One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized
is by “compensatory diffe... more One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that in such cases we have the multiple realization of a single determinate, “fine grained” property instance that is exactly similar to another instance. As simple as this moral is, it has ramifications for a number of recent discussions of multiple realization in science. Taken collectively, these ramifications indicate that multiple realization by compensatory adjustments merits greater attention in the philosophy of science literature than it has hitherto received.
Shapiro have been among the most influential writers regarding multiple realization. Who working ... more Shapiro have been among the most influential writers regarding multiple realization. Who working in the area has not, for example, accepted the idea that the difference in the color of two corkscrews does not make for multiple realization? Despite this influence, however, few appreciate the complexity of their view. On the one hand, Polger and Shapiro propose a schema for realization that may relate entities in many different ontological categories, including properties, states, kinds, and objects. 1 Moreover, they suggest that while many contemporary realization theories treat properties or property instances as the relata of realization relations, such variations are philosophically unimportant. 2 They "suspect that in
Over the last 25 years, there has been a concerted effort to settle questions about multiple real... more Over the last 25 years, there has been a concerted effort to settle questions about multiple realization by bringing detailed scientific evidence to bear. Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett have pursued this scientific approach to multiple realization with a precise theory and applications. This paper reviews the application of the Dimensioned approach to human color vision, addressing objections that have appeared in the literature.
SomeNewMechanistshave proposed that claims of compositional relations are justified by combining ... more SomeNewMechanistshave proposed that claims of compositional relations are justified by combining the results of top-down and bottom-up interlevel interventions. But what do scientists do when they can perform, say, a cellular intervention, but not a subcellular detection? In such cases, paired interlevel interventions are unavailable. We propose that scientists use abduction and we illustrate its use through a case study of the ionic theory of resting and action potentials.
Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive pro... more Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive processes extend in the physical world beyond the bounds of the brain and the body. We argue that, while transcranial cognition may be both a logical and a nomological possibility, no case has been made for its current existence. In other words, we defend a form of contingent intracranial-ism about the cognitive.
Introductory Survey Chapter from SCIENTIFIC COMPOSITION AND METAPHYSICAL GROUND providing an over... more Introductory Survey Chapter from SCIENTIFIC COMPOSITION AND METAPHYSICAL GROUND providing an overview of new philosophical debates over "vertical" relations spanning a number of philosophical areas from philosophy of science to philosophy of mind to analytic metaphysics.
InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean so... more InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his motivation for them-tracing them to problems in the literature. Then we argue that Fodor's conditions still do not work. They are open to objections of two different varieties: they are too strong and too weak. We develop these objections and indicate why Fodor's new, improved list of conditions still do not work to naturalize meaning.
Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literature. Extrem... more Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literature. Extremely common among these contrasts are distinctions that in various ways involve rules. For example, connectionist models are not supposed to use explicit rules where computationalist models do. Connectionist models are said to use soft rules, or soft constraints, where computationalist models do not. The authors believe that, while the distinctions that have been offered in the literature make sense, they do not serve to ...
One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized
is by “compensatory diffe... more One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that in such cases we have the multiple realization of a single determinate, “fine grained” property instance that is exactly similar to another instance. As simple as this moral is, it has ramifications for a number of recent discussions of multiple realization in science. Taken collectively, these ramifications indicate that multiple realization by compensatory adjustments merits greater attention in the philosophy of science literature than it has hitherto received.
Shapiro have been among the most influential writers regarding multiple realization. Who working ... more Shapiro have been among the most influential writers regarding multiple realization. Who working in the area has not, for example, accepted the idea that the difference in the color of two corkscrews does not make for multiple realization? Despite this influence, however, few appreciate the complexity of their view. On the one hand, Polger and Shapiro propose a schema for realization that may relate entities in many different ontological categories, including properties, states, kinds, and objects. 1 Moreover, they suggest that while many contemporary realization theories treat properties or property instances as the relata of realization relations, such variations are philosophically unimportant. 2 They "suspect that in
Over the last 25 years, there has been a concerted effort to settle questions about multiple real... more Over the last 25 years, there has been a concerted effort to settle questions about multiple realization by bringing detailed scientific evidence to bear. Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett have pursued this scientific approach to multiple realization with a precise theory and applications. This paper reviews the application of the Dimensioned approach to human color vision, addressing objections that have appeared in the literature.
SomeNewMechanistshave proposed that claims of compositional relations are justified by combining ... more SomeNewMechanistshave proposed that claims of compositional relations are justified by combining the results of top-down and bottom-up interlevel interventions. But what do scientists do when they can perform, say, a cellular intervention, but not a subcellular detection? In such cases, paired interlevel interventions are unavailable. We propose that scientists use abduction and we illustrate its use through a case study of the ionic theory of resting and action potentials.
Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive pro... more Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive processes extend in the physical world beyond the bounds of the brain and the body. We argue that, while transcranial cognition may be both a logical and a nomological possibility, no case has been made for its current existence. In other words, we defend a form of contingent intracranial-ism about the cognitive.
