Analytical Philosophy

The illustrious poets also, annoyed by the platitude of prose,
speedily relinquished their uncongenial task.
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley

Anmerkungen zu sprachlicher Selbstbezüglichkeit anhand von Textbeispielen Steffen Popps, Judith Fischers und Thomas Raabs

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms.

Az alábbi tanulmány azon kérdést feszegeti, hogy mi szükség lehet egy hívő ember életében a természeti teológiára és az istenérvekre. Első lépésben röviden bemutatja a természeti teológia koncepcióját, annak tágabb és szűkebb értelmét. Ezek után a dolgozat konkrét kérdésére felelve kitér a felvilágosodás során felmerült empirista kritikára, mely szerint egy meggyőződést csak akkor racionális elfogadni, ha azt megfelelő bizonyítékok támasztják alá. Az ezen kritikára adott teista, illetve keresztény megközelítések közül az angolszász vallásfilozófia két kiemelkedő alakjának, Richard Swinburne-nek és Alvin Plantingának a válaszát mutatja be. A két megközelítés episztemológiai szempontból részben fedi egymást, viszont más tekintetben gyökeresen eltérnek, közös viszont bennük, hogy mindkettő segítheti a keresztény embereket abban, hogy identitásuk, az Isten létébe vetett meggyőződésük megerősödjön és növekedjen.

Este ensayo busca mostrar cómo el concepto de derecho de H. L. A. Hart, propuesto en su célebre ensayo de mismo nombre publicado en 1961, comprende una concepción del fenómeno jurídico que es propiamente analítica. En otras palabras, la pretensión de estas páginas es señalar que el análisis de ‘ sociología descriptiva’ del derecho de Hart es una tesis que se desarrolla en el seno de una determinada manera de hacer filosofía. Su propuesta no solo posee un parecido de familia con ideas que se han originado y evolucionado dentro de la teoría jurídica anglosajona o analytical jurisprudence; también el método que el autor utiliza en El concepto de derecho, a saber, un análisis descriptivo sobre un ‘ gran concepto’ , remite a una manera peculiar de hacerse preguntas filosóficas y aproximarse a sus respuestas.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

A következő tanulmány célja, hogy tematikusan ismertesse a teista természeti teológia irányába érkezett legfontosabb, XX-XXI. századi filozófiai kritikákat és az azokra adott válaszokat. A filozófiai kritikák közül először Ayer nyelvfilozófiai megközelítésével, azon keresztül a verifikációs kritikával, majd a falszifikációs kritikával, azon belül is Anthony Flew megközelítésével foglalkozom. Ezek után bemutatom azokat a megközelítéseket, amik nem hagynak logikai teret a természeti teológiának (Phillips, Nielsen), majd azokat, amelyeken keresztül egyesek a teizmust kvázi-tudományos hipotézisként láttatják (Dawkins, Narveson). A dolgozatom második felében a fenti kritikákat elemzem, illetve az azokra adott lehetséges válaszokat mutatom be.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

Thomas Nagel in ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ suggests that we don’t yet have much idea of how mental entities could be identical with physical ones (though he wisely stops short of accusing physicalists of not meaning ANYTHING WHATSOEVER by their identity-claims).  Colin McGinn goes further by suggesting that we may forever remain in this state of ignorance and incomprehension because of the inherent limitations of the human intellect.  I argue that the mere possibility that McGinn is right shows that it is over-hasty to conclude from philosophy’s failure to solve its problems that there must be something wrong with the problems themselves.  I also try to relate Nagel’s and McGinn’s view to David Stove’s response to philosophy’s apparent failure to make much progress.  He seems pessimistic about whether we will ever fully understand what is wrong with some philosophical claims.

En un estilo argumentativo, directo y claro, Jean-Marie Schaeffer aborda en este volumen cuatro cuestiones centrales del debate actual de la estética filosófica: las consecuencias de la “teoría especulativa” sobre la crisis del arte contemporáneo, las dificultades epistemológicas que comporta discernir los objetos estéticos del resto de las cosas, la función de las representaciones imaginarias en los procesos cognitivos y la implicación antropológica entre imagen y cuerpo en las sociedades occidentales.

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."

