Markus Gabriel

This paper aims to get a general overview over this question : can the conception of reality as it is consecrated in Clément Rosset's theory, as being a totality and of which little can be known, be opposed to the one promoted by Markus Gabriel around the fields of sense, key concept of his theory (fundamental in the new realist ontology) ? In a first chapter, it will therefore be necessary to determine in what way reality is constituted according to Clément Rosset, and more particularly the different approaches constituting the human capacity to admit reality – or to refuse it – from a gathering of his works on the question of reality. After having identified the meaning of his proposal on this subject, we will examine whether it could be called into question in relation to the new realistic movement in which Markus Gabriel is the leading figure. To his famous assertion that "Everything exists but the world", the German philosopher intends to rebuild the foundation of realism by constituting its own movement (the new realism). We will thus see how Rosset’s philosophy seems to be built on a radical conception of reality while trying to put it in parallel with the idea developed by Markus Gabriel on the matter.

Este texto consiste básicamente en una presentación general de la corriente filosófica del nuevo realismo (realismo ontológico, realismo especulativo) surgida en 2007 y en la que participan autores europeos y norteamericanos. Un punto en común de las diversas posiciones dentro de esta corriente (Quentin Meillassoux, Markus Gabriel, Graham Harman) es el deslinde crítico frente a la filosofía posmoderna y a la filosofía moderna en general. Explico esta crítica y sus implicaciones para la posibilidad de un restablecimiento en la filosofía contemporánea del pensamiento metafísico (ontológico).

A partir de la recuperación de la ontología planteada en los últimos años por la corriente del nuevo realismo (realismo especulativo) proponemos aquí la redefinición y revaloración de la filosofía que se sigue de tal planteamiento. En principio, defendemos la necesidad de un retorno filosófico al primado del Ser. Esto significa un primado del Ser sobre la conciencia, de la existencia sobre el pensamiento, del objeto sobre el sujeto, en fin, de la ontología sobre la epistemología. Lo que implica, y será nuestro asunto central, la recuperación del primado de la razón en filosofía, la propuesta de un nuevo racionalismo filosófico, que designamos con la expresión " racionalismo ontológico ", es decir, un racionalismo o una racionalidad fundamentada en el Ser (en lo que es y existe), y que desde ahí puede fundar nuestras concepciones y prácticas en diversos modos y diversas instancias.

Con una doble faceta de filósofo mundano y académico, el pensador alemán Markus Gabriel articula en su obra algunos debates de la filosofía analítica contemporánea y cierta interpretación del Idealismo alemán, bajo la forma de una filosofía que es a la vez poscontinental y posanalítica. En este artículo se realiza una investigación bibliográfica del pensamiento de Markus Gabriel y de sus principales referentes intelectuales y alternativas teóricas, con el propósito de explicitar su posicionamiento ontológico y epistemológico. A través de la obra de Gabriel, se puede reconocer una concepción epistemológica realista y alejada del relativismo y del psicologismo, así como una concepción ontológica no metafísica ―en cierto sentido―, que impugna la existencia del mundo como totalidad autocontenida y esboza cierto esencialismo débil.

[Winner of the 2022 Hegel PD Prize and Awarded a Special Mention by the Metaphysical Society of America for the 2024 Findlay Prize]

Contemporary philosophical discourse has deeply problematized the possibility of absolute existence. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics demonstrates that by reading Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept in his Science of Logic as a form of Absolute Dialetheism, Hegel’s logic of the concept can account for the possibility of absolute existence. Through a close examination of Hegel’s concept of self-referential universality in his Science of Logic, Moss demonstrates how Hegel’s concept of singularity is designed to solve a host of metaphysical and epistemic paradoxes central to this problematic. He illustrates how Hegel’s revolutionary account of universality, particularity, and singularity offers solutions to six problems that have plagued the history of Western philosophy: the problem of nihilism, the problem of instantiation, the problem of the missing difference, the problem of absolute empiricism, the problem of onto-theology, and the third man regress. What is more, Moss reconstructs how Hegel’s affirmation and development of a revised ontological argument for God’s existence is designed to establish the necessity of absolute existence. By adopting a metaphysical reading of Richard Dien Winfield’s foundation free epistemology, Moss critically engages dominant readings and contemporary debates in Hegel scholarship. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics will appeal to scholars interested in Hegel, German Idealism, 19th-20th century European philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and contemporary European thought.