Introductory Survey Chapter from SCIENTIFIC COMPOSITION AND METAPHYSICAL GROUND providing an over... more Introductory Survey Chapter from SCIENTIFIC COMPOSITION AND METAPHYSICAL GROUND providing an overview of new philosophical debates over "vertical" relations spanning a number of philosophical areas from philosophy of science to philosophy of mind to analytic metaphysics.
InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean so... more InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his motivation for them-tracing them to problems in the literature. Then we argue that Fodor's conditions still do not work. They are open to objections of two different varieties: they are too strong and too weak. We develop these objections and indicate why Fodor's new, improved list of conditions still do not work to naturalize meaning.
Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literature. Extrem... more Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literature. Extremely common among these contrasts are distinctions that in various ways involve rules. For example, connectionist models are not supposed to use explicit rules where computationalist models do. Connectionist models are said to use soft rules, or soft constraints, where computationalist models do not. The authors believe that, while the distinctions that have been offered in the literature make sense, they do not serve to ...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
In the New Mechanist literature, most attention has focused on the compositional explanation of p... more In the New Mechanist literature, most attention has focused on the compositional explanation of processes/activities of wholes by processes/activities of their parts. These are sometimes called “constitutive mechanistic explanations.” In this paper, we defend moving beyond this focus to a Pluralism about compositional explanation by highlighting two additional species of such explanations. We illuminate both Analytic compositional explanations that explain a whole using a compositional relation to its parts, and also Standing compositional explanations that explain a property of a whole using a compositional relation to the properties of its parts. We also highlight how adopting a Pluralism about compositional explanations justifies a more Pluralist view of the ontological posits of such explanations and opens up a range of new research questions.
In a number of individual and collaborative papers, Carl Gillett and I have championed a theory o... more In a number of individual and collaborative papers, Carl Gillett and I have championed a theory of realization that we take to characterize a many-one ontological determination relation between property instances found in the natural sciences. In addition, we have defended the view that multiple realization occurs, in essence, when two (or more) non-identical sets of property instances, {F1-Fn} and {F*1-F*m}, at the same level determine another property instance G at a higher level. Moreover, we have provided numerous clear scientific illustrations of this. Among these is that the property of having normal human color vision is multiply realized by individuals who differ only in the absorption spectra of their red cone opsins. Faced with this account, many philosophers react that the account of multiple realization is overly permissive. It is not enough that the sets of realizer property instances {F1-Fn} and {F*1-F*m} be non-identical; {F1-Fn} and {F*1-F*m} must also constitute distinct “ways” of realizing G. This paper makes the case that the Aizawa-Gillett approach to multiple realization is making better progress than is the alternative approach of multiple "ways" of realization.
In a series of roughly a dozen papers circa 1950, Alan Hodgkin, Andrew Huxley, and Bernard Katz e... more In a series of roughly a dozen papers circa 1950, Alan Hodgkin, Andrew Huxley, and Bernard Katz established one of the monumental accomplishments of neurophysiology, the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential. In recent years, neuroscientists have made substantial contributions to our retrospective understanding of this complicated work (Cf., e.g., (Brown, 2019, 2020), (Raman & Ferster, 2022)). Historians and philosophers of science, however, should play a part in this. (Aizawa & Headley, 2022) argued that (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952) used a kind of abductive reasoning in support of the role of sodium and potassium ion fluxes. To a first approximation, Hodgkin and Huxley concluded that sodium and potassium ion fluxes produced the currents of the action potential, because the fluxes would explain the currents associated with the action potential. This is abductive reasoning, understood as confirming some hypothesis H by appealing to its explaining some evidence E. H is the flux of ions; E is the measured currents associated with the action potential. This abductive reasoning might be called “mechanistic constitutive abductive reasoning,” since H provides a mechanistic constitutive explanation of X. (For a description of this type of explanation, see (Craver, 2007)). This paper fleshes out additional details of the (Aizawa & Headley, 2022) abductive account of pertinent sections of (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952). The current paper focuses on the reasoning given by Hodgkin, Huxley, and Katz in (Hodgkin & Katz, 1949) and (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952). More specifically, it draws attention to the combination of constitutive abduction and controlled experiments. To take an example, Hodgkin and Huxley did not simply seek an explanation of why an axon in seawater displays an initial inward current when depolarized by 65mV. Instead, they sought an explanation of why an axon in seawater (a sodium-containing medium) displays an initial inward current when depolarized by 65mV, but an axon in a sodium-free medium displays an initial outward current when depolarized by 65mV. This more complicated question arises from the controlled experiment they performed.