In order to find a convincing position in the ‘free will’ debate, two sorts of determinism are distinguished. The merits of encompassing determinism, which is determinism as it is usually understood, and individual determinism, which focuses on the agent, are brought to the fore. The existence of encompassing determinism cannot conclusively be proven, but it may be demonstrated, on the basis of individual determinism, that actions come about in a determined way, leaving no room for ‘free will’. In order to facilitate the discussion, recent scientific developments in such diverse fields as, e.g., quantum mechanics and neuropsychology are incorporated. Balancing the arguments, I aspire to a consistent and nuanced viewpoint, not eschewing divergent conclusions.

Hobbes’s political philosophy starts from a number of premises that are supposed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations from experience. These statements are examined critically and in their interrelatedness in order to find out to what extent Hobbes provides a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of man’s actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his practical philosophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes maintains a number of concepts that have such a connotation, but interprets these in a specific way. The article is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s main thoughts in practical philosophy.

... On the one hand, Wittgenstein radicalized and linguistically transformed Kant's critical conception of philosophy as setting the bounds of sense; on the other hand, he toyed with mystical ideas and was hostile toward aspects of science and the Enlightenment (see Glock 2001). ...

On October 3, 2020, Pope Francis issued the encyclical named Fratelli Tutti (We Are All Brothers) to urge humanity to promote a universal aspiration toward fraternity and social friendship. In the final chapter of the encyclical, Pope Francis repeatedly appeals to us to bear witness to God (Cf. FT § 274 § 276 § 280) and thereby contribute to the formation of universal friendship and solidarity. After one year, from 25 to 28 April 2021, the Indian Theological Association (ITA) discussed the theme "Credibility and Witness" in their 43 rd annual conference. Earlier in the mission documents, we oft found the repeated presence of the term 'witness'. Therefore, the present article "Witness in Fratelli Tutti" tries to explore the role of witness in the encyclical FT while initiating a universal home of peace and love. Does witnessing life (of Christian) play a significant role to initiate a common home?

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

Stimulated by T. P. Uschanov’s paper ‘The strange death of ordinary language philosophy’, I try to reach a balanced assessment of Gellner’s notorious book and also to decide where Gellner stands on the notion of philosophical nonsense.  Some of the things he says suggest that he rejects the notion but he neither clearly formulates what it would have to be nor gives much in the way of argument that there could be no such thing.  One gets the impression that when philosophers he does not like – Wittgenstein and Oxford ordinary language philosophers – use it, it is unacceptable but not necessarily when philosophers to whom he is less hostile – Russell and the logical positivists – do so.

Bu çalışma, veri görselleştirmesinin temsiller (tasarılar) oluşturabilmesinin mantıksal yapıya sahip olmasından ileri geldiğini iddia eder. Böylece pratik bir temsil (tasarım) sistemi olan veri görselleştirmesinden hareketle pratikte işleyen tüm temsil (tasarım) sistemlerinin mantıksal yapıda olduğunu öne sürer. Bu bağlamda mantıksal bir yapıya sahip olmanın, temsilin (tasarımın) gerçekleşmesinin zorunluluğu (doğası) olduğunu göstermeyi amaçlar. Bu amaç doğrultusunda çalışmada ilkin; bir tanım araştırması bağlamında veri görselleştirmesinin işleyişinin mantıksal yapısına, yine ilgili alan örneklemeleri üzerinden ulaşılmaktadır. Ardından, veri görselleştirmesinin pratikte işlevsel olmasını sağlayan bu yapısının, yani mantığın; en genelde tasarımın yeter-neden koşulu olduğu, ilgili felsefi alanların da çözümlemeleriyle ortaya konmaktadır. Böylece analitik felsefe bağlamında tasarımın dil olduğu ve mantığın işleyişinin göstereni olarak kabul edilmesi gerektiği gösterilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Veri Görselleştirmesi, Tasarım, Temsil,  Analitik Felsefe, Dil, Mantık


-----------


This thesis, argues that data visualization’s being able to create representations is because it has a logical structure. Thus this thesis, through data visualization which has a representation system, states that every representation system that is practically operating has a logical structure. In this sense, this thesis aims to demonstrate that representations’ occuring requires (by nature) a logical structure. In accordance with this aim, firstly, in a sense of research for definition, data visualization’s operation with a logical structure, is again understood by the examples of the related field. Subsquent to that, data visualization’s structure (logic) that makes it practically operative is, in the most general sense, a condition of sufficiency-cause of, is demonstrated through the analyses of the related fields of philosophy. Thus in the sense of analytical philosophy, this thesis shows that representation should be accepted as language and the demonstrator of the operation of logic.

