Roberto Redaelli

This chapter aims to investigate the notion of digital normativity, understood as the binding force exerted on the human subject by the predictions and standards established by artificial intelligent systems. To this end, we focus our attention on the merits and limits of the recent treatment of digital normativity proposed by Fourneret and Yvert, in order to bring a decisive correction to their ideas through the introduction of the notion of quasi-normativity. In order to introduce and develop this notion in the context of enquiry into the digital sphere, we make use of Don Ihde's precise postphenomenological considerations on the nature of the artificial agent as a quasi-other. With the aid of Ihde's postphenomenological approach and the introduction of the notion of quasi-normativity, we intend to shed new light on the binding force of AI and offer some guidance for the resolution of the normative question in intelligent systems.

This chapter aims to clarify the moral status of AI systems by applying to them the notion of moral mediator developed by P. P. Verbeek in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). More precisely, we propose to define artificial intelligent systems as moral mediators of a particular kind, i. e. as possessing technological intentionality linked to composite intentionality. To this end, it is first necessary to show that the common view of technology held by various forms of instrumental theories is insufficient for the purpose of understanding the agency of AI systems. We then analyse some paradigmatic positions that assign a certain moral status to technological artefacts, such as those of D. G. Johnson and J. Sullins, in order to compare them with Verbeek's postphenomenological approach. Finally, we illustrate how this latter approach overcomes certain limitations that can be ascribed to these other positions and offers a contribution to the process of understanding the moral significance of artificial intelligence.

The exponential progress of AI systems today compels scientists and philosophers to redefine their conceptual frameworks to better understand the nature of these new technologies and their moral status. Among the various theories that are used to respond to the challenges posed by intelligent systems are instrumentalism, Socio-technical Systems Theory (STST) and Mediation Theory (MT), all widely adopted in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). This paper intends to present the main features of these theories and provide a comparative analysis of them in order to assess their contribution to the process of understanding the moral status of artificial intelligence. Our investigation intends to show how (1) instrumentalism is inadequate to account for the moral status of AI, (2) STST, while helping to highlight the link between AI, society and morality, lends itself to the criticism of anthropocentrism, (3) MT in its Latourian version has the merit of highlighting the active character of technological artefacts and thus of artificial intelligence in the moral sphere. However, the principle of symmetry it proposes poses the problem of the de-accountability of the human agent. (4) MT in its postphenomenological form seems to partially resolve the problem of moral responsibility, but the opacity of the terminology it employs exposes it to various criticisms. In light of these results, we intend to show how an understanding of the moral status of intelligent systems cannot be based on the diametrically opposed positions that consider technologies either morally neutral or else moral agents similar to humans, whereas particularly useful elements can be found in STST and in postphenomenological MT.

The decisions, forecasts and operations produced by intelligent systems reveal new possibilities for action in various areas of society and radically transform our lifestyles. This epochal change has triggered, in parallel with a remodeling of our habits, an important process of re-semantisation of some notions traditionally ascribed to human beings, such as those regarding intentionality and responsibility. This paper addresses the process of redefining these notions with the aim to shed light on composite forms of intentionality and responsibility in the increasingly close relationship between humans and AI. To this purpose, we propose to apply in the specific field of AI the idea of composite intentionality developed by P.P. Verbeek and extend it to the notion of responsibility. Despite some terminological problems related to Verbeek's proposal, his post-phenomenological approach has the merit of taking the human-technology association as its main focus, helping us to better understand the moral status of artificial intelligence.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a redefinition, in heterological terms, of the relationship between the natural and cultural spheres of human existence. To this purpose, by following the lead of certain outcomes of Windelband’s philosophy of history and of Rickert’s philosophical anthropology, the paper aims first to locate and identify the essential trait of the human being in its processual and self-formative
nature, and then to assess the effectiveness and limitations of this thesis within the current philosophical debate radically transformed by the phenomena of posthumanism and transhumanism.