The concept of “world” as a totality of things, occupies a central place in philosophical thought. The new realism of Markus Gabriel is for us, like a radicalization of the skeptical position about the world, through their project to show us “why the world does not exist.” What does the “world” means? Is the universe essentially external to man? Did the romantic exaltation not seal faith in a likely inner world that can be communicated from a certain kind of sensitivity? G. E. Moore intends to give his “past-present dialectic” at least two “proofs” of the existence of an external world from our most ordinary experience, this is in contrast to Kant who saw only one possible proof of the existence of things outside us.

In his 2016 paper “The Trouble With Ontological Liberalism” Louis Morelle sketches Markus Gabriel’s new realism as ontologically liberal and raises several objections concerning the approach. In his understanding, this ontological liberalism leads into an illusory peace in which two conflicting accounts on a subject are put to rest by an unjustified division into fields of sense. In brief Gabriel’s theory can be considered a metametaphysical nihilism which either argues against the existence of the totality of all things – an “ontic whole” or any sort of metaphysical groundfloor – that is to say, any sort of most general reference under which something exists, if it exists. In his most illuminating account of the ontology “Fields Of Sense” (2015) Gabriel offers various arguments to support his main thesis which essentially rests upon what is claimed to be an ontological impossibilia: Totality and self-inclusion. Briefly, to exist for Gabriel means to appear in a local field of sense – a specific context whose rules determine the object that appears in it.  Consequently, if the world existed, it would be the “field of all the fields” and would need to appear in a distinct field of sense. That is not possible; therefore, the world does not exist. Hence, the “no-world-view” or metametaphysical nihilism is based on a reductio ad absurdum. Of course, all of this does not mean that nothing exists at all. Existence – for Gabriel – refers to a local relation between an object and its field of sense. It’s clear what is rejected is merely the WORLD in capitals – the world as the “thing that is an everything” or any sort of procedure that involves reference to a most general structure of reality. This “no-world-view” is the result of an ontology that understands existence as the predicate to stand in relation to other objects that function as manifestation-grounds (fields of sense). It is an ontology that at its centerpiece is built up on contrast. In this paper I will not give a critique in regard to the general approach of Gabriel’s ontology. I rather shall aim to give an account on the objections that are raised by Louis Morelle as well as conceptualize Peter Gaitsch’s phenomenological reconstruction as a possible consideration.

We propose here that metaphysics is a form of fundamental violence, as discourse that denies the being of reality and imposes an abstract and idealistic conception of Being. Following the lines of the new realism or speculative realism, we counterpose to the metaphysical a conception of the ontology as a discourse that assumes and agrees to be such that, in its contingency, becoming and plurality. Ontology so understood can be the foundation of a non-violent conception of reality and found the search for peace in social life and human existence in general.

What is the shape of the resurrected body?  Origen of Alexandria was condemned for having apparently believed the shape of the resurrected body to be that of a sphere.  We can perhaps trace the pedigree of this belief, through Neo-Pythagorean sources, to Philo of Alexandria, and ultimately to Plato's idea of the soul, which, as in Aristophanes' speech of the Symposium, assumes the shape of a sphere.  Common to these writers was the conviction that a soul freed of the body should assume the shape of the most perfect geometric form, proceeding in the dialectical circuit of a hyperbolic geometry.  The 'shape' of the soul may be expressed in the plenitude of all possible articulations.  Origen’s allusions to a 'city of the saints' can be read in anticipation of Augustine’s Civitate Dei as a model for conceiving of the shape of the body in felicitous communion with the Church.

Malaise dans le Royaume de Dieu, entre Culture & Foi, avec Emmanuel Carrère, Laurent Lemoine, Paul-Laurent Assoun, Cynthia Fleury, Tzvetan Todorov, Markus Gabriel, saint Augustin, Michaël Foessel, les films Le Déclin de l’Empire Américain, de Denys Arcand, et Rois & reine, d'Arnaud Desplechin, et une playlist allant des Sisters of Mercy à Christian Death...

En el presente artículo se muestran los argumentos y los supuestos lógico-matemáticos que están a la base de la fundamentación del realismo especulativo de Quentin Meillassoux y de Markus Gabriel. Se muestra que, en el caso de ambos, si bien reivindican la ciencia empírica, todo su proyecto depende de una aprehensión particular de la lógica y de la matemática. Las argumentaciones de Meillassoux y de Gabriel a favor del realismo descansan enteramente en la tesis de Badiou de que la filosofía especulativa solamente es posible a partir de la matemática y, dentro de ella, en el marco de la teoría de conjuntos. En
el artículo se exponen algunas limitaciones de la teoría de conjuntos a la luz de sus paradojas.
clásicas, pero, de manera más importante, a partir de su confrontación con la teoría
de categorías, teoría que se disputa con aquella la fundación de las matemáticas. Se busca
entonces apuntar a una ontología fundada en categorías más que en conjuntos. Al mismo
tiempo, se ofrece una defensa del realismo, pero desde un punto de vista schellinguiano,
el cual trata de empatarse también con el enfoque categórico en matemáticas.

