Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021
The Vegan Society (VS) is one of the most influential vegan organisations worldwide. In 1990 VS c... more The Vegan Society (VS) is one of the most influential vegan organisations worldwide. In 1990 VS created a trademark, The Vegan Trademark, which certifies products as being suitable for vegans. While this, without doubt, has been beneficial in many ways, a change in their present labelling practice is in order. This, I argue, is due to inobservance of a simple coherence requirement to treat morally similar cases alike: the fundamental moral reason that is precluding some products from vegan certification is not precluding other products from such certification. I start by presenting the standard definition of veganism and briefly describing the two relevant cases. I then go on to argue that the treatment of such cases involves incoherence of the labelling practice. In addition, I propose a way of removing the incoherence that fits better with veganism’s future-orientedness. I finally consider and respond to some objections.
Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica, 2020
Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como ... more Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como uma forma de discriminação moral com base na espécie. Em grande medida, a discussão contemporânea sobre a importância moral dos animais surgiu e desenvolveu-se em torno da crítica e da defesa do especismo. Este artigo oferece uma visão da discussão filosófica contemporânea sobre o especismo. Após uma breve introdução, apresenta-se uma definição de especismo e caracterizam-se vários tipos de especismo, sendo o Antropocentrismo o mais relevante. Depois, expõe-se um argumento proeminente contra o Antropocentrismo: o argumento dos casos marginais. Por fim, algumas posições antropocêntricas são criticamente discutidas.
We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are simila... more We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are similarly bad according to Deprivationism; hence, it seems that we should display symmetric attitudes towards both. This entails the implausible conclusion that we should display negative attitudes towards the time of our birth. In a series of articles Brueckner and Fischer offered one of the most prominent attempts to block this conclusion by appealing to a temporal bias towards future pleasures. Inspired by Yi’s criticism of their view, we argue that there is an appropriate sense of deprivation in which late birth can deprive of future pleasures. Hence, Brueckner and Fischer’s Temporal Bias does not explain the attitudinal asymmetry. In addition, to make sure that one picks out the appropriate sense of deprivation, we offer a restriction, the Historical Condition, that prevents us from considering that every value one would otherwise have is value that one was deprived of due to one’s actual birth/death. Finally, we present a novel account for the attitudinal asymmetry that relies on what we call ‘Interests Proximity Bias’.
No artigo "O vegetarianismo como obrigação ética" (Crítica, 10 de Setembro de 2015), Moutinho def... more No artigo "O vegetarianismo como obrigação ética" (Crítica, 10 de Setembro de 2015), Moutinho defende que o vegetarianismo é uma obrigação moral. Fá-lo argumentando por duas vias: que o estatuto moral dos animais é incompatível com serem usados pelos humanos para alimentação; e que o vegetarianismo é consequência do nosso dever em preservar o equilíbrio ecológico do planeta. O meu objectivo neste artigo é mostrar que os argumentos apresentados são insuficientes para estabelecer o vegetarianismo como obrigação moral.
We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is m... more We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and to no animal, ultimately, if they exclude every animal, they also exclude some humans. Lastly, qualified non-empirical Anthropocentrism is rejected due to implausible consequences about which individuals have moral status. After rejecting Anthropocentrism, we consider a generalization of the marginal cases argument against all forms of speciesism. We show that only a species entirely comprised of essentially moral individuals would be unaffected by this argument. However, the possibility of such a species has limited practical import. Contrarily, Anthropocentrism’s moral unacceptability requires profound changes in the way humans relate with animals.
It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and even ... more It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and even artists point out moral flaws in artworks while evaluating them. Philosophers, however , have maintained a hot debate on the meaning of such criticism. This debate can be understood as a disagreement about the kind of relation between the artistic value of artworks and their alleged moral value. While some claim that moral value can contribute to artistic value (moralism), others claim that there cannot be such a contribution (autonomism). Since at least some works of architecture are artworks, that debate also concerns architecture. A moderate moralist view claims that some works of architecture have moral flaws/merits that bear on their artistic evaluation. In an apparently promising version, the contention is that some moral flaws/merits are aesthetically relevant. In this paper I argue against such contention and defend an autonomist view. Following some taxonomy remarks I distinguish the views in the debate and present two points in favour of autonomism: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. Then I discuss Carroll's merited response argument for moralism and I argue that in its best interpretation either it begs the question against autonomism or it is compatible with it. I conclude with some possible objections that may help further investigations on the subject.