The aim of the paper is to provide a relational explanation of the sources of moral normativity, within a Neo-Kantian framework. To this purpose, the key notions employed are those of we-society and stance-taking, developed by Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. Specifically, by resorting to such notions, the paper attempts to overcome two limits ascribed to the theory of moral normativity of Ch. Korsgaard: namely W. Smith's objection of solipsism and S. Crowell's problem of non-deliberate action, whereby Ch. Korsgaard's identification of the source of normativity in reflection would lead her theory to a form of solipsism and to failing to explain actions based on so-called 'mindless coping'. In tackling these objections, the paper outlines a Rickertian inspired theory, according to which the sources of moral normativity can be explained on the basis of the heterological I-You relationship, which is the foundation of the we-society intended as a set of values, patterns of expectations, tacit consents, and procedural knowledge.

The paper offers a concise introduction to the special issue of Ethics and Politics "Rethinking the Sources of Normativity in Ethics". To this purpose it outlines the intellectual scenario within which the contributions of this special issue are embedded and the overarching goal of redefining the question on the sources of moral normativity through an interdisciplinary framework. The paper moreover provides an overview of each contribution categorized in thematically distinguished areas.

This paper examines Rickert's reflection on ethics, with a special focus on the notion of Wir-Gemeinschaft, and assesses its relevance to the current philosophical debate on the sources of moral normativity. To this purpose the paper firstly examines the social notion of self developed by Rickert against solipsistic theories in ethical and theoretical fields. The second point is to bring to light the presence of a thought of the other in Rickert's philosophy: albeit this proposition is apparently reminiscent of certain virtuous phenomenological positions recognizable in the current debate on sources of normativity, yet it does break away from it on account of the symmetry it establishes between the I and the you. Finally, on the basis of these inquiries, I conclude attributing to Rickertian philosophy a theory of normativity in the first-person-plural (We) featuring a radical redefinition of the Kantian notion of autonomy in the social sense.

This paper examines the two different modalities of finitude identified by Heidegger, i.e. perishing and dying, respectively attributed to animals and to human beings. The first goal of the paper is to bring to light the structural link in Heideggerian philosophy between death and language, by virtue of which Dasein dies properly only within the symbolic space originated by the word. The second goal is to assess the extent to which the Heideggerian distinction between perishing and dying has held up in the environment of contemporary philosophy: despite some unavoidable limitations, recent scientific outcomes seem to provide its validation.

The emergence of the anthropological question in the late
Rickert. This paper traces the emergence of the anthropological question in the philosophy of Heinrich Rickert by examining the role played by anthropological philosophy in the latter developments of Rickert’s system of thought. In pursuing this goal, we point to a set of works written in the 1930s as the turning point in Rickert’s inquiry, where the inner articulation of his philosophical system was redefined by designating a broad space for the anthropological issues. By focusing on such issues this paper also wishes to lay out a thorough introduction to the first Italian translation of Rickert’s essay Thesen zum System der Philosophie and to a part of the unpublished notes the philosopher used in delivering the 1932 lectures on Sozialphilosophie. According to the herein hermeneutic thesis, these works – together – are indeed the locus where we should recognise the earliest emergence of the anthropological question in Rickert’s philosophy.

Contrary to the progress of the Postmodern condition – first recognized by J. F. Lyotard – the last century’s philosophical scenario saw the establishment of a new philosophical current shunning any kind of relativism and proposing a form of renovated realism. This realism opposes the Nietzschean maxim, acknowledged by Postmodernism, according to which there are no facts, but only interpretations, and contrary to that maxim it holds true that reality is “unamendable” (Ferraris). A lively debate has thus sparked off in the last decade over the status of reality and of truth, involving the great part of the exponents of our philosophical scene. This paper wishes to contribute to the unfolding of such debate, which indeed revives the classical question on the objective or subjective nature of truth and reality: it does so by appealing to the philosophy of Carlo Sini and specifically to the notion of subject developed by this philosopher in the course of his intellectual trajectory. To this purpose the paper pursues two main goals. Firstly, we wish to expound the notion of subject as developed in Carlo Sini’s philosophy; especially we should point out the unique form that the subject assumes in this philosopher’s thought of practices: which is – essentially – a sort of hermeneutical pragmatism. The second goal is to assess the significance of Sini’s notion of subject in the current debate between New Realism and Postmodernism. More specifically, according to the thesis here argued, we can recognize, in the philosophy developed by Sini, a unique form of the subject-reality relationship which neither reduces the latter to a mere product of the former, nor raises it to something absolute and enfranchised from the subjective sphere of experience. This mode of the world-man relationship can provide a new approach to the question on the nature of reality distinct from both Postmodernism and New Realism.