One of the most significant achievements of Twentieth-Century physiology was Alan Hodgkin and And... more One of the most significant achievements of Twentieth-Century physiology was Alan Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley’s development of theory of the action potential. Despite the scientific prominence of this theory and the amount of philosophical attention that has been devoted to the Hodgkin-Huxley model, there has been no philosophical attempt to show how Hodgkin and Huxley brought experimental work to bear in support of the theory. (Imagine philosophers of evolutionary biology not reading Darwin’s Origin of Species.) In this talk, I will do five things: 1) introduce an example of Hodgkin and Huxley’s reasoning, 2) provide a theory of that case, 3) indicate how the approach differs from alternatives, 4) indicate how the theory applies to other cases, and 5) show how the theory might advance the debate over the scientific legitimacy of mental representations.
How do scientists confirm compositional hypotheses, such as that rats navigate mazes using cognit... more How do scientists confirm compositional hypotheses, such as that rats navigate mazes using cognitive maps or that humans parse sentences using a grammar? Compositional abduction.
The philosophical tools one needs to describe the first experiment of HH, 1952: Implementation is... more The philosophical tools one needs to describe the first experiment of HH, 1952: Implementation is a natural ontological dependence relation among spatiotemporally localized activity instances. Singular dynamic compositional explanations are representations of implementation relations between spatiotemporally localized activity instances. Singular dynamic compositional abductive inferences are matters of inferring some hypothesis H, because H provides a singular dynamic compositional explanation of E. Singular dynamic compositional abductive inferences are sometimes based on the results of experiments. Singular dynamic compositional abductive inferences are sometimes based on the results of controlled experiments.
Some metaphysicians have recently proposed that an ontological dependence relation of “Big-G” Gro... more Some metaphysicians have recently proposed that an ontological dependence relation of “Big-G” Grounding plays a role in understanding what it is for some things to hold “in virtue of” something else. By contrast, (Wilson, 2014) has argued that there is “no work” for a Big-G Grounding relation to do. Instead, such work as Ground might do is, in fact, done by other “small-g” ontological dependence relations. In this paper, I join “Team Wilson.” I will 1) describe a “small-g” ontological dependence relation, implementation, 2) describe how implementation differs from at least familiar conceptions of Ground, and 3) describe some of the work that implementation does in science.
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Papers by Kenneth Aizawa
is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that in such cases we have the multiple realization of a single determinate, “fine grained” property instance that is exactly similar to another instance. As simple as this moral is, it has ramifications for a number of recent discussions of multiple realization in science. Taken collectively, these ramifications indicate that multiple realization by compensatory adjustments merits greater attention in the philosophy of science literature than it has hitherto received.
paired interlevel interventions are unavailable. We propose that scientists use abduction and we illustrate its use through a case study of the ionic theory of resting and action potentials.
is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that in such cases we have the multiple realization of a single determinate, “fine grained” property instance that is exactly similar to another instance. As simple as this moral is, it has ramifications for a number of recent discussions of multiple realization in science. Taken collectively, these ramifications indicate that multiple realization by compensatory adjustments merits greater attention in the philosophy of science literature than it has hitherto received.
paired interlevel interventions are unavailable. We propose that scientists use abduction and we illustrate its use through a case study of the ionic theory of resting and action potentials.
Faced with this account, many philosophers react that the account of multiple realization is overly permissive. It is not enough that the sets of realizer property instances {F1-Fn} and {F*1-F*m} be non-identical; {F1-Fn} and {F*1-F*m} must also constitute distinct “ways” of realizing G.
This paper makes the case that the Aizawa-Gillett approach to multiple realization is making better progress than is the alternative approach of multiple "ways" of realization.
(Aizawa & Headley, 2022) argued that (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952) used a kind of abductive reasoning in support of the role of sodium and potassium ion fluxes. To a first approximation, Hodgkin and Huxley concluded that sodium and potassium ion fluxes produced the currents of the action potential, because the fluxes would explain the currents associated with the action potential. This is abductive reasoning, understood as confirming some hypothesis H by appealing to its explaining some evidence E. H is the flux of ions; E is the measured currents associated with the action potential. This abductive reasoning might be called “mechanistic constitutive abductive reasoning,” since H provides a mechanistic constitutive explanation of X. (For a description of this type of explanation, see (Craver, 2007)).
This paper fleshes out additional details of the (Aizawa & Headley, 2022) abductive account of pertinent sections of (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952). The current paper focuses on the reasoning given by Hodgkin, Huxley, and Katz in (Hodgkin & Katz, 1949) and (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952). More specifically, it draws attention to the combination of constitutive abduction and controlled experiments. To take an example, Hodgkin and Huxley did not simply seek an explanation of why an axon in seawater displays an initial inward current when depolarized by 65mV. Instead, they sought an explanation of why an axon in seawater (a sodium-containing medium) displays an initial inward current when depolarized by 65mV, but an axon in a sodium-free medium displays an initial outward current when depolarized by 65mV. This more complicated question arises from the controlled experiment they performed.
In this talk, I will do five things: 1) introduce an example of Hodgkin and Huxley’s reasoning, 2) provide a theory of that case, 3) indicate how the approach differs from alternatives, 4) indicate how the theory applies to other cases, and 5) show how the theory might advance the debate over the scientific legitimacy of mental representations.