Keywords: Data Visualization, Design, Representation, Analytical Philosophy, Language, Logic

There are passages in Wittgenstein where he compares his method to psychotherapy and one or two where he seems to suggest that the ‘patient’ has the last word on his ‘illness’ and ‘cure’.  This paper tries to take these seriously, especially in connexion with the idea that victims of philosophical confusion talk nonsense.

Philosophical accusations of talking nonsense made in a polemical spirit are bound to fail, since the only way one can effectively criticise another’s utterance is by attaching some meaning to it.  But if the other acknowledges the possibility that his puzzlement arises from his having been taken in by nonsense, then perhaps a co-operative investigation of this suggestion might be fruitful.  Indeed self-diagnosis ought in principle to be possible.  Ought it not to have happened at least once in the history of philosophy if philosophical nonsense has ever been exposed? 

But there are difficulties.  For example:
a) We must ask whether or not philosophical nonsense, when exposed as such, is supposed to lose all appearance of meaningfulness.  Either answer is problematic.
b) The acknowledged similarity of the methodology under investigation to that of psychoanalysis exposes it to many of the familiar objections to the methodology of psychoanalysis, especially those that draw attention to the misleading influence of suggestion by an authority-figure.
c) The proposal that relentless cross-questioning of a suspected nonsense-talker will eventually lead her to ‘dry up’ (if she really is talking nonsense) seems to involve a version of the so-called Socratic Fallacy.

NEUROÉTICA/NÚMERO ESPECIAL

Edición a cargo de Arleen Salles, con  la colaboración de Abel Wajnerman y Paula Castelli

ARLEEN SALLES
Sobre la neuroética


ARTÍCULOS

ADELA CORTINA
En favor de la libertad. Una perspectiva neuroética

KATHINKA EVERS
The Responsible Brain. Free Will and Personal Responsibility in the Wake of Neuroscience

PAULA CASTELLI
Sobre la percepción del mérito. Una posible respuesta a J. Greene y J. Cohen acerca de la neurociencia y el castigo

MARIANA NOÉ y ABEL WAJNERMAN
¿Cómo entender el vínculo entre censura y desarrollo emocional? Un caso de intercambio entre paideía platónica y neurociencia cognitiva

AXEL CHERNIAVSKY
El cráneo y el cerebro. Damasio, Bergson y Deleuze sobre la relación entre ciencia y metafísica

DIANA I. PÉREZ
¿Pueden las neurociencias enseñarnos cómo vivir mejor?


COMENTARIOS BIBLIOGRÁFICOS

MATHIAS GIULIANI
Histoire, langage et art chez Walter Benjamin et Martin Heidegger (L. Bidon-Chanal)

ANABELLA DI PEGO
La modernidad en cuestión: Totalitarismo y sociedad de masas en Hannah Arendt (J. A. Goldín Pagés)

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says that the “most fruitful ideas” of the book are due to the stimulus of Sraffa’s criticism, but does not mention him nowhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. I solve the puzzle by explaining Sraffa’s role in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development. Due to Sraffa’s stimulating criticism, Wittgenstein definitely parted away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), introduced the “anthropological approach”, and structured the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations.

I originally entitled this paper ‘Why are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense?’, but since this seemed apt to provoke rather superficial responses, I decided to re-title it.  In it I ponder the fact that, not only are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense, there are no uncontroversial examples of what one might call ‘analogue philosophical nonsense’.  These would be non-philosophical cases of someone’s believing he means something when in reality he means nothing.  (Someone’s saying, ‘It’s 5 o’clock on the sun’ is sometimes offered as an example.)  I ask what conditions such cases would need to satisfy.  What would count as a compellingly clear case of an illusion of meaning?  Why has no one described one?

