The article aims to reveal the specificity of the legal as such in its difference from political ... more The article aims to reveal the specificity of the legal as such in its difference from political or economic from a phenomenological point of view, that is, to determine what the experience of law is and what is its place in our experience as a whole. The key assumption is that while the political and the economic are based on the logic of the equivalent, which implies the establishment of a balance based on the balance of forces or interchangeable goods, the experience of law is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and subordinated rather to the logic of excess, or gift. This idea unfolds in three stages. The first part of article detects the place of gift in human experience. The next one is about the place of law in fundamental experience and the relationship between the experience of law and the experience of gift. In the final part, the question of the transformation of human experience and the corresponding perspectives of law is raised. The author argues that law is rooted in the structure of our fundamental experience or way of being in the world. The latter consists in the openness to the infinite otherness of the Other and, in this sense, is subject to the logic of the gift. At the same time this openness is never guaranteed, which gives rise to the experience of law. Aimed at maintaining the logic of excess or gift, law turns out to be not just one of the aspects of experience, but a condition of experience as such. However, today, in the conditions of the spread of the market and its inherent logic of equivalence to all spheres of life, the experience of law, subject to the opposite idea, and with it the experience as such, appears to be under threat.
Exploring the history of our experience, Hannah Arendt reveals not only a radical transformation ... more Exploring the history of our experience, Hannah Arendt reveals not only a radical transformation of its structure, but also the loss of experience as such and its replacement with technology. In order to identify the place of law in this process, we are trying to clarify the legal aspect of experience in terms of phenomenological hermeneutics and to trace its transformation in the digital age. The experience of law is thought of as one of the aspects of our mode of being-in-the-world, which is based on openness to the world and consists in the mutual recognition of people in their dignity. Digital technologies, in turn, contribute to replacing fundamental openness with illusory freedom in cyberspace. The latter, unlike the public realm as a realm of action of many, and in this sense legal realm, is based primarily on productive activities of one and no longer requires law.
The essay addresses the problem of normativity of law from the point of view of phenomenological ... more The essay addresses the problem of normativity of law from the point of view of phenomenological hermeneutics. First, the author briefly reconstructs the theory of hermeneutic experience as an experience of understanding or an experience of meaning, highlights the inherent normative dimension in the structure of hermeneutic experience and describes its aspects. Then, the essay traces the connection between this initial normativity and the formalized normative systems that largely mediate our lives in the modern world. In particular, using the concept of human dignity as an example, the author shows that hermeneutic optics enables us to see the foundations of legal norms in the very mode of our being in the world. Finally, the essay explains the modern crisis of law as an integral part of the general crisis of meaning, which is associated with the destruction of public realm and a radical transformation of our fundamental experience.
Метою статті є прояснення правової складової фундаментального до- свіду як досвіду сенсу та окрес... more Метою статті є прояснення правової складової фундаментального до- свіду як досвіду сенсу та окреслення у такий спосіб контурів герменевтичної теорії природного права. Окреслено загальні перспективи та деякі напрями застосування герменевтичної оптики для осмислення проблеми природного права як проблеми співвідношення фактичності і значущості у структурі людського досвіду. Герменевтичне осмислення проблеми природного права відбувається у три кро- ки. Спершу здійснено реконструкцію теорії герменевтичного досвіду як досвіду ро- зуміння себе, Іншого і світу. Останнє мислиться як спосіб буття людини у світі, що виявляється можливим завдяки герменевтичній відкритості як первинному визнан- ню Іншого. Другу частину статті присвячено виявленню у структурі герменевтичного до- свіду іманентного йому правового виміру, який локалізовано в постійній напрузі між таким, що уможливлює досвід сенсу, взаємним визнанням і таким, що його не можна уникнути, ризиком невизнання. Насамкінець встановлюється зв’язок між структурою герменевтичного досвіду та правовими інститутами, що вони розглядаються як підтвердження взаємного публічного визнання людьми одне одного. Зокрема, продемонстровано, що люд- ська гідність є не штучною конструкцією, до якої людство вимушене було вдатися заради самозбереження, і не порожньою політичною декларацією, а фундаменталь- ною цінністю інших людей, зумовленою особливістю людського досвіду як досвіду розуміння, можливого лише в діалозі. Через виявлення правового виміру досвіду людини як досвіду сенсу окреслено контури герменевтичної теорії природного права як онтологічної теорії, що вба- чає підстави права у “природі речей” і як така становить альтернативу, з одного боку, релятивізму правового позитивізму, а з другого – догматизму деонтологічних теорій природного права.
The article outlines the general perspectives and some areas of application of hermeneutic optics to understand the problem of natural law. The latter is considered as a problem of the ratio of factuality and normativity in the structure of human experience. Hermeneutic comprehension of the natural law problem occurs in three steps. First, the author reconstructs the theory of hermeneutic experience as an experience of understanding oneself, others and the world. Understanding is thought of as a human’s mode of being in the world, which is possible due to hermeneutic openness and the initial recognition of the Other. The second part of the article aims to identify the legal dimension inherent in the structure of hermeneutic experience. It is localized in the constant tension between the mutual recognition, which makes the experience of meaning possible, and the inevitable risk of non-recognition. Finally, the connection between the structure of hermeneutic experience and the legal institutions that confirm mutual public recognition between people is clarified. In particular, the article shows that human dignity is neither an artificial construction that humanity was forced to resort to for self-preservation, nor an empty political declaration. Instead, it is the fundamental importance of other people, due to the peculiarity of our experience as an experience of understanding, possible only in dialogue. Through the discovery of the legal dimension of human experience as an experience of meaning, the author outlines the contours of the hermeneutic theory of natural law as an ontological theory that sees the foundations of law in the “nature of things”. Such a theory is an alternative, on the one hand, to the relativism of legal positivism and, on the other, to the dogmatism of deontological theories of natural law.
Вісник Національної академії правових наук України, 2019
Статтю присвячено проблемі постметафізичного мислення у праві, про актуальність якої свідчить кри... more Статтю присвячено проблемі постметафізичного мислення у праві, про актуальність якої свідчить криза фундаментальної юриспруденції як наслідок властивої сучасній думці в цілому відмови від осмислення граничних підстав. З метою виявлення умов можливості постметафізичного мислення у праві, використовується метод історико-філософської реконструкції, що він водночас виявляється герменевтичним проясненням. Проблема розкривається у три кроки. Спершу в широкому історико-філософському контексті розглянуто поняття метафізики та чинники, які зумовили критику метафізичного мислення. Далі виявлено основні мотиви постметафізичного мислення та розкрито сенс філософської герменевтики як постметафізичного проєкта. Нарешті, визначено особливості постметафізичного мислення у праві та роль герменевтичної філософії права в епоху постметафізики. Метафізичність (що її характеризують передусім ідеалізм і пріоритет теорії) мислиться як одвічна складова філософії, що виявляється у парадоксі теоретичного досвіду, який головно й інспірує критику метафізичного мислення. Відповідно, перевершення метафізики виявляється перманентним самоперевершенням філософії, яке, разом з тим, стає домінуючою спонукою сучасного (постметафізичного) мислення. Герменевтична філософія, або феноменологічна герменевтика, розглядається як приклад реалізації позитивної стратегії критики метафізики, основним мотивом якої є переосмислення класичного пріоритету теорії над практикою та відновлення цілісності людського досвіду. У свою чергу, досвід права розглядається як парадигматичний приклад досвіду у власному розумінні слова, що він завжди є фронетичним досвідом, тобто таким, що поєднує теорію, практику та мистецтво. При цьому герменевтична філософія права постає як онтологічна теорія природного права, що локалізує граничні підстави права у самій структурі фундаментального досвіду як досвіду розуміння. У такий спосіб етика поєднується з онтологією й водночас уможливлюються як постметафізична філософія, так і постметафізичне право. Ключові слова: постметафізичне мислення, феноменологія, герменевтична філософія, досвід, фронесис.
The article deals with the problem of postmetaphysical thinking in law, the relevance of which is connected with the crisis of fundamental jurisprudence as a consequence of the refusal of modern thought to think of the grounds. To identify the conditions for the possibility of post-metaphysical thinking in law, the author uses the method of historical and philosophical reconstruction, which at the same time turns out to be a hermeneutical highlighting. The problem is revealed in three stages. First, in the broad historical and philosophical context, the author considers the concept of metaphysics and the factors that motivated the critique of metaphysical thinking. Then she discusses the main motives of post-metaphysical thinking and reveals the nature of philosophical hermeneutics as a postmetaphysical project. Finally, the author identifies the features of postmetaphysical thinking in law and the role of hermeneutic philosophy of law in the postmetaphysics era. Metaphysicality (characterized primarily by idealism and the priority of theory) is considered to be an eternal component of philosophy, which manifests itself in the paradox of theoretical experience. The latter mainly inspires criticism of metaphysical thinking. Accordingly, overcoming metaphysics is a constant self-overcoming of philosophy, which at the same time becomes the dominant motivation of modern (postmetaphysical) thinking. Hermeneutic philosophy, or phenomenological hermeneutics, is considered as an example of a positive strategy for criticizing metaphysics, the main motive of which is to rethink the classical priority of theory over practice. In turn, the experience of law is seen as a paradigmatic example of experience as such, which is always a phronetic experience, that is, a combination of theory, practice, and art. Wherein the hermeneutic philosophy of law turns out to be an ontological theory of natural law, localizing the foundations of law in the very structure of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding. Ethics is thus combined with ontology, and postmetaphysical philosophy and postmetaphysical law become possible.
Огляд XXIX Всесвітнього конгресу Міжнародної асоціації філософії права та соціальної філософії «Г... more Огляд XXIX Всесвітнього конгресу Міжнародної асоціації філософії права та соціальної філософії «Гідність. Демократія. Різноманітність», що відбувся у липні 2019 року в місті Люцерн (Швейцарія), містить інформацію про тему Конгресу та його академічну програму, включно з основними тезами пленарних лекцій, тематикою панельних заходів та оглядом спеціального семінару «Досвід права». Три концепти, навколо яких розгортаються ключові дискусії в сучасній філософії права та соціальній філософії, розглядаються у їх суперечливому взаємозв’язку в контексті викликів сьогодення.
Review of the XXIX World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy “Dignity. Democracy. Diversity”, which was held in July 2019 in Lucerne (Switzerland), contains information on the lead theme of the Congress and its academic program, including the main theses of plenary lectures (“Dignity: An Equality Analysis” by Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Human Rights Overreach” by John Tasioulas, “The Islamic View of Humanity” by Azizah Y. al-Hibri, “Replacing the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood” (IVR Young Scholar Prize Lecture) by Eilidh Beaton, “Rescuing Human Rights: Challenges of Identity and Pluralism in an Age of Globalisation” by Neus Torbisco-Casals, “Natural Law, Cognitive Science and Human Rights” by John Mikhail, “Diversity: Importance and Relevance” by Yoshiki Wakamatsu, “Human Dignity: Challenges, Controversies and Promise” by Heiner Bielefeldt, Peter Schaber and Simone Zurbuchen), the themes of panel events, and an overview of the special workshop “Experience of Law”.
Український переклад статті Ізабель Тружильо. У статті розглянуто взаємозв’язок між правами людин... more Український переклад статті Ізабель Тружильо. У статті розглянуто взаємозв’язок між правами людини та миром з точки зору поняття права. Обґрунтовано, що логіка прав людини принципово суперечить логіці війни, а концепція прав людини як справедливої причини війни є наслідком панування парадигми права, орієнтованої на державу. На противагу модерному правовому мисленню, яке характеризувалося акцентом на державі та уніфікацією правового суб’єкта всупереч фактичній багатоманітності становищ людей у різних правових статусах, формування сучасного правового мислення може сприяти зосередженню на людях та їхніх правах і переосмисленню ролі примусу у праві.
Ukrainian translation of Isabel Trujillo's article. The article is an observation of the relationship between human rights and peace from the perspective of the definition of law.
Автор рассматривает право не с точки зрения его институциональной стороны, а с точки зрения опыта... more Автор рассматривает право не с точки зрения его институциональной стороны, а с точки зрения опыта, то есть не как объект нашего познания или технического господства, а как то, что происходит с нами. С позиций феноменологической герменевтики проясняется сущность нашего фундаментального опыта как опыта понимания, или опыта смысла, который является не одной из наших способностей, а изначальным способом нашего бытия в мире, посредством которого мы примиряемся с реальностью. Вместе с тем отмечается, что смысла нет как такового ни в мире, ни в человеке; смысл – это всегда встреча, и условием возможности всякого опыта является фундаментальная открытость и готовность признать Другого в его претензии на истину, то есть признать его равносво- боду и равнодостоинство (I). Таким образом, опыт права как движение от непризнания к взаимному признанию людей мыслится как неотъемлемый аспект нашего опыта бытия в мире, который, однако, всегда сопровождается риском непризнания. Именно в этой зоне риска, на полпути от непризнания к состоянию мира, автор локализует право (II). В свою очередь, опыт бесправия рассматривается как опыт радикального непризнания, переживаемый людьми в ситуациях, которые в современной философии концептуализи- руются посредством понятия «чрезвычайное положение». Согласно автору, последнее не может быть вписано в правовую реальность ни в качестве «включенного исключения», ни в каком другом качестве, поскольку, будучи опытом политического насилия, оно по сути антитетично опыту права как опыту признания, вдохновленному утопией мира (III).
The author views law not from the point of view of its institutional side, but of experience, i.e. not as the object of our cognition or our technical domination, but as what happens to us. From the perspective of phenomenological hermeneutics, she highlights the essence of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding, or an experience of meaning, which is not one of our abilities, but the original way of our being in the world by which we come to terms with reality. At the same time, it is said that there is no meaning as such, either in the world or in a man himself; meaning is always a meeting, and the condition for the possibility of any experience is a fundamental openness and readiness to recognize the Other in his claim to truth, i.e. to recognize he to be equal to myself in freedom and dignity (I). Thus, an experience of law as a movement from non-recognition to mutual recognition by people of each other is thought of as an inherent aspect of our being in the world, which is always accompanied, however, by the risk of non-recognition. It is in this risky zone, halfway from non-recognition to the state of peace, that the author locates law (II). In turn, experience of lawlessness (equal to rightlessness) is regarded as a radical non-recognition experienced by people in situations that are conceptualized in modern philosophy as a “state of exception”. According to the author, the latter cannot be inscribed in legal reality either as an “inclusive exclusion” or in any other capacity, since, as an experience of political violence, it is essentially antithetic to legal experience as an experience of recognition inspired by the utopia of peace (III).
Ukrainian translation of Bjarne Melkevik and Åsbjørn Melkevik's article.
This paper considers la... more Ukrainian translation of Bjarne Melkevik and Åsbjørn Melkevik's article. This paper considers law as a practical art that should be autonomous so to better fulfill the law’s primary goal, which is about the settlement of conflicts, be it inside or outside a courtroom. The dominant views, today, all understand law as fulfilling a certain instrumental role, normally linked to the values of justice or efficacy. Yet something will inevitably be amiss, we argue, if the law is understood only in instrumental terms. Once we begin to understand the law purely in instrumental terms, notwithstanding how noble are the objectives pursued, it is then our autonomy as individuals that will soon be compromised. There is indeed a parallel between individual autonomy and the autonomy of law – these two kinds of autonomy stand or fall together. Individuals cannot truly be free if the law is a play eld for heteronymous forces, even if these forces are democratically elected lawgivers. We therefore oppose the classical model equating lawgivers with the law, or saying that lawgivers speak for their communities. It is imperative that the people themselves own the law. This, we think, can be best be realized with strong lawyers and with procedural constraints, permitting lawyers to force judges and the offices of the lawgivers in general to bend under the autonomy of law.
Ukrainian translation of Tom Campbell's article.
The article deals with the problem of the relat... more Ukrainian translation of Tom Campbell's article. The article deals with the problem of the relation of political and legal functions of the human rights principally in the constitutional context of the Commonwealth of Nations. The author advocates the position of legalism, or ethical positivism, involving a model of the rule of law, according to which human rights Acts must serve legislative, rather than judicial, review that would facilitate both individual autonomy and democratic effectiveness.
Ukrainian translation of Robert Alexy's article. The article deals with the problem of justificat... more Ukrainian translation of Robert Alexy's article. The article deals with the problem of justification of the constitutional review or the relation between constitutional review and democracy. The main thesis is that on the one hand constitutional review is justified on the basis of principles theory and on the other hand it is based on the theory of argumentative representation. Three arguments in favor of constitutional control are consistently revealed in the article: formal (the constitutional court controls compliance with constitutional rights by the parliament), substantive (constitutional review is designed to provide additional protection of constitutional rights as positivized human rights) and procedural (constitutional review is an «argumentative representation» of the people). The conclusion is that our mind justifies democratic constitutionalism, and constitutional review is detected reasonable as one of its necessary components.
The article deals with the reactualization of Aristotelian idea of phronesis within the framework... more The article deals with the reactualization of Aristotelian idea of phronesis within the framework of the hermeneutic philosophy in order to clarify a nature of jurisprudence as the experience of law. In the light of Aristotle’s typology of the experience and knowledge forms (episteme, techne, phronesis), the question of whether jurisprudence is a science in the strict sense of the word or just a technology, gets a new reading. The problem of the experience of law is placed in a broad historical and philosophical context. In particular, the idea of phenomenological hermeneutics (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer) is being clarified as an anti-metaphysical project aimed at criticizing the rationality of natural sciences and rehabilitation of the phronetic experience of understanding. The experience of law is conceived as a paradigmatic example of such experience, which, unlike the experience of art (techne) and the experience of science (episteme), doesn’t presuppose either free creativity, or the extraction of already existing legal meanings from authoritative sources, but rather the reproduction of these meanings in a dialogue with the tradition which we are a part of. It is clarified the rhetorical nature of any reasoning about the law as a conversation, the participants of which strive not to defend their position and not to accept the position of the interlocutor, but to understand the essence of the case in question. In this sense, the hermeneutic philosophy of law is an alternative to both dogmatism and relativism in jurisprudence, replacing the metaphysical ideas about the existence of independent moral truths with the experience of our own historicity.
Статья посвящена реактуализации аристотелевской идеи фронезиса в рамках герменевтической философии с целью прояснения природы юриспруденции как опыта права. В свете предложенной Аристотелем типологии форм опыта и знания (эпистеме, технэ, фронезис) вопрос о том, является ли юриспруденция наукой в срогом смысле этого слова или всего лишь технологией, получает новое прочтение. Проблема помещается в широкий историко-философский контекст. В частности, проясняется идея феноменологической герменевтики (Э. Гуссерль, М. Хайдеггер, Х.-Г. Гадамер) как антиметафизического проекта, направленного на критику естественнонаучной рациональности и реабилитацию фронетического опыта понимания. При этом опыт права мыслится как парадигматический пример фронезиса, который, в отличие от опыта искусства (технэ) и опыта науки (эпистеме), предполагает скорее не извлечение существующих правовых смыслов из авторитетных источников с целью их последующего применения к той или иной ситуации, но и не произвольное создание этих смыслов, а их воспроизведение в диалоге с традицией, частью которой мы являемся. Так раскрывается риторическая природа всякого рассуждения о праве как разговора, участники которого, стремятся не отстоять свою позицию и не принять позицию собеседника, а понять суть самого дела, о котором идет речь. В этом смысле герменевтическая философия права оказывается альтернативой как догматизму, так и релятивизму в юриспруденции, поставив на место метафизических представлений о существовании независимых моральных истин опыт нашей собственной историчности.