Singer’s much-discussed replaceability argument states that non-self-conscious animals may be kil... more Singer’s much-discussed replaceability argument states that non-self-conscious animals may be killed and replaced by new animals that will lead equally valuable lives. If sound, this argument can be used to justify the cycle of raising and killing animals for food. Thus, many have argued that Singer’s theory, and utilitarianism in general, while committed to this argument, offers inadequate protection to animals. However, some utilitarians reject the argument and Singer himself was rather tentative in preventing its additional application to self-conscious beings. This tension, within utilitarianism, about how to best deal with the argument is the core of what I call “the problem of replaceability”. My main goal here is to provide a precise description of this problem. Firstly, I distinguish between the general question of replacement permissibility and the specific question of whether (a certain version of) utilitarianism implies the replaceability argument. Focusing on the specific question I set the problem apart from other known objections to utilitarianism, like the value receptacles objection and some replacement-like difficulties. I also compare two versions of the replaceability argument and advance a better one. Finally, I point out how different interpretations of the argument affect the way out of the problem. I hope this understanding of the problem offers helpful insight to possible solutions and to further investigate its importance to animal food production and animals’ moral status.
OFA 11 – Oficina de Filosofia Analítica
Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy
9-10 February 20... more OFA 11 – Oficina de Filosofia Analítica Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy 9-10 February 2017 Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon Room: TBA Organized by Argument Clinic
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
This call for abstracts is directed at all graduate students and young researchers from the Portuguese analytic philosophy community, i.e. either Portuguese or based in Portugal, working in the analytic tradition (broadly construed). Young researchers include those who have obtained their PhD in philosophy within the last 5 years and also post-docs. All submitted abstracts must be in English or Portuguese, with no further restrictions as regards topics or areas.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
Abstracts should have no more than 500 words, should be in PDF format and arranged for blind review (omitting any identifying reference, including meta-data). All submissions must be made to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > with the subject “OFA 11 SUBMISSION”. Information about authors must be provided on the body of the email and include: title of the paper, author’s full name, e-mail address and affiliation. Authors should also indicate whether they would be willing to participate as commentators as well. (This will not be relevant to the selection process. Every abstract will be subject to double-blind review by the scientific committee (TBA) and authors will be informed of the decision by email (see dates bellow).
COMMENTATORS
Those interested in participating merely as commentators should send their data (name, e-mail address, affiliation and a short CV) to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > mentioning the areas of philosophy in which they are competent to comment.
DATES
Deadline for submissions: 2 December 2016. Notification of acceptance : 9 January 2017. Deadline for papers: 27 January 2017.
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
TBA
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Diogo Santos Domingos Faria Hugo Luzio José Mestre Luís Veríssimo Ricardo Miguel
CONTACT
oficinanalitica AT gmail.com SPONSORS
Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2021
The Vegan Society (VS) is one of the most influential vegan organisations worldwide. In 1990 VS c... more The Vegan Society (VS) is one of the most influential vegan organisations worldwide. In 1990 VS created a trademark, The Vegan Trademark, which certifies products as being suitable for vegans. While this, without doubt, has been beneficial in many ways, a change in their present labelling practice is in order. This, I argue, is due to inobservance of a simple coherence requirement to treat morally similar cases alike: the fundamental moral reason that is precluding some products from vegan certification is not precluding other products from such certification. I start by presenting the standard definition of veganism and briefly describing the two relevant cases. I then go on to argue that the treatment of such cases involves incoherence of the labelling practice. In addition, I propose a way of removing the incoherence that fits better with veganism’s future-orientedness. I finally consider and respond to some objections.
Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica, 2020
Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como ... more Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como uma forma de discriminação moral com base na espécie. Em grande medida, a discussão contemporânea sobre a importância moral dos animais surgiu e desenvolveu-se em torno da crítica e da defesa do especismo. Este artigo oferece uma visão da discussão filosófica contemporânea sobre o especismo. Após uma breve introdução, apresenta-se uma definição de especismo e caracterizam-se vários tipos de especismo, sendo o Antropocentrismo o mais relevante. Depois, expõe-se um argumento proeminente contra o Antropocentrismo: o argumento dos casos marginais. Por fim, algumas posições antropocêntricas são criticamente discutidas.
