In: Mišík, M., Figulová, A. (Eds.) EU Energy and Climate Policy after Covid-19 and the Invasion of Ukraine: Decarbonisation and Security in Transition. Routledge: Abingdon – New York: 119–137, Oct 14, 2024
Russia deployed its ‘gas weapon’ to coerce European states into supporting its political agenda f... more Russia deployed its ‘gas weapon’ to coerce European states into supporting its political agenda following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This chapter explores the Kremlin’s intentions and the responses of Central and East European countries with relatively pro-Russian politics prior to the war. Russia aimed to minimise the target country’s contribution to Ukraine’s war efforts and support of Western sanctions, while nudging them to maintain cooperation. The form and impact of Russia’s actions differed based on the socio-political contexts, which are illustrated with three case studies: Hungary, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Findings are theorised with the use of analytical framework developed by Crawford and Klotz in 1999 that identifies four models of influence – ‘compellance’, ‘normative communication’, ‘resource denial’, and ‘political fracture’. The cases are not clear-cut but, broadly speaking, each falls into one of three categories – Hungary into the normative communication, Serbia into the resource denial, and Bulgaria into political fracture – based on predominant patterns, while compellance can be perceived in each country. Domestic and international policy, energy politics, and the characteristics of energy systems in the target countries all shape sanction design in addition to which the dominant political leadership’s penetration of domestic society is especially pertinent in shaping the sanction design, its effect, and the responses of the receiver of the sanctions.
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Jul 31, 2024
The Eastern enlargements of the EU increased the bloc's dependency on Russian gas and contributed... more The Eastern enlargements of the EU increased the bloc's dependency on Russian gas and contributed to a more cautious attitude towards these supplies. This paper assesses the Russian gas dependency of the 11 Central and East European new member states according to the ambition and execution of their national energy strategies and compares it to the gas dependency shifts in the old member states. Two composite indicators of gas dependency-one for supply and one for demand-based on nine individual indicators were used for this evaluation, calculated for 2004, 2019, and 2022. We find that the new member states mostly reduced gas dependency through supply-side measures, while old member states increased dependency through some combination of worsening supply-or demand-side situations until Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The behaviour of member states was influenced by different perceptions of vulnerability and a varying sense of threat in the prewar period. The old member states did not perceive their Russian gas dependency as a significant risk, whereas the new member states viewed this as a high-risk factor. New gas infrastructure capacity has contributed to diversification from Russia, but reducing gas demand did not receive much attention before the invasion.
Politics in Central Europe, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 271-301, 2024
International business research is usually focused on various aspects of foreign direct investmen... more International business research is usually focused on various aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI) by non-European emerging-market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) without attention to non-traditional factors pulling them into host countries. The objective of this paper is to examine the investments of EMNEs from two source countries, China and Russia, within the Visegrad Four (V4) economies. Based on interviews and a qualitative document analysis, it explores the main characteristics of their investments into the V4, including host-country determinants by focusing on macroeconomic, institutional and political factors. The paper finds that these factors do influence EMNEs’ investment practices, and that they correlate with the changing quality of political relations, but this influence needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Energy, Sustainability and Society, Vol. 14, 30, Jun 6, 2024
Background
To curb human-made carbon-dioxide emissions, the European Union will introduce carbon ... more Background To curb human-made carbon-dioxide emissions, the European Union will introduce carbon pricing for buildings and transport in 2027. Central and East European (CEE) countries are pressured to embark on ambitious decarbonization pathways leading to carbon-neutral economies by 2050. This paper is the first to investigate the public acceptance of and the willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon tax in a CEE country, Hungary. It analyzes the support-increasing effects of five revenue-recycling mechanisms (tax cuts, green spending, support for poor households, funding for health care and education, and debt reduction), a wider range than covered in previous studies. A national face-to-face survey of 3013 adults on public attitudes to climate change, conducted in summer 2022, is the main method of data collection. This is combined with secondary analysis of related statistics and documentary analysis of relevant materials.
Results The results show low public acceptance, with only a modest increase from 20.3% to 27.3% due to revenue recycling. This is accompanied by low WTP values and WTP increases. All these are lower than those found in Western surveys. A novel empirical result is the relative popularity of public health care and education in revenue recycling, though differences in revenue-recycling preferences are apparent between those who accept a carbon tax even without a redistribution mechanism and those who are willing to pay only if redistribution is included. Green spending also performed relatively well, while supporting the poor fared less well, albeit with relatively high WTP values. Reducing taxes and public debt were the least likely to instigate carbon-tax acceptance.
Conclusions The results highlight the importance of carefully assessing the distributional impact of implementing carbon pricing mechanisms and thoroughly integrating social considerations into climate policy. Based on this, as well as the analysis of the social conditions and political economy of climate policy development in Hungary, policies—such as a gradually increasing carbon tax, social cushioning, legal earmarking of carbon-tax revenues, and policy bundling—are proposed to make carbon pricing socially tolerable and politically acceptable. The findings and conclusions might also be relevant for other parts of the CEE region.
In: Casanova, L. and Miroux, A. (Eds.) Emerging Market Multinationals Report 2022: Reinventing Global Value Chains. Ithaca, NY, USA: Emerging Markets Institute, S.C. Johnson College of Business, Cornell University: 110–117, https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112770, Nov 1, 2022
This chapter examines how the sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine have... more This chapter examines how the sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine have impacted Russian firms, their direct investment abroad, and Hungarian business presence in Russia, and, in particular, how Russian and Hungarian firms have adjusted to this new reality. It highlights the main commonalities, such as the difficulties of access to finance transactions and the interruption of logistics and supply chains, especially in the areas of technology goods. The chapter also looks at the main differences between Russia and Hungary. In Russia, large firms with exposure to the West have been facing major difficulties in their international operations and have focused their efforts on mitigating the effects of sanctions. On the other side, Hungarian firms investing in and/or exporting to Russia typically try to hold their ground in the Russian market. They are attempting to overcome difficulties such as risks of foreign exchange and non-payment, issues with logistics and supply chain disruptions, problems with banking and financial transactions, increased time and costs of international shipping due to altered routing, additional administrative burdens at the border, air travel restrictions, and a constant need for information to adapt to sanctions and counter-sanctions. It is uncertain whether the generally positive attitude of Hungarian firms towards staying (and even taking advantage of the situation to expand further) will change over time. The challenges may become too great to take on, not only for smaller, resource-poor, and less-experienced firms, but also for stronger enterprises.
Available at https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112770
In: Kaeding, M., Pollak, J., Schmidt, P. (Eds.) The Future of Europe and Russia: Views from the Capitals. Cham: Springer: 51–54, Jul 7, 2022
Hungary has the typical national contours that feature in relations between Central and East Euro... more Hungary has the typical national contours that feature in relations between Central and East European (CEE) EU Member States and Russia. Troublesome historical legacies, relatively minor and narrowing economic relations (except for energy) and sharp party divisions regarding the Russian nexus are generally shared features in CEE. What stands out within this setting are the inherently domestic policy patterns of bilateral relations, especially as far as interrelations between Viktor Orbán’s illiberal leanings along with Euroscepticism and Moscow’s foreign policy agenda are concerned. Viktor Orbán’s and Vladimir Putin’s mindsets partially overlap, creating some ideological foundations for an opportunistic relationship.
Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 32-49, Mar 28, 2022
South-Eastern European (SEE) countries are typically keen to maintain the status quo in their ene... more South-Eastern European (SEE) countries are typically keen to maintain the status quo in their energy systems, generally characterized by underinvestment, high coal share and utility affordability needs. Their energy mixes have historically been determined by external factors, currently mainly related to decarbonization pressure. This article assesses how the EU’s ongoing decarbonization-driven withdrawal from supporting natural gas projects shapes fuel choices in nine selected SEE countries and may have geopolitical consequences. It is based on more than 70 interviews with stakeholders from these countries, EU institutions, and international organizations. In exploring and theorizing the geopolitical ramifications of the energy transition in SEE, it applies a novel approach, which draws on theories of power and the concept of an assemblage, which we link to theories on entanglement and disentanglement. We find that the EU’s climate policy significantly changes local infrastructural assemblages and the EU’s disentanglement from natural gas goes against Russian and US efforts. By wielding its power to support such an energy transition, the EU has shifted the bipolar system ‘EU/US vis-à-vis Russia’ defined along a single geopolitical ruleset (supply security), to a tripolar disposition ‘EU-Russia-USA’ defined along two rulesets (supply security and climate policy). In addition, China has become involved. States will thus have to take crucial energy policy decisions in a new geopolitical context.
Energy Strategy Reviews, Vol. 40, 100817, Mar 31, 2022
In Hungary, regulated energy prices fell by a quarter in 2013–2014 due to a state intervention. T... more In Hungary, regulated energy prices fell by a quarter in 2013–2014 due to a state intervention. The objective of this article is to measure the effects of this change on the Hungarian residential energy consumption and assess the rationale, the policy context and other consequences of such an intervention. We decompose residential energy-use change in 2010–2018. We calculate 13.2 PJ of excess consumption relating to the programme, and find that the higher income deciles benefited the most from the lower prices compared to low-income households using market-priced lower-quality fuels and living in inefficient homes. The intervention lacked a strong policy background. The energy policy documents were later adjusted to the situation and finally the programme was linked to energy poverty. We point to price-setting failures and discrepancies between energy-efficiency goals and measures as well as negative effects of these and the programme itself. In the future, the policy emphasis should be on energy efficiency and supporting those really in need.
In: Szunomár, Á. (Ed.) Emerging-market Multinational Enterprises in East Central Europe. Studies in Economic Transition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 313–321, 2020
Although the current status of East Central European (ECE) countries in the process and level of ... more Although the current status of East Central European (ECE) countries in the process and level of their integration into global business varies, a rather general phenomenon is the exhaustion of the foreign direct investment (FDI)-led development model, at least its dominant version of the 1990s and early 2000s. On the one hand, this is a result of multinational affiliates’ isolated and strongly integrated presence in a strictly designed international cooperation system with no physical contact with local firms to deliver spillovers. On the other hand, even those affiliates that are entangled in the development of local supplier networks deliver spillovers only to a limited level. As a consequence, they are not becoming primary players of innovative local business clusters, while the design of affiliates’ activity range is usually specialized on low value-added segments of global value chains (GVC).
In: Szunomár, Á. (Ed.) Emerging-market Multinational Enterprises in East Central Europe. Studies in Economic Transition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 153–195, 2020
This chapter assesses the characteristics of Russian outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and... more This chapter assesses the characteristics of Russian outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and multinationals in general and in particular in five EU-member Central and East European (CEE) states, including Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Besides official statistics, the research relies on company data analysed using Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and his typology of four motives. In addition to pull factors, the importance of push factors is emphasised. Weiner finds that Russian FDI in the five CEE countries is dominated by market-seeking and, to a lesser extent, efficiency-seeking projects carried out by state-owned or state-related private firms. Most Russian FDI has been done in hydrocarbons, iron, steel and machinery, but banking, software solutions, electronic production, real estate and even the light industry have also been targeted.
Knodt, M. and Kemmerzell, J. (Eds.) Handbook of Energy Governance in Europe. Cham: Springer: 737–768, 2022
Hungarian energy governance conveys a unique disposition, filled with contradictions, lacking cla... more Hungarian energy governance conveys a unique disposition, filled with contradictions, lacking clarity, but reflecting centralized control at the highest echelons of politics. Like many of its Central and Eastern European (CEE) neighbors, it is still entrenched in preexisting producer-consumer relations that shape its amicable relations with Russia, while its accession to the European Union has led it to take on disruptive climate and energy policy targets. The country’s energy transition has been unfolding slowly, as the government maintains a moderate pace of action. The diffusion of renewables continues to unfold in the shadow of other historical legacies, most prominently Russia-sourced nuclear power technology, natural gas, and oil. Power and control over energy corporations is concentrated in the hands of those closely aligned with the government, and multilevel governance is subordinated to anticipate or execute the objectives dictated by political leaders. Challenges mount in the Hungarian sector as we move towards the 2030 and 2050 EU decarbonization targets, which will pressure the government to implement much more disruptive measures, severing and rewriting historical energy-based ties.
In Mišík, M. and Oravcová, V. (Eds.) From Economic to Energy Transition: Three Decades of Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 211–245, 2021
This chapter examines the transition to low-carbon electricity in Poland and Hungary from a secur... more This chapter examines the transition to low-carbon electricity in Poland and Hungary from a security–of–supply point of view. Despite large differences in emphasis, both countries aim to increase electricity generation, decrease import dependence and reduce or eliminate coal-based electricity, while turning to renewables and nuclear energy. In Poland, instead of a coal-dominated electricity mix accompanied by wind, natural gas and biomass, a coal–wind–natural gas–nuclear portfolio may emerge by 2040. In Hungary, the nuclear–natural gas–coal–biomass composition is scheduled to transform into a nuclear–solar–biomass–natural gas focus. While electricity is expected to be predominantly low-carbon in Hungary in 2040, such sources may provide only a bit more than half of the Polish power generation.
In Hungary, regulated energy prices have been crucial in supplying electricity, district heating ... more In Hungary, regulated energy prices have been crucial in supplying electricity, district heating and natural gas to households, and as a result of a utility cost reduction programme, implemented in several stages starting from 2013, a sharp decline has been seen in these prices. However, this state intervention was performed without a strong policy background and the energy policy documents were just later adjusted to the prevailing situation. This paper focuses on the direct and indirect effects of this programme. The logarithmic mean Divisia index (LMDI) method is applied to decompose the absolute change in residential energy consumption between 2010 and 2017. We calculate price, intensive structure, extensive structure, expenditure and population effects. The results are in line with our expectations that decreasing energy prices for households had a positive impact on their energy use in the first few years. Overall, it induced an additional energy use of as much as 18.9 PJ between 2013 and 2017, while residential energy consumption stood at 263 PJ in 2017. We find that the state intervention created a new situation where the ratio of residential expenditure on energy services to total expenditure significantly decreased, the inflation rate declined and the economic and income situation of the majority, especially that of the middle class, considerably improved. However, the efficiency of the applied measures is still doubtful and several negative effects have also been detected. The utility cost reduction programme discourages energy conservation and energy efficiency; erodes the competitiveness of renewables; reduces gross capital formation in the energy sector; deteriorates security of supply; and increases energy prices for non-household customers. Despite these drawbacks, the utility cost reduction programme is expected to continue with some adjustments at most.
Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право [Outlines of Global Transformations: politics, economics, law], Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 138-163, Jun 2019
Commercial and geopolitical realities drive Central and East European (CEE) countries to reduce d... more Commercial and geopolitical realities drive Central and East European (CEE) countries to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports and enhance security of supply. While, in general, these countries are heavily dependent on Russian gas, they have different conditions, varying approaches towards dependence and security of supply, and thus give differing energy policy answers. Diversification is a means of reducing dependence and enhancing security of supply. There are many types of diversification. To understand this complexity and assess CEE countries, we have developed a scheme of different CEE diversification options for Russian gas imports. In this article, we analyse these options and achievements for one specific country, Poland, which seeks a level of diversification that would enable ending Russian gas imports. We find that since the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken concrete action, and it has finally made huge progress in gas import source diversification. New pipeline and liquefied natural gas capacities could allow Poland to reach its goal, though the existing import portfolio still lacks a supply contract for Norwegian gas imports to be supplied through the yet-to-be-built Danish–Polish Baltic Pipe. Without these amounts, Russian supplies could be necessary, or at least Russian molecule supplies. In contrast, domestic gas production does not seem to provide a grounding for diversification. Albeit energy efficiency and conservation are significant opportunities, reducing total gas consumption is also not possible, mainly due to the movement away from coal. From this point of view, sectoral diversification has limited real relevance, as it can only limit further gas demand growth. With the termination of large-quantity long-term Russian gas supplies, transit diversification will also bear less importance. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the termination of Russian (long-term) gas supplies will actually serve security of supply, as diversification alone does not inevitably lead to achieving this goal.
This paper aims to assess the security of stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the three... more This paper aims to assess the security of stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the three-dimensional approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability. The main focus is on primary energy fuels in relation to electricity, but the approach is also applied, in part, to electricity itself. It is shown how select influencing factors affect the choices made from among security of supply dimensions. Although providing a source-by-source review, special attention is paid to nuclear energy and natural gas. For a long time, natural gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of security of energy supply. Thus, gas diversification has become a key issue, analysed here also by using my own gas diversification scheme. I find that considerable progress has been made in this area. However, along with the 2014 decision on the construction of new units at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks II), aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in Hungarian electricity supplies, the energy agenda has changed considerably. With Paks II, Hungary’s dependence will both decrease and increase – as new types of risks emerge. In such circumstances, a Nuclear–Solar/Biomass–Natural Gas concept of the electricity mix seems to be emerging in Hungary.
Investigating the Russian economic footprint through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and... more Investigating the Russian economic footprint through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and the activities of Russian multinationals has not become either outdated or less interesting, even though, understandably, most of the current attention on Russian influence in Europe has been focused on direct interference in political affairs. This paper is the second of a four-part series that outlines the international expansion of Russian multinationals in five EU-member Central and East European (CEE) states, i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Here, the focus is on the pull factors responsible for Russian FDI inflows into these countries, as well as on the sectors in which investments are made. In doing so, the research relies on company data analysed using Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of international production and his typology of four motives behind FDI. We find that most Russian FDI has been done in hydrocarbons, iron, steel and machinery, but banking, software solutions, electronic production, real estate and even the light industry have also been targeted. Investment is dominated by market-seeking and, to a lesser extent, efficiency-seeking projects carried out by state-owned or state-related private firms. There are a limited number of innovative private Russian companies on the market that show features similar to those of multinationals from developed countries.
In Shentov, O., Stefanov, R. and Vladimirov, M. (Eds.) The Russian Economic Grip on Central and Eastern Europe. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series) Abingdon – New York: Routledge: 136–150., Jan 1, 2019
Hungary has become a showcase for Russian energy statecraft in Central and Eastern Europe over th... more Hungary has become a showcase for Russian energy statecraft in Central and Eastern Europe over the last decade. Russian–Hungarian relations have developed in a vociferous and spectacular manner, demonstrating a broad understanding between the two leaders in world policy and economic matters. This turn of events, however, is astonishing given the small-scale economic underpinnings of bilateral relations and lack of clear business vision. This paper outlines a new kind of Russian influence-building through the Hungarian case. It maps out major milestones and interprets the construction process of Moscow’s regional power in an environment highly integrated into the Western value chains and once dominated by foreign multinationals. The paper finds that (a) the impetus for engagement came from both the Hungarian and Russian sides; (b) a successful transition from communism and smooth integration into Western value chains do not shield entirely against Russian leverage; (c) energy is the field where Russia can permanently preserve its credibility; and (d) Western powers and institutions have little leverage to stop this process. The question remains whether Russia’s energy statecraft in Hungary has irreversible features or it is only a temporary phenomenon that may disappear when political conditions change.
Poland entered the twenty-first century with an unsustainable energy/electricity mix, strongly ov... more Poland entered the twenty-first century with an unsustainable energy/electricity mix, strongly over-dependent on coal. This situation seems to be changing very slowly, while there are multiple factors that make it imperative for the issue to be urgently addressed. On the one hand, this paper aims to assess the security of the stationary fuel supply by applying the conventional three-dimensional approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability. On the other, we plan to use our own scheme to analyse gas diversification (Weiner, 2017: 6), i.e. a fuel which, alongside coal, is a very sensitive issue linked to the security of the Polish electric power fuel supply. We demonstrate that the three-dimensional approach is also appropriate for addressing the issue of supply security in the case of a country with a securitized energy agenda based on fears of problems with the availability and affordability of Russian gas supplies. It also highlights Poland’s concern over foreign technological reliance regarding renewables production. We show how the energy perspective, the institutional context, as well as perceptions regarding threat, dependence and Russia influence choices made from among different security of supply dimensions. We find that though the role of coal will surely decrease, there is great uncertainty about Poland’s energy policy and security of supply because of deficiencies in infrastructure and the unknown future role of the particular fuels in the energy/electricity mix, also expected to include nuclear. We can observe that every energy policy step possible is being taken to maintain the role of coal, and Poland moves toward sustainability only as much and as soon as it is required by its EU membership. Not only does the coal industry capture Poland’s energy policy, but also geopolitical considerations cement reliance on coal, providing low energy import dependence. Regarding gas, we find that since the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken action to diversify its gas supplies, and it has finally achieved results, but there is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding Russian gas imports.
For a long time, gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of secu... more For a long time, gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of security of energy supply; thus, gas diversification has become a key issue. However, along with the 2014 decision on the construction of new units at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks-2), the energy agenda has changed considerably. Paks-2 will have a decisive role in ensuring security of supply, and, in fact, it has already begun to perform a role in energy decisions. This paper aims to assess, on the one hand, the security of the stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the conventional three-dimensional approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability, and, on the other, use our own gas diversification scheme to analyse the issue of gas diversification. We find that considerable progress has been made on gas diversification, and Paks-2 can also be included in our diversification scheme as a kind of sectoral diversification option. Prior to the Paks-2 decision, Hungary had followed an upward trajectory for its security of supply, despite certain negative developments. With Paks-2, Hungary’s dependence will both decrease and increase – as new types of risks emerge. There is great uncertainty about Hungary’s energy policies and security of supply, with the role of coal, gas and renewables in the energy/electricity mix still not settled. Their future is expected to be heavily dependent on political decisions rather than energy market factors, though energy market uncertainties are also high.
