This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the... more
This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person
methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person
experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size
and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for
taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background
assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological
preliminaries.
In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements
are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel,
2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making
phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, which
are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal
judgements may still be statistically less reliable than
perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that
Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical
unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between
reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending
phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism.
Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal
judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments
can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and
discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors,
minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability.
In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use
first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that
distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an
awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or
retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of
uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for
the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides
support for a subjectivist account of variance in size
experience.
In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish
between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of
self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I
use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate
an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at
where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is
not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor
the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience
that I seem to be looking from here.
Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The
question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience
of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience
the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself.
I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the
visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms
to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the
subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem
to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie
evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that
contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a
direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend.
methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person
experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size
and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for
taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background
assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological
preliminaries.
In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements
are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel,
2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making
phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, which
are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal
judgements may still be statistically less reliable than
perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that
Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical
unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between
reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending
phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism.
Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal
judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments
can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and
discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors,
minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability.
In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use
first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that
distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an
awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or
retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of
uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for
the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides
support for a subjectivist account of variance in size
experience.
In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish
between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of
self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I
use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate
an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at
where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is
not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor
the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience
that I seem to be looking from here.
Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The
question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience
of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience
the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself.
I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the
visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms
to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the
subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem
to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie
evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that
contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a
direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend.
