Edited books by Simon Drugda
This is the inaugural edition of the I·CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law ... more This is the inaugural edition of the I·CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law (ISBN: 978-0-692-92516-4). The 2016 Global Review assembles detailed but relatively brief reports on constitutional developments and cases in 44 jurisdictions during the past calendar year. The reports are are authored by academic and/or judicial experts, and often the reports are co-authored by judges and scholars. The reports in this first-of-its-kind volume offer readers systematic knowledge that, previously, has been limited mainly to local networks rather than a broader readership. By making this information available to the larger field of public law in an easily digestible format, we aim to increase the base of knowledge upon which scholars and judges can draw. We expect to repeat the project every year with new annual reports, and we hope over time that coverage will grow to an even wider range of countries. We invite scholars and jurists from the presently non-covered jurisdictions to contact us about contributing a report in next year’s Global Review.
Blog posts by Simon Drugda
I-CONnectblog, 2019
The Slovak Parliament recently passed a legislative rider to extend the length of the silence per... more The Slovak Parliament recently passed a legislative rider to extend the length of the silence period, which prohibits the publication of opinion polls before an election. Slovak electoral rules had previously prohibited political campaigning and the publication of opinion polls 14 days before an election taking place. The new legislation makes the Slovak moratorium “third-longest in the world after Cameroon and Tunisia,” according to the Slovak Academy of Sciences.
The legislative change was widely criticised as unconstitutional, not least because legislative riders that are materially unrelated to the proposed law are prohibited by Article 93(3) of Standing Orders of the Parliament. The President of the Republic, therefore, decided to veto the extension on the grounds that the extended silence period disproportionately infringes the information rights of citizens and media. The President also declared that she would challenge the legislation in court and request an interim injunction against its effect if the Parliament were to overturn her veto.
The presidential veto has only a suspensive effect in law and can be overturned by a simple majority of all MPs (76 out of 150) pursuant to Article 84.3 of the Constitution. On November 26, the Parliament overturned the veto against expectations of most legal scholars and political observers. The Parliament has to publish the new electoral rule in the official gazette, which will enable the President to challenge the legislation at the Constitutional Court.
This contribution first explores comparative case-law on the extension of the silence period and then critically examines the constitutionality of the 50-day silence period in the Slovak law. This is not a difficult case in substance. The Slovak Constitution, as well as the European Convention of Human Rights, only allow the limitation of information rights if the restrictive measure pursues a legitimate aim, is necessary, and proportionate. The 50-day silence period fails to meet all of these criteria and is thus clearly unconstitutional.
I-CONnectblog, 2019
Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman Jørgen Steen Sørensen resigned from office on November 1 to take o... more Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman Jørgen Steen Sørensen resigned from office on November 1 to take on the job of a Supreme Court judge. Sørensen had announced his intention to resign on short notice because of the extraordinary circumstance of his audition for a Supreme Court judge. However, with the Parliament shut until October because of the summer recess, MPs struggled to find the new Ombudsman. The Parliament eventually filled the vacancy with a month delay, but throughout this time, it was not clear who was up in the running, how to apply for the position, or when the decision on the new Ombudsman will be made.
The delay was also due to the fact that the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Legal Affairs (LAC), which is tasked with authority to propose a suitable candidate for an Ombudsman to the Parliament, had a hard time reaching an agreement. The Committee, therefore, decided to appoint a temporary Ombudsman in the interim, who served the whole month of November 2019. The Ombudsman proper will take office on December 1.
The episode showed that the selection of an Ombudsman in Denmark is unwieldy and somewhat obscure, especially when compared to appointments to other public offices and comparative best practice. This contribution examines the procedure for selection of the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman, taking the recently adopted “Venice Principles on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution” as a benchmark. The selection process of the Danish Ombudsman could be modernised at least in one important way: the process should be opened up to allow for external applications that would be transparently processed and evaluated.
I-CONnectblog, 2019
The change in the Slovak electoral legislation from September 2019 was meant to prevent judges fr... more The change in the Slovak electoral legislation from September 2019 was meant to prevent judges from travelling back and forth between politics and law. The new rules require that judges give up their office to run for a parliamentary election. This contribution reviews the rules on the political activity of judges in Slovakia from 1993 onwards and contextualises this most recent development.
This contribution quantitatively examines the prolific drafting of constitutional amendment propo... more This contribution quantitatively examines the prolific drafting of constitutional amendment proposals by the far-right Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia. The current parliamentary term in Slovakia surpassed all previous terms on record in the number of submitted proposals for constitutional change, and almost a third of all proposals have been authored by the People’s Party.
The Supreme Court (SC) of Denmark will have a new judge. The Judicial Appointments Council (JAC) ... more The Supreme Court (SC) of Denmark will have a new judge. The Judicial Appointments Council (JAC) has recommended Ombudsman Jørgen Steen Sørensen for the position late in June. The appointment is not final, however, as Sørensen must first prove his merit by voting with the SC in four “trial” cases. After the quota, SC judges will have a choice to confirm Sørensen to the position.