In: Mišík, M., Figulová, A. (Eds.) EU Energy and Climate Policy after Covid-19 and the Invasion of Ukraine: Decarbonisation and Security in Transition. Routledge: Abingdon – New York: 119–137, Oct 14, 2024
Russia deployed its ‘gas weapon’ to coerce European states into supporting its political agenda f... more Russia deployed its ‘gas weapon’ to coerce European states into supporting its political agenda following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This chapter explores the Kremlin’s intentions and the responses of Central and East European countries with relatively pro-Russian politics prior to the war. Russia aimed to minimise the target country’s contribution to Ukraine’s war efforts and support of Western sanctions, while nudging them to maintain cooperation. The form and impact of Russia’s actions differed based on the socio-political contexts, which are illustrated with three case studies: Hungary, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Findings are theorised with the use of analytical framework developed by Crawford and Klotz in 1999 that identifies four models of influence – ‘compellance’, ‘normative communication’, ‘resource denial’, and ‘political fracture’. The cases are not clear-cut but, broadly speaking, each falls into one of three categories – Hungary into the normative communication, Serbia into the resource denial, and Bulgaria into political fracture – based on predominant patterns, while compellance can be perceived in each country. Domestic and international policy, energy politics, and the characteristics of energy systems in the target countries all shape sanction design in addition to which the dominant political leadership’s penetration of domestic society is especially pertinent in shaping the sanction design, its effect, and the responses of the receiver of the sanctions.
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Jul 31, 2024
The Eastern enlargements of the EU increased the bloc's dependency on Russian gas and contributed... more The Eastern enlargements of the EU increased the bloc's dependency on Russian gas and contributed to a more cautious attitude towards these supplies. This paper assesses the Russian gas dependency of the 11 Central and East European new member states according to the ambition and execution of their national energy strategies and compares it to the gas dependency shifts in the old member states. Two composite indicators of gas dependency-one for supply and one for demand-based on nine individual indicators were used for this evaluation, calculated for 2004, 2019, and 2022. We find that the new member states mostly reduced gas dependency through supply-side measures, while old member states increased dependency through some combination of worsening supply-or demand-side situations until Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The behaviour of member states was influenced by different perceptions of vulnerability and a varying sense of threat in the prewar period. The old member states did not perceive their Russian gas dependency as a significant risk, whereas the new member states viewed this as a high-risk factor. New gas infrastructure capacity has contributed to diversification from Russia, but reducing gas demand did not receive much attention before the invasion.
Politics in Central Europe, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 271-301, 2024
International business research is usually focused on various aspects of foreign direct investmen... more International business research is usually focused on various aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI) by non-European emerging-market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) without attention to non-traditional factors pulling them into host countries. The objective of this paper is to examine the investments of EMNEs from two source countries, China and Russia, within the Visegrad Four (V4) economies. Based on interviews and a qualitative document analysis, it explores the main characteristics of their investments into the V4, including host-country determinants by focusing on macroeconomic, institutional and political factors. The paper finds that these factors do influence EMNEs’ investment practices, and that they correlate with the changing quality of political relations, but this influence needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Energy, Sustainability and Society, Vol. 14, 30, Jun 6, 2024
Background
To curb human-made carbon-dioxide emissions, the European Union will introduce carbon ... more Background To curb human-made carbon-dioxide emissions, the European Union will introduce carbon pricing for buildings and transport in 2027. Central and East European (CEE) countries are pressured to embark on ambitious decarbonization pathways leading to carbon-neutral economies by 2050. This paper is the first to investigate the public acceptance of and the willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon tax in a CEE country, Hungary. It analyzes the support-increasing effects of five revenue-recycling mechanisms (tax cuts, green spending, support for poor households, funding for health care and education, and debt reduction), a wider range than covered in previous studies. A national face-to-face survey of 3013 adults on public attitudes to climate change, conducted in summer 2022, is the main method of data collection. This is combined with secondary analysis of related statistics and documentary analysis of relevant materials.
Results The results show low public acceptance, with only a modest increase from 20.3% to 27.3% due to revenue recycling. This is accompanied by low WTP values and WTP increases. All these are lower than those found in Western surveys. A novel empirical result is the relative popularity of public health care and education in revenue recycling, though differences in revenue-recycling preferences are apparent between those who accept a carbon tax even without a redistribution mechanism and those who are willing to pay only if redistribution is included. Green spending also performed relatively well, while supporting the poor fared less well, albeit with relatively high WTP values. Reducing taxes and public debt were the least likely to instigate carbon-tax acceptance.
Conclusions The results highlight the importance of carefully assessing the distributional impact of implementing carbon pricing mechanisms and thoroughly integrating social considerations into climate policy. Based on this, as well as the analysis of the social conditions and political economy of climate policy development in Hungary, policies—such as a gradually increasing carbon tax, social cushioning, legal earmarking of carbon-tax revenues, and policy bundling—are proposed to make carbon pricing socially tolerable and politically acceptable. The findings and conclusions might also be relevant for other parts of the CEE region.
In: Casanova, L. and Miroux, A. (Eds.) Emerging Market Multinationals Report 2022: Reinventing Global Value Chains. Ithaca, NY, USA: Emerging Markets Institute, S.C. Johnson College of Business, Cornell University: 110–117, https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112770, Nov 1, 2022
This chapter examines how the sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine have... more This chapter examines how the sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine have impacted Russian firms, their direct investment abroad, and Hungarian business presence in Russia, and, in particular, how Russian and Hungarian firms have adjusted to this new reality. It highlights the main commonalities, such as the difficulties of access to finance transactions and the interruption of logistics and supply chains, especially in the areas of technology goods. The chapter also looks at the main differences between Russia and Hungary. In Russia, large firms with exposure to the West have been facing major difficulties in their international operations and have focused their efforts on mitigating the effects of sanctions. On the other side, Hungarian firms investing in and/or exporting to Russia typically try to hold their ground in the Russian market. They are attempting to overcome difficulties such as risks of foreign exchange and non-payment, issues with logistics and supply chain disruptions, problems with banking and financial transactions, increased time and costs of international shipping due to altered routing, additional administrative burdens at the border, air travel restrictions, and a constant need for information to adapt to sanctions and counter-sanctions. It is uncertain whether the generally positive attitude of Hungarian firms towards staying (and even taking advantage of the situation to expand further) will change over time. The challenges may become too great to take on, not only for smaller, resource-poor, and less-experienced firms, but also for stronger enterprises.
Available at https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112770
In: Kaeding, M., Pollak, J., Schmidt, P. (Eds.) The Future of Europe and Russia: Views from the Capitals. Cham: Springer: 51–54, Jul 7, 2022
Hungary has the typical national contours that feature in relations between Central and East Euro... more Hungary has the typical national contours that feature in relations between Central and East European (CEE) EU Member States and Russia. Troublesome historical legacies, relatively minor and narrowing economic relations (except for energy) and sharp party divisions regarding the Russian nexus are generally shared features in CEE. What stands out within this setting are the inherently domestic policy patterns of bilateral relations, especially as far as interrelations between Viktor Orbán’s illiberal leanings along with Euroscepticism and Moscow’s foreign policy agenda are concerned. Viktor Orbán’s and Vladimir Putin’s mindsets partially overlap, creating some ideological foundations for an opportunistic relationship.
Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 32-49, Mar 28, 2022
South-Eastern European (SEE) countries are typically keen to maintain the status quo in their ene... more South-Eastern European (SEE) countries are typically keen to maintain the status quo in their energy systems, generally characterized by underinvestment, high coal share and utility affordability needs. Their energy mixes have historically been determined by external factors, currently mainly related to decarbonization pressure. This article assesses how the EU’s ongoing decarbonization-driven withdrawal from supporting natural gas projects shapes fuel choices in nine selected SEE countries and may have geopolitical consequences. It is based on more than 70 interviews with stakeholders from these countries, EU institutions, and international organizations. In exploring and theorizing the geopolitical ramifications of the energy transition in SEE, it applies a novel approach, which draws on theories of power and the concept of an assemblage, which we link to theories on entanglement and disentanglement. We find that the EU’s climate policy significantly changes local infrastructural assemblages and the EU’s disentanglement from natural gas goes against Russian and US efforts. By wielding its power to support such an energy transition, the EU has shifted the bipolar system ‘EU/US vis-à-vis Russia’ defined along a single geopolitical ruleset (supply security), to a tripolar disposition ‘EU-Russia-USA’ defined along two rulesets (supply security and climate policy). In addition, China has become involved. States will thus have to take crucial energy policy decisions in a new geopolitical context.