The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to redefining the anthropological question from the perspective of the two paramount members of the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism: Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband. To this purpose, following the lead of the outcomes of Windelband's philosophy of history and of Rickert's philosophical anthropology, the paper firstly proposes to identify the essential trait of the human being in its processual and self-formative nature and, then, to assess the effectiveness and limitations of this thesis within the current philosophical debate as radically redefined by the phenomena of posthumanism and transhumanism. In this line of inquiry, the paper dwells principally on the redefinition, in heterological-processual terms, of the relationship between the natural and cultural spheres of the human being, as well as on the ethical-practical character that marks the process of human formation, i.e. form-taking.

This paper aims at assessing the current significance of the anthropological reflections of Heinrich Rickert, comparing his most important contributions to recent results in the fields of evolutionary and philosophical anthropology. With this aim in mind, we examine two Rickertian theses of considerable theoretical interest: the fundamental value of sociality in being human and the foundation role of the corporeal in the cultural world. The first thesis, developed by Rickert in the field of axiology, closely relates to Michael Tomasello's definition of man as an ultra-social animal. The second thesis represents an original contribution to the re-evaluation of the corporeal basis of human experience, which has continued to play a central role in some areas of philosophical research since the last century.

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between living body and artefacts in the perspective of Helmuth Plessner's aesthesiology. According to the outcomes of Plessner's aesthesiology, I present two main theses: 1) artefacts are not created, but rather discovered (entdeckt) and expressed by human agency, and 2) the bodily dimension of the human being is the condition of the "discovery" of material and symbolic artefacts. To argue these theses I highlight a) the process of "somatisation" that engages the Kantian transcendental model of subject in Plessner's philosophical anthropology, b) Plessner's rejection of the Kantian profile of Uexküll's theory of Umwelt as an application of this transcendental model of subjectivity in the biological field, and c) the development in Plessner of a type of transcendental aesthetics, which can be linked with S. Crowell's recent theory of perception.

Das Interesse an der Geschichte in ihrem formalen und materialen Profil steht – primär in methodologischer und sekundär in ontologischer Hinsicht – im Mittelpunkt des Badener Neukantianismus: von Rickerts Grenzen zu Windelbands Präludien und Lasks Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte ist die historische Dimension des Menschen der bevorzugte Untersuchungsgegenstand. Im Gegensatz zu anderen philosophischen Strömungen, die in der Kulturszene der Jahrhundertwende von 1900 dominieren, ist das Geschichtsinteresse in der Badischen Schule durch eine zweifache und unlösbare Spannung geprägt. Sie versucht, die faktische und zeitliche Dimension, wenn auch mit unüberbrückbaren Schwierigkeiten, mit der Dimension des Wertes und der Ewigkeit zu verbinden. Die geschichtlichen Güter sind dieser Perspektive zufolge nichts anderes als Wertträger, die im Grunde genommen das kulturphi-losophische Apriori darstellen, d.h. den Leitfaden bilden, um im magmatischen und irisierenden Material der Geschichte Ordnung zu schaffen.
Im Rahmen von Reflexionen über die unauflösliche Spannung zwischen Zeitlichem und Ewigem, zwischen Empirie und Werten tritt indes ein theoretisches Element bzw. ein begrifflicher Knoten hervor, der nicht auf den Dualismus reduzierbar ist, der die Vorgehensweise der drei Denker kennzeichnet, sondern für den philosophischen Diskurs über die Geschichte der Badischen Schule von ebenso entscheidender Bedeutung ist. Dieses Element lässt sich unter dem Titel ‚Mereologie der Geschichte‘ rubrizieren.
Wie wir zu beweisen versuchen, weist dieser Begriff hier auf eine formale Reflexion über die Geschichte hin, der eine präzise Teil-Ganzes-Theorie zugrunde liegt, die sowohl auf ontologischer als auch auf epistemologischer Ebene gelten soll. Im Neudenken des Ge-schichtsbegriffs der neukantianischen Schule zu Beginn des 20. Jahr-hunderts kommt dieser Theorie, die bei Windelband und Rickert Form anzunehmen beginnt und ihren höchsten Ausdruck bei Lask findet, eine entscheidende Rolle zu. Die hier gestellte Aufgabe, die Grundzüge dieser Theorie zu rekonstruieren, wird von einer doppelten Überzeugung getragen. Einerseits kann sich im aktuellen philosophischen Szenarium, das sich zur Lösung unumgehbarer philosophischer Probleme von mehreren Seiten auf die Mereologie beruft, eine solche Reflexion als fruchtbar erweisen. Andererseits verrät Lasks Ausarbeitung dieser Theorie in seinem ersten Werk Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte die Originalität und theoretische Stärke eines Denkers, der an die Re-flexionen seiner beiden Lehrer anknüpfend das letzte Geheimnis der Geschichte im fichteschen Begriff der Wertindividualität zu erkennen wusste, d.h. in seiner Auffassung des Individuums, dessen Wert von seiner im Wertganzen eingenommenen Stellung abhängt. Der Teil und das Ganze, das Individuum und die Geschichte sind daher die Begriffe, mit denen Lask das Problem der Geschichte neu definiert und sich, wie wir sehen werden, als philosophischer Erbe des von der Badischen Schule erklärten und vertretenen Kantianismus der Geschichtsphilosophie erweist.  Denn die Grundlage bildet hier nicht nur der Bezug auf die axiologische Sphäre, die schon durch die Sekundärliteratur umfassend dokumentiert ist, sondern eine bestimmte Teil-Ganzes-Theorie, die von diesen Studien jedoch allzu oft übersehen wird. Erst durch den Zusammenhang dieser Theorie mit der axiologischen Ebene wird für den Neukritizismus von Windelband, Rickert und Lask ein radikales Neudenken der geschichtlichen Sphäre möglich, das sich auch heute noch als fruchtbar erweisen kann.