In this contribution, I examine the procedure for appointment of SC judges in Denmark, which has several interesting features. All Danish judges, except for the SC President, are appointed by the Minister of Justice, on the recommendation of JAC, in on an open call for applications. However, the SC has a decisive influence over the appointment of its own judges: due to 1) the informal pre-selection that precedes Council recommendation; 2) the composition of the JAC; 3) and the practice of trial-vote.
On March 28, 2019, the Slovak Parliament amended the Constitution to cap the retirement age at 64... more On March 28, 2019, the Slovak Parliament amended the Constitution to cap the retirement age at 64. The imposition of retirement age is quite an unusual design feature in comparative constitutional law. In this post, I introduce the amendment and provide context for the change.
On January 30, 2019, the Slovak Constitutional Court declared a constitutional amendment unconsti... more On January 30, 2019, the Slovak Constitutional Court declared a constitutional amendment unconstitutional. The Court held that the Constitution contains an implicit material core that cannot be changed through the ordinary amendment process. Consequently, if an amendment violates a core provision, it will be struck down.
This historic ruling aroused much less controversy than expected. It was overshadowed by the election of the country’s first female President and the first selection hearings of constitutional judges broadcast live to the public on television. I will return to the judgment to examine its several key aspects. But first I will explain the distinction between direct and indirect constitutional amendments in the Slovak legal system and then reveal how the invalidated amendment nonetheless remains law.
This is the second of five parts in an online symposium on "The Slovak Constitutional Court Appoi... more This is the second of five parts in an online symposium on "The Slovak Constitutional Court Appointments Case."
On December 6 the I. Senate of the Slovak Constitutional Court (CC) held that President Andrej Kiska infringed rights of the CC candidates when he rejected them, again, for lack of interest in constitutional law, language skills, or no publication in the field in a reputable outlet (I. ÚS 575/2016). This contribution presents a case criticism of one procedural aspect of the I. Senate decision.
Edited books and special issues by Simon Drugda
Last year we published the first edition of the I CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitu... more Last year we published the first edition of the I CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law. We gathered teams from 44 jurisdictions to prepare relatively brief reports on constitutional developments and cases in their own jurisdiction during the 2016 calendar year. Our inaugural edition attracted readers from every part of the world, and their enthusiasm about the project proved infectious as we have grown to 61 jurisdictions in this second edition.
The purpose of the Global Review is the same this year as it was before: to offer readers systemic knowledge that, previously, has been limited mainly to local networks rather than a broader readership.
Papers by Simon Drugda
Právny Obzor, Biannual English Issue, 2020
This contribution examines changes to the selection and appointment of judges to the Slovak Const... more This contribution examines changes to the selection and appointment of judges to the Slovak Constitutional Court. A year before a scheduled replacement of nine judges of the Court in 2019, the government introduced constitutional and legislative reforms of the process. The leitmotif of the proposed reform was an effort to qualitatively improve the appointment process at the point of selection, and increase the sum of available public information about candidates for the position. The government ultimately succeeded in implementing legislative reforms of the selection process but not the constitutional amendment.
Uploads
Edited books by Simon Drugda
Blog posts by Simon Drugda
The legislative change was widely criticised as unconstitutional, not least because legislative riders that are materially unrelated to the proposed law are prohibited by Article 93(3) of Standing Orders of the Parliament. The President of the Republic, therefore, decided to veto the extension on the grounds that the extended silence period disproportionately infringes the information rights of citizens and media. The President also declared that she would challenge the legislation in court and request an interim injunction against its effect if the Parliament were to overturn her veto.
The presidential veto has only a suspensive effect in law and can be overturned by a simple majority of all MPs (76 out of 150) pursuant to Article 84.3 of the Constitution. On November 26, the Parliament overturned the veto against expectations of most legal scholars and political observers. The Parliament has to publish the new electoral rule in the official gazette, which will enable the President to challenge the legislation at the Constitutional Court.
This contribution first explores comparative case-law on the extension of the silence period and then critically examines the constitutionality of the 50-day silence period in the Slovak law. This is not a difficult case in substance. The Slovak Constitution, as well as the European Convention of Human Rights, only allow the limitation of information rights if the restrictive measure pursues a legitimate aim, is necessary, and proportionate. The 50-day silence period fails to meet all of these criteria and is thus clearly unconstitutional.
The delay was also due to the fact that the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Legal Affairs (LAC), which is tasked with authority to propose a suitable candidate for an Ombudsman to the Parliament, had a hard time reaching an agreement. The Committee, therefore, decided to appoint a temporary Ombudsman in the interim, who served the whole month of November 2019. The Ombudsman proper will take office on December 1.