Recension de Fields of Sense & Pourquoi le monde n'existe pas de Markus Gabriel, via le concept de "libéralisme métaphysique" développé par Peter Wolfendale dans Object-Oriented-Philosophy, The Noumenon's New Clothes.
Sont également discutés Graham Harman (L'Objet Quadruple), Tristan Garcia (Forme et Objet) et Bruno Latour (Enquête sur les modes d'existence)
https://www.cairn.info/revue-critique-2015-10-p-793.htm

Contrary to the progress of the Postmodern condition – first recognized by J. F. Lyotard – the last century’s philosophical scenario saw the establishment of a new philosophical current shunning any kind of relativism and proposing a form of renovated realism. This realism opposes the Nietzschean maxim, acknowledged by Postmodernism, according to which there are no facts, but only interpretations, and contrary to that maxim it holds true that reality is “unamendable” (Ferraris). A lively debate has thus sparked off in the last decade over the status of reality and of truth, involving the great part of the exponents of our philosophical scene. This paper wishes to contribute to the unfolding of such debate, which indeed revives the classical question on the objective or subjective nature of truth and reality: it does so by appealing to the philosophy of Carlo Sini and specifically to the notion of subject developed by this philosopher in the course of his intellectual trajectory. To this purpose the paper pursues two main goals. Firstly, we wish to expound the notion of subject as developed in Carlo Sini’s philosophy; especially we should point out the unique form that the subject assumes in this philosopher’s thought of practices: which is – essentially – a sort of hermeneutical pragmatism. The second goal is to assess the significance of Sini’s notion of subject in the current debate between New Realism and Postmodernism. More specifically, according to the thesis here argued, we can recognize, in the philosophy developed by Sini, a unique form of the subject-reality relationship which neither reduces the latter to a mere product of the former, nor raises it to something absolute and enfranchised from the subjective sphere of experience. This mode of the world-man relationship can provide a new approach to the question on the nature of reality distinct from both Postmodernism and New Realism.

What are the prospects for contemporary continental philosophy in the wake of speculative realism's rehabilitation of ontology? In order to answer this question, I discuss the fundamental reasons behind the rise of antirealist philosophies from Hume and Kant to the postmodernists and how they are addressed in the new realist philosophies of M. Ferraris and M. Gabriel. First, I point out why realist metaphysics has been increasingly linked to dogmatism in modern and postmodern philosophy. I argue that the many forms of anti-realism have their roots in a twofold quest, the desire to uncover and overcome the dogmatic presuppositions of traditional philosophising, and the desire to show the limits of instrumental rationality. Second, I sketch out the essence of the dogmatic-realist moves of traditional philosophy as established by Kant: in a nutshell, they consist in regarding the forms of representation as determined by the mind-independent nature of the objects of representation. The post-Kantian development of philosophy is largely influenced by this view of dogmatism as it gives rise to various attempts for overcoming of metaphysics. Third, I discuss how Ferraris and Gabriel resist the influential criticisms of realism by developing non-representationalist accounts of truth. In particular, I regard the pluralist tendency in Gabriel's theory of Sinnfelder as highly productive. Having in mind their insights, I discuss how the realist turn has the potential to oppose contemporary forms of dogmatism.

Resumen: Se analiza la tensión que hay entre ontología y epistemología al interior de la corriente filosófica-llamada por Ferraris-nuevo realismo, que trata de ir más allá de la correlación entre la realidad y el pensamiento humano. Se analiza la postura de Ferraris, que quiere superar la posmodernidad relativizante, separando la ontología de la epistemología, y volviendo a la experiencia. Se analiza también la postura casi opuesta de Markus Gabriel de postular que hay diversos campos de sentido, y no sólo el del naturalismo reduccionista cientificista. Summary: This article examines the tension between ontology and epistemology within the philosophical position described by Ferraris as New Realism, which tries to go beyond the correlation between reality and human thought. Firstly, an analysis of Ferraris' position is made, a position which tries to overcome postmodern relativist, dividing ontology from epistemology, and going back to experience. Secondly, the almost contrary position of Markus Gabriel is examined, which posits different fields of sense and not only the scientificist reductionist naturalist one