In order to reconstruct the problem of human rights justification, the article deals with evoluti... more In order to reconstruct the problem of human rights justification, the article deals with evolution and modern interpretation of this problem. Justification of human rights is regarded as identifying of their ultimate grounds, i.e. the manner in which these rights are entrenched in the being in general, or at least in the human being. The author reveals the skeptical and non-skeptical approaches to the justification of human rights, descriptive and normative strategy within the latter, the will theory and the interest theory, as well as the main directions of their criticism. In conclusion, it is noted that the debate about the justification of human rights cannot be stopped due to the very nature of the latter, in particular, the openness of human rights as a consequence of the openness of human being as such. Key words: philosophy of human rights, justification of human rights, the will theory, the interest theory, moral rights and legal rights.
The present essay explains law as a way of mastering the past in case of large-scale human rights... more The present essay explains law as a way of mastering the past in case of large-scale human rights violations. On the example of the theory and practice of transitional justice, such key strategies for mastering the past as truth, justice and reconciliation are viewed as forms of mutual recognition. The very phenomenon of transitional justice is conceived as a 'border situation', which makes it possible to clarify the true nature of law as an antithesis to violence and its fundamental connection with the peace.
The article draws an analogy between legal reality and the reality of artistic fiction, between t... more The article draws an analogy between legal reality and the reality of artistic fiction, between the legal subject and the reader of the novel. With the works of Franz Kafka authors demonstrate how the text can be constituted by his reader and how the legal reality can be reconstituted by the legal subject endowed with the capacity of judgment.
The article is devoted to the phenomenon of legal experience. The problem is placed into a broad ... more The article is devoted to the phenomenon of legal experience. The problem is placed into a broad historical and philosophical context and is conceived as a part of the problem of ontological unity. The question of the nature of law is transformed into the question of the grounds of law in the experience and nature of the latter. To clarify this issue, the author considers the methodological foundations, essence and internal contradictions of a number of concepts that localize the law in this or that aspect of the experience which is understood as a basic one, as well as the interrelation between them. The author of the psychological theory of law L. I. Petrażycki places the foundations of law in the emotional experience, keeping, however, the matter regarding the foundations of the emotions themselves unsettled. In turn, the phenomenology of law motivated in many ways by the desire to overcome psychologism sees the primary reality of law in the experience of a consciousness cleared of all prejudices, so that the sense (phenomenon) of law becomes obvious to it. At the same time, phenomenology does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of how the phenomenon of law is related to our everyday experience. Finally, philosophical hermeneutics striving to overcome the aporias of the phenomenological project understands the basic level of experience, by which a person is connected with the world, as the experience of a specific being, while the structure of this experience is understood as a hermeneutic circle of our existence in time in interaction with the world. The latter is carried out in the form of a dialogue the outcome of which is never predetermined in advance and, therefore, implies fundamental openness and readiness to recognize the other in his claim to truth. It is this that is regarded as a basis of normativity. By discovering the basis of law neither in the mental experience, nor in the experience of the reduced consciousness, but rather in the experience as such, that is, the experience of one’s own historicity, the hermeneutical concept of law is much closer to the classical ontological theories of natural law than to the later deontological conceptions, because hermeneutics enroots the due in the experience structure itself.
The purpose of this paper is to provoke some thought about the relationship between «Law, Reason,... more The purpose of this paper is to provoke some thought about the relationship between «Law, Reason, and Emotion» (the theme of the 2015 IVR World Congress in Washington, DC). The author suggests that law, reason and emotion are inextricably intertwined and in fact the central values of any effective system of justice. The foundational axiom posited for rational justice is that every human being has value and that all deserve support and encouragement in living worthwhile and fulfilling lives with other human beings. The best legislation and the most interesting and persuasive philosophy and interpretation of the law will take our natural human emotions into account, as they relate to the possibility of a good life and the rules of a just society. Emotions should be cultivated or not according to their value and likely effects, in the light of reason and justice. We cannot and should not deny the law claim to reason, but emotions remain the first and final basis of justice and ultimate foundation of the law.
The article deals with the problem of judicial ethics in the context of the history of Western le... more The article deals with the problem of judicial ethics in the context of the history of Western legal tradition, which is seen as a struggle for the rule of law. A special role in this struggle is given to the judges, which shall have the independence and security so that they can defend the rule of law against the encroachments of those in power. The ideal of the rule of law is regarded by the author as a universal and duty to fight for its implementation rests with the judges everywhere. Judges must be brave and through the interpretation of the right to make unjust legal system fairer, or be «heroes of the rule of law».
The aim of the paper is to present the historical and the modern form of hermeneutic. As W. Dilth... more The aim of the paper is to present the historical and the modern form of hermeneutic. As W. Dilthey stated, the understanding of the text is not entering of one individual into the spirit of the other, but rather a rising to a higher level of general overcoming not only one’s own but also someone else’s particularity. Any situation can be considered as a certain position limiting the possibility of vision. Н. Gadamer calls this limitation a horizon. So we may say that the following factors decide about the attachment to hermeneutic trend: 1) the recognition of understanding as the central philosophical category; 2) the analysis of the problem of pre-understanding; 3) the interpretation is regarded as discussion within a certain community. Why is this hermeneutical criticism of essential for the theory of law? As the matter of fact, in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s considerations one crucial question appears: How to reconcile the world of everyday experience of an individual with the world of scientific objectiveness and scientific authority? H. Gadamer tries to prove that an anthropological reduction of science to the world of everyday experience is possible through the demystification of the scientific methodological self-consciousness. The theory of law which is scientific and axiomatically neutral is not able to give answers to such questions as: «Why should we built discussion without resorting to violence or without restraining the freedom of participants?».
The article aims to reveal the specificity of the legal as such in its difference from political ... more The article aims to reveal the specificity of the legal as such in its difference from political or economic from a phenomenological point of view, that is, to determine what the experience of law is and what is its place in our experience as a whole. The key assumption is that while the political and the economic are based on the logic of the equivalent, which implies the establishment of a balance based on the balance of forces or interchangeable goods, the experience of law is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and subordinated rather to the logic of excess, or gift. This idea unfolds in three stages. The first part of article detects the place of gift in human experience. The next one is about the place of law in fundamental experience and the relationship between the experience of law and the experience of gift. In the final part, the question of the transformation of human experience and the corresponding perspectives of law is raised. The author argues that law is rooted in the structure of our fundamental experience or way of being in the world. The latter consists in the openness to the infinite otherness of the Other and, in this sense, is subject to the logic of the gift. At the same time this openness is never guaranteed, which gives rise to the experience of law. Aimed at maintaining the logic of excess or gift, law turns out to be not just one of the aspects of experience, but a condition of experience as such. However, today, in the conditions of the spread of the market and its inherent logic of equivalence to all spheres of life, the experience of law, subject to the opposite idea, and with it the experience as such, appears to be under threat.
Exploring the history of our experience, Hannah Arendt reveals not only a radical transformation ... more Exploring the history of our experience, Hannah Arendt reveals not only a radical transformation of its structure, but also the loss of experience as such and its replacement with technology. In order to identify the place of law in this process, we are trying to clarify the legal aspect of experience in terms of phenomenological hermeneutics and to trace its transformation in the digital age. The experience of law is thought of as one of the aspects of our mode of being-in-the-world, which is based on openness to the world and consists in the mutual recognition of people in their dignity. Digital technologies, in turn, contribute to replacing fundamental openness with illusory freedom in cyberspace. The latter, unlike the public realm as a realm of action of many, and in this sense legal realm, is based primarily on productive activities of one and no longer requires law.
The essay addresses the problem of normativity of law from the point of view of phenomenological ... more The essay addresses the problem of normativity of law from the point of view of phenomenological hermeneutics. First, the author briefly reconstructs the theory of hermeneutic experience as an experience of understanding or an experience of meaning, highlights the inherent normative dimension in the structure of hermeneutic experience and describes its aspects. Then, the essay traces the connection between this initial normativity and the formalized normative systems that largely mediate our lives in the modern world. In particular, using the concept of human dignity as an example, the author shows that hermeneutic optics enables us to see the foundations of legal norms in the very mode of our being in the world. Finally, the essay explains the modern crisis of law as an integral part of the general crisis of meaning, which is associated with the destruction of public realm and a radical transformation of our fundamental experience.
Метою статті є прояснення правової складової фундаментального до- свіду як досвіду сенсу та окрес... more Метою статті є прояснення правової складової фундаментального до- свіду як досвіду сенсу та окреслення у такий спосіб контурів герменевтичної теорії природного права. Окреслено загальні перспективи та деякі напрями застосування герменевтичної оптики для осмислення проблеми природного права як проблеми співвідношення фактичності і значущості у структурі людського досвіду. Герменевтичне осмислення проблеми природного права відбувається у три кро- ки. Спершу здійснено реконструкцію теорії герменевтичного досвіду як досвіду ро- зуміння себе, Іншого і світу. Останнє мислиться як спосіб буття людини у світі, що виявляється можливим завдяки герменевтичній відкритості як первинному визнан- ню Іншого. Другу частину статті присвячено виявленню у структурі герменевтичного до- свіду іманентного йому правового виміру, який локалізовано в постійній напрузі між таким, що уможливлює досвід сенсу, взаємним визнанням і таким, що його не можна уникнути, ризиком невизнання. Насамкінець встановлюється зв’язок між структурою герменевтичного досвіду та правовими інститутами, що вони розглядаються як підтвердження взаємного публічного визнання людьми одне одного. Зокрема, продемонстровано, що люд- ська гідність є не штучною конструкцією, до якої людство вимушене було вдатися заради самозбереження, і не порожньою політичною декларацією, а фундаменталь- ною цінністю інших людей, зумовленою особливістю людського досвіду як досвіду розуміння, можливого лише в діалозі. Через виявлення правового виміру досвіду людини як досвіду сенсу окреслено контури герменевтичної теорії природного права як онтологічної теорії, що вба- чає підстави права у “природі речей” і як така становить альтернативу, з одного боку, релятивізму правового позитивізму, а з другого – догматизму деонтологічних теорій природного права.