The episode showed that the selection of an Ombudsman in Denmark is unwieldy and somewhat obscure, especially when compared to appointments to other public offices and comparative best practice. This contribution examines the procedure for selection of the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman, taking the recently adopted “Venice Principles on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution” as a benchmark. The selection process of the Danish Ombudsman could be modernised at least in one important way: the process should be opened up to allow for external applications that would be transparently processed and evaluated.
In this contribution, I examine the procedure for appointment of SC judges in Denmark, which has several interesting features. All Danish judges, except for the SC President, are appointed by the Minister of Justice, on the recommendation of JAC, in on an open call for applications. However, the SC has a decisive influence over the appointment of its own judges: due to 1) the informal pre-selection that precedes Council recommendation; 2) the composition of the JAC; 3) and the practice of trial-vote.
This historic ruling aroused much less controversy than expected. It was overshadowed by the election of the country’s first female President and the first selection hearings of constitutional judges broadcast live to the public on television. I will return to the judgment to examine its several key aspects. But first I will explain the distinction between direct and indirect constitutional amendments in the Slovak legal system and then reveal how the invalidated amendment nonetheless remains law.
On December 6 the I. Senate of the Slovak Constitutional Court (CC) held that President Andrej Kiska infringed rights of the CC candidates when he rejected them, again, for lack of interest in constitutional law, language skills, or no publication in the field in a reputable outlet (I. ÚS 575/2016). This contribution presents a case criticism of one procedural aspect of the I. Senate decision.
Edited books and special issues by Simon Drugda
The purpose of the Global Review is the same this year as it was before: to offer readers systemic knowledge that, previously, has been limited mainly to local networks rather than a broader readership.
Papers by Simon Drugda
The legislative change was widely criticised as unconstitutional, not least because legislative riders that are materially unrelated to the proposed law are prohibited by Article 93(3) of Standing Orders of the Parliament. The President of the Republic, therefore, decided to veto the extension on the grounds that the extended silence period disproportionately infringes the information rights of citizens and media. The President also declared that she would challenge the legislation in court and request an interim injunction against its effect if the Parliament were to overturn her veto.
The presidential veto has only a suspensive effect in law and can be overturned by a simple majority of all MPs (76 out of 150) pursuant to Article 84.3 of the Constitution. On November 26, the Parliament overturned the veto against expectations of most legal scholars and political observers. The Parliament has to publish the new electoral rule in the official gazette, which will enable the President to challenge the legislation at the Constitutional Court.
This contribution first explores comparative case-law on the extension of the silence period and then critically examines the constitutionality of the 50-day silence period in the Slovak law. This is not a difficult case in substance. The Slovak Constitution, as well as the European Convention of Human Rights, only allow the limitation of information rights if the restrictive measure pursues a legitimate aim, is necessary, and proportionate. The 50-day silence period fails to meet all of these criteria and is thus clearly unconstitutional.
The delay was also due to the fact that the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Legal Affairs (LAC), which is tasked with authority to propose a suitable candidate for an Ombudsman to the Parliament, had a hard time reaching an agreement. The Committee, therefore, decided to appoint a temporary Ombudsman in the interim, who served the whole month of November 2019. The Ombudsman proper will take office on December 1.
The episode showed that the selection of an Ombudsman in Denmark is unwieldy and somewhat obscure, especially when compared to appointments to other public offices and comparative best practice. This contribution examines the procedure for selection of the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman, taking the recently adopted “Venice Principles on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution” as a benchmark. The selection process of the Danish Ombudsman could be modernised at least in one important way: the process should be opened up to allow for external applications that would be transparently processed and evaluated.
In this contribution, I examine the procedure for appointment of SC judges in Denmark, which has several interesting features. All Danish judges, except for the SC President, are appointed by the Minister of Justice, on the recommendation of JAC, in on an open call for applications. However, the SC has a decisive influence over the appointment of its own judges: due to 1) the informal pre-selection that precedes Council recommendation; 2) the composition of the JAC; 3) and the practice of trial-vote.
This historic ruling aroused much less controversy than expected. It was overshadowed by the election of the country’s first female President and the first selection hearings of constitutional judges broadcast live to the public on television. I will return to the judgment to examine its several key aspects. But first I will explain the distinction between direct and indirect constitutional amendments in the Slovak legal system and then reveal how the invalidated amendment nonetheless remains law.
On December 6 the I. Senate of the Slovak Constitutional Court (CC) held that President Andrej Kiska infringed rights of the CC candidates when he rejected them, again, for lack of interest in constitutional law, language skills, or no publication in the field in a reputable outlet (I. ÚS 575/2016). This contribution presents a case criticism of one procedural aspect of the I. Senate decision.
The purpose of the Global Review is the same this year as it was before: to offer readers systemic knowledge that, previously, has been limited mainly to local networks rather than a broader readership.