According to Markus Gabriel, the world does not exist. This view—baptised metametaphysical nihilism—is exposited at length in his recent book Fields of Sense, which updates his earlier project of transcendental ontology. In this paper, I question whether meta-metaphysical nihilism is internally coherent, specifically whether the proposition ‘the world does not exist’ is expressible without performative contradiction on that view. Call this the inexpressibility objection. This is not an original objection—indeed it is anticipated in Gabriel’s book. However, I believe that his response to it is inadequate and that I have something illuminating to say about this state of affairs. My claim is that we can distinguish between two senses of ‘the world’, one of which is benign and acceptable, the other not. The acceptable sense of ‘the world’ suffices to answer the inexpressibility objection—at a certain theoretical cost, of course. To explain what this cost is, I turn briefly to an examination of Martin Hägglund’s radical atheism.

This text is a draft version of a talk that I will be giving on November 11th as part of the NYU Space Talks series.

https://www.space-talks.com/

I am posting it here in advance in the hopes of helping my listeners to better understand my talk and with the aim of receiving more and better feedback on the text.




The central thesis of this paper is that outer space doesn’t exist. This assertion-- mostly articulated in terms borrowed from Markus Gabriel's New Realism--may seem crazy or absurd, but it is rather less radical than it sounds, in no way involving the denial of the reality of the Moon, Mars, and the stars, and only insisting that the real location of outer space is in culture. The obvious importance of this claim for the study of astroculture is clear, if at first it may seem tantamount to denying  the possibility or the legitimacy of the study of astroculture as it has been carried out up to the present. Yet recognizing that outer space doesn’t exist both legitimates the study of astroculture and sheds light on the nature of this endeavor. It also helps to see the limitations of outer space as a concept for thinking critically about the social, economic and ecological implications of the new space economy, and so clarifies why we may need to develop alternative and resolutely realist approach to the study of astroculture.

Si nous pouvons parler de (ou penser à) ce qui n’existe pas, y a-t-il pourtant nécessairement quelque chose dont on parle (ou auquel on pense) ? On reconnaît la question classique du statut des objets inexistants, telle qu’elle a été remise au goût du jour sous ses diverses formes par les théories de l’intentionalité. Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière une approche dite grammaticale, d’inspiration wittgensteinienne,
du problème des objets intentionels, à partir des travaux de la philosophe britannique Elisabeth Anscombe. Faire passer les objets intentionels au crible de la grammaire, cela signifie mettre en évidence les limites – logiques – que le langage dicte à notre ontologie, tout en prenant garde de tracer ces limites depuis nos pratiques ordinaires, et non en amont de celles-ci.

The purpose of this talk is to propose a middle position between relics as mementos occasioning a recollection of a saint and relics as magical objects with their own power to act on physical reality, and to do so by using Neuer Realismus aesthetic theory to suggest that relics, as art, have a certain autonomy of action on the mind of the one who venerates them (though not on physical reality).

RESUMO: Neste artigo, discutiremos a relação entre determinação e existência na filosofia de Markus Gabriel, ao remontarmos a abordagem que Gabriel fez dessa questão de volta a Kant. Para tanto, visaremos mostrar como uma pressuposição fundamental tanto de Kant quanto de Gabriel seria a pressuposição daquilo que chamaremos de ontologia da determinação, ou seja, uma ontologia segundo a qual tudo que existe é determinado. Uma vez que tenhamos exposto como essa ontologia da determinação se apresenta em Kant e em Gabriel, mostraremos como a filosofia de ambos autores desemboca em dificuldades semelhantes, e arguiremos que a concepção de uma realidade indeterminada-a qual não é necessariamente sinônima de uma totalidade-pode ser necessária à filosofia de Gabriel. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: determinação, determinado, indeterminado, Kant, Markus Gabriel. ABSTRACT: In our paper we will discuss the relationship between determination and existence in Gabriel's philosophy, by retracing Gabriel's approach to this issue back to Kant. In order to do so, we will attempt to show how that which we shall call as an ontology of determination is a fundamental presupposition both from Kant and Gabriel, according to which all that exists is determined. Once we have presented how this ontology of determination is present both in Kant and in Gabriel, we will show how the philosophy of both these authors face similar difficulties. Finally, we will argue that a conception of an indeterminate reality-which is not necessarily synonymous to a totality-might be necessary to Gabriel's philosophy.