intuitively immoral results. The deontological version of this principle is preferable because it can retain the merits of the standard consequentialist version without falling prey to its problems.
Conclusion
Compared to the standard consequentialist version, the deontological version of the maximization principle can better guide the ethical decisions of the health community, even in cases where we face a scarcity of resources.
Abraham’s dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called ‘accordion effect’ in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son, nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained.
A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity