Non c’e dubbio che ormai da diversi anni la forma partito sia in crisi e in molti ne hanno annunc... more Non c’e dubbio che ormai da diversi anni la forma partito sia in crisi e in molti ne hanno annunciato (e talvolta auspicato) la definitiva scomparsa. Ma e davvero possibile fare politica sul lungo periodo senza una struttura organizzata, che si richiami a un preciso orizzonte di ideali e valori e che si riconnetta a una storia e a una tradizione? E come possono i partiti imparare la lezione dei movimenti? L’interessante caso del Partito laburista inglese.
Non c’e dubbio che ormai da diversi anni la forma partito sia in crisi e in molti ne hanno annunc... more Non c’e dubbio che ormai da diversi anni la forma partito sia in crisi e in molti ne hanno annunciato (e talvolta auspicato) la definitiva scomparsa. Ma e davvero possibile fare politica sul lungo periodo senza una struttura organizzata, che si richiami a un preciso orizzonte di ideali e valori e che si riconnetta a una storia e a una tradizione? E come possono i partiti imparare la lezione dei movimenti? L’interessante caso del Partito laburista inglese.
For a century at least, parties have been central to the study of politics. Yet their typical con... more For a century at least, parties have been central to the study of politics. Yet their typical conceptual reduction to a network of power-seeking elites has left many to wonder why parties were ever thought crucial to democracy. This book seeks to retrieve a richer conception of partisanship, drawing on modern political thought and extending it in the light of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Looking beyond the party as organization, the book develops an original account of what it is to be a partisan. It examines the ideas, orientations, obligations, and practices constitutive of partisanship properly understood, and how these intersect with the core features of democratic life. Such an account serves to underline in distinctive fashion why democracy needs its partisans, and puts in relief some of the key trends of contemporary politics.
This article critically engages with Rainer Forst’s recent book Justification and Critique: Towar... more This article critically engages with Rainer Forst’s recent book Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics, focusing in particular on his account of utopia in the last part of it.
Rosa Luxemburg is well known for her political activism in the revolutionary movements in Poland,... more Rosa Luxemburg is well known for her political activism in the revolutionary movements in Poland, Russia and Germany, and as a leading Marxist member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. She is also well known for her economic work on capital accumulation. But although she formulated important arguments in political economy, the theory of revolution, and council democracy her contributions to political philosophy are less than fully appreciated in the contemporary academic community. Marking the hundredth anniversary of Luxemburg's murder in January 1919, this conference turns towards her political philosophy and discusses her philosophical arguments at the intersection with more strategic, historical, and sociological considerations. We invite paper proposals for papers on, but not limited to, the following topics:
Suppose a gang of Mafiosi manages to fence off a part of common land and by sheer recourse to vio... more Suppose a gang of Mafiosi manages to fence off a part of common land and by sheer recourse to violence and oppression convinces everyone around them that they have acquired legitimate property. What could justify their descendants’ right to exclude given the tainted origins of first acquisition? One answer is to appeal to the doctrine of ‘adverse possession’ in law. The doctrine is often invoked to claim de facto title on holdings arguing that wrongful occupants of land might nevertheless establish a right to it after a sufficient period of time has elapsed, provided that the property has not been contested. Adverse possession is often invoked to discuss the rights of irregular migrants to naturalise in countries in which they have entered via illegal channels (thus committing an original wrong). Some authors have suggested that the doctrine of adverse possession only works if it combines a claim to continuous enjoyment of access to land with indifference from others whose rights are violated by such wrongful and unilateral taking of property. In this paper I explore the implications of the doctrine of adverse possession for states’ rights to exclude irregular migrants in light of their tainted history of unjust appropriation of the territories they occupy. I suggest that if the doctrine of adverse possession is insufficient to provide irregular migrants with a justification of the right to settle even after some lapse of time, it also does not justify the territorial rights of states whose claims to jurisdiction and the related right to exclude is built on an analogous (and in fact much worse) form of unilateral occupation of territory. I then review the temporal significance of social membership ties and explore potential objections to this argument.
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Adverse possession is often invoked to discuss the rights of irregular migrants to naturalise in countries in which they have entered via illegal channels (thus committing an original wrong). Some authors have suggested that the doctrine of adverse possession only works if it combines a claim to continuous enjoyment of access to land with indifference from others whose rights are violated by such wrongful and unilateral taking of property. In this paper I explore the implications of the doctrine of adverse possession for states’ rights to exclude irregular migrants in light of their tainted history of unjust appropriation of the territories they occupy. I suggest that if the doctrine of adverse possession is insufficient to provide irregular migrants with a justification of the right to settle even after some lapse of time, it also does not justify the territorial rights of states whose claims to jurisdiction and the related right to exclude is built on an analogous (and in fact much worse) form of unilateral occupation of territory. I then review the temporal significance of social membership ties and explore potential objections to this argument.