We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are simila... more We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are similarly bad according to Deprivationism; hence, it seems that we should display symmetric attitudes towards both. This entails the implausible conclusion that we should display negative attitudes towards the time of our birth. In a series of articles Brueckner and Fischer offered one of the most prominent attempts to block this conclusion by appealing to a temporal bias towards future pleasures. Inspired by Yi’s criticism of their view, we argue that there is an appropriate sense of deprivation in which late birth can deprive of future pleasures. Hence, Brueckner and Fischer’s Temporal Bias does not explain the attitudinal asymmetry. In addition, to make sure that one picks out the appropriate sense of deprivation, we offer a restriction, the Historical Condition, that prevents us from considering that every value one would otherwise have is value that one was deprived of due to one’s actual birth/death. Finally, we present a novel account for the attitudinal asymmetry that relies on what we call ‘Interests Proximity Bias’.
No artigo "O vegetarianismo como obrigação ética" (Crítica, 10 de Setembro de 2015), Moutinho def... more No artigo "O vegetarianismo como obrigação ética" (Crítica, 10 de Setembro de 2015), Moutinho defende que o vegetarianismo é uma obrigação moral. Fá-lo argumentando por duas vias: que o estatuto moral dos animais é incompatível com serem usados pelos humanos para alimentação; e que o vegetarianismo é consequência do nosso dever em preservar o equilíbrio ecológico do planeta. O meu objectivo neste artigo é mostrar que os argumentos apresentados são insuficientes para estabelecer o vegetarianismo como obrigação moral.
We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is m... more We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and to no animal, ultimately, if they exclude every animal, they also exclude some humans. Lastly, qualified non-empirical Anthropocentrism is rejected due to implausible consequences about which individuals have moral status. After rejecting Anthropocentrism, we consider a generalization of the marginal cases argument against all forms of speciesism. We show that only a species entirely comprised of essentially moral individuals would be unaffected by this argument. However, the possibility of such a species has limited practical import. Contrarily, Anthropocentrism’s moral unacceptability requires profound changes in the way humans relate with animals.
It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and even ... more It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and even artists point out moral flaws in artworks while evaluating them. Philosophers, however , have maintained a hot debate on the meaning of such criticism. This debate can be understood as a disagreement about the kind of relation between the artistic value of artworks and their alleged moral value. While some claim that moral value can contribute to artistic value (moralism), others claim that there cannot be such a contribution (autonomism). Since at least some works of architecture are artworks, that debate also concerns architecture. A moderate moralist view claims that some works of architecture have moral flaws/merits that bear on their artistic evaluation. In an apparently promising version, the contention is that some moral flaws/merits are aesthetically relevant. In this paper I argue against such contention and defend an autonomist view. Following some taxonomy remarks I distinguish the views in the debate and present two points in favour of autonomism: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. Then I discuss Carroll's merited response argument for moralism and I argue that in its best interpretation either it begs the question against autonomism or it is compatible with it. I conclude with some possible objections that may help further investigations on the subject.
Singer’s much-discussed replaceability argument states that non-self-conscious animals may be kil... more Singer’s much-discussed replaceability argument states that non-self-conscious animals may be killed and replaced by new animals that will lead equally valuable lives. If sound, this argument can be used to justify the cycle of raising and killing animals for food. Thus, many have argued that Singer’s theory, and utilitarianism in general, while committed to this argument, offers inadequate protection to animals. However, some utilitarians reject the argument and Singer himself was rather tentative in preventing its additional application to self-conscious beings. This tension, within utilitarianism, about how to best deal with the argument is the core of what I call “the problem of replaceability”. My main goal here is to provide a precise description of this problem. Firstly, I distinguish between the general question of replacement permissibility and the specific question of whether (a certain version of) utilitarianism implies the replaceability argument. Focusing on the specific question I set the problem apart from other known objections to utilitarianism, like the value receptacles objection and some replacement-like difficulties. I also compare two versions of the replaceability argument and advance a better one. Finally, I point out how different interpretations of the argument affect the way out of the problem. I hope this understanding of the problem offers helpful insight to possible solutions and to further investigate its importance to animal food production and animals’ moral status.