ARTÍCULOS

DIEGO TAJER
En defensa del argumento finitista

MAXIMILIANO ESCOBAR VIRE
La necesidad moral en Leibniz: su contenido alético y su significación específica

RAMIRO CASO
Una defensa de las aserciones suboracionales

LUIS MARIANO DE LA MAZA
Voluntad, razón práctica y reconocimiento en Hegel y Ricoeur


ESTUDIOS CRÍTICOS

RICARDO IBARLUCIA
La autonomía del arte en Benjamin y Heidegger: a propósito de la interpretación de Burkhardt Lindner


NOTAS

LEANDRO INDAVERA
Rousseau, Smith y las rudas selvas de la naturaleza


COMENTARIOS BIBLIOGRÁFICOS

LORENZINO DE’ MEDICI
Apología (F. Andrade Marambio)

LETICIA CABANAS y OSCAR M. ESQUISABEL (eds.)
Leibniz frente a Spinoza. Una interpretación panorámica (F. Raffo Quintana)

SERGIO SANCHEZ
La insensata fabrica de la vigilia. Nietzsche y el fenómeno del sueño (P. Hunziker)

MARIA CRISTINA DI GREGORI y FEDERICO E. LOPEZ (coords.)
Regreso a la experiencia: lecturas de Peirce, James, Dewey y Lewis (L. Mattarollo)

.Taking as my starting-point Cora Diamond’s paper ‘What nonsense might be’, I extend her ‘austere’ conception of nonsense to encompass the talking of nonsense.  We need to focus on the utterer as well as the utterance.  This brings out how difficult it is going to be to DIAGNOSE the talking of (philosophical) nonsense, without falling into the ‘sense that is senseless’ trap (PI, I, 500).  It is not clear to what extent Diamond sees the problem here.  I suggest that if there is a way round the difficulty, it will involve adopting a therapeutic approach.

La presente tesis demuestra la influencia del idealismo trascendental kantiano en la reforma epistemológica desarrollada por el filósofo Wilfrid Sellars en su propósito de lograr una filosofía desprovista del Mito de lo Dado y afín al ideal de conciliar la imagen manifiesta y la imagen científica en una visión estereoscópica del ser humano en el universo. Se argumenta que Sellars transforma la filosofía teórica de Kant en una propuesta contemporánea que enfatiza el aspecto normativo de las reglas trascendentales y las convierte en presupuestos de una actividad lingüística que opera, incluso, desde el nivel del reporte de nuestras percepciones. Para dar cuenta de lo anterior, la tesis se encuentra dividida en tres momentos argumentativos: en el primer momento se demuestra la adopción y redefinición que Sellars hace de nociones claves kantianas (las distinciones analítico–sintético, a priori–a posteriori, fenómeno–noúmeno) y su interpretación del modelo conceptualista de la cognición humana desarrollado por Kant a partir de sus principales compromisos filosóficos: el naturalismo, el realismo científico y el nominalismo psicológico. En el segundo momento, se analiza la interpretación sellarsiana de la metafísica de la experiencia desarrollada en la primera parte de la Crítica de la Razón Pura, específicamente en la Doctrina Trascendental de los Elementos, lugar de la obra en la cual se definen las condiciones a priori de posibilidad de todo conocimiento objetivo y válido universalmente, como también la función de las facultades del pensamiento humano. En el tercer y último momento, se expone la reapropiación que hace Sellars del idealismo trascendental kantiano en su teoría normativa del rol conceptual, en términos de un viraje del idealismo trascendental a la lingüística trascendental. En las conclusiones de la tesis, se desarrolla y defiende el naturalismo científico kantiano como la apuesta teórico-metodológica más coherente con el propósito mencionado inicialmente.

The posthumous publication of Wittgenstein’s papers took a very polemic and intricate form. This is particularly the case with his last writings. Instead of almost all the manuscripts from 1946 to 1951 to be in print, the decisions about how to present it in different books do not help understanding how Wittgenstein conceived the relationship between his remarks on colors, psychology and “certainty”. Reading Remarks on Colors is particularly problematic without a clear understanding of this broader context. To understand this material in a more consistent way we propose a revision of the original manuscripts making clear the context of the remarks on color and the sense in which they relate to the questions that concern Wittgenstein from 1946 to 1951 (after concluding the 693 paragraphs of the Philosophical Investigations). We hope that this perspective provides the elements for a more consistent and integrated understanding of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colors.

In continuation of their 2013 article in the New York Times, where they stated “a host of struggling colleges and universities—the bottom 25 per cent of every tier, we predict—will disappear or merge in the next 10 to 15 years.”, Professor Clayton Christensen and Michael Horn predict 50% of the colleges and universities will either go bankrupt, close or merge" and their prediction is turning out to be true faster than expected. The list of colleges and universities closed down in the past couple of years across the world is alarming. Among this list, Art colleges stand at the top. They say, "The prediction arose out of an observation that the business model of traditional colleges and universities was broken". ....