La crescente specializzazione dei saperi ha restituito un’immagine sempre più frammentaria dell’essere umano, ridotto, a seconda delle diverse prospettive d’indagine, alle sue proprietà fisiche, chimiche o neurologiche, secondo il paradigma dominante delle scienze naturali. Questo riduzionismo, che si nutre di esponenziali progressi tecnologici, ha come effetto una radicale parcellizzazione della nozione di essere umano e della sua poliedrica natura psicofisica, depauperata della sua complessità e presentata dalle diverse scienze a partire da prospettive unilaterali. In questo scenario, dominato in larga parte da un’ontologia fisicalista, si avverte di nuovo l’urgenza di riformulare la Menschenfrage a partire da una prospettiva onnicomprensiva, che abbandoni le infinite micrologie dell’umano, ovvero da un’antropologia filosofica, capace di interagire in modo fecondo con le scienze. Tale genuina istanza di confronto e integrazione tra i risultati delle scienze umane e naturali è incarnata dall’antropologia filosofica di Helmuth Plessner. Di tale antropologia il presente articolo intende lumeggiare gli esiti più fecondi e attuali: l’interdisciplinarietà che informa il procedere dell’indagine plessneriana, la centralità assunta dalla nozione di corporeità e la conseguente ontologia continuista dell’organico proposta dal filosofo.

Il presente articolo intende lumeggiare l’esito tanto fecondo quanto problematico a cui conduce l’originale opera laskiana di risemantizzazione del concetto di soggettività. Al centro di tale opera si staglia la progressiva elaborazione di ciò che il filosofo rubrica, al termine del suo Denkweg, sotto il titolo di soggetto ricettivo. Con tale concetto, a cui è intimamente legato quello di “dedizione”, Lask individua in una mera ricettività intuitiva il momento sorgivo e originario di ogni processo cognitivo; il solo momento che rende possibile un accesso diretto all’oggetto trascendente. Ma come si realizza questo accesso? Qual è lo statuto di ciò che il filosofo nomina “dedizione”? L’insufficiente risposta a tali quesiti conduce il pensiero laskiano ad un esito aporetico, ossia alla riduzione della dedizione a momento ideale e alla conseguente riattivazione, in ambito conoscitivo, dell’inaggirabile distanza tra soggetto e oggetto. Ma, se in tale aporia è riconosciuto il limite del modello della conoscenza elaborato da Lask nel suo sistema maturo, non è comunque possibile occultare il decisivo contributo offerto dalla sua riflessione al problema gnoseologico: il superamento del coscienzialismo attraverso l’elaborazione di un soggetto concreto-ricettivo e, accanto ad esso, di un peculiare realismo.

