- Istanbul, Turkey
Erhan Demircioglu
Koç University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Physicalism, Disjunctivism, Epistemic Justification, Extended Cognition, and 11 morePhilosophy of Cognitive Science, Metaphysics of Consciousness, Perception, Philosophy of perception, Intentionality, Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy Of Language, Skepticism, John McDowell, Metaphysics, and Phenomenal Consciousnessedit
- I am myself.edit
In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the... more
In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it.
In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification (the argument from conditionality) against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after... more
In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification (the argument from conditionality) against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found in Klein’s works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative.
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Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing "properties of the object of... more
Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing "properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object" and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman's attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the anti-functionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two.
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In "A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem", Comesaña argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly,... more
In "A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem", Comesaña argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief's being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim: It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesaña, the legitimacy claim follows straightforwardly from the unavoidability claim. The third is what I call the basing solution claim: An appeal to the notion of basing relation is all we need to solve the generality problem for (process) reliabilism. In this article, I argue that the unavoidability claim and the basing solution claim are false and that the legitimacy claim might be true only in a qualified sense.
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Özet: Arda Denkel'in Anlam ve Nedensellik adlı kitabında önerdiği anlam kuramı, üç temel iddia üzerinde inşa edilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, "anlam taşıyan bir im ile anlam arasındaki ilişki nedir?" sorusuna kitabın verdiği şu yanıttır:... more
Özet: Arda Denkel'in Anlam ve Nedensellik adlı kitabında önerdiği anlam kuramı, üç temel iddia üzerinde inşa edilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, "anlam taşıyan bir im ile anlam arasındaki ilişki nedir?" sorusuna kitabın verdiği şu yanıttır: "Anlamlılığın temeli, tek tek bireylerden bağımsız olarak var olan, ancak onların yaşam ortamları içinde bilip tanıdıkları kimi bağlantıların iletişim amacıyla kullanılmalarında yatıyor". Bu iddiaya Dışsal Bağlantı İddiası adını verelim. İkincisi, "anlamı ilgilendiren zihinsel bir boyutun söz konusu olduğu" iddiasıdır. Bu iddiaya Zihinsel Boyut İddiası adını verelim. Üçüncüsü ise, "iletişim ve anlamın oldukça belirgin bir biçimde izlenebilen bir evrim geçirerek sonuçta dil aşamasına ulaşan bir gelişim çizgisi oluşturduğu" iddiasıdır. Bu iddiaya Anlamın Evrimi İddiası adını verelim. Bu makalede, Dışsal Bağlantı ve Zihinsel Boyut İddiaları üzerine eğilmek istiyorum. Öncelikle bu iki iddianın mevcut halleriyle muğlak olan içeriklerini netleştirip bu iddiaların yaslandığı gerekçelerin ayrıntılı bir tasvirini sunacağım. Daha sonrasında ise, Denkel'in anlam kuramının bu iki iddianın tutarlı bir sentezini oluşturamadığını göstermeye çalışacağım.
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Considerations on the transparency of experience in particular, and introspection in general, play a central role in the contemporary philosophy of mind. However, despite various attempts to rectify matters, it seems to me that appeals to... more
Considerations on the transparency of experience in particular, and introspection in general, play a central role in the contemporary philosophy of mind. However, despite various attempts to rectify matters, it seems to me that appeals to transparency and introspection are sometimes mired in confusion: neither there is an explicit and general recognition of the fact that different transparency claims are often treated as one and the same, nor is there sufficiently robust clarity in what introspection itself can support. The central aim of this paper is to achieve some conceptual clarity by bringing to the surface for examination the rich variety of different experiential transparency claims that are left implicit in the literature. The paper falls into three main sections. Section 2 discusses Moore's views on introspection and the transparency of experience. Contra common opinion, I argue inter alia that Moore is concerned with showing that experience is not transparent (in a sense to be specified). Section 3 introduces "Harmanian transparency", as it arises in the context of the debate between representationism and phenomenism, and distinguishes it from "phenomenist transparency." Section 4 distinguishes two varieties of Harmanian transparency, i.e. "experiencing-act transparency" and "mental-paint transparency."
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In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between "objectual" and "propositional" ignorance, and the other is the distinction between... more
In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between "objectual" and "propositional" ignorance, and the other is the distinction between "truth-ignorance" and "fact-ignorance," which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the "received view," according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is "always about truth," and enables us to "overcome our [philosophers'] propositional-bias." I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls "the received view" can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him.