Energy Strategy Reviews, Vol. 40, 100817, Mar 31, 2022
In Hungary, regulated energy prices fell by a quarter in 2013–2014 due to a state intervention. T... more In Hungary, regulated energy prices fell by a quarter in 2013–2014 due to a state intervention. The objective of this article is to measure the effects of this change on the Hungarian residential energy consumption and assess the rationale, the policy context and other consequences of such an intervention. We decompose residential energy-use change in 2010–2018. We calculate 13.2 PJ of excess consumption relating to the programme, and find that the higher income deciles benefited the most from the lower prices compared to low-income households using market-priced lower-quality fuels and living in inefficient homes. The intervention lacked a strong policy background. The energy policy documents were later adjusted to the situation and finally the programme was linked to energy poverty. We point to price-setting failures and discrepancies between energy-efficiency goals and measures as well as negative effects of these and the programme itself. In the future, the policy emphasis should be on energy efficiency and supporting those really in need.
In: Szunomár, Á. (Ed.) Emerging-market Multinational Enterprises in East Central Europe. Studies in Economic Transition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 313–321, 2020
Although the current status of East Central European (ECE) countries in the process and level of ... more Although the current status of East Central European (ECE) countries in the process and level of their integration into global business varies, a rather general phenomenon is the exhaustion of the foreign direct investment (FDI)-led development model, at least its dominant version of the 1990s and early 2000s. On the one hand, this is a result of multinational affiliates’ isolated and strongly integrated presence in a strictly designed international cooperation system with no physical contact with local firms to deliver spillovers. On the other hand, even those affiliates that are entangled in the development of local supplier networks deliver spillovers only to a limited level. As a consequence, they are not becoming primary players of innovative local business clusters, while the design of affiliates’ activity range is usually specialized on low value-added segments of global value chains (GVC).
In: Szunomár, Á. (Ed.) Emerging-market Multinational Enterprises in East Central Europe. Studies in Economic Transition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 153–195, 2020
This chapter assesses the characteristics of Russian outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and... more This chapter assesses the characteristics of Russian outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and multinationals in general and in particular in five EU-member Central and East European (CEE) states, including Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Besides official statistics, the research relies on company data analysed using Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and his typology of four motives. In addition to pull factors, the importance of push factors is emphasised. Weiner finds that Russian FDI in the five CEE countries is dominated by market-seeking and, to a lesser extent, efficiency-seeking projects carried out by state-owned or state-related private firms. Most Russian FDI has been done in hydrocarbons, iron, steel and machinery, but banking, software solutions, electronic production, real estate and even the light industry have also been targeted.
Knodt, M. and Kemmerzell, J. (Eds.) Handbook of Energy Governance in Europe. Cham: Springer: 737–768, 2022
Hungarian energy governance conveys a unique disposition, filled with contradictions, lacking cla... more Hungarian energy governance conveys a unique disposition, filled with contradictions, lacking clarity, but reflecting centralized control at the highest echelons of politics. Like many of its Central and Eastern European (CEE) neighbors, it is still entrenched in preexisting producer-consumer relations that shape its amicable relations with Russia, while its accession to the European Union has led it to take on disruptive climate and energy policy targets. The country’s energy transition has been unfolding slowly, as the government maintains a moderate pace of action. The diffusion of renewables continues to unfold in the shadow of other historical legacies, most prominently Russia-sourced nuclear power technology, natural gas, and oil. Power and control over energy corporations is concentrated in the hands of those closely aligned with the government, and multilevel governance is subordinated to anticipate or execute the objectives dictated by political leaders. Challenges mount in the Hungarian sector as we move towards the 2030 and 2050 EU decarbonization targets, which will pressure the government to implement much more disruptive measures, severing and rewriting historical energy-based ties.
In Mišík, M. and Oravcová, V. (Eds.) From Economic to Energy Transition: Three Decades of Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 211–245, 2021
This chapter examines the transition to low-carbon electricity in Poland and Hungary from a secur... more This chapter examines the transition to low-carbon electricity in Poland and Hungary from a security–of–supply point of view. Despite large differences in emphasis, both countries aim to increase electricity generation, decrease import dependence and reduce or eliminate coal-based electricity, while turning to renewables and nuclear energy. In Poland, instead of a coal-dominated electricity mix accompanied by wind, natural gas and biomass, a coal–wind–natural gas–nuclear portfolio may emerge by 2040. In Hungary, the nuclear–natural gas–coal–biomass composition is scheduled to transform into a nuclear–solar–biomass–natural gas focus. While electricity is expected to be predominantly low-carbon in Hungary in 2040, such sources may provide only a bit more than half of the Polish power generation.
In Hungary, regulated energy prices have been crucial in supplying electricity, district heating ... more In Hungary, regulated energy prices have been crucial in supplying electricity, district heating and natural gas to households, and as a result of a utility cost reduction programme, implemented in several stages starting from 2013, a sharp decline has been seen in these prices. However, this state intervention was performed without a strong policy background and the energy policy documents were just later adjusted to the prevailing situation. This paper focuses on the direct and indirect effects of this programme. The logarithmic mean Divisia index (LMDI) method is applied to decompose the absolute change in residential energy consumption between 2010 and 2017. We calculate price, intensive structure, extensive structure, expenditure and population effects. The results are in line with our expectations that decreasing energy prices for households had a positive impact on their energy use in the first few years. Overall, it induced an additional energy use of as much as 18.9 PJ between 2013 and 2017, while residential energy consumption stood at 263 PJ in 2017. We find that the state intervention created a new situation where the ratio of residential expenditure on energy services to total expenditure significantly decreased, the inflation rate declined and the economic and income situation of the majority, especially that of the middle class, considerably improved. However, the efficiency of the applied measures is still doubtful and several negative effects have also been detected. The utility cost reduction programme discourages energy conservation and energy efficiency; erodes the competitiveness of renewables; reduces gross capital formation in the energy sector; deteriorates security of supply; and increases energy prices for non-household customers. Despite these drawbacks, the utility cost reduction programme is expected to continue with some adjustments at most.
Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право [Outlines of Global Transformations: politics, economics, law], Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 138-163, Jun 2019
Commercial and geopolitical realities drive Central and East European (CEE) countries to reduce d... more Commercial and geopolitical realities drive Central and East European (CEE) countries to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports and enhance security of supply. While, in general, these countries are heavily dependent on Russian gas, they have different conditions, varying approaches towards dependence and security of supply, and thus give differing energy policy answers. Diversification is a means of reducing dependence and enhancing security of supply. There are many types of diversification. To understand this complexity and assess CEE countries, we have developed a scheme of different CEE diversification options for Russian gas imports. In this article, we analyse these options and achievements for one specific country, Poland, which seeks a level of diversification that would enable ending Russian gas imports. We find that since the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken concrete action, and it has finally made huge progress in gas import source diversification. New pipeline and liquefied natural gas capacities could allow Poland to reach its goal, though the existing import portfolio still lacks a supply contract for Norwegian gas imports to be supplied through the yet-to-be-built Danish–Polish Baltic Pipe. Without these amounts, Russian supplies could be necessary, or at least Russian molecule supplies. In contrast, domestic gas production does not seem to provide a grounding for diversification. Albeit energy efficiency and conservation are significant opportunities, reducing total gas consumption is also not possible, mainly due to the movement away from coal. From this point of view, sectoral diversification has limited real relevance, as it can only limit further gas demand growth. With the termination of large-quantity long-term Russian gas supplies, transit diversification will also bear less importance. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the termination of Russian (long-term) gas supplies will actually serve security of supply, as diversification alone does not inevitably lead to achieving this goal.