In seinem Gedankenweg präsentiert Anton Friedrich Koch zwei in der theoretischen Philosophie folgenschwere Thesen: Die Antinomiethese und die Subjektivitätsthese. Mit der Antinomiethese stützt der Philosoph dass das Denken als solches widerspruchsvoll ist. Mit der Antinomiethese drückt Koch die Notwendigkeit der Existenz einer körperlichen Subjektivität aus, die Garant für die Möglichkeit eines raum-zeitlichen Systems. Diese Thesis und ihre Grenzen sind der Schwerpunkt dieses Artikels.

Nowadays many disciplines are devoting particular attention from a
variety of perspectives to the normative nature of our ways of life.
From linguistics to jurisprudence, from anthropology to philosophy,
from economics to neuroscience, the subject of moral normativity
constitutes a Gordian knot of the present age, towards which the
efforts of scientific and philosophical understanding are directed.
The following volume aims to reach a better understanding of
moral normativity. It collects works by primatologists, sociologists,
philosophers of law, ethicists, and phenomenologists to illustrate
their contributions to resolving issues regarding the normative
profile of ethical concepts, judgments and reasons, i.e., the source
of the binding force that guides the behaviour of the human agent.
With contributions by
John J. Drummond | Federico L.G. Faroldi | Edoardo Fittipaldi | Roberto
Redaelli | Alessio Rotundo | Richard Wrangham

Following the post-idealist identity crisis and the advent of nihilism, which dominated the European cultural scene after the fall of the great systems of thought, philosophy underwent a decisive transformation under the impetus of a movement that rallied its best minds around the famous call "zurück zu Kant!". This call had first been uttered by Eduard Zeller and then resounded throughout Europe, and soon found its place in the strongholds of scholarship which were the Universities of Heidelberg, Freiburg and Marburg, where various schools of thought took shape, united by the intention to meet the intellectual challenges of the present day with renewed forms of criticism. Prominent representatives of these schools, among them Windelband, Rickert and Lask in the Baden school, Natorp, Cohen and Cassirer in the Marburg school to name only the most famous, sparked a radical redefinition of the European philosophical and cultural scene in the 20th century and impacted disparate fields of study: from the theory of knowledge to aesthetics, from anthropology to the doctrine of values, the breadth of the horizons unlocked by the work of these authors became a cardinal reference point for successive generations of philosophers. The crucial role that this movement played in the genesis and development of twentieth-century philosophical thought is examined in the series Studies in Neo-Kantianism, whose goal is to provide an international platform for contributions from leading scholars in this current. Specifically, the series aims to collect historical-philosophical studies written in the major European languages with the purpose of investigating the multiple forms that neo-Kantianism has assumed, while remaining open to the thematization of the impact of this school of thought on the methods of the various cultural sciences, without excluding from its scope more explicitly theoretical works that highlight the contemporary relevance of certain issues raised by this current. The series also intends to include editions and translations of classic Neo-Kantian texts. In this mission, the series has a clear international vocation, strengthened by the collaboration with the Centre for Studies in Neo-Kantianism at the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität in Erlangen-Nürnberg. In keeping with the work of investigation and dissemination promoted by the research centre, the series seeks to restore the spirit of Neo-Kantianism by bringing together specialised works that are the fruit of international collaboration between leading scholars in this current of thought.

Der Band versammelt die wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz des Philosophen Emil Lask (1875–1915), einem der wichtigsten Vertreter des Neukantianismus der »Südwestdeutschen« Schule. Im Mittelpunkt steht der Briefwechsel Lasks mit seinem akademischen Lehrer Heinrich Rickert.