The article outlines the general perspectives and some areas of application of hermeneutic optics to understand the problem of natural law. The latter is considered as a problem of the ratio of factuality and normativity in the structure of human experience. Hermeneutic comprehension of the natural law problem occurs in three steps. First, the author reconstructs the theory of hermeneutic experience as an experience of understanding oneself, others and the world. Understanding is thought of as a human’s mode of being in the world, which is possible due to hermeneutic openness and the initial recognition of the Other. The second part of the article aims to identify the legal dimension inherent in the structure of hermeneutic experience. It is localized in the constant tension between the mutual recognition, which makes the experience of meaning possible, and the inevitable risk of non-recognition. Finally, the connection between the structure of hermeneutic experience and the legal institutions that confirm mutual public recognition between people is clarified. In particular, the article shows that human dignity is neither an artificial construction that humanity was forced to resort to for self-preservation, nor an empty political declaration. Instead, it is the fundamental importance of other people, due to the peculiarity of our experience as an experience of understanding, possible only in dialogue. Through the discovery of the legal dimension of human experience as an experience of meaning, the author outlines the contours of the hermeneutic theory of natural law as an ontological theory that sees the foundations of law in the “nature of things”. Such a theory is an alternative, on the one hand, to the relativism of legal positivism and, on the other, to the dogmatism of deontological theories of natural law.
Вісник Національної академії правових наук України, 2019
Статтю присвячено проблемі постметафізичного мислення у праві, про актуальність якої свідчить кри... more Статтю присвячено проблемі постметафізичного мислення у праві, про актуальність якої свідчить криза фундаментальної юриспруденції як наслідок властивої сучасній думці в цілому відмови від осмислення граничних підстав. З метою виявлення умов можливості постметафізичного мислення у праві, використовується метод історико-філософської реконструкції, що він водночас виявляється герменевтичним проясненням. Проблема розкривається у три кроки. Спершу в широкому історико-філософському контексті розглянуто поняття метафізики та чинники, які зумовили критику метафізичного мислення. Далі виявлено основні мотиви постметафізичного мислення та розкрито сенс філософської герменевтики як постметафізичного проєкта. Нарешті, визначено особливості постметафізичного мислення у праві та роль герменевтичної філософії права в епоху постметафізики. Метафізичність (що її характеризують передусім ідеалізм і пріоритет теорії) мислиться як одвічна складова філософії, що виявляється у парадоксі теоретичного досвіду, який головно й інспірує критику метафізичного мислення. Відповідно, перевершення метафізики виявляється перманентним самоперевершенням філософії, яке, разом з тим, стає домінуючою спонукою сучасного (постметафізичного) мислення. Герменевтична філософія, або феноменологічна герменевтика, розглядається як приклад реалізації позитивної стратегії критики метафізики, основним мотивом якої є переосмислення класичного пріоритету теорії над практикою та відновлення цілісності людського досвіду. У свою чергу, досвід права розглядається як парадигматичний приклад досвіду у власному розумінні слова, що він завжди є фронетичним досвідом, тобто таким, що поєднує теорію, практику та мистецтво. При цьому герменевтична філософія права постає як онтологічна теорія природного права, що локалізує граничні підстави права у самій структурі фундаментального досвіду як досвіду розуміння. У такий спосіб етика поєднується з онтологією й водночас уможливлюються як постметафізична філософія, так і постметафізичне право. Ключові слова: постметафізичне мислення, феноменологія, герменевтична філософія, досвід, фронесис.
The article deals with the problem of postmetaphysical thinking in law, the relevance of which is connected with the crisis of fundamental jurisprudence as a consequence of the refusal of modern thought to think of the grounds. To identify the conditions for the possibility of post-metaphysical thinking in law, the author uses the method of historical and philosophical reconstruction, which at the same time turns out to be a hermeneutical highlighting. The problem is revealed in three stages. First, in the broad historical and philosophical context, the author considers the concept of metaphysics and the factors that motivated the critique of metaphysical thinking. Then she discusses the main motives of post-metaphysical thinking and reveals the nature of philosophical hermeneutics as a postmetaphysical project. Finally, the author identifies the features of postmetaphysical thinking in law and the role of hermeneutic philosophy of law in the postmetaphysics era. Metaphysicality (characterized primarily by idealism and the priority of theory) is considered to be an eternal component of philosophy, which manifests itself in the paradox of theoretical experience. The latter mainly inspires criticism of metaphysical thinking. Accordingly, overcoming metaphysics is a constant self-overcoming of philosophy, which at the same time becomes the dominant motivation of modern (postmetaphysical) thinking. Hermeneutic philosophy, or phenomenological hermeneutics, is considered as an example of a positive strategy for criticizing metaphysics, the main motive of which is to rethink the classical priority of theory over practice. In turn, the experience of law is seen as a paradigmatic example of experience as such, which is always a phronetic experience, that is, a combination of theory, practice, and art. Wherein the hermeneutic philosophy of law turns out to be an ontological theory of natural law, localizing the foundations of law in the very structure of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding. Ethics is thus combined with ontology, and postmetaphysical philosophy and postmetaphysical law become possible.
Огляд XXIX Всесвітнього конгресу Міжнародної асоціації філософії права та соціальної філософії «Г... more Огляд XXIX Всесвітнього конгресу Міжнародної асоціації філософії права та соціальної філософії «Гідність. Демократія. Різноманітність», що відбувся у липні 2019 року в місті Люцерн (Швейцарія), містить інформацію про тему Конгресу та його академічну програму, включно з основними тезами пленарних лекцій, тематикою панельних заходів та оглядом спеціального семінару «Досвід права». Три концепти, навколо яких розгортаються ключові дискусії в сучасній філософії права та соціальній філософії, розглядаються у їх суперечливому взаємозв’язку в контексті викликів сьогодення.
Review of the XXIX World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy “Dignity. Democracy. Diversity”, which was held in July 2019 in Lucerne (Switzerland), contains information on the lead theme of the Congress and its academic program, including the main theses of plenary lectures (“Dignity: An Equality Analysis” by Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Human Rights Overreach” by John Tasioulas, “The Islamic View of Humanity” by Azizah Y. al-Hibri, “Replacing the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood” (IVR Young Scholar Prize Lecture) by Eilidh Beaton, “Rescuing Human Rights: Challenges of Identity and Pluralism in an Age of Globalisation” by Neus Torbisco-Casals, “Natural Law, Cognitive Science and Human Rights” by John Mikhail, “Diversity: Importance and Relevance” by Yoshiki Wakamatsu, “Human Dignity: Challenges, Controversies and Promise” by Heiner Bielefeldt, Peter Schaber and Simone Zurbuchen), the themes of panel events, and an overview of the special workshop “Experience of Law”.
Український переклад статті Ізабель Тружильо. У статті розглянуто взаємозв’язок між правами людин... more Український переклад статті Ізабель Тружильо. У статті розглянуто взаємозв’язок між правами людини та миром з точки зору поняття права. Обґрунтовано, що логіка прав людини принципово суперечить логіці війни, а концепція прав людини як справедливої причини війни є наслідком панування парадигми права, орієнтованої на державу. На противагу модерному правовому мисленню, яке характеризувалося акцентом на державі та уніфікацією правового суб’єкта всупереч фактичній багатоманітності становищ людей у різних правових статусах, формування сучасного правового мислення може сприяти зосередженню на людях та їхніх правах і переосмисленню ролі примусу у праві.
Ukrainian translation of Isabel Trujillo's article. The article is an observation of the relationship between human rights and peace from the perspective of the definition of law.
Автор рассматривает право не с точки зрения его институциональной стороны, а с точки зрения опыта... more Автор рассматривает право не с точки зрения его институциональной стороны, а с точки зрения опыта, то есть не как объект нашего познания или технического господства, а как то, что происходит с нами. С позиций феноменологической герменевтики проясняется сущность нашего фундаментального опыта как опыта понимания, или опыта смысла, который является не одной из наших способностей, а изначальным способом нашего бытия в мире, посредством которого мы примиряемся с реальностью. Вместе с тем отмечается, что смысла нет как такового ни в мире, ни в человеке; смысл – это всегда встреча, и условием возможности всякого опыта является фундаментальная открытость и готовность признать Другого в его претензии на истину, то есть признать его равносво- боду и равнодостоинство (I). Таким образом, опыт права как движение от непризнания к взаимному признанию людей мыслится как неотъемлемый аспект нашего опыта бытия в мире, который, однако, всегда сопровождается риском непризнания. Именно в этой зоне риска, на полпути от непризнания к состоянию мира, автор локализует право (II). В свою очередь, опыт бесправия рассматривается как опыт радикального непризнания, переживаемый людьми в ситуациях, которые в современной философии концептуализи- руются посредством понятия «чрезвычайное положение». Согласно автору, последнее не может быть вписано в правовую реальность ни в качестве «включенного исключения», ни в каком другом качестве, поскольку, будучи опытом политического насилия, оно по сути антитетично опыту права как опыту признания, вдохновленному утопией мира (III).
The author views law not from the point of view of its institutional side, but of experience, i.e. not as the object of our cognition or our technical domination, but as what happens to us. From the perspective of phenomenological hermeneutics, she highlights the essence of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding, or an experience of meaning, which is not one of our abilities, but the original way of our being in the world by which we come to terms with reality. At the same time, it is said that there is no meaning as such, either in the world or in a man himself; meaning is always a meeting, and the condition for the possibility of any experience is a fundamental openness and readiness to recognize the Other in his claim to truth, i.e. to recognize he to be equal to myself in freedom and dignity (I). Thus, an experience of law as a movement from non-recognition to mutual recognition by people of each other is thought of as an inherent aspect of our being in the world, which is always accompanied, however, by the risk of non-recognition. It is in this risky zone, halfway from non-recognition to the state of peace, that the author locates law (II). In turn, experience of lawlessness (equal to rightlessness) is regarded as a radical non-recognition experienced by people in situations that are conceptualized in modern philosophy as a “state of exception”. According to the author, the latter cannot be inscribed in legal reality either as an “inclusive exclusion” or in any other capacity, since, as an experience of political violence, it is essentially antithetic to legal experience as an experience of recognition inspired by the utopia of peace (III).
Ukrainian translation of Bjarne Melkevik and Åsbjørn Melkevik's article.
This paper considers la... more Ukrainian translation of Bjarne Melkevik and Åsbjørn Melkevik's article. This paper considers law as a practical art that should be autonomous so to better fulfill the law’s primary goal, which is about the settlement of conflicts, be it inside or outside a courtroom. The dominant views, today, all understand law as fulfilling a certain instrumental role, normally linked to the values of justice or efficacy. Yet something will inevitably be amiss, we argue, if the law is understood only in instrumental terms. Once we begin to understand the law purely in instrumental terms, notwithstanding how noble are the objectives pursued, it is then our autonomy as individuals that will soon be compromised. There is indeed a parallel between individual autonomy and the autonomy of law – these two kinds of autonomy stand or fall together. Individuals cannot truly be free if the law is a play eld for heteronymous forces, even if these forces are democratically elected lawgivers. We therefore oppose the classical model equating lawgivers with the law, or saying that lawgivers speak for their communities. It is imperative that the people themselves own the law. This, we think, can be best be realized with strong lawyers and with procedural constraints, permitting lawyers to force judges and the offices of the lawgivers in general to bend under the autonomy of law.
Ukrainian translation of Tom Campbell's article.
The article deals with the problem of the relat... more Ukrainian translation of Tom Campbell's article. The article deals with the problem of the relation of political and legal functions of the human rights principally in the constitutional context of the Commonwealth of Nations. The author advocates the position of legalism, or ethical positivism, involving a model of the rule of law, according to which human rights Acts must serve legislative, rather than judicial, review that would facilitate both individual autonomy and democratic effectiveness.
Ukrainian translation of Robert Alexy's article. The article deals with the problem of justificat... more Ukrainian translation of Robert Alexy's article. The article deals with the problem of justification of the constitutional review or the relation between constitutional review and democracy. The main thesis is that on the one hand constitutional review is justified on the basis of principles theory and on the other hand it is based on the theory of argumentative representation. Three arguments in favor of constitutional control are consistently revealed in the article: formal (the constitutional court controls compliance with constitutional rights by the parliament), substantive (constitutional review is designed to provide additional protection of constitutional rights as positivized human rights) and procedural (constitutional review is an «argumentative representation» of the people). The conclusion is that our mind justifies democratic constitutionalism, and constitutional review is detected reasonable as one of its necessary components.
The article deals with the reactualization of Aristotelian idea of phronesis within the framework... more The article deals with the reactualization of Aristotelian idea of phronesis within the framework of the hermeneutic philosophy in order to clarify a nature of jurisprudence as the experience of law. In the light of Aristotle’s typology of the experience and knowledge forms (episteme, techne, phronesis), the question of whether jurisprudence is a science in the strict sense of the word or just a technology, gets a new reading. The problem of the experience of law is placed in a broad historical and philosophical context. In particular, the idea of phenomenological hermeneutics (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer) is being clarified as an anti-metaphysical project aimed at criticizing the rationality of natural sciences and rehabilitation of the phronetic experience of understanding. The experience of law is conceived as a paradigmatic example of such experience, which, unlike the experience of art (techne) and the experience of science (episteme), doesn’t presuppose either free creativity, or the extraction of already existing legal meanings from authoritative sources, but rather the reproduction of these meanings in a dialogue with the tradition which we are a part of. It is clarified the rhetorical nature of any reasoning about the law as a conversation, the participants of which strive not to defend their position and not to accept the position of the interlocutor, but to understand the essence of the case in question. In this sense, the hermeneutic philosophy of law is an alternative to both dogmatism and relativism in jurisprudence, replacing the metaphysical ideas about the existence of independent moral truths with the experience of our own historicity.
Статья посвящена реактуализации аристотелевской идеи фронезиса в рамках герменевтической философии с целью прояснения природы юриспруденции как опыта права. В свете предложенной Аристотелем типологии форм опыта и знания (эпистеме, технэ, фронезис) вопрос о том, является ли юриспруденция наукой в срогом смысле этого слова или всего лишь технологией, получает новое прочтение. Проблема помещается в широкий историко-философский контекст. В частности, проясняется идея феноменологической герменевтики (Э. Гуссерль, М. Хайдеггер, Х.-Г. Гадамер) как антиметафизического проекта, направленного на критику естественнонаучной рациональности и реабилитацию фронетического опыта понимания. При этом опыт права мыслится как парадигматический пример фронезиса, который, в отличие от опыта искусства (технэ) и опыта науки (эпистеме), предполагает скорее не извлечение существующих правовых смыслов из авторитетных источников с целью их последующего применения к той или иной ситуации, но и не произвольное создание этих смыслов, а их воспроизведение в диалоге с традицией, частью которой мы являемся. Так раскрывается риторическая природа всякого рассуждения о праве как разговора, участники которого, стремятся не отстоять свою позицию и не принять позицию собеседника, а понять суть самого дела, о котором идет речь. В этом смысле герменевтическая философия права оказывается альтернативой как догматизму, так и релятивизму в юриспруденции, поставив на место метафизических представлений о существовании независимых моральных истин опыт нашей собственной историчности.
In order to reconstruct the problem of human rights justification, the article deals with evoluti... more In order to reconstruct the problem of human rights justification, the article deals with evolution and modern interpretation of this problem. Justification of human rights is regarded as identifying of their ultimate grounds, i.e. the manner in which these rights are entrenched in the being in general, or at least in the human being. The author reveals the skeptical and non-skeptical approaches to the justification of human rights, descriptive and normative strategy within the latter, the will theory and the interest theory, as well as the main directions of their criticism. In conclusion, it is noted that the debate about the justification of human rights cannot be stopped due to the very nature of the latter, in particular, the openness of human rights as a consequence of the openness of human being as such. Key words: philosophy of human rights, justification of human rights, the will theory, the interest theory, moral rights and legal rights.
The present essay explains law as a way of mastering the past in case of large-scale human rights... more The present essay explains law as a way of mastering the past in case of large-scale human rights violations. On the example of the theory and practice of transitional justice, such key strategies for mastering the past as truth, justice and reconciliation are viewed as forms of mutual recognition. The very phenomenon of transitional justice is conceived as a 'border situation', which makes it possible to clarify the true nature of law as an antithesis to violence and its fundamental connection with the peace.
The article draws an analogy between legal reality and the reality of artistic fiction, between t... more The article draws an analogy between legal reality and the reality of artistic fiction, between the legal subject and the reader of the novel. With the works of Franz Kafka authors demonstrate how the text can be constituted by his reader and how the legal reality can be reconstituted by the legal subject endowed with the capacity of judgment.
The article is devoted to the phenomenon of legal experience. The problem is placed into a broad ... more The article is devoted to the phenomenon of legal experience. The problem is placed into a broad historical and philosophical context and is conceived as a part of the problem of ontological unity. The question of the nature of law is transformed into the question of the grounds of law in the experience and nature of the latter. To clarify this issue, the author considers the methodological foundations, essence and internal contradictions of a number of concepts that localize the law in this or that aspect of the experience which is understood as a basic one, as well as the interrelation between them. The author of the psychological theory of law L. I. Petrażycki places the foundations of law in the emotional experience, keeping, however, the matter regarding the foundations of the emotions themselves unsettled. In turn, the phenomenology of law motivated in many ways by the desire to overcome psychologism sees the primary reality of law in the experience of a consciousness cleared of all prejudices, so that the sense (phenomenon) of law becomes obvious to it. At the same time, phenomenology does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of how the phenomenon of law is related to our everyday experience. Finally, philosophical hermeneutics striving to overcome the aporias of the phenomenological project understands the basic level of experience, by which a person is connected with the world, as the experience of a specific being, while the structure of this experience is understood as a hermeneutic circle of our existence in time in interaction with the world. The latter is carried out in the form of a dialogue the outcome of which is never predetermined in advance and, therefore, implies fundamental openness and readiness to recognize the other in his claim to truth. It is this that is regarded as a basis of normativity. By discovering the basis of law neither in the mental experience, nor in the experience of the reduced consciousness, but rather in the experience as such, that is, the experience of one’s own historicity, the hermeneutical concept of law is much closer to the classical ontological theories of natural law than to the later deontological conceptions, because hermeneutics enroots the due in the experience structure itself.