OFA 11 – Oficina de Filosofia Analítica
Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy
9-10 February 20... more OFA 11 – Oficina de Filosofia Analítica Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy 9-10 February 2017 Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon Room: TBA Organized by Argument Clinic
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
This call for abstracts is directed at all graduate students and young researchers from the Portuguese analytic philosophy community, i.e. either Portuguese or based in Portugal, working in the analytic tradition (broadly construed). Young researchers include those who have obtained their PhD in philosophy within the last 5 years and also post-docs. All submitted abstracts must be in English or Portuguese, with no further restrictions as regards topics or areas.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
Abstracts should have no more than 500 words, should be in PDF format and arranged for blind review (omitting any identifying reference, including meta-data). All submissions must be made to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > with the subject “OFA 11 SUBMISSION”. Information about authors must be provided on the body of the email and include: title of the paper, author’s full name, e-mail address and affiliation. Authors should also indicate whether they would be willing to participate as commentators as well. (This will not be relevant to the selection process. Every abstract will be subject to double-blind review by the scientific committee (TBA) and authors will be informed of the decision by email (see dates bellow).
COMMENTATORS
Those interested in participating merely as commentators should send their data (name, e-mail address, affiliation and a short CV) to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > mentioning the areas of philosophy in which they are competent to comment.
DATES
Deadline for submissions: 2 December 2016. Notification of acceptance : 9 January 2017. Deadline for papers: 27 January 2017.
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
TBA
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Diogo Santos Domingos Faria Hugo Luzio José Mestre Luís Veríssimo Ricardo Miguel
CONTACT
oficinanalitica AT gmail.com SPONSORS
Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon
Uploads
Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy
9-10 February 2017
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Room: TBA
Organized by Argument Clinic
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
This call for abstracts is directed at all graduate students and young researchers from the Portuguese analytic philosophy community, i.e. either Portuguese or based in Portugal, working in the analytic tradition (broadly construed). Young researchers include those who have obtained their PhD in philosophy within the last 5 years and also post-docs. All submitted abstracts must be in English or Portuguese, with no further restrictions as regards topics or areas.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
Abstracts should have no more than 500 words, should be in PDF format and arranged for blind review (omitting any identifying reference, including meta-data).
All submissions must be made to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > with the subject “OFA 11 SUBMISSION”.
Information about authors must be provided on the body of the email and include: title of the paper, author’s full name, e-mail address and affiliation. Authors should also indicate whether they would be willing to participate as commentators as well. (This will not be relevant to the selection process.
Every abstract will be subject to double-blind review by the scientific committee (TBA) and authors will be informed of the decision by email (see dates bellow).
COMMENTATORS
Those interested in participating merely as commentators should send their data (name, e-mail address, affiliation and a short CV) to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > mentioning the areas of philosophy in which they are competent to comment.
DATES
Deadline for submissions: 2 December 2016.
Notification of acceptance : 9 January 2017.
Deadline for papers: 27 January 2017.
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
TBA
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Diogo Santos
Domingos Faria
Hugo Luzio
José Mestre
Luís Veríssimo
Ricardo Miguel
CONTACT
oficinanalitica AT gmail.com
SPONSORS
Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy
Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon
Graduate Workshop in Analytic Philosophy
9-10 February 2017
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Room: TBA
Organized by Argument Clinic
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
This call for abstracts is directed at all graduate students and young researchers from the Portuguese analytic philosophy community, i.e. either Portuguese or based in Portugal, working in the analytic tradition (broadly construed). Young researchers include those who have obtained their PhD in philosophy within the last 5 years and also post-docs. All submitted abstracts must be in English or Portuguese, with no further restrictions as regards topics or areas.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
Abstracts should have no more than 500 words, should be in PDF format and arranged for blind review (omitting any identifying reference, including meta-data).
All submissions must be made to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > with the subject “OFA 11 SUBMISSION”.
Information about authors must be provided on the body of the email and include: title of the paper, author’s full name, e-mail address and affiliation. Authors should also indicate whether they would be willing to participate as commentators as well. (This will not be relevant to the selection process.
Every abstract will be subject to double-blind review by the scientific committee (TBA) and authors will be informed of the decision by email (see dates bellow).
COMMENTATORS
Those interested in participating merely as commentators should send their data (name, e-mail address, affiliation and a short CV) to < oficinanalitica AT gmail.com > mentioning the areas of philosophy in which they are competent to comment.
DATES
Deadline for submissions: 2 December 2016.
Notification of acceptance : 9 January 2017.
Deadline for papers: 27 January 2017.
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
TBA
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Diogo Santos
Domingos Faria
Hugo Luzio
José Mestre
Luís Veríssimo
Ricardo Miguel
CONTACT
oficinanalitica AT gmail.com
SPONSORS
Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy
Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon