Emil Lask

If Emil Lask’s position can be considered as taking part in the Southwest Neokantian School, it nevertheless presents some original characteristic within this very influential Baden School. He indeed introduces the very idea that the realm of sense, far from being solely formal, is an interpenetration of form and matter (Materie, Material). Moreover, he interestingly claims in his Logik der Philosophie und Kategorienlehre (1911) that this matter is impenetrable (undurchdringlich). As a consequence, one could be tempted to consider Lask as the “materialist” of the Baden School or at least as the one who makes room for what the contemporary debates have analysed in terms of “given”. Lask notably thematizes himself the concept of “Gegebenheit”.
In order to develop this hypothesis, my paper will first pay attention to the lexicon developed by Lask in order to describe the matter given to the cognitive subject. In particular, I will try to carefully distinguish between his uses of the German notions of “das Alogische” and “das logische Nackt”, in order to show that the second notion is purely functional. According to this theory, even a non-sensitive or a supra-sensible form can be considered as a “logical Nakedness” (of a constitutive category) and consequently as a matter. Second, from a more critical point of view, I will ask whether those non-sensitive or supra-sensitive “materials” can indeed be considered as given.

Un résumé de mes recherches d'inspiration phénoménologique sur la Logique de la philosophie d'Eric Weil. Mon travail présuppose qu'il demeure quelque chose à penser chez Weil, en d'autres termes, que son oeuvre contient un potentiel pour une pensée future plus que contemporaine. A mon avis, ce potentiel peut être identifié dans les apports principaux de la Logique, dans les deux notions forgées par Weil d'« attitude » et de « sens ». On retrouve ainsi dans mon livre sur la Logique de Weil avant tout deux thèses capitales que je lui attribue: la première est que la cogitatio philosophique, c'est-à-dire tout acte de penser, est liée à une attitude. Le défi de l'interprétation est alors de montrer comment la notion d'attitude, originellement liée à un contexte psychologique, peut adopter un nouveau statut, à savoir un statut « pure » ou logique transcendantale. La deuxième thèse est que le sens visé par ces actes de penser n'est pas seulement une forme logique mais un « Urphänomen », un phénomène fondateur. Dans ce cas, le défi de l'interprétation est de montrer comment ce phénomène qui est par définition prélogique, peut être donné à notre expérience. Dans cette présentation, il s'agit surtout de développer ces deux thèses grâce à une synthèse de mon livre sur la Logique, en traitant dans la première partie du statut transcendantal de l'attitude et dans la deuxième partie du sens comme un donné phénoménologique.

This introduction to a translated part of Heidegger's article "The Concept of Time" (1924)  touches upon his confrontation with physics over the topic of time, his phenomenology of the pro-ject vs. Husserl's phenomenology of the sub-ject, his early idea of philosophy as pre-theoretical science,  and his understanding of event vs. process in his KNS course of 1919.

Recently, Emil Lask’s work has been the object of renewed interest.
As it has been noted, Lask’s work is much closer to phenomenology than that
of his fellow Neo-Kantians. Many recent contributions to current discussions
on this topic have compared his account of logic to Husserl’s. Less attention
has been paid to Lask’s original metaphilosophical insights. In this paper, I
explore Lask’s conception of transcendental philosophy to show how it led
him to a phenomenological conversion. Lask found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations
the possibility of grounding transcendental philosophy in purely
objective terms, thus avoiding any risk of psychologism. But he also concluded
that the tools found in Logical Investigations needed to be complemented by
a method which would inquire back fr om the constituted to the constituting
(anticipating Husserlian reduction) and a way of grounding such a methodological
move in experience itself (anticipating Husserlian motivation). Lask
then provided a model for reduction and motivation without bringing a transcendental
ego into the picture.

Is justice (merely) an expression of particular values or is it to be understood as a (universal) cross-cultural standard of validity? Following the ideas of Jacques Derrida, this book provides a new answer to this question: Justice is to be explained as a process of deconstruction. To arrive at this conclusion, I proceed from a critical discussion of Martin Heidegger's approach to social philosophy in Being and Time which I connect with a detailed analysis of the implications of Derrida's writings on practical philosophy aspiring to provide a variety of insights, both critical and constructive, into the cultural and normative foundations of democracy. Thematically, the book bridges the frontiers between the philosophy of law, cultural and social philosophy, ethics and political theory, focusing on fundamental questions of the constitution of normativity, responsibility and justification. In this way, my reading of Heidegger and Derrida aims to shed light on the nature of the political problems that concern our societies today.

The file contains the table of contents and the first two (introductory) chapters, the introductions of the remaining chapters, as well as the concluding remarks (in German).

The focus of this paper is Cassirer's Neo-Kantian reading of Kant's conception of unity of space. Cassirer's neo-Kantian reading is largely in conformity with the mainstream of intellectualist Kant-scholars, which unsurprising, given his own intellectualist view of space and perception and his rejection of the existence of a 'merely sensory consciousness' as a 'formless mass of impression'. I argue against Cassirer's reading by relying on a Kantian distinction first recognized by Heinrich Rickert, a neo-Kantian from the Southwest school, between Kenntnis (roughly knowledge by acquaintance) and Erkenntnis (roughly proposi-tional knowledge). Correspondingly, I claim that concepts and categories are conditions for Erkenntnis of objects as such, namely for thinking of and apprehending the pre-existing unity as an object, rather than for the 'constitution' of this very unity.

Georg Lukács’s concept of reification has won many admirers for its account of how individual subjectivity is affected by capitalist society. However, even its admirers have rejected the way Lukács uses this to argue that the proletariat can develop a revolutionary class consciousness out of reification: they argue that he relies too much on flawed Romantic models of subjectivity. In contrast to this, I outline a phenomenological reading of Lukács’s theory, comparing his thought to Edmund Husserl and Emil Lask. This makes consciousness a mode of being rather than an epistemological question. Thus, categories of consciousness affect the existence of objects: the way society appears is, for Lukács, the way it exists. Ultimately, this leads to a new appreciation of the role of the revolutionary Party in Lukács’s theory: his preference for a Luxemburgian party gives a theoretical foundation for describing performed social action as “free.”

L’autore analizza il Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte (1902) di Emil Lask, rilevando il fallimento che in esso si consuma nel tentativo di fondare un rapporto integrativo fra valore e individualità reale, e di conciliare la trascendenza della validità e la fondazione individuale del valore. La possibilità di concepire una dimensione integrativa fra valore e realtà presuppone il rifiuto di ogni universalismo valoriale e l’accettazione di tutte le conseguenze relativizzanti derivanti dal fatto che il valore emerge solo in seno all’individualità storica. L’autore ritiene tuttavia ancora pensabile un’universalità del valore intesa come valorialità, ovvero come comune capacità di attribuire valore propria dei soggetti storici.

Abstract
The objective of this paper is to present and contextualize the work Philosophy of Law of Emil Lask, showing its virtues and limitations. First of all it shows the circumstances in which the work was produced, followed by the exposure of Lask's theoretical influences, especially the philosophy of values of Windelband and Rickert. Them we analyze how Lask applies the philosophy of values to the law, process by which justice is taken as the fundamental value that constitutes the meaning of any possible juridical phenomenon. Finally, still in the perspective of philosophy of values, we examine the process of constitution of the scientific disciplines that study the juridical phenomena.

Resumo
O objetivo do artigo é apresentar e contextualizar a obra Filosofia do Direito de Emil Lask, mostrando suas virtudes e limitações. Inicialmente são apresentadas as circunstâncias em que a obra foi produzida, seguindo-se a exposição das influências teóricas de Lask, com destaque para a filosofia dos valores de Windelband e Rickert. Posteriormente é analisado o modo como Lask aplica a filosofia dos valores ao direito, processo pelo qual a justiça é tomada como o valor fundamental que constitui o significado de todo fenômeno jurídico possível. Por fim, ainda na perspectiva da filosofia dos valores, é examinado o processo de constituição das disciplinas científicas que estudam os fenômenos jurídicos.

Das Interesse an der Geschichte in ihrem formalen und materialen Profil steht – primär in methodologischer und sekundär in ontologischer Hinsicht – im Mittelpunkt des Badener Neukantianismus: von Rickerts Grenzen zu Windelbands Präludien und Lasks Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte ist die historische Dimension des Menschen der bevorzugte Untersuchungsgegenstand. Im Gegensatz zu anderen philosophischen Strömungen, die in der Kulturszene der Jahrhundertwende von 1900 dominieren, ist das Geschichtsinteresse in der Badischen Schule durch eine zweifache und unlösbare Spannung geprägt. Sie versucht, die faktische und zeitliche Dimension, wenn auch mit unüberbrückbaren Schwierigkeiten, mit der Dimension des Wertes und der Ewigkeit zu verbinden. Die geschichtlichen Güter sind dieser Perspektive zufolge nichts anderes als Wertträger, die im Grunde genommen das kulturphi-losophische Apriori darstellen, d.h. den Leitfaden bilden, um im magmatischen und irisierenden Material der Geschichte Ordnung zu schaffen.
Im Rahmen von Reflexionen über die unauflösliche Spannung zwischen Zeitlichem und Ewigem, zwischen Empirie und Werten tritt indes ein theoretisches Element bzw. ein begrifflicher Knoten hervor, der nicht auf den Dualismus reduzierbar ist, der die Vorgehensweise der drei Denker kennzeichnet, sondern für den philosophischen Diskurs über die Geschichte der Badischen Schule von ebenso entscheidender Bedeutung ist. Dieses Element lässt sich unter dem Titel ‚Mereologie der Geschichte‘ rubrizieren.
Wie wir zu beweisen versuchen, weist dieser Begriff hier auf eine formale Reflexion über die Geschichte hin, der eine präzise Teil-Ganzes-Theorie zugrunde liegt, die sowohl auf ontologischer als auch auf epistemologischer Ebene gelten soll. Im Neudenken des Ge-schichtsbegriffs der neukantianischen Schule zu Beginn des 20. Jahr-hunderts kommt dieser Theorie, die bei Windelband und Rickert Form anzunehmen beginnt und ihren höchsten Ausdruck bei Lask findet, eine entscheidende Rolle zu. Die hier gestellte Aufgabe, die Grundzüge dieser Theorie zu rekonstruieren, wird von einer doppelten Überzeugung getragen. Einerseits kann sich im aktuellen philosophischen Szenarium, das sich zur Lösung unumgehbarer philosophischer Probleme von mehreren Seiten auf die Mereologie beruft, eine solche Reflexion als fruchtbar erweisen. Andererseits verrät Lasks Ausarbeitung dieser Theorie in seinem ersten Werk Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte die Originalität und theoretische Stärke eines Denkers, der an die Re-flexionen seiner beiden Lehrer anknüpfend das letzte Geheimnis der Geschichte im fichteschen Begriff der Wertindividualität zu erkennen wusste, d.h. in seiner Auffassung des Individuums, dessen Wert von seiner im Wertganzen eingenommenen Stellung abhängt. Der Teil und das Ganze, das Individuum und die Geschichte sind daher die Begriffe, mit denen Lask das Problem der Geschichte neu definiert und sich, wie wir sehen werden, als philosophischer Erbe des von der Badischen Schule erklärten und vertretenen Kantianismus der Geschichtsphilosophie erweist.  Denn die Grundlage bildet hier nicht nur der Bezug auf die axiologische Sphäre, die schon durch die Sekundärliteratur umfassend dokumentiert ist, sondern eine bestimmte Teil-Ganzes-Theorie, die von diesen Studien jedoch allzu oft übersehen wird. Erst durch den Zusammenhang dieser Theorie mit der axiologischen Ebene wird für den Neukritizismus von Windelband, Rickert und Lask ein radikales Neudenken der geschichtlichen Sphäre möglich, das sich auch heute noch als fruchtbar erweisen kann.

Der Band versammelt die wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz des Philosophen Emil Lask (1875–1915), einem der wichtigsten Vertreter des Neukantianismus der »Südwestdeutschen« Schule. Im Mittelpunkt steht der Briefwechsel Lasks mit seinem akademischen Lehrer Heinrich Rickert.

The article presents the premises, description and basic tenets of Emil Lask's logic of philosophy. It is set forth the biography of the German philosopher, and available bibliography is analyzed. The underlying ideas of Lask's philosophical project are outlined here, including Lask's interpretation of the Copernican revolution of Kant, putting the sphere of the meaning as a special field of knowledge, setting the concept of «logos-immanenсe» as the highest category, general classification of categories of philosophy as the doctrine of science (Wissenschaftslehre).

Este artículo se centra en algunos aspectos clave del sistema filosófico de Emil Lask con el fin de poner de manifiesto cómo su intento de determinar lo que podría llamarse la esfera de lo originario, es decir, el encuentro primigenio entre la conciencia y la realidad, le conduce inevitablemente a una aporía. En la primera parte afrontaremos la cuestión a partir del problema del conocimiento y, en la segunda, a partir de la historia y su valor, mostrando en este recorrido qué une y qué separa a Lask del pensamiento de Husserl y Heidegger.

La fitta trama biografica e filosofica incarnata da Emil Lask (1875-1915) tratteggia, nelle temperie culturali d’inizio Novecento, una figura inusuale, un profilo umano e teoretico che non si lascia facilmente riassumere in un ritratto dai contorni ben definiti. Il suo pensiero e la sua vita appaiono sospesi al crocevia tra diversi destini cui si piegò con forza la generazione di uomini che, nei primi tre lustri del XX secolo, si era trovata a fronteggiare l’incombente avvento della Grande Guerra. In questo scenario, e in poco più di un decennio, si consumarono, di fronte agli occhi di un’intera genia di filosofi, la peculiare parabola dell’astro filosofico laskiano e, insieme ad essa, il suo tragico destino. Nonostante l’ammirazione dei suoi contemporanei – da Heidegger a Plessner, da Lukács ad Adorno – dopo la scomparsa di Lask sul fronte di guerra il suo nome e il suo pensiero furono avvolti dal silenzio. Solo negli ultimi decenni si è cercato di strappare la filosofia laskiana da un ingiustificato oblio, restituendole il rilievo che merita per la profondità dell’impegno teoretico e l’ampiezza degli orizzonti tracciati. A poco più di cent’anni dalla sua morte, il presente volume si propone di offrire una ricomprensione del pensiero di Lask, contribuendo non solo a restituire i lineamenti di uno straordinario capitolo della storia della filosofia novecentesca, ma soprattutto i tratti di una riflessione radicalmente rivolta al futuro, la cui grandezza è consistita nell’anticipare problemi tuttora al centro del dibattito filosofico.

O objetivo do artigo e apresentar e contextualizar a obra Filosofia do Direito de Emil Lask, mostrando suas virtudes e limitacoes. Inicialmente sao apresentadas as circunstâncias em que a obra foi produzida, seguindo-se a exposicao das influencias teoricas de Lask, com destaque para a filosofia dos valores de Windelband e Rickert. Posteriormente e analisado o modo como Lask aplica a filosofia dos valores ao direito, processo pelo qual a justica e tomada como o valor fundamental que constitui o significado de todo fenomeno juridico possivel. Por fim, ainda na perspectiva da filosofia dos valores, e examinado o processo de constituicao das disciplinas cientificas que estudam os fenomenos juridicos.

The article presents the phenomenological background of Emil Lask’s logic of philosophy. First, it shows the history of the relationship between E. Lask and Husserl, analyzing the level of their acquaintance with the texts of each other; after that the main historical-philosophical works on the subject are reviewed. The influence of Husserl’s early phenomenology on Lask’s philosophy is summarized in the following topics: 1) the intent to develop a "pure philosophy," rigorous science, logic of logic; 2) focusing the scientific analysis on the region of meaning, and unveiling the categorial structures of consciousness therein; 3) understanding basic knowledge stages (Husserl’s four standpoints of phenomenological reduction and Lask’s "levels of being"); 4) emphasizing the activity of consciousness (interpretation of intentionality); 5) correlation between Lask’s "primary objects" and Husserl’s "specific objects". The analysis leads to the conclusion that despite the proximity to neo-Kantianism and a substantial influence of Husserl’s early phenomenology, Lask succeeded in forming an independent line of thought, partially anticipating the later philosophy of Husserl, and having significant impact on some of the later philosophical systems (D. Lukács, M. Heidegger).

In this paper I argue that an adequate understanding of Husserl's late ethics of love requires careful consideration of the Neo-Kantian milieu in Southwest Germany. After discussing some general aspects of the contextualization of Husserl's phenomenology and, in particular, Husserl's ethics I move to consider his transition from an action-centered to a life-centered conception of ethics. I show that this transition is largely indebted to Georg Simmel's critique of Kant's practical philosophy. In the second part of the paper I argue that the problem of the value of individuality (Wertindividualität) that defines Emil Lask's early work on Fichte and Heinrich Rickert's conception of erotics (Erotik) as an autonomous domain of value is the same problem behind Husserl's re-conceptualization of ethics around the experience of a personal call issuing from a value affecting the subject in an absolute fashion.

It is well known that Gustav Radbruch’s philosophy of law is significantly influenced by the neo-Kantian philosophy of Rickert’s student Emil Lask. However, so far, there has been no systematic investigation of the question of which aspects of Lark’s analyses of legal philosophy, cultural philosophy and epistemology are important to Radbruch’s philosophy of law.

The monograph endeavors to close this gap. Its structure orients itself towards a fundamental distinction between the scientific knowledge of the subject and the subject itself. The topic of the first part is the epistemological foundation of the philosophy and science of law; the second part deals with the justification of law itself. In the third part, the developments in the legal philosophical thoughts of Radbruch and Lask are analysed from the point of view of their relationship to the neo-Kantian tradition. The result also offers a new perspective on the much-discussed “transformation” in Radbruch’s legal philosophy.

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Dass die Rechtsphilosophie Gustav Radbruchs von der neukantianisch geprägten Philosophie des Rickert-Schülers Emil Lask maßgeblich beeinflusst wurde, ist bekannt. Bisher fehlt aber eine systematische Untersuchung der Frage, in welchen Punkten die rechtsphilosophischen, kulturphilosophischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Analysen Lasks für die Rechtsphilosophie Radbruchs von Bedeutung sind.

Die Arbeit unternimmt es, diese Lücke zu schließen. Der Aufbau orientiert sich an der für den Neukantianismus fundamentalen Unterscheidung zwischen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes und dem Gegenstand selbst. Im ersten Teil geht es um die erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegung der Rechtsphilosophie und -wissenschaft, im zweiten um die rechtsphilosophische Begründung des Rechts. Der dritte Teil analysiert Entwicklungen im Denken Radbruchs wie Lasks unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihres Verhältnisses zur neukantianischen Tradition. Dabei ergibt sich eine neue Sichtweise auf die vieldiskutierte „Wandlung“ in der Rechtsphilosophie Radbruchs.

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        众所周知，古斯塔夫·拉德布鲁赫（Gustav Radbruch）的法哲学深受新康德主义哲学，尤其是西南德意志学派价值哲学思想的影响。作为该学派的主要代表之一，埃米尔·拉斯克（Emil Lask）更是对拉德布鲁赫法哲学思想的形成与发展起到了决定性作用。然而，拉斯克的法哲学、文化科学与认识论思想究竟在哪些方面具体影响到了拉德布鲁赫的法哲学呢？对于这一问题，学界至今尚无体系性的研究专著。本书正是致力于填补这一漏洞。
        新康德主义哲学严格区分了“关于对象的科学认识”与“对象本身”。上述区分为本书前两编的结构安排奠定了基石。具体言之，本书第一编致力于探究拉德布鲁赫与拉斯克二人在法哲学与法律科学层面的逻辑—认识论基础。第二编则对法律这一对象进行法哲学层面的证立，且具体涵盖了法律的概念论、目的论与效力论三个维度。本书第三编进一步将视角转向拉德布鲁赫与拉斯克的晚年理论，尝试分析它们与二人早期的新康德主义法哲学模型之间的关系，揭示其中的发展与变迁趋势。
        迄今为止，学界仍然争论不休的一大难题在于：如何解读拉德布鲁赫早年与晚年法哲学思想中的“变迁”。本书最后一章尝试为这一学界公案的解答打开一个崭新的视阈。

The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to redefining the anthropological question from the perspective of the two paramount members of the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism: Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband. To this purpose, following the lead of the outcomes of Windelband's philosophy of history and of Rickert's philosophical anthropology, the paper firstly proposes to identify the essential trait of the human being in its processual and self-formative nature and, then, to assess the effectiveness and limitations of this thesis within the current philosophical debate as radically redefined by the phenomena of posthumanism and transhumanism. In this line of inquiry, the paper dwells principally on the redefinition, in heterological-processual terms, of the relationship between the natural and cultural spheres of the human being, as well as on the ethical-practical character that marks the process of human formation, i.e. form-taking.

Emil Lask: between neo-Kantianism and post-neo-Kantianism

In this paper, the author shows that Emil Lask’s philosophy starts with considering typical neo-Kantian’s questions but at the same time it grounds a new philosophical perspective – post-neo-Kantianism. The origin of Lask’s research is Heinrich Rickert’s theory of judgment, however, Lask finds many new solutions and initiates new ideas adopted from him by  Martin  Heidegger. The article discusses innovative elements of Lask’s thought like the problem of the material side of cognition, the logic of object, a logos-immanency of the object, the doctrine of the material determination of form, the ontological theory of truth, the problem of the individual subject. Although Lask does not create ontology he is this one of Neo-Kantian philosophers, who make transcendental philosophy ask ontological questions. When we study his considerations it starts to be obvious that the theory of cognition is not possible without ontology.

El presente trabajo examina el papel que habría jugado la pregunta por el ser en la evolución filosófica de Heidegger. Contra lo que se asume habitualmente, el examen de los textos muestra que la pregunta tradicional de la ontología no provee un hilo conductor permanente a todo lo largo de la evolución del pensamiento de Heidegger. Por el contrario, en la época de los primeros escritos académicos, Heidegger abandona primero la orientación tradicional de la ontología a partir de la noción de ‘ser’, para asumir, durante tiempo considerable, la concepción ontológica que caracteriza a la lógica de la validez (Geltungslogik) elaborada por Lotze y Lask. Sin embargo, posteriormente, en el período que va desde 1919 hasta 1925/26, Heidegger se ve forzado a recuperar y reformular la pregunta ontológica tradicional, entre otras cosas, sobre la base de un diagnóstico crítico referido a las aporías ontológicas a las que había conducido la posición antipsicologista que, en el ámbito de la filosofía de la lógica, habían desarrollado tanto el neokantismo como la propia fenomenología.

The article presents the analysis of the influence of the logic of philosophy of E. Lask at the early philosophy of M. Heidegger 1912–1919 (article «New Research in Logic», two dissertations, Freiburg lectures). The philosophy of Lask is regarded as a transitional stage in the development of Heidegger: from neo-Kantianism to phenomenology. The article discusses the importance of this influence on the later philosophy of M. Heidegger.

In his first academic courses, Heidegger presents givenness as a crucial question for phenomenology, a question around which the different philosophical schools split. The first part of the article therefore analyzes the Heideggerian criticism of the meanings of givenness in critical realism (Külpe), in Neo-Kantianism (Natorp and Rickert) and in Husserlian phenomenology. In the second part, through analyzing the experience of the question of the givenness of something (Frageerlebnis) and through a close examination of the difference between generalization and formalization, the author aims to demonstrate that the whole Heideggerian argument is based on the interpretation of givenness as a formal indication.

Il presente articolo intende lumeggiare l’esito tanto fecondo quanto problematico a cui conduce l’originale opera laskiana di risemantizzazione del concetto di soggettività. Al centro di tale opera si staglia la progressiva elaborazione di ciò che il filosofo rubrica, al termine del suo Denkweg, sotto il titolo di soggetto ricettivo. Con tale concetto, a cui è intimamente legato quello di “dedizione”, Lask individua in una mera ricettività intuitiva il momento sorgivo e originario di ogni processo cognitivo; il solo momento che rende possibile un accesso diretto all’oggetto trascendente. Ma come si realizza questo accesso? Qual è lo statuto di ciò che il filosofo nomina “dedizione”? L’insufficiente risposta a tali quesiti conduce il pensiero laskiano ad un esito aporetico, ossia alla riduzione della dedizione a momento ideale e alla conseguente riattivazione, in ambito conoscitivo, dell’inaggirabile distanza tra soggetto e oggetto. Ma, se in tale aporia è riconosciuto il limite del modello della conoscenza elaborato da Lask nel suo sistema maturo, non è comunque possibile occultare il decisivo contributo offerto dalla sua riflessione al problema gnoseologico: il superamento del coscienzialismo attraverso l’elaborazione di un soggetto concreto-ricettivo e, accanto ad esso, di un peculiare realismo.

Traduction de Emil Lask, « Hegel in seinem Verhältnis zur Weltanschauung der Aufklärung », conférence inaugurale publique tenue le 11 janvier 1905 à Heidelberg, dont l’épreuve fut publiée par Eugen Herrigel dans E. LASK, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1923,
p. 333-345.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the analysis and the reviewing of the re- markable European philosophical projects became routine in the central Russian philosophical editions and the Russian philosophical community as a whole. In Russian philosophers’s articles and books, almost all the most prominent Western philosophical doctrines found their response and reaction. The striking project of the ‘logic of philosophy’ by the Neo-Kantian philosopher E. Lask did not remain without attention, too. The criticism of the Lask’s doctrine in the texts of Russian philosophers can be seen as an organic part of the reception of Neo- Kantian ideas in Russia. The most presentative texts containing the constructive and consistent analysis of the ‘logic of philosophy’ are the texts of Russian Neo- Kantians B.V. Yakovenko and B.P. Vysheslavtsev, and the Russian religious phi- losophers E.N. Trubetskoy and S.A. Askoldov. The research attempts to recon- struct and compare the critical arguments of the Russian philosophers regarding the main points and terminology of Lask’s doctrine. This study allows us to ex- pand and refine our understanding of reception and criticism of Neo-Kantianism in Russia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

short abstract: Emil Lask provides the bridge from Kant to phenomenology but also from Kant to Kyoto School philosophy.  Heidegger and Nishida, contemporaneously but independently, took Lask's collapsing of Neo-Kantian hylomorphism in distinct directions.  They accepted Lask's anti-subjectivism while moving beyond his object-centrism.  Heidegger broadened Lask's notion of lived experience in the direction of the "horizon" explicated in terms of temporality.  Nishida takes it in terms of a pre-objective "predicate,” indicative of the "place" wherein beings, objects, grammatical subjects are implaced.  Both assume "world" as contextual (back)ground.  The presentation thus examines Heidegger and Nishida under Lask’s light as a common source.

Longer abstract: Emil Lask has been said to provide a bridge from Kant to phenomenology through a kind of self-deconstruction from within Neo-Kantianism.  One could also argue that he provides a bridge from Kant to Kyoto School philosophy in Japan.  Remarkably both Martin Heidegger and Nishida Kitarō, independent of one another but contemporaneously, took Lask's collapsing of Neo-Kantian hylomorphism in parallel but distinct directions, developing Lask's conception of a pre-judicative object-paradigm and the implicit difference within it between category and material.  Both to a degree accepted Lask's anti-subjectivism in his attempt to avoid psychologism.  Nishida and Heidegger, however, also moved beyond Lask's object-centrism.  In the case of Heidegger, Lask's notion of prethematic lived experience is broadened in the direction of the "horizon" that in Sein und Zeit becomes explicated in terms of the temporality of human existence.  In the case of Nishida in Basho it is understood in terms of a pre-objective "predicate" (in distinction from the grammatical subject) and as indicative of the "place" wherein beings, objects, or grammatical subjects are implaced.  For Nishida, place in its deepest significance is the place of nothing, for Heidegger, temporality is the meaning of being.  Both notions indicate a pretheoretical lived sense of meaning that assumes the "world" (Welt, sekai) as the contextual ground for the emergence of objects or beings.  I thus examine Heidegger and Nishida under the light of Lask as a common source of influence and inspiration and to whom both were responding.
Videos of SPEP presentation: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCff0OTUMMJajEwqXXXJzHbA/videos?view=0&sort=dd&shelf_id=1

Para los interesados en la filosofía del joven Heidegger el título de este ensayo recordará sin duda el célebre artículo que Theodore Kisiel publicó en 1995, Por qué los estudiantes de Heidegger tendrán que leer a Emil Lask.  Aquí hemos sustituido a Lask por Natorp (y el tiempo futuro por un condicional más modesto). Sin embargo, esta sustitución no es arbitraria. En efecto, podríamos decir que los estudiantes de Heidegger tendrían que leer a ambos, Lask y Natorp. El primero porque era un neokantiano en camino hacia la fenomenología –y que, como demuestra Kisiel, ayudó al propio Heidegger a alejarse de su trasfondo neokantiano–; el segundo porque –y esta es nuestra tesis– fue indirectamente uno de los artífices de la transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología heideggeriana.

Este breve escrito se centra en algunos aspectos clave del sistema filosófico de Emil Lask con el fin de poner de manifiesto la aporía a la que llega siempre que intenta determinar lo que podría llamarse la esfera de lo originario, es decir, la descripción del encuentro primigenio entre la conciencia y la realidad