The purpose of this paper is to provoke some thought about the relationship between «Law, Reason,... more The purpose of this paper is to provoke some thought about the relationship between «Law, Reason, and Emotion» (the theme of the 2015 IVR World Congress in Washington, DC). The author suggests that law, reason and emotion are inextricably intertwined and in fact the central values of any effective system of justice. The foundational axiom posited for rational justice is that every human being has value and that all deserve support and encouragement in living worthwhile and fulfilling lives with other human beings. The best legislation and the most interesting and persuasive philosophy and interpretation of the law will take our natural human emotions into account, as they relate to the possibility of a good life and the rules of a just society. Emotions should be cultivated or not according to their value and likely effects, in the light of reason and justice. We cannot and should not deny the law claim to reason, but emotions remain the first and final basis of justice and ultimate foundation of the law.
The article deals with the problem of judicial ethics in the context of the history of Western le... more The article deals with the problem of judicial ethics in the context of the history of Western legal tradition, which is seen as a struggle for the rule of law. A special role in this struggle is given to the judges, which shall have the independence and security so that they can defend the rule of law against the encroachments of those in power. The ideal of the rule of law is regarded by the author as a universal and duty to fight for its implementation rests with the judges everywhere. Judges must be brave and through the interpretation of the right to make unjust legal system fairer, or be «heroes of the rule of law».
The aim of the paper is to present the historical and the modern form of hermeneutic. As W. Dilth... more The aim of the paper is to present the historical and the modern form of hermeneutic. As W. Dilthey stated, the understanding of the text is not entering of one individual into the spirit of the other, but rather a rising to a higher level of general overcoming not only one’s own but also someone else’s particularity. Any situation can be considered as a certain position limiting the possibility of vision. Н. Gadamer calls this limitation a horizon. So we may say that the following factors decide about the attachment to hermeneutic trend: 1) the recognition of understanding as the central philosophical category; 2) the analysis of the problem of pre-understanding; 3) the interpretation is regarded as discussion within a certain community. Why is this hermeneutical criticism of essential for the theory of law? As the matter of fact, in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s considerations one crucial question appears: How to reconcile the world of everyday experience of an individual with the world of scientific objectiveness and scientific authority? H. Gadamer tries to prove that an anthropological reduction of science to the world of everyday experience is possible through the demystification of the scientific methodological self-consciousness. The theory of law which is scientific and axiomatically neutral is not able to give answers to such questions as: «Why should we built discussion without resorting to violence or without restraining the freedom of participants?».
The present volume comprises papers presented at the Special workshop “The Experience of Law” wit... more The present volume comprises papers presented at the Special workshop “The Experience of Law” within the 29th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) held in Lucerne, Switzerland, during July 7–12, 2019. The contribution brought together 13 researchers from 5 countries in order to view an experience of law from different epistemological perspectives among them phenomenological hermeneutics and postmodernism, psychoanalysis and neo-Kantianism, legal realism and psychological theory of law. The volume reflects the wide range of topics that were addressed by contributors: from general phenomenology of law and lawlessness to philosophy of liberation, from genesis and experience of normativity to psychological foundations of legal validity. What is common to all authors is an attempt to take a fresh look at the basic question of the philosophy of law and consider law not as an object of our cognition or our technical domination, but as something that happens to us.
Видання об’єднує статті та есеї, представлені на спеціальному семінарі «Досвід права» в рамках 29-го Всесвітнього конгресу Міжнародної асоціації філософії права та соціальної філософії (IVR), який проходив у м. Люцерн (Швейцарія) з 7 по 12 липня 2019 р. У підготовці тому взяли участь 13 дослідників з 5 країн, зацікавлених в осмисленні досвіду права з різних епістемологічних перспектив, серед яких феноменологічна герменевтика і постмодернізм, психоаналіз і неокантіанство, правової реалізм і психологічна теорія права. Коло проблем, до яких звертаються автори, досить широке: від загальної феноменології права і безправ’я до філософії звільнення, від генезису і досвіду нормативності до психологічних підстав правової валідності. Об’єднує всі представлені тексти спроба поглянути на основне питання філософії права у радикально новий спосіб і мислити право не як об’єкт нашого пізнання або технічного панування, а як те, що відбувається з нами.
У колективній монографії, підготовленій науковцями, юристами-практиками й експертами неурядов... more У колективній монографії, підготовленій науковцями, юристами-практиками й експертами неурядових організацій, вперше докладно розкрито зміст, основні елементи та механізми реалізації правосуддя перехідного періоду, яке розглянуто в контексті одночасної трансформації українського суспільства від авторитарного минулого до демократичної сучасності та від умов військового конфлікту до постконфліктного стану. Проаналізовано досвід запровадження моделей правосуддя перехідного періоду в інших країнах. Зроблено акцент на неможливості простого запозичення будь-якої моделі перехідного правосуддя через відмінність соціально-культурних особливостей кожної з країн, де ці моделі застосовувалися.
Abstract review reflects the main content of a collective monograph: prepared by the academics, l... more Abstract review reflects the main content of a collective monograph: prepared by the academics, legal practitioners and civil society experts, it for the first time detailed the essence, key elements and implementation mechanisms of Transitional Justice. Transitional Justice is considered in the context of simultaneous transition of the Ukrainian society from the authoritarian past to a democratic modernity and from the military conflict to post-conflict situation. e paper includes analysis of implementation of Transitional Justice models in other countries; the main emphasis was made on a simple inability to borrow any model of Transitional Justice due to different social and cultural characteristics of each country, where these models are used. e given paper intends to raise the subject-matter understanding by deputies, public servants working in the eld of criminal justice, law enforcement, culture and social welfare; representatives of international and non-governmental organizations.
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Papers by Nataliia Satokhina
The key assumption is that while the political and the economic are based on the logic of the equivalent, which implies the establishment of a balance based on the balance of forces or interchangeable goods, the experience of law is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and subordinated rather to the logic of excess, or gift. This idea unfolds in three stages. The first part of article detects the place of gift in human experience. The next one is about the place of law in fundamental experience and the relationship between the experience of law and the experience of gift. In the final part, the question of the transformation of human experience and the corresponding perspectives of law is raised.
The author argues that law is rooted in the structure of our fundamental experience or way of being in the world. The latter consists in the openness to the infinite otherness of the Other and, in this sense, is subject to the logic of the gift. At the same time this openness is never guaranteed, which gives rise to the experience of law. Aimed at maintaining the logic of excess or gift, law turns out to be not just one of the aspects of experience, but a condition of experience as such. However, today, in the conditions of the spread of the market and its inherent logic of equivalence to all spheres of life, the experience of law, subject to the opposite idea, and with it the experience as such, appears to be under threat.
its structure, but also the loss of experience as such and its replacement with technology. In order to identify the place of law in this process, we are trying to clarify the legal aspect of experience in terms
of phenomenological hermeneutics and to trace its transformation in the digital age. The experience of law is thought of as one of the aspects of our mode of being-in-the-world, which is based on openness to the world and consists in the mutual recognition of people in their dignity. Digital technologies, in turn, contribute to replacing fundamental openness with illusory freedom in cyberspace. The latter, unlike the public realm as a realm of action of many, and in this sense legal realm, is based primarily on productive activities of one and no longer requires law.
Окреслено загальні перспективи та деякі напрями застосування герменевтичної оптики для осмислення проблеми природного права як проблеми співвідношення фактичності і значущості у структурі людського досвіду.
Герменевтичне осмислення проблеми природного права відбувається у три кро- ки. Спершу здійснено реконструкцію теорії герменевтичного досвіду як досвіду ро- зуміння себе, Іншого і світу. Останнє мислиться як спосіб буття людини у світі, що виявляється можливим завдяки герменевтичній відкритості як первинному визнан- ню Іншого.
Другу частину статті присвячено виявленню у структурі герменевтичного до- свіду іманентного йому правового виміру, який локалізовано в постійній напрузі між таким, що уможливлює досвід сенсу, взаємним визнанням і таким, що його не можна уникнути, ризиком невизнання.
Насамкінець встановлюється зв’язок між структурою герменевтичного досвіду та правовими інститутами, що вони розглядаються як підтвердження взаємного публічного визнання людьми одне одного. Зокрема, продемонстровано, що люд- ська гідність є не штучною конструкцією, до якої людство вимушене було вдатися заради самозбереження, і не порожньою політичною декларацією, а фундаменталь- ною цінністю інших людей, зумовленою особливістю людського досвіду як досвіду розуміння, можливого лише в діалозі.
Через виявлення правового виміру досвіду людини як досвіду сенсу окреслено контури герменевтичної теорії природного права як онтологічної теорії, що вба- чає підстави права у “природі речей” і як така становить альтернативу, з одного боку, релятивізму правового позитивізму, а з другого – догматизму деонтологічних теорій природного права.
The article outlines the general perspectives and some areas of application of hermeneutic optics to understand the problem of natural law. The latter is considered as a problem of the ratio of factuality and normativity in the structure of human experience.
Hermeneutic comprehension of the natural law problem occurs in three steps. First, the author reconstructs the theory of hermeneutic experience as an experience of understanding oneself, others and the world. Understanding is thought of as a human’s mode of being in the world, which is possible due to hermeneutic openness and the initial recognition of the Other.
The second part of the article aims to identify the legal dimension inherent in the structure of hermeneutic experience. It is localized in the constant tension between the mutual recognition, which makes the experience of meaning possible, and the inevitable risk of non-recognition.
Finally, the connection between the structure of hermeneutic experience and the legal institutions that confirm mutual public recognition between people is clarified. In particular, the article shows that human dignity is neither an artificial construction that humanity was forced to resort to for self-preservation, nor an empty political declaration. Instead, it is the fundamental importance of other people, due to the peculiarity of our experience as an experience of understanding, possible only in dialogue.
