Papers by Lydia Farina
Emotional Machines, 2023
According to dominant views in affective computing, artificial systems e.g. robots and algorithms... more According to dominant views in affective computing, artificial systems e.g. robots and algorithms cannot experience emotion because they lack the phenomenological aspect associated with emotional experience. In this paper I suggest that if we wish to design artificial systems such that they are able to experience emotion states with phenomenal properties we should approach artificial phenomenology by borrowing insights from the concept of ‘attunement to the world’ introduced by early phenomenologists. This concept refers to an openness to the world, a connection with the world which rejects the distinction between an internal mind and the external world. Early phenomenologists such as Heidegger, consider this ‘attunement’ necessary for the experience of affective states. I argue that, if one accepts that the phenomenological aspect is part of the emotion state and that ‘attunement to the world’ is necessary for experiencing emotion, affective computing should focus on designing artificial systems which are ‘attuned to the world’ in the phenomenological sense to enable them to experience emotion. Current accounts of the phenomenal properties of affective states, analyse them in terms of specific types of representations. As artificial systems lack a capability for such representation mainly because of an inability to determine relevance in changing contexts (‘the frame problem’), artificial phenomenology is impossible. I argue that some affective states, such as ‘attunement’ are not necessarily representational and as such a lack of capacity for representation does not imply that artificial phenomenology is impossible. At the same time ‘attunement’ helps restrict some aspects of the ‘frame problem’ and as such, goes some way of enabling representational states such as emotion.
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Springer eBooks, 2022
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Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, 2022
This paper investigates the claim that artificial Intelligence Systems cannot be held morally res... more This paper investigates the claim that artificial Intelligence Systems cannot be held morally responsible because they do not have an ability for agential selfawareness e.g. they cannot be aware that they are the agents of an action. The main suggestion is that if agential self-awareness and related first person representations presuppose an awareness of a self, the possibility of responsible artificial intelligence systems cannot be evaluated independently of research conducted on the nature of the self. Focusing on a specific account of the self from the phenomenological tradition, this paper suggests that a minimal necessary condition that artificial intelligence systems must satisfy so that they have a capability for self-awareness, is having a minimal self defined as 'a sense of ownership'. As this sense of ownership is usually associated with having a living body, one suggestion is that artificial intelligence systems must have similar living bodies so they can have a sense of self. Discussing cases of robotic animals as examples of the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a sense of self, the paper concludes that the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a 'sense of ownership' or a sense of self may be a necessary condition for having responsibility.
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In this thesis I argue that the category of emotion is a social natural kind and that this claim ... more In this thesis I argue that the category of emotion is a social natural kind and that this claim has implications for the scientific study of emotion. It is a social kind because it includes social features that are necessary for the explanation of emotional phenomena. It is a natural kind because it is a stable property cluster which shows an aptness for successful induction and explanation. In chapter 1 I introduce the main views on natural kinds in affective science. I present three different views to claim that all three rely heavily on an influential psychological theory, namely Basic Emotion Theory. I claim that the natural kind status of several affective phenomena is not exclusively a metaphysical or philosophical issue and show its implications for interpreting experimental data and designing experiments. This thesis is divided in two parts. Part A (chapters 2 and 3) deals with the metaphysics of natural kinds and social kinds. In chapter 2 I outline and reject the traditio...
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Thesis Chapters by Lydia Farina
Natural Kinds in Affective Science, 2019
In this thesis I argue that the category of emotion is a social natural kind and that this claim ... more In this thesis I argue that the category of emotion is a social natural kind and that this claim has implications for the scientific study of emotion. It is a social kind because it includes social features that are necessary for the explanation of emotional phenomena. It is a natural kind because it is a stable property cluster which shows an aptness for successful induction and explanation.
In chapter 1 I introduce the main views on natural kinds in affective science. I present three different views to claim that all three views rely heavily on an influential psychological theory namely Basic Emotion Theory. I also claim that the natural kind status of several affective phenomena is not exclusively a metaphysical or philosophical issue and show its implications for interpreting experimental data and designing experiments.
This thesis is divided in two parts. Part A (chapters 2 and 3) deals with the metaphysics of natural kinds and social kinds. In chapter 2 I outline and reject the traditional view of natural kinds (namely essentialism) in favour of an epistemological view where natural kinds are property clusters showing an aptness for successful induction and explanation of the phenomena included in them. The epistemological view I endorse has similarities with accounts proposed by Boyd (1991) or Khalidi (2013) however is primarily based on Slater’s (2015) Stable Property Cluster account. I argue that Slater’s account is a plausible account of natural kinds and has advantages over other available accounts in the literature.
In chapter 3, I argue that we should reject the claim that social kinds cannot be considered natural kinds (or useful scientific categories) because they can be subject to heterogeneous construction, and because they are associated with interactivity and normativity features. I argue that in some cases heterogeneous construction, interactivity between the clustered properties and the environment or normativity factors do not necessarily entail that the social kind will not show an aptness for successful induction and explanation. I use the example of gender categories to argue that such social kinds can be stable property clusters and show an aptness for successful induction and explanation.
Part B (chapters 4 and 5) applies the account defended in the first part to affective phenomena and more specifically to the category of emotion. In chapter 4 I claim that emotion is not a neurobiological kind but a social kind; its properties cannot be reduced to neurobiological properties or neurobiological states. I argue that most of the main views presented in chapter 1 rely on BET; I present evidence against this theory and argue that it should not be relied upon to determine the natural kind status of the category of emotion because it oversimplifies and does not provide a good explanation of emotional phenomena.