This paper aims to assess the security of stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the three... more This paper aims to assess the security of stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the three-dimensional approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability. The main focus is on primary energy fuels in relation to electricity, but the approach is also applied, in part, to electricity itself. It is shown how select influencing factors affect the choices made from among security of supply dimensions. Although providing a source-by-source review, special attention is paid to nuclear energy and natural gas. For a long time, natural gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of security of energy supply. Thus, gas diversification has become a key issue, analysed here also by using my own gas diversification scheme. I find that considerable progress has been made in this area. However, along with the 2014 decision on the construction of new units at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks II), aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in Hungarian electricity supplies, the energy agenda has changed considerably. With Paks II, Hungary’s dependence will both decrease and increase – as new types of risks emerge. In such circumstances, a Nuclear–Solar/Biomass–Natural Gas concept of the electricity mix seems to be emerging in Hungary.
Investigating the Russian economic footprint through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and... more Investigating the Russian economic footprint through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and the activities of Russian multinationals has not become either outdated or less interesting, even though, understandably, most of the current attention on Russian influence in Europe has been focused on direct interference in political affairs. This paper is the second of a four-part series that outlines the international expansion of Russian multinationals in five EU-member Central and East European (CEE) states, i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Here, the focus is on the pull factors responsible for Russian FDI inflows into these countries, as well as on the sectors in which investments are made. In doing so, the research relies on company data analysed using Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of international production and his typology of four motives behind FDI. We find that most Russian FDI has been done in hydrocarbons, iron, steel and machinery, but banking, software solutions, electronic production, real estate and even the light industry have also been targeted. Investment is dominated by market-seeking and, to a lesser extent, efficiency-seeking projects carried out by state-owned or state-related private firms. There are a limited number of innovative private Russian companies on the market that show features similar to those of multinationals from developed countries.
In Shentov, O., Stefanov, R. and Vladimirov, M. (Eds.) The Russian Economic Grip on Central and Eastern Europe. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series) Abingdon – New York: Routledge: 136–150., Jan 1, 2019
Hungary has become a showcase for Russian energy statecraft in Central and Eastern Europe over th... more Hungary has become a showcase for Russian energy statecraft in Central and Eastern Europe over the last decade. Russian–Hungarian relations have developed in a vociferous and spectacular manner, demonstrating a broad understanding between the two leaders in world policy and economic matters. This turn of events, however, is astonishing given the small-scale economic underpinnings of bilateral relations and lack of clear business vision. This paper outlines a new kind of Russian influence-building through the Hungarian case. It maps out major milestones and interprets the construction process of Moscow’s regional power in an environment highly integrated into the Western value chains and once dominated by foreign multinationals. The paper finds that (a) the impetus for engagement came from both the Hungarian and Russian sides; (b) a successful transition from communism and smooth integration into Western value chains do not shield entirely against Russian leverage; (c) energy is the field where Russia can permanently preserve its credibility; and (d) Western powers and institutions have little leverage to stop this process. The question remains whether Russia’s energy statecraft in Hungary has irreversible features or it is only a temporary phenomenon that may disappear when political conditions change.
Poland entered the twenty-first century with an unsustainable energy/electricity mix, strongly ov... more Poland entered the twenty-first century with an unsustainable energy/electricity mix, strongly over-dependent on coal. This situation seems to be changing very slowly, while there are multiple factors that make it imperative for the issue to be urgently addressed. On the one hand, this paper aims to assess the security of the stationary fuel supply by applying the conventional three-dimensional approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability. On the other, we plan to use our own scheme to analyse gas diversification (Weiner, 2017: 6), i.e. a fuel which, alongside coal, is a very sensitive issue linked to the security of the Polish electric power fuel supply. We demonstrate that the three-dimensional approach is also appropriate for addressing the issue of supply security in the case of a country with a securitized energy agenda based on fears of problems with the availability and affordability of Russian gas supplies. It also highlights Poland’s concern over foreign technological reliance regarding renewables production. We show how the energy perspective, the institutional context, as well as perceptions regarding threat, dependence and Russia influence choices made from among different security of supply dimensions. We find that though the role of coal will surely decrease, there is great uncertainty about Poland’s energy policy and security of supply because of deficiencies in infrastructure and the unknown future role of the particular fuels in the energy/electricity mix, also expected to include nuclear. We can observe that every energy policy step possible is being taken to maintain the role of coal, and Poland moves toward sustainability only as much and as soon as it is required by its EU membership. Not only does the coal industry capture Poland’s energy policy, but also geopolitical considerations cement reliance on coal, providing low energy import dependence. Regarding gas, we find that since the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken action to diversify its gas supplies, and it has finally achieved results, but there is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding Russian gas imports.
For a long time, gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of secu... more For a long time, gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of security of energy supply; thus, gas diversification has become a key issue. However, along with the 2014 decision on the construction of new units at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks-2), the energy agenda has changed considerably. Paks-2 will have a decisive role in ensuring security of supply, and, in fact, it has already begun to perform a role in energy decisions. This paper aims to assess, on the one hand, the security of the stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the conventional three-dimensional approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability, and, on the other, use our own gas diversification scheme to analyse the issue of gas diversification. We find that considerable progress has been made on gas diversification, and Paks-2 can also be included in our diversification scheme as a kind of sectoral diversification option. Prior to the Paks-2 decision, Hungary had followed an upward trajectory for its security of supply, despite certain negative developments. With Paks-2, Hungary’s dependence will both decrease and increase – as new types of risks emerge. There is great uncertainty about Hungary’s energy policies and security of supply, with the role of coal, gas and renewables in the energy/electricity mix still not settled. Their future is expected to be heavily dependent on political decisions rather than energy market factors, though energy market uncertainties are also high.
Вишеградская Европа [Visegrad Europe] (ISSN 2686-9756), Vol. 4, No. 2 (14), pp. 24-33, 2022
В статье оценивается влияние военной спецоперации на Украине в 2022 г. на венгерские компании, ин... more В статье оценивается влияние военной спецоперации на Украине в 2022 г. на венгерские компании, инвестирующие в России, и их приспособление к данной новой реальности. В начале кратко описывается роль России в прямых иностранных инвестициях (ПИИ) из Венгрии, а также приводятся сведения об основных венгерских компаниях-инвесторах ПИИ и их дочерних компаниях в России. Затем рассматриваются трудности, с которыми венгерский бизнес сталкивается на российском рынке. С помощью коротких тематических исследований анализируется как три ведущих венгерских игрока — OTP Group в банковском секторе, фармацевтическая компания Richter и нефтегазовая компания MOL — отреагировали на эти вызовы. Установлено, что венгерские компании, как правило, стараются остаться на российском рынке. Они пытаются преодолеть такие трудности, как курсовые риски и неплатежи, проблемы с логистикой и сбои в цепи поставок, вопросы с банковскими и финансовыми операциями, увеличение времени и расходов на международные перевозки из-за изменения маршрутов, дополнительное административное бремя в пунктах пропуска на границе, ограничения на авиаперелеты, а также постоянную потребность в информации для адаптации к западным санкциям и российским контрмерам. Неясно, как изменится со временем их в целом позитивное отношение к тому, чтобы остаться (и даже воспользоваться нынешней ситуацией для дальнейшего расширения). Проблемы могут стать слишком серьезными не только для небольших, бедных ресурсами и менее опытных фирм, но и для более сильных предприятий. Каждый из трех крупнейших венгерских инвесторов ПИИ в России, рассмотренные в этой статье, по-своему оценивает ситуацию, но все продолжают сотрудничество с Россией, несмотря на санкции, контрмеры и внешнее политическое давление.