Through the discovery of the legal dimension of human experience as an experience of meaning, the author outlines the contours of the hermeneutic theory of natural law as an ontological theory that sees the foundations of law in the “nature of things”. Such a theory is an alternative, on the one hand, to the relativism of legal positivism and, on the other, to the dogmatism of deontological theories of natural law.
The article deals with the problem of postmetaphysical thinking in law, the relevance of which is connected with the crisis of fundamental jurisprudence as a consequence of the refusal of modern thought to think of the grounds. To identify the conditions for the possibility of post-metaphysical thinking in law, the author uses the method of historical and philosophical reconstruction, which at the same time turns out to be a hermeneutical highlighting. The problem is revealed in three stages. First, in the broad historical and philosophical context, the author considers the concept of metaphysics and the factors that motivated the critique of metaphysical thinking. Then she discusses the main motives of post-metaphysical thinking and reveals the nature of philosophical hermeneutics as a postmetaphysical project. Finally, the author identifies the features of postmetaphysical thinking in law and the role of hermeneutic philosophy of law in the postmetaphysics era. Metaphysicality (characterized primarily by idealism and the priority of theory) is considered to be an eternal component of philosophy, which manifests itself in the paradox of theoretical experience. The latter mainly inspires criticism of metaphysical thinking. Accordingly, overcoming metaphysics is a constant self-overcoming of philosophy, which at the same time becomes the dominant motivation of modern (postmetaphysical) thinking. Hermeneutic philosophy, or phenomenological hermeneutics, is considered as an example of a positive strategy for criticizing metaphysics, the main motive of which is to rethink the classical priority of theory over practice. In turn, the experience of law is seen as a paradigmatic example of experience as such, which is always a phronetic experience, that is, a combination of theory, practice, and art. Wherein the hermeneutic philosophy of law turns out to be an ontological theory of natural law, localizing the foundations of law in the very structure of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding. Ethics is thus combined with ontology, and postmetaphysical philosophy and postmetaphysical law become possible.
Review of the XXIX World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy “Dignity. Democracy. Diversity”, which was held in July 2019 in Lucerne (Switzerland), contains information on the lead theme of the Congress and its academic program, including the main theses of plenary lectures (“Dignity: An Equality Analysis” by Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Human Rights Overreach” by John Tasioulas, “The Islamic View of Humanity” by Azizah Y. al-Hibri, “Replacing the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood” (IVR Young Scholar Prize Lecture) by Eilidh Beaton, “Rescuing Human Rights: Challenges of Identity and Pluralism in an Age of Globalisation” by Neus Torbisco-Casals, “Natural Law, Cognitive Science and Human Rights” by John Mikhail, “Diversity: Importance and Relevance” by Yoshiki Wakamatsu, “Human Dignity: Challenges, Controversies and Promise” by Heiner Bielefeldt, Peter Schaber and Simone Zurbuchen), the themes of panel events, and an overview of the special workshop “Experience of Law”.
Ukrainian translation of Isabel Trujillo's article. The article is an observation of the relationship between human rights and peace from the perspective of the definition of law.
The author views law not from the point of view of its institutional side, but of experience, i.e. not as the object of our cognition or our technical domination, but as what happens to us. From the perspective of phenomenological hermeneutics, she highlights the essence of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding, or an experience of meaning, which is not one of our abilities, but the original way of our being in the world by which we come to terms with reality. At the same time, it is said that there is no meaning as such, either in the world or in a man himself; meaning is always a meeting, and the condition for the possibility of any experience is a fundamental openness and readiness to recognize the Other in his claim to truth, i.e. to recognize he to be equal to myself in freedom and dignity (I). Thus, an experience of law as a movement from non-recognition to mutual recognition by people of each other is thought of as an inherent aspect of our being in the world, which is always accompanied, however, by the risk of non-recognition. It is in this risky zone, halfway from non-recognition to the state of peace, that the author locates law (II). In turn, experience of lawlessness (equal to rightlessness) is regarded as a radical non-recognition experienced by people in situations that are conceptualized in modern philosophy as a “state of exception”. According to the author, the latter cannot be inscribed in legal reality either as an “inclusive exclusion” or in any other capacity, since, as an experience of political violence, it is essentially antithetic to legal experience as an experience of recognition inspired by the utopia of peace (III).
This paper considers law as a practical art that should be autonomous so to better fulfill the law’s primary goal, which is about the settlement of conflicts, be it inside or outside a courtroom. The dominant views, today, all understand law as fulfilling a certain instrumental role, normally linked to the values of justice or efficacy. Yet something will inevitably be amiss, we argue, if the law is understood only in instrumental terms. Once we begin to understand the law purely in instrumental terms, notwithstanding how noble are the objectives pursued, it is then our autonomy as individuals that will soon be compromised. There is indeed a parallel between individual autonomy and the autonomy of law – these two kinds of autonomy stand or fall together. Individuals cannot truly be free if the law is a play eld for heteronymous forces, even if these forces are democratically elected lawgivers. We therefore oppose the classical model equating lawgivers with the law, or saying that lawgivers speak for their communities. It is imperative that the people themselves own the law. This, we think, can be best be realized with strong lawyers and with procedural constraints, permitting lawyers to force judges and the offices of the lawgivers in general to bend under the autonomy of law.
The article deals with the problem of the relation of political and legal functions of the human rights principally in the constitutional context of the Commonwealth of Nations. The author advocates the position of legalism, or ethical positivism, involving a model of the rule of law, according to which human rights Acts must serve legislative, rather than judicial, review that would facilitate both individual autonomy and democratic effectiveness.
Статья посвящена реактуализации аристотелевской идеи фронезиса в рамках герменевтической философии с целью прояснения природы юриспруденции как опыта права. В свете предложенной Аристотелем типологии форм опыта и знания (эпистеме, технэ, фронезис) вопрос о том, является ли юриспруденция наукой в срогом смысле этого слова или всего лишь технологией, получает новое прочтение. Проблема помещается в широкий историко-философский контекст. В частности, проясняется идея феноменологической герменевтики (Э. Гуссерль, М. Хайдеггер, Х.-Г. Гадамер) как антиметафизического проекта, направленного на критику естественнонаучной рациональности и реабилитацию фронетического опыта понимания. При этом опыт права мыслится как парадигматический пример фронезиса, который, в отличие от опыта искусства (технэ) и опыта науки (эпистеме), предполагает скорее не извлечение существующих правовых смыслов из авторитетных источников с целью их последующего применения к той или иной ситуации, но и не произвольное создание этих смыслов, а их воспроизведение в диалоге с традицией, частью которой мы являемся. Так раскрывается риторическая природа всякого рассуждения о праве как разговора, участники которого, стремятся не отстоять свою позицию и не принять позицию собеседника, а понять суть самого дела, о котором идет речь. В этом смысле герменевтическая философия права оказывается альтернативой как догматизму, так и релятивизму в юриспруденции, поставив на место метафизических представлений о существовании независимых моральных истин опыт нашей собственной историчности.
Key words: philosophy of human rights, justification of human rights, the will theory, the interest theory, moral rights and legal rights.
The key assumption is that while the political and the economic are based on the logic of the equivalent, which implies the establishment of a balance based on the balance of forces or interchangeable goods, the experience of law is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and subordinated rather to the logic of excess, or gift. This idea unfolds in three stages. The first part of article detects the place of gift in human experience. The next one is about the place of law in fundamental experience and the relationship between the experience of law and the experience of gift. In the final part, the question of the transformation of human experience and the corresponding perspectives of law is raised.
The author argues that law is rooted in the structure of our fundamental experience or way of being in the world. The latter consists in the openness to the infinite otherness of the Other and, in this sense, is subject to the logic of the gift. At the same time this openness is never guaranteed, which gives rise to the experience of law. Aimed at maintaining the logic of excess or gift, law turns out to be not just one of the aspects of experience, but a condition of experience as such. However, today, in the conditions of the spread of the market and its inherent logic of equivalence to all spheres of life, the experience of law, subject to the opposite idea, and with it the experience as such, appears to be under threat.
its structure, but also the loss of experience as such and its replacement with technology. In order to identify the place of law in this process, we are trying to clarify the legal aspect of experience in terms
of phenomenological hermeneutics and to trace its transformation in the digital age. The experience of law is thought of as one of the aspects of our mode of being-in-the-world, which is based on openness to the world and consists in the mutual recognition of people in their dignity. Digital technologies, in turn, contribute to replacing fundamental openness with illusory freedom in cyberspace. The latter, unlike the public realm as a realm of action of many, and in this sense legal realm, is based primarily on productive activities of one and no longer requires law.
Окреслено загальні перспективи та деякі напрями застосування герменевтичної оптики для осмислення проблеми природного права як проблеми співвідношення фактичності і значущості у структурі людського досвіду.
Герменевтичне осмислення проблеми природного права відбувається у три кро- ки. Спершу здійснено реконструкцію теорії герменевтичного досвіду як досвіду ро- зуміння себе, Іншого і світу. Останнє мислиться як спосіб буття людини у світі, що виявляється можливим завдяки герменевтичній відкритості як первинному визнан- ню Іншого.
Другу частину статті присвячено виявленню у структурі герменевтичного до- свіду іманентного йому правового виміру, який локалізовано в постійній напрузі між таким, що уможливлює досвід сенсу, взаємним визнанням і таким, що його не можна уникнути, ризиком невизнання.
Насамкінець встановлюється зв’язок між структурою герменевтичного досвіду та правовими інститутами, що вони розглядаються як підтвердження взаємного публічного визнання людьми одне одного. Зокрема, продемонстровано, що люд- ська гідність є не штучною конструкцією, до якої людство вимушене було вдатися заради самозбереження, і не порожньою політичною декларацією, а фундаменталь- ною цінністю інших людей, зумовленою особливістю людського досвіду як досвіду розуміння, можливого лише в діалозі.
