Career Learning Spine

Facts are not always present in the representation of information. Tensions between truth and representation can be explored using examples from the game Dungeons & Dragons (D&D). Tabletop role-playing games such as D&D are used as a form of escapism entertainment. In the game players tell a collaborative story involving the liberal use of descriptive violence. Critics of the game use the stylised barbarity to imply D&D is a gateway to the perpetration of real world violence. When thinking critically on any form of communication it is important to consider the objectivity of the presentation. However, the problem with objectivity is that the depth of examples used will often speak to the subjectivity surrounding the issue. As such, a study using complex analysis of the subject will influence its audience by the choice of omissions. Sociologists speculate that the use of labels encourages the manifestation of associated traits. This has greater impact when the information comes from a trusted source, thus evoking similar thinking within the audience. When considering truth and representation in journalism, a struggle can be seen between remaining objective in the presentation of the facts and a desire for a subjective representation of what is considered to be the truth (Kovach & Rosential, 2014, pp.36-37). In this context objectivity is defined as the function of presenting facts without personal bias

It may be that simply questioning whether substance dependence (SD) is a behaviour or a disease perpetrates and supports the presupposition of a false dichotomy. There is no necessary characteristic of either behaviour nor disease that prohibit SD being categorised as both.

Baruch Spinoza (A.K.A Benedito de Espinosa or Benedict de Spinoza) was a Dutch philosopher known for his controversial ideas on the nature of God, nature, thought and the infinite. In considering Spinoza's book on metaphysics the 'Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order', or simply Ethics, an answer to 'What does Spinoza mean that the human mind is the idea the body has of itself?' may be found.

The nature of intelligence is a question society has been seeking to answer for generations. In the early 20th century Charles Spearman is credited with developing the concept of the g-factor, simply explained as the single underlying component at the root of intelligence (Burton, Westen & Kowalski, 2015, pp.346-347). Others have argued that there is not one underlying factor, rather multiple facets; arguably the most prevalent of these being Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences (Burton et al., 2015, pp.351-353). Gardener's theory postulates that intelligence is broken down into eight different criterion. With there being as many characterisations of what intelligence is as there are theories on how intelligence works, it is unlikely that the question of if there is one or multiple intelligences will be answered until a consensus can be reached on the definition of the word.

Three experiments investigated the specific spatial relations that define the human body configuration. In Experiment 1, participants searched for scrambled bodies amongst normal distractors. In Experiments 2 and 3 participants were asked to identify whether single body images (upright or inverted) were scrambled or normal. Scrambled bodies had head or limbs displaced to either symmetrical or asymmetrical positions. Experiment 1 showed that asymmetrical violations are recognized faster than symmetrical violations. All three experiments revealed that when the number of structural violations is held constant, head violations are recognized faster than limb violations. Experiment 3 also showed a greater inversion effect for scrambled bodies that maintained head on top and vertical symmetry, providing evidence that these are key spatial relations in the human body configuration. Overall, the results supported our hypothesis that the human body configuration is defined primarily by a head at the apex of a vertically symmetrical body.

In this article, we sought to isolate the processing demands of combining the concepts of modifier-noun phrases from those of other language comprehension processes. Probe reaction time (RT) was used as an indication of the processing resources required for combining concepts. Phrase frequency (as measured by Google hit rates) was used as a metric of the degree of conceptual combination required for each phrase. Participants were asked to interpret modifier-noun phrases using a sense-nonsense decision (Experiment 1) and a phrase meaning access task (Experiment 2). Experiment 2 also used a lexical decision task to activate the word’s individual meanings. Regression analyses for both experiments indicated that phrase frequency (indicating novelty) predicts a significant portion of the probe RT variance, such that low-frequency phrases required more processing resources than high-frequency phrases, when controlling for associative strength, word frequency, letter length, and lexical-semantic activation. Overall, this study indicates that conceptual combination requires processing resources beyond those of other language processes.

Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judgments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in producing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments can be accounted for by domain-general factors: attention, working memory limits and conceptualization. As these factors are shared with the production of perceptual judgments, errors in phenomenal judgments are not due to faulty domain-specific processes. Furthermore, this account defends phenomenal judgments against general scepticism by providing criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgments.

Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must (1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I use Douglas Harding's first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where one cannot see one's own head. I argue that this open space conforms to the above criteria and hence is consistent with being the subject. I respond to the objection that this location is merely a lack of visual experience. I argue that this space also encompasses sound and touch properties and hence functions as a bearer for other sensory modalities. These first-person findings provide prima facie support for the view that the subject is a thin bearer of experience.

While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject's experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal judgement about the target experience of the investigation. I examine historical and contemporary examples of first-person experiments: Mariotte's demonstration of the visual blind spot, Kanizsa's subjective contours, the Tse Illusion, and investigations of the non-uniform resolution of the visual field. I discuss the role that phenomenal contrast plays in these methods, and how they overcome typical introspective errors. I argue that their intersubjective repeatability is an important factor in their scientific status, however, it is not the only factor. That they control for extraneous factors and confounds is another factor which sets them apart from pseudoscience (e.g., the perception of auras), and hence another reason for classifying them as genuine experiments. Furthermore, by systematically mapping out the structure of visual experience, these methods make scientific progress. Praises of such first-person experimental approaches may not always be sung by philosophers and psychologists, but they continue to flourish as respectable scientific methods nevertheless.

This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person
methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person
experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size
and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for
taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background
assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological
preliminaries.
In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements
are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel,
2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making
phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, which
are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal
judgements may still be statistically less reliable than
perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that
Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical
unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between
reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending
phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism.
Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal
judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments
can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and
discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors,
minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability.
In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use
first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that
distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an
awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or
retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of
uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for
the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides
support for a subjectivist account of variance in size
experience.
In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish
between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of
self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I
use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate
an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at
where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is
not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor
the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience
that I seem to be looking from here.
Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The
question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience
of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience
the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself.
I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the
visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms
to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the
subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem
to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie
evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that
contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a
direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend.

I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognizing pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time.

Phenomenal objectivism explains perceptual phenomenal character by reducing it to an awareness of mind-independent objects, properties, and relations. A challenge for this view is that there is a sense in which a distant tree looks smaller than a closer tree even when they are the same objective size (perceptual size variation). The dual content view is a popular objectivist account in which such experiences are explained by my objective spatial relation to the tree, in particular visual angle (perspectival size). I describe a series of first-person experiments for investigating size experience. I use a ruler as a first-person method for operationalising perspectival size (Experiment 1). I use the corridor illusion (Experiment 2), outlining one’s head in the mirror (Experiment 3), and outlining the size of objects on glass (Experiment 4) to show a phenomenal difference in size for items in different depth contexts, despite being identical in visual angle. These finding demonstrate that visual angle cannot account for these spatial experiences. Psychological evidence provides further support for the thesis that subjects do not experience visual angle when depth information is present. Together this evidence supports the hypothesis that perceptual size variation cannot be accounted for by visual angle, hence undermining a plausible version of the dual content theory. This outcome, combined with problems raised by alternative objectivist accounts of size variation, provides support for a subjectivist account of size experience.

Erwin Schrödinger holds a prominent place in the history of science primarily due to his crucial role in the development of quantum physics. What is perhaps lesser known are his insights into subject-object duality, consciousness and mind. He documented himself that these were influenced by the Upanishads, a collection of ancient Hindu spiritual texts. Central to his thoughts in this area is that Mind is only One and there is no separation between subject and object. This chapter aims to bridge Schrödinger’s view on One Mind with the teachings of Dōgen, a twelfth century Zen master. This bridge is formed by addressing the question of how time relates to One Mind, and subject-object duality. Schrödinger describes the experience of One Mind to be like a timeless now, whereas subject-object duality involves a linear continuum of time. We show how these differing positions are unified in the notion of ‘absolute present’, which was put forward in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1871–1945). In addition, we argue that it is in this notion of absolute present that the views of Schrödinger, Dōgen and Nishida meet.