In questi ultimi anni, con l’incalzare della globalizzazione, della rivoluzione digitale, della bioingegneria, dell’automazione, dell’intelligenza artificiale e altro ancora, l’essere umano è stato sottoposto a molteplici sollecitazioni che ne stanno “muovendo” il profilo. I confini di ciò che sarebbe proprio dell’uomo sono in vario modo messi in discussione. In tale contesto diviene necessaria, perfino urgente, una ricognizione del concetto di umanità, con uno sguardo il più possibile ampio, impegnato con i diversi fronti delle sfide in corso. È questo il tentativo del presente volume: contribuire a una riflessione sistematica sul complesso di problemi racchiusi nell’antica e nuova questione dell’identità umana.

La fitta trama biografica e filosofica incarnata da Emil Lask (1875-1915) tratteggia, nelle temperie culturali d’inizio Novecento, una figura inusuale, un profilo umano e teoretico che non si lascia facilmente riassumere in un ritratto dai contorni ben definiti. Il suo pensiero e la sua vita appaiono sospesi al crocevia tra diversi destini cui si piegò con forza la generazione di uomini che, nei primi tre lustri del XX secolo, si era trovata a fronteggiare l’incombente avvento della Grande Guerra. In questo scenario, e in poco più di un decennio, si consumarono, di fronte agli occhi di un’intera genia di filosofi, la peculiare parabola dell’astro filosofico laskiano e, insieme ad essa, il suo tragico destino. Nonostante l’ammirazione dei suoi contemporanei – da Heidegger a Plessner, da Lukács ad Adorno – dopo la scomparsa di Lask sul fronte di guerra il suo nome e il suo pensiero furono avvolti dal silenzio. Solo negli ultimi decenni si è cercato di strappare la filosofia laskiana da un ingiustificato oblio, restituendole il rilievo che merita per la profondità dell’impegno teoretico e l’ampiezza degli orizzonti tracciati. A poco più di cent’anni dalla sua morte, il presente volume si propone di offrire una ricomprensione del pensiero di Lask, contribuendo non solo a restituire i lineamenti di uno straordinario capitolo della storia della filosofia novecentesca, ma soprattutto i tratti di una riflessione radicalmente rivolta al futuro, la cui grandezza è consistita nell’anticipare problemi tuttora al centro del dibattito filosofico.

Celebrato dai suoi contemporanei per il contributo offerto alla ridefinizione dello statuto della filosofia di inizio Novecento, Emil Lask (1875-1915), dopo la prematura morte in guerra, cadde presto in un ingiustificato oblio, che ne oscurò l’intero percorso intellettuale. A un secolo dalla sua scomparsa, tale oblio inizia a lasciar spazio a una vera e propria riscoperta del suo pensiero: la traduzione in Francia, in Inghilterra e in Italia della sua
Logik, la ripubblicazione delle opere complete in Germania, la fioritura di una serie di monografie a lui dedicate sono gli elementi più visibili di tale Renaissance, che coinvolge l’Europa ormai da un quindicennio. Nella scia di tale rinnovato interesse si colloca il presente studio che intende restituire al lettore la complessa e articolata opera di risemantizzazione cui il filosofo sottopose il concetto di soggettività nell’arco del suo itinerario di pensiero; un’opera il cui esito è tanto più fecondo quanto più maturato in seno alla tradizione neokantiana: il definitivo abbandono di qualsivoglia modello trascendentale del soggetto attraverso un radicale ripensamento del concetto di forma logica.

Convegno Internazionale di Filosofia
23-24 Novembre 2023
Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Law and Governance
Intelligenza Artificiale tra Etica, Diritto e Governance
Dipartimento di Filosofia “Piero Martinetti”
Università degli Studi di Milano

Workshop:
Esperienza e giudizio di Edmund Husserl

4 maggio 2023, ore 14:30-16:30

Sala Lauree di via Festa del Perdono 3, Milano.

In occasione dell’uscita della nuova traduzione italiana di Esperienza e giudizio di Edmund Husserl (Scholé, Morcelliana, Brescia 2022, a cura di F. Masi) discutono del libro:

Vincenzo Costa (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)

Carmine Di Martino (Università degli Studi di Milano)

Felice Masi (Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II)

Roberto Redaelli (Università degli Studi di Milano)

Andrea Staiti (Università degli Studi di Parma)