Через виявлення правового виміру досвіду людини як досвіду сенсу окреслено контури герменевтичної теорії природного права як онтологічної теорії, що вба- чає підстави права у “природі речей” і як така становить альтернативу, з одного боку, релятивізму правового позитивізму, а з другого – догматизму деонтологічних теорій природного права.
The article outlines the general perspectives and some areas of application of hermeneutic optics to understand the problem of natural law. The latter is considered as a problem of the ratio of factuality and normativity in the structure of human experience.
Hermeneutic comprehension of the natural law problem occurs in three steps. First, the author reconstructs the theory of hermeneutic experience as an experience of understanding oneself, others and the world. Understanding is thought of as a human’s mode of being in the world, which is possible due to hermeneutic openness and the initial recognition of the Other.
The second part of the article aims to identify the legal dimension inherent in the structure of hermeneutic experience. It is localized in the constant tension between the mutual recognition, which makes the experience of meaning possible, and the inevitable risk of non-recognition.
Finally, the connection between the structure of hermeneutic experience and the legal institutions that confirm mutual public recognition between people is clarified. In particular, the article shows that human dignity is neither an artificial construction that humanity was forced to resort to for self-preservation, nor an empty political declaration. Instead, it is the fundamental importance of other people, due to the peculiarity of our experience as an experience of understanding, possible only in dialogue.
Through the discovery of the legal dimension of human experience as an experience of meaning, the author outlines the contours of the hermeneutic theory of natural law as an ontological theory that sees the foundations of law in the “nature of things”. Such a theory is an alternative, on the one hand, to the relativism of legal positivism and, on the other, to the dogmatism of deontological theories of natural law.
The article deals with the problem of postmetaphysical thinking in law, the relevance of which is connected with the crisis of fundamental jurisprudence as a consequence of the refusal of modern thought to think of the grounds. To identify the conditions for the possibility of post-metaphysical thinking in law, the author uses the method of historical and philosophical reconstruction, which at the same time turns out to be a hermeneutical highlighting. The problem is revealed in three stages. First, in the broad historical and philosophical context, the author considers the concept of metaphysics and the factors that motivated the critique of metaphysical thinking. Then she discusses the main motives of post-metaphysical thinking and reveals the nature of philosophical hermeneutics as a postmetaphysical project. Finally, the author identifies the features of postmetaphysical thinking in law and the role of hermeneutic philosophy of law in the postmetaphysics era. Metaphysicality (characterized primarily by idealism and the priority of theory) is considered to be an eternal component of philosophy, which manifests itself in the paradox of theoretical experience. The latter mainly inspires criticism of metaphysical thinking. Accordingly, overcoming metaphysics is a constant self-overcoming of philosophy, which at the same time becomes the dominant motivation of modern (postmetaphysical) thinking. Hermeneutic philosophy, or phenomenological hermeneutics, is considered as an example of a positive strategy for criticizing metaphysics, the main motive of which is to rethink the classical priority of theory over practice. In turn, the experience of law is seen as a paradigmatic example of experience as such, which is always a phronetic experience, that is, a combination of theory, practice, and art. Wherein the hermeneutic philosophy of law turns out to be an ontological theory of natural law, localizing the foundations of law in the very structure of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding. Ethics is thus combined with ontology, and postmetaphysical philosophy and postmetaphysical law become possible.
Review of the XXIX World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy “Dignity. Democracy. Diversity”, which was held in July 2019 in Lucerne (Switzerland), contains information on the lead theme of the Congress and its academic program, including the main theses of plenary lectures (“Dignity: An Equality Analysis” by Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Human Rights Overreach” by John Tasioulas, “The Islamic View of Humanity” by Azizah Y. al-Hibri, “Replacing the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood” (IVR Young Scholar Prize Lecture) by Eilidh Beaton, “Rescuing Human Rights: Challenges of Identity and Pluralism in an Age of Globalisation” by Neus Torbisco-Casals, “Natural Law, Cognitive Science and Human Rights” by John Mikhail, “Diversity: Importance and Relevance” by Yoshiki Wakamatsu, “Human Dignity: Challenges, Controversies and Promise” by Heiner Bielefeldt, Peter Schaber and Simone Zurbuchen), the themes of panel events, and an overview of the special workshop “Experience of Law”.
Ukrainian translation of Isabel Trujillo's article. The article is an observation of the relationship between human rights and peace from the perspective of the definition of law.
The author views law not from the point of view of its institutional side, but of experience, i.e. not as the object of our cognition or our technical domination, but as what happens to us. From the perspective of phenomenological hermeneutics, she highlights the essence of fundamental experience as an experience of understanding, or an experience of meaning, which is not one of our abilities, but the original way of our being in the world by which we come to terms with reality. At the same time, it is said that there is no meaning as such, either in the world or in a man himself; meaning is always a meeting, and the condition for the possibility of any experience is a fundamental openness and readiness to recognize the Other in his claim to truth, i.e. to recognize he to be equal to myself in freedom and dignity (I). Thus, an experience of law as a movement from non-recognition to mutual recognition by people of each other is thought of as an inherent aspect of our being in the world, which is always accompanied, however, by the risk of non-recognition. It is in this risky zone, halfway from non-recognition to the state of peace, that the author locates law (II). In turn, experience of lawlessness (equal to rightlessness) is regarded as a radical non-recognition experienced by people in situations that are conceptualized in modern philosophy as a “state of exception”. According to the author, the latter cannot be inscribed in legal reality either as an “inclusive exclusion” or in any other capacity, since, as an experience of political violence, it is essentially antithetic to legal experience as an experience of recognition inspired by the utopia of peace (III).
This paper considers law as a practical art that should be autonomous so to better fulfill the law’s primary goal, which is about the settlement of conflicts, be it inside or outside a courtroom. The dominant views, today, all understand law as fulfilling a certain instrumental role, normally linked to the values of justice or efficacy. Yet something will inevitably be amiss, we argue, if the law is understood only in instrumental terms. Once we begin to understand the law purely in instrumental terms, notwithstanding how noble are the objectives pursued, it is then our autonomy as individuals that will soon be compromised. There is indeed a parallel between individual autonomy and the autonomy of law – these two kinds of autonomy stand or fall together. Individuals cannot truly be free if the law is a play eld for heteronymous forces, even if these forces are democratically elected lawgivers. We therefore oppose the classical model equating lawgivers with the law, or saying that lawgivers speak for their communities. It is imperative that the people themselves own the law. This, we think, can be best be realized with strong lawyers and with procedural constraints, permitting lawyers to force judges and the offices of the lawgivers in general to bend under the autonomy of law.
The article deals with the problem of the relation of political and legal functions of the human rights principally in the constitutional context of the Commonwealth of Nations. The author advocates the position of legalism, or ethical positivism, involving a model of the rule of law, according to which human rights Acts must serve legislative, rather than judicial, review that would facilitate both individual autonomy and democratic effectiveness.
Статья посвящена реактуализации аристотелевской идеи фронезиса в рамках герменевтической философии с целью прояснения природы юриспруденции как опыта права. В свете предложенной Аристотелем типологии форм опыта и знания (эпистеме, технэ, фронезис) вопрос о том, является ли юриспруденция наукой в срогом смысле этого слова или всего лишь технологией, получает новое прочтение. Проблема помещается в широкий историко-философский контекст. В частности, проясняется идея феноменологической герменевтики (Э. Гуссерль, М. Хайдеггер, Х.-Г. Гадамер) как антиметафизического проекта, направленного на критику естественнонаучной рациональности и реабилитацию фронетического опыта понимания. При этом опыт права мыслится как парадигматический пример фронезиса, который, в отличие от опыта искусства (технэ) и опыта науки (эпистеме), предполагает скорее не извлечение существующих правовых смыслов из авторитетных источников с целью их последующего применения к той или иной ситуации, но и не произвольное создание этих смыслов, а их воспроизведение в диалоге с традицией, частью которой мы являемся. Так раскрывается риторическая природа всякого рассуждения о праве как разговора, участники которого, стремятся не отстоять свою позицию и не принять позицию собеседника, а понять суть самого дела, о котором идет речь. В этом смысле герменевтическая философия права оказывается альтернативой как догматизму, так и релятивизму в юриспруденции, поставив на место метафизических представлений о существовании независимых моральных истин опыт нашей собственной историчности.
Key words: philosophy of human rights, justification of human rights, the will theory, the interest theory, moral rights and legal rights.
Видання об’єднує статті та есеї, представлені на спеціальному семінарі «Досвід права» в рамках 29-го Всесвітнього конгресу Міжнародної асоціації філософії права та соціальної філософії (IVR), який проходив у м. Люцерн (Швейцарія) з 7 по 12 липня 2019 р. У підготовці тому взяли участь 13 дослідників з 5 країн, зацікавлених в осмисленні досвіду права з різних епістемологічних перспектив, серед яких феноменологічна герменевтика і постмодернізм, психоаналіз і неокантіанство, правової реалізм і психологічна теорія права. Коло проблем, до яких звертаються автори, досить широке: від загальної феноменології права і безправ’я до філософії звільнення, від генезису і досвіду нормативності до психологічних підстав правової валідності. Об’єднує всі представлені тексти спроба поглянути на основне питання філософії права у радикально новий спосіб і мислити право не як об’єкт нашого пізнання або технічного панування, а як те, що відбувається з нами.
e paper includes analysis of implementation of Transitional Justice models in other countries; the main emphasis was made on a simple inability to borrow any model of Transitional Justice due to different social and cultural characteristics of each country, where these models are used.
e given paper intends to raise the subject-matter understanding by deputies, public servants working in the eld of criminal justice, law enforcement, culture and social welfare; representatives of international and non-governmental organizations.