This short essay explores the reason for this trend of art school close-downs.

Gender and sexual variance invite a cornucopia of philosophically salient inquiries. My dissertation considers them in the realm of bioethics. Bioethics can be defined as a field of philosophy that interrogates ethical, societal, and political questions emerging from the development of medicine and biosciences. In my dissertation, I discuss how queer feminist interrogations of key bioethical concepts, such as autonomy and justice, can enrich bioethical theory, methodology, and practice.

A prominent view, both in bioethical research and in the ethical evaluation of medical practices, systems, and policies, is the so-called principlist approach. This has two subfields: the view that principles are grounded in moral theory, and the view that they are based on a common morality. In my dissertation, I offer a critique of both views. In both cases, however, principles are thought to abstract morally salient elements that should guide bioethical analyses. The most prominent principles are, in nonhierarchical order: respect for autonomy; nonmaleficence (not to cause harm); beneficence (to provide benefits, and to balance benefits against risks); and justice (as the fair distribution of benefits and risks—in my view an insufficient definition of justice).

In my dissertation, I discuss how cis- and heteronormativity can affect bioethical analyses, including the definition and application of principles. Cis- and heteronormativity refers to the categorization of gender and sexual variance through the binaries of male/female and homo/hetero, which are constructed hierarchically. My work is informed by the theoretical backdrops of feminist philosophy, feminist bioethics, and queer bioethics. I conclude that gender and sexual variance should replace cis- and heteronormativity in bioethical analyses, including principlist approaches.

My dissertation consists of four articles and an introduction. The introduction contextualizes, bridges, evaluates, and further develops the argumentation presented in the articles. In article I, “Considering Unicorns: Queer Bioethics and Intersectionality” (Sudenkaarne 2018a), I discuss queer bioethics via concept analysis in relation to intersectionality, the prominent notion that there are several overlapping axes of oppression. This philosophical discussion reveals some persistent issues that I call the problem of identity, the problem of relativism, and the problem of essentialism, which are also framed by my inquiry in the introduction. In article II, “Queering Bioethics: A Queer Bioethics Inventory of Surrogacy” (Sudenkaarne 2018b), I offer a queer bioethical analysis of ethical guidelines for surrogacy treatment, applying the queer bioethical methodology known as the queer bioethics inventory (QBI). I find these ethical guidelines to include cis- and heteronormativity. In article III, “Queering Vulnerability: A Layered Bioethical Approach” (Sudenkaarne 2019), I offer a unique contribution to queer and feminist bioethical theory and methodology by building on the central concepts of QBI and the feminist theory of layered vulnerability to formulate what I call queer vulnerabilities, targeting kinship, intimacy, agency, and ethical sustainability. In article IV, “Queering Medicalized Gender Variance” (Sudenkaarne 2020b), I apply my theory and methodology of queer vulnerabilities to diagnostics of gender variance in the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, currently in their 11th and fifth versions respectively. I conclude that despite progress from the previous versions, both are in need of further queer bioethical scrutiny and operate with a confused metaphysics of gender.

Ultimately, I conclude that gender and sexual variance as a norm in the framework for principlist analyses is needed to guarantee the fulfillment of principles, including in LGBTQI+ cases. For this reason, my dissertation aims to offer a queer feminist framework for principles. Further, I seek to formulate queer bioethics as a posthuman moral theory to further enhance a queer feminist approach to bioethics, ethics, and philosophy. Such an approach should be better attuned to intersectionality, and should seek to resolve the imbalance between reproductive rights, reproductive justice, and ecojustice on a global scale.

Scholars in the humanities and social sciences have turned to ethics to theorize politics in what seems to be an increasingly depoliticized age. Yet the move toward ethics has obscured the ongoing value of political responsibility and the vibrant life it represents as an effective response to power.

Sounding the alarm for those who care about robust forms of civic engagement, this book fights for a new conception of political responsibility that meets the challenges of today's democratic practice. Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo forcefully argues against the notion that modern predicaments of power can only be addressed ethically or philosophically through pristine concepts that operate outside of the political realm. By returning to the political, the individual is reintroduced to the binding principles of participatory democracy and the burdens of acting and thinking as a member of a collective. Vázquez-Arroyo historicizes the ethical turn to better understand its ascendence and reworks Adorno's dialectic of responsibility to reassert the political in contemporary thought and theory.

https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-responsibility/9780231174848