Современная Европа [Contemporary Europe] (ISSN 0201-7083), Vol. 18, No. 7 (79), pp. 131-141, 2017
Длительное время газ был топливом, к поставкам которого Венгрия была особенно чувствительна с точ... more Длительное время газ был топливом, к поставкам которого Венгрия была особенно чувствительна с точки зрения обеспечения безопасности энергоснабжения страны, в связи с чем существовала большая потребность в диверсификации газа. Но с принятием в 2014 г. решения о строительстве новых блоков на АЭС “Пакш” (“Пакш-2”) энергетическая повестка заметно изменилась. “Пакш-2” будет играть решающую роль в обеспечении энергобезопасности страны и уже сейчас влияет на принятие решений в энергетической сфере. В статье даётся оценка безопасности поставок топлива, используемого для генерации электроэнергии и тепла, а также диверсификации газа в Венгрии путём применения принятого трёхмерного подхода, включающего оценку физической и ценовой доступности и экологической устойчивости, а также с использованием собственной схемы диверсификации поставок газа. Автор приходит к выводу, что достигнут значительный прогресс в области диверсификации газа, а “Пакш-2” можно также включить в схему диверсификации как один из видов отраслевой диверсификации. До принятия решения о строительстве “Пакш-2” в Венгрии, несмотря на отдельные негативные события, наблюдался рост безопасности поставок. С Пакш-2 зависимость Венгрии как снизится, так и возрастёт, поскольку появятся новые виды рисков. Существует большая неопределённость в отношении энергетической политики и безопасности поставок в Венгрию в связи с неурегулированной ролью угля, газа и возобновляемых источников энергии в топливно-энергетическом балансе. Ожидается, что их будущее в значительной степени будет зависеть от политических решений, а не от факторов энергетического рынка, хотя неопределённость на энергетическом рынке также высока.
Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право [Outlines of Global Transformations: politics, economics, law], Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 138-163, Jun 2019
Коммерческие и геополитические реалии побуждают страны Центральной и Восточной Европы (ЦВЕ) снижа... more Коммерческие и геополитические реалии побуждают страны Центральной и Восточной Европы (ЦВЕ) снижать зависимость от российского импорта газа и повышать безопасность поставок. Хотя в целом эти страны сильно зависят от российского газа, у них разные условия, разные подходы к этой зависимости и безопасности поставок, и поэтому они дают разные ответы на вопросы энергетической политики. Диверсификация является способом снижения зависимости и повышения безопасности поставок. Существует много видов диверсификации. Чтобы понять эту сложность и оценить страны ЦВЕ, мы разработали схему различных вариантов диверсификации импорта российского газа в ЦВЕ. В этой статье мы анализируем эти варианты и достижения для одной конкретной страны, Польши, которая стремится к такому уровню диверсификации, который позволил бы прекратить импорт российского газа. Мы видим, что после российско-украинского газового кризиса в январе 2009 года Польша предприняла конкретные действия и наконец добилась огромного прогресса в диверсификации источников импорта газа. Новые трубопроводы и мощности по сжиженному природному газу могут позволить Польше достичь своей цели, хотя в существующем портфеле соглашений об импорте по-прежнему отсутствует контракт на поставку норвежского газа, который будет поставляться по еще не построенной датско-польской «Балтийской трубе». Без норвежских поставок могли бы потребоваться поставки, по крайней мере, в небольшом объеме газа с российским происхождением. Напротив, отечественная добыча газа, как представляется, не обеспечивает основы для диверсификации. Хотя энергоэффективность и энергосбережение являются значительными возможностями, сокращение общего потребления газа также невозможно, главным образом из-за отказа от угля. С этой точки зрения секторальная диверсификация имеет ограниченную реальную значимость, поскольку она может лишь ограничить дальнейший рост спроса на газ. С прекращением крупных долгосрочных поставок российского газа диверсификация транзита также будет иметь меньшее значение. Тем не менее еще предстоит выяснить, действительно ли прекращение российских (долгосрочных) поставок газа послужит обеспечению безопасности поставок, поскольку сама по себе диверсификация не обязательно ведет к достижению этой цели.
Современная Европа [Contemporary Europe] (ISSN 0201-7083), Vol. 17, No. 6 (72), pp. 116-124, 2016
В Центрально-Восточной Европе всегда уделялось особое внимание влиянию России как политическому, ... more В Центрально-Восточной Европе всегда уделялось особое внимание влиянию России как политическому, так и экономическому. Последнее относится главным образом к торговле и инвестициям. В данной статье автор измеряет присутствие российского капитала в Венгрии через прямые иностранные инвестиции (ПИИ). Отмечается, что российские прямые инвестиции в Венгрии в реальности больше, чем указывает официальная статистика, но общей картины это не меняет. Российские прямые инвестиции в Венгрии играют ограниченную роль – это подтверждает не только официальная статистика, но и данные компаний и аналитические исследования. Однако, как отмечает автор, есть вероятность, что в Венгрии может появиться новая форма присутствия российского капитала – крупный кредит, который будет предоставлен российской стороной на реализацию проекта по строительству новых блоков венгерской АЭС “Пакш” (проект “Пакш-2”); это будет иметь важные последствия как для венгерской стороны, так и для российско-венгерских отношений.
Современная Европа [Contemporary Europe] (ISSN 0201-7083), Vol. 16, No. 6 (66), pp. 60-75, 2015
В статье впервые затрагивается проблема присутствия российского капитала в вишеградских странах, ... more В статье впервые затрагивается проблема присутствия российского капитала в вишеградских странах, анализируется мотивация российских компаний, предпочитающих инвестировать за рубежом. Авторский коллектив собрал и проанализировал большой объём статистических данных о российских фирмах, имеющих офисы и производство на территории Венгрии, Польши, Словакии и Чехии, и специализированной литературы, который лег в основу оценочной части данного исследования. Авторы сумели сделать некоторые предварительные теоретические выводы об этом явлении, а именно о том, почему страны Вишеградской четвёрки являются столь привлекательными для российских инвестиций, несмотря на целый ряд неблагоприятных факторов местного и глобального масштаба.