In chapter 5 I argue that emotion is a social kind because it relates to phenomena which are best investigated by looking at several domains in the social sphere such as social psychology, sociology and social ecology. To support my claim I first provide an account of emotion as a stable property cluster which performs a specific function e.g. to enable us to successfully interact with the environment; I then give examples of successful induction and explanation on the basis of which emotion can be considered a natural kind. I conclude that emotion is a social natural kind.
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Talks by Lydia Farina
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Book Reviews by Lydia Farina
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2022
Review of 'Humans and Robots' by Sven Nyholm, 2020
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Papers by Lydia Farina
Thesis Chapters by Lydia Farina
In chapter 1 I introduce the main views on natural kinds in affective science. I present three different views to claim that all three views rely heavily on an influential psychological theory namely Basic Emotion Theory. I also claim that the natural kind status of several affective phenomena is not exclusively a metaphysical or philosophical issue and show its implications for interpreting experimental data and designing experiments.
This thesis is divided in two parts. Part A (chapters 2 and 3) deals with the metaphysics of natural kinds and social kinds. In chapter 2 I outline and reject the traditional view of natural kinds (namely essentialism) in favour of an epistemological view where natural kinds are property clusters showing an aptness for successful induction and explanation of the phenomena included in them. The epistemological view I endorse has similarities with accounts proposed by Boyd (1991) or Khalidi (2013) however is primarily based on Slater’s (2015) Stable Property Cluster account. I argue that Slater’s account is a plausible account of natural kinds and has advantages over other available accounts in the literature.
In chapter 3, I argue that we should reject the claim that social kinds cannot be considered natural kinds (or useful scientific categories) because they can be subject to heterogeneous construction, and because they are associated with interactivity and normativity features. I argue that in some cases heterogeneous construction, interactivity between the clustered properties and the environment or normativity factors do not necessarily entail that the social kind will not show an aptness for successful induction and explanation. I use the example of gender categories to argue that such social kinds can be stable property clusters and show an aptness for successful induction and explanation.
Part B (chapters 4 and 5) applies the account defended in the first part to affective phenomena and more specifically to the category of emotion. In chapter 4 I claim that emotion is not a neurobiological kind but a social kind; its properties cannot be reduced to neurobiological properties or neurobiological states. I argue that most of the main views presented in chapter 1 rely on BET; I present evidence against this theory and argue that it should not be relied upon to determine the natural kind status of the category of emotion because it oversimplifies and does not provide a good explanation of emotional phenomena.
In chapter 5 I argue that emotion is a social kind because it relates to phenomena which are best investigated by looking at several domains in the social sphere such as social psychology, sociology and social ecology. To support my claim I first provide an account of emotion as a stable property cluster which performs a specific function e.g. to enable us to successfully interact with the environment; I then give examples of successful induction and explanation on the basis of which emotion can be considered a natural kind. I conclude that emotion is a social natural kind.
Talks by Lydia Farina
Watch a mini lecture on 'Understanding Artificial Intelligence'.
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/virtual/video.aspx?id=48b67adb-755d-4b80-a5cc-d8e89153d45d
Book Reviews by Lydia Farina
In chapter 1 I introduce the main views on natural kinds in affective science. I present three different views to claim that all three views rely heavily on an influential psychological theory namely Basic Emotion Theory. I also claim that the natural kind status of several affective phenomena is not exclusively a metaphysical or philosophical issue and show its implications for interpreting experimental data and designing experiments.
This thesis is divided in two parts. Part A (chapters 2 and 3) deals with the metaphysics of natural kinds and social kinds. In chapter 2 I outline and reject the traditional view of natural kinds (namely essentialism) in favour of an epistemological view where natural kinds are property clusters showing an aptness for successful induction and explanation of the phenomena included in them. The epistemological view I endorse has similarities with accounts proposed by Boyd (1991) or Khalidi (2013) however is primarily based on Slater’s (2015) Stable Property Cluster account. I argue that Slater’s account is a plausible account of natural kinds and has advantages over other available accounts in the literature.
In chapter 3, I argue that we should reject the claim that social kinds cannot be considered natural kinds (or useful scientific categories) because they can be subject to heterogeneous construction, and because they are associated with interactivity and normativity features. I argue that in some cases heterogeneous construction, interactivity between the clustered properties and the environment or normativity factors do not necessarily entail that the social kind will not show an aptness for successful induction and explanation. I use the example of gender categories to argue that such social kinds can be stable property clusters and show an aptness for successful induction and explanation.
Part B (chapters 4 and 5) applies the account defended in the first part to affective phenomena and more specifically to the category of emotion. In chapter 4 I claim that emotion is not a neurobiological kind but a social kind; its properties cannot be reduced to neurobiological properties or neurobiological states. I argue that most of the main views presented in chapter 1 rely on BET; I present evidence against this theory and argue that it should not be relied upon to determine the natural kind status of the category of emotion because it oversimplifies and does not provide a good explanation of emotional phenomena.
In chapter 5 I argue that emotion is a social kind because it relates to phenomena which are best investigated by looking at several domains in the social sphere such as social psychology, sociology and social ecology. To support my claim I first provide an account of emotion as a stable property cluster which performs a specific function e.g. to enable us to successfully interact with the environment; I then give examples of successful induction and explanation on the basis of which emotion can be considered a natural kind. I conclude that emotion is a social natural kind.
Watch a mini lecture on 'Understanding Artificial Intelligence'.
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/virtual/video.aspx?id=48b67adb-755d-4b80-a5cc-d8e89153d45d