This paper aims at assessing the current significance of the anthropological reflections of Heinrich Rickert, comparing his most important contributions to recent results in the fields of evolutionary and philosophical anthropology. With... more
This paper aims at assessing the current significance of the anthropological reflections of Heinrich Rickert, comparing his most important contributions to recent results in the fields of evolutionary and philosophical anthropology. With this aim in mind, we examine two Rickertian theses of considerable theoretical interest: the fundamental value of sociality in being human and the foundation role of the corporeal in the cultural world. The first thesis, developed by Rickert in the field of axiology, closely relates to Michael Tomasello's definition of man as an ultra-social animal. The second thesis represents an original contribution to the re-evaluation of the corporeal basis of human experience, which has continued to play a central role in some areas of philosophical research since the last century.
In Dynamis. Ontologia dell’incommensurabile, Gaetano Chiurazzi offers an account of the philosophical sense and implications of the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes in ancient thought. In his study, Chiurazzi presents the scope of... more
In Dynamis. Ontologia dell’incommensurabile, Gaetano Chiurazzi offers an account of the philosophical sense and implications of the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes in ancient thought. In his study, Chiurazzi presents the scope of the idea of incommensurability in contrast to those theories that have interpreted perception as the primary access to reality. Chiurazzi claims that the discovery of incommensurable relations, such as that of “1/square root of 2,” which expresses the relation between the side and the diagonal of a square, introduces the conception of asymmetrical relations into Western epistemology and ontology. This conception finds in the modern idea of transcendental philosophy its mature formulation. In this paper, I draw on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s proposal of a phenomenology of perception in order to critically evaluate the working assumption in Chiurazzi’s account that perception is the faculty of intuition that seizes upon the individual and therefore as “atomic” in nature.