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Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is... more
Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis of which is that the subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) Even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it.
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Abstract. Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is... more
Abstract. Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis is that the subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it.
Resumen. Turri argumenta en contra de lo que él llama una visión “ortodoxa” de la relación entre la justificación proposicional y doxástica, según la cual (Basis) para que S esté doxásticamente justificado al creer que p es suficiente que p esté justificado proposicionalmente para S en virtud de tener una razón R y que S crea que p sobre la base de R. Según Turri, (Base) es falsa y, por lo tanto, la opinión ortodoxa es errónea. Turri ofrece “una propuesta alternativa”, cuya tesis definitiva es que las habilidades intelectuales del sujeto explican por qué una proposición dada, p, está justificada para ella, y argumenta que, en contra de la ortodoxia, esta propuesta lleva a explicar la justificación proposicional en términos de justificación doxástica en lugar de viceversa.
Resumen. Turri argumenta en contra de lo que él llama una visión “ortodoxa” de la relación entre la justificación proposicional y doxástica, según la cual (Basis) para que S esté doxásticamente justificado al creer que p es suficiente que p esté justificado proposicionalmente para S en virtud de tener una razón R y que S crea que p sobre la base de R. Según Turri, (Base) es falsa y, por lo tanto, la opinión ortodoxa es errónea. Turri ofrece “una propuesta alternativa”, cuya tesis definitiva es que las habilidades intelectuales del sujeto explican por qué una proposición dada, p, está justificada para ella, y argumenta que, en contra de la ortodoxia, esta propuesta lleva a explicar la justificación proposicional en términos de justificación doxástica en lugar de viceversa.
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Frank Jackson's famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have... more
Frank Jackson's famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson's Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary's epistemic progress when she fi rst experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered.
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There are two claims that are central to McGinn's mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe... more
There are two claims that are central to McGinn's mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms 'naturalist' and 'constructive', which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.
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Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in... more
Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, a distinction thanks to which we can reply to a standard objection against the ontological reductionism of strong supervenience. Second,I claim that because of “the problem of random distribution,” global supervenience needs strengthening to be an adequate relation to capture our physicalistic intuitions; and I show, in accordance with Stalnaker’s relevant proof, why a natural strengthening of global supervenience renders it equivalent to strong supervenience. Finally, I argue against Stalnaker about the possibility of a non-reductionist global supervenience. The upshot is that despite appearances, supervenience physicalism is a form of reductive physicalism.
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In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to... more
In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.
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Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of... more
Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”
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Bu yazının esas gayesi, Quine’ın çevirinin belirsizliği tezini eleştirmektir. Yazıda ilk olarak çevirinin belirsizliği tezinin standart bir yetersiz belirlenim tezinden farklarına işaret edeceğim. Bunu takiben çevirinin belirsizliği... more
Bu yazının esas gayesi, Quine’ın çevirinin belirsizliği tezini eleştirmektir. Yazıda ilk olarak çevirinin belirsizliği tezinin standart bir yetersiz belirlenim tezinden farklarına işaret edeceğim. Bunu takiben çevirinin belirsizliği tezinin kendi dilimize ait kelimelerin anlamlarının hem belirli hem de belirsiz olmasını gerektirdiğini ve dolayısıyla bir çelişkiye yol açtığını iddia edeceğim.
In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called... more
In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.
How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not... more
How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to insist that perceptual experiences provide epistemic reasons for perceptual beliefs about the external world as we pre-reflectively take it to be, then one should find a way of avoiding Cartesianism. Here are the two main aims of this paper: firstly, identify the premise that is doing the heavy-lifting work in the Cartesian thinking; and, secondly, formulate an adequate way of denying that premise. The adequacy I claim for my formulation of a way of denying the premise will roughly amount to this: the way I offer is not as susceptible to Cartesian traps as other apparently available ways of denying the premise are.
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Bu yazının esas gayesi, Evans’ın melez gönderim teorisini eleştirmektir. Görülecektir ki, Evans’ın teorisi kimi düşünce-deneylerinde yanlış sonuçlar vermektedir. Yazı, iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde Evans’ın teorisinin kısa bir... more
Bu yazının esas gayesi, Evans’ın melez gönderim teorisini eleştirmektir. Görülecektir ki, Evans’ın teorisi kimi düşünce-deneylerinde yanlış sonuçlar vermektedir. Yazı, iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde Evans’ın teorisinin kısa bir sunumunu yaptıktan sonra ikinci bölümde bu teorinin problemlerine işaret edeceğiz.