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Abstracts: David Ruah é aluno no segundo ano da licenciatura em Filosofia, na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. Na sua comunicação avalia a compatibilidade entre o relativismo moral e a existência de direitos humanos. Eva... more
Abstracts:

David Ruah é aluno no segundo ano da licenciatura em Filosofia, na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. Na sua comunicação avalia a compatibilidade entre o relativismo moral e a existência de direitos humanos.

Eva Ribeiro é aluna no primeiro ano da licenciatura em Filosofia na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Na sua comunicação trata a importância da definição de conceitos na discussão filosófica.

Hugo Luzio é aluno no terceiro ano da licenciatura em Filosofia na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. Na sua comunicação defende uma posição fisicista sobre a persistência pessoal ao longo do tempo.

Diogo Santos é membro do Grupo de Investigação Language, Mind and Cognition e do Centro de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. Está a fazer o doutoramento em Filosofia na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa na área da filosofia da linguagem. Na sua comunicação apresenta aparentes inconsistências em relação à doutrina do quadrado da oposição.

Organização: Hugo Luzio (FLUL), Profª. Maria Fernanda Peixoto (ESSM), Prof.ª Margarida Vidal (ESSM). Apoios Oficiais: Escola Secundária de Santa Maria; Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group (FLUL).
Research Interests:
OFA 11 – Oficina de Filosofia Analítica Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy 9-10 February 2017 Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon Room: TBA Organized by Argument Clinic CALL FOR ABSTRACTS This call for abstracts is directed... more
OFA 11 – Oficina de Filosofia Analítica
Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy
9-10 February 2017
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Room: TBA
Organized by Argument Clinic

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

This call for abstracts is directed at all graduate students and young researchers from the Portuguese analytic philosophy community, i.e. either Portuguese or based in Portugal, working in the analytic tradition (broadly construed). Young researchers include those who have obtained their PhD in philosophy within the last 5 years and also post-docs. All submitted abstracts must be in English or Portuguese, with no further restrictions as regards topics or areas.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Abstracts should have no more than 500 words, should be in PDF format and arranged for blind review (omitting any identifying reference, including meta-data).
All submissions must be made to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > with the subject “OFA 11 SUBMISSION”.
Information about authors must be provided on the body of the email and include: title of the paper, author’s full name, e-mail address and affiliation. Authors should also indicate whether they would be willing to participate as commentators as well. (This will not be relevant to the selection process.
Every abstract will be subject to double-blind review by the scientific committee (TBA) and authors will be informed of the decision by email (see dates bellow).

COMMENTATORS

Those interested in participating merely as commentators should send their data (name, e-mail address, affiliation and a short CV) to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > mentioning the areas of philosophy in which they are competent to comment.

DATES

Deadline for submissions: 2 December 2016.
Notification of acceptance : 9 January 2017.
Deadline for papers: 27 January 2017.

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

TBA

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

Diogo Santos
Domingos Faria
Hugo Luzio
José Mestre
Luís Veríssimo
Ricardo Miguel

CONTACT

oficinanalitica AT gmail.com
SPONSORS

Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy
Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon
Research Interests:
MacFarlane (2014) advocates a radical form of semantic relativism. He argues that his proposal complies with the norms governing our assertion practices in various areas of discourse. These practices also include norms regarding the... more
MacFarlane (2014) advocates a radical form of semantic relativism. He argues that his proposal complies with the norms governing our assertion practices in various areas of discourse. These practices also include norms regarding the conditions in which it is inappropriate not to retract an assertion. Ferrari & Zeman (2014) identify an asymmetry concerning retractions in two relevant areas of discourse and argue that assessment-sensitivity needs to be supplemented with further theoretical tools to explain it. I dispel the asymmetry and conclude that assessment-sensitivity needs no supplementation to account for it.
Research Interests:
We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified... more
We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and to no animal, ultimately, if they exclude every animal, they also exclude some humans. Lastly, qualified non-empirical Anthropocentrism is rejected due to implausible consequences about which individuals have moral status. After rejecting Anthropocentrism, we consider a generalization of the marginal cases argument against all forms of speciesism. We show that only a species entirely comprised of essentially moral individuals would be unaffected by this argument. However, the possibility of such a species has limited practical import. Contrarily, Anthropocentrism’s moral unacceptability requires profound changes in the way humans relate with animals.