Books by Marina Eleftheriadou
Tι είναι η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση, ποιοι παράγοντες την ευνοούν και υπό ποιες συνθήκες εκδηλώνεται; Α... more Tι είναι η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση, ποιοι παράγοντες την ευνοούν και υπό ποιες συνθήκες εκδηλώνεται; Απλά ερωτήματα στα οποία καθένας μπορεί να δώσει όμως διαφορετική απάντηση. Το βιβλίο διαλύει ευρέως διαδεδομένες παρανοήσεις και αναδεικνύει την πολυπλοκότητα της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης και το εύρος των παραγόντων που την επηρεάζουν.
Το πρώτο μέρος του βιβλίου προσεγγίζει το φαινόμενο στο πλαίσιο μιας κλιμακωτής διερεύνησης των παραγόντων ριζοσπαστικοποίησης. Εκκινώντας από το άτομο, το οποίο αποτελεί το πλέον σύνηθες πρίσμα μελέτης του φαινομένου, καταλήγει στους παράγοντες που αναπτύσσονται στο επίπεδο του διεθνούς περιβάλλοντος και συνήθως παραλείπονται εξολοκλήρου στις σχετικές μελέτες.
Το δεύτερο μέρος προσφέρει μια επισκόπηση της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης, η οποία με άξονα τα κύματα της τρομοκρατίας φτάνει ως την ισλαμιστική και την ακροδεξιά τρομοκρατία σήμερα. Σκιαγραφεί τη σημασία επιμέρους παραγόντων σε διαφορετικές μορφές και περιόδους πολιτικής βίας, επισημαίνοντας τις διαφορές αλλά κυρίως τις αναπάντεχες ομοιότητες που παρουσιάζει η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση σε εκ διαμέτρου αντίθετες και ενίοτε εχθρικές ομάδες και κινήματα.
Μια σύντομη και περιεκτική θεώρηση της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης και ένα έναυσμα για μια βαθύτερη και γονιμότερη μελέτη του φαινομένου.
Book chapters by Marina Eleftheriadou
Ελευθεριάδου, Μ. (2023). Οι τεθλασμένες απολήξεις του ισλαμιστικού εξτρεμισμού: μία αποτίμηση των βασικών ερωτημάτων και παραδοχών στη μελέτη της ισλαμιστικής ριζοσπαστικοποίησης. στο Ανδρέας Γκόφας (επιμ.). Ο Κόσμος και η Απειλή της Τρομοκρατίας μετά την 11η Σεπτεμβρίου. Αθήνα: Πεδίο, 237-265, 2023
Eleftheriadou, M. (2023). Christian Right and US Middle East Policy: Foreign Policy in the Servic... more Eleftheriadou, M. (2023). Christian Right and US Middle East Policy: Foreign Policy in the Service of God’s Will. In S. Roussos (Ed.), From Pluralism to Extinction? Perspectives and Challenges for Christians in the Middle East (pp. 149-168). London: Transnational Press.
Eleftheriadou, M., Roussos, S. (2018). Islamic State’s notion of ‘mobile’ Sovereignty/Territoriality in a Postsecular Perspective, In Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, Deina Abdelkader (eds.), Islam in International Affairs: Politics and Paradigms. Oxford: Routledge, 2018
This chapter explores the strategy of military conquest, administrative consolidation and territo... more This chapter explores the strategy of military conquest, administrative consolidation and territorial expansion of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS), claiming that IS constitutes a hybrid formation that overcomes the dichotomy between the secular and the religious. However, contrary to the Habermasian western vantage-point views of postsecularism