Sahil Gandhi

Mutually beneficial arrangements between politicians and real estate developers are common in many developing countries. We document what happens when the politician-developer nexus is disrupted by an election. We construct a novel dataset of real estate projects and electoral constituencies in Mumbai’s municipal government. We find that an incumbent party losing the election increases real estate project completion times by 5%. We find no effect of quasi-random redistricting or changes in voter preferences on project delays. We investigate two mechanisms for the slowdown associated with party turnover — delays in construction approvals around the time of the election and increase in litigation against projects after the election. While we see no rise in litigation, we find that delayed approvals near an election explain 23% of the increased total delays due to party change.

This study is among the first to investigate whether patterns of access to basic services could explain the disproportionately severe impact of COVID-19 in slums. Using geolocated containment zones and COVID-19 case data for Mumbai, India’s most populous city, we find that cases and case fatality rates are higher in slums compared to formal residential buildings. Our results show that while access to toilets for men is associated with lower COVID-19 prevalence, the effect is opposite in the case of toilets for women. This could be because limited hours for safely using toilets and higher waiting times increase risk of exposure, and women and children sharing toilet facilities results in crowding. Proximity to water pipelines has no effect on prevalence, likely because slumdwellers are disconnected from for- mal water supply networks. Indoor crowding does not seem to have an effect on case prevalence. Finally, while police capacity – measured by number of police station outposts – is associated with lower prevalence in non-slum areas, indicat- ing effective enforcement of containment, this relationship does not hold in slums. The study highlights the urgency of finding viable solutions for slum improvement and upgrading to mitigate the effects of contagion for some of the most vulnerable populations.

In developing countries, separation of powers coexists with corruption by the ruling elite. This can be attributed to informal institutions, which counter the formal checks and balances. We demonstrate, by studying the Adarsh scam, the vulnerabilities of checks and balances. Fourteen actors belonging to different tiers of the Indian federal setup who could have vetoed the project or certain permissions failed to do so.We find that 54 percent of the checks collapsed because of quid pro quo, 21 percent due to being overridden, 4 percent due to misrepresentation, 7 percent due to absorption, and 14 percent due to omissions in the process.

Cities in the global south are undergoing changes in the production structure brought about by globalization and liberalization. These cities also witness significant informalities in terms of shelter and livelihoods. These phenomena are reflected in the urban land use patterns. Planning in these cities is under pressure to adapt to the dynamic urban condition but is constrained by the technical and bureaucratic process of master/development plan making. Through an empirical study of an area in the suburbs of Mumbai (India), this paper shows the wedge between planned and actual land use and discusses the reasons for this dichotomy. The paper argues that master/development plans based on technical principles with micro-level detailing are unable to foresee and hence or otherwise adapt to the economic dynamics and spatial restructuring in Mumbai; they are partly undermined by “occupancy urbanism” (Benjamin, 2008). We discuss how these factors are accommodated within and outside the scope of the development plans. The paper calls for a re-thinking of urban planning in India so that plans are better able to reflect the requirements and needs of the citizens.

Corruption in India is ubiquitous and may be broadly identified as illegal and legal. This paper delves into the typology of legal corruption in India, which, apart from abuse of discretionary power, and tactical law and policy making, also includes – not so well documented – use of information advantage and the externality impact of such information by politicians to make gains. The paper, by analyzing the growth rates in assets of some politicians in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, finds that the elected politicians experience a higher growth in their assets as compared to the market growth. The findings strongly support the existence of this form of legal corruption in India. The paper recommends that practices of ‘misuse’ of information advantage by politicians to make legal gains could be reduced by enforcing greater transparency via dissemination of relevant information in public domain. These measures must be backed by broad based reforms – that are commensurate with the current level of economic development – that would bring about system-wide changes in an effort to lower overall corruption in the country.

The paper written from a governance perspective takes the position that a useful governance perspective must be informed by the socio-economic-cultural milieu and in the specific Indian context must sit on a tripod of 'political reality','state of decentralization'and 'basic economic principles'. Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) is one of the most important growth engines for India as it accrues tremendous revenues to the central and the Maharashtra (State) governments.