A keleti bővítések hatására megugrott az Európai Unió függősége az orosz gáztól, és a közösség óv... more A keleti bővítések hatására megugrott az Európai Unió függősége az orosz gáztól, és a közösség óvatosabbá vált az orosz gázszállításokkal szemben. A tanulmány a 11 közép- és kelet-európai új tagállam oroszgáz-függőségét értékeli, figyelembe véve a nemzeti energiastratégiáikban a 2004. évi bővítés idején megfogalmazott célokat és azok megvalósítását. A gázfüggőség méréséhez egy kereslet- és egy kínálatoldali összetett mutatót használ két évre: 2004-re és 2019-re, utóbbi az utolsó teljes év két nagy válságesemény, a koronavírus-járvány és Oroszország ukrajnai háborúja előtt. A fő következtetés, hogy amíg az új tagállamok többnyire kínálati oldali intézkedésekkel csökkentették gázfüggőségüket, addig a régi tagállamokban nőtt a függőség a kínálati és keresleti mutatók különféle negatív tendenciáinak következtében. Az új gázinfrastruktúra-kapacitások hozzájárultak az új tagállamok kínálati és útvonal-diverzifikációjához, de a gázfelhasználás csökkentése nem kapott elegendő figyelmet Oroszország 2022. februári ukrajnai inváziójáig.
Nemzet és Biztonság – Biztonságpolitikai Szemle, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 84-107, Jul 10, 2024
Oroszország 2022. februári ukrajnai inváziója óta drámaian visszaestek az Európába irányuló orosz... more Oroszország 2022. februári ukrajnai inváziója óta drámaian visszaestek az Európába irányuló orosz gázszállítások. Tanulmányunk azzal foglalkozik, hogy Oroszország hogyan szankcionálta a gázfegyver bevetésével a háború előtt még viszonylag orosz-barát politikát folytató közép- és kelet-, illetve dél-európai államokat, és utóbbiak miként reagáltak erre. Oroszország szándéka az volt, hogy a célország minimalizálja a hozzájárulását Ukrajna honvédő erőfeszítéseihez és a nyugati szankciókhoz, illetve hogy tartsa fenn az együttműködést Oroszországgal. Magyarország, Bulgária és Szerbia esetének segítségével, valamint az N. C. Crawford és A. Klotz 1999-es írásában ismertetett négy befolyásolási modell – kényszerítés, normatív kommunikáció, erőforrás-megtagadás és politikai törés – alkalmazásával mutatjuk be, hogy milyen különbözően működnek a szankciók eltérő társadalmi-politikai kontextusban. Habár egyik eset sem kínál vegytiszta példát, a domináns jegyek alapján mind-egyik ország egy-egy modellt képvisel – Magyarország a normatív kommunikációt, Szerbia az erőforrás-megtagadást, Bulgária pedig a politikai törést –, míg az úgy-nevezett kényszerítés minden országban megjelent. A célország főbb vonatkozó ismérvei – bel- és külpolitika, energiapolitika, az energiarendszerek jellemzői – közül az állam behatolása a társadalomba különösen fontos szerepet játszott a szankciók kialakításában és hatásában, illetve a szankcionáltak válaszlépéseiben.
A tanulmany az orosz cegek visegradi orszagokban vegrehajtott beruhazasainak fő jellemzőit es mot... more A tanulmany az orosz cegek visegradi orszagokban vegrehajtott beruhazasainak fő jellemzőit es motivacioit vizsgalja. Fő kovetkeztetese, hogy a nemzetkozi befektetesek meglevő elmeletei - Dunning eklektikus paradigmajanak kivetelevel - kevesse kepesek megmagyarazni az orosz multinacionalis vallalatok visegradi orszagokbeli tevekenyseget. Ezert az orosz befektetők tulajdonosi előnyeit elsősorban a dunningi eklektikus paradigma segitsegevel elemzi, megfelelően igazitva azt az adott vallalati kor sajatossagaihoz. A cikk a statisztikai jellemzőkon tul a legfontosabb, visegradiakba befektető, orosz cegeket is bemutatja. Ezek kozott a kőolaj- es foldgaz-, az acelipari es atomenergetikai, valamint a piac- es erőforras-orientalt allami tulajdonu vagy allamhoz kozel allo orosz vallalatok hajtjak vegre a legjelentősebb beruhazasokat. Tovabba - bar joval kisebb szamban - jelen vannak innovativ orosz maganvallalatok is, amelyek sokban hasonlitanak a fejlett orszagok multinacionalis vallalataira....
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Papers in English by Csaba Weiner
To curb human-made carbon-dioxide emissions, the European Union will introduce carbon pricing for buildings and transport in 2027. Central and East European (CEE) countries are pressured to embark on ambitious decarbonization pathways leading to carbon-neutral economies by 2050. This paper is the first to investigate the public acceptance of and the willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon tax in a CEE country, Hungary. It analyzes the support-increasing effects of five revenue-recycling mechanisms (tax cuts, green spending, support for poor households, funding for health care and education, and debt reduction), a wider range than covered in previous studies. A national face-to-face survey of 3013 adults on public attitudes to climate change, conducted in summer 2022, is the main method of data collection. This is combined with secondary analysis of related statistics and documentary analysis of relevant materials.
Results
The results show low public acceptance, with only a modest increase from 20.3% to 27.3% due to revenue recycling. This is accompanied by low WTP values and WTP increases. All these are lower than those found in Western surveys. A novel empirical result is the relative popularity of public health care and education in revenue recycling, though differences in revenue-recycling preferences are apparent between those who accept a carbon tax even without a redistribution mechanism and those who are willing to pay only if redistribution is included. Green spending also performed relatively well, while supporting the poor fared less well, albeit with relatively high WTP values. Reducing taxes and public debt were the least likely to instigate carbon-tax acceptance.
Conclusions
The results highlight the importance of carefully assessing the distributional impact of implementing carbon pricing mechanisms and thoroughly integrating social considerations into climate policy. Based on this, as well as the analysis of the social conditions and political economy of climate policy development in Hungary, policies—such as a gradually increasing carbon tax, social cushioning, legal earmarking of carbon-tax revenues, and policy bundling—are proposed to make carbon pricing socially tolerable and politically acceptable. The findings and conclusions might also be relevant for other parts of the CEE region.
Available at https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112770
To curb human-made carbon-dioxide emissions, the European Union will introduce carbon pricing for buildings and transport in 2027. Central and East European (CEE) countries are pressured to embark on ambitious decarbonization pathways leading to carbon-neutral economies by 2050. This paper is the first to investigate the public acceptance of and the willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon tax in a CEE country, Hungary. It analyzes the support-increasing effects of five revenue-recycling mechanisms (tax cuts, green spending, support for poor households, funding for health care and education, and debt reduction), a wider range than covered in previous studies. A national face-to-face survey of 3013 adults on public attitudes to climate change, conducted in summer 2022, is the main method of data collection. This is combined with secondary analysis of related statistics and documentary analysis of relevant materials.
Results
The results show low public acceptance, with only a modest increase from 20.3% to 27.3% due to revenue recycling. This is accompanied by low WTP values and WTP increases. All these are lower than those found in Western surveys. A novel empirical result is the relative popularity of public health care and education in revenue recycling, though differences in revenue-recycling preferences are apparent between those who accept a carbon tax even without a redistribution mechanism and those who are willing to pay only if redistribution is included. Green spending also performed relatively well, while supporting the poor fared less well, albeit with relatively high WTP values. Reducing taxes and public debt were the least likely to instigate carbon-tax acceptance.
Conclusions
The results highlight the importance of carefully assessing the distributional impact of implementing carbon pricing mechanisms and thoroughly integrating social considerations into climate policy. Based on this, as well as the analysis of the social conditions and political economy of climate policy development in Hungary, policies—such as a gradually increasing carbon tax, social cushioning, legal earmarking of carbon-tax revenues, and policy bundling—are proposed to make carbon pricing socially tolerable and politically acceptable. The findings and conclusions might also be relevant for other parts of the CEE region.
Available at https://hdl.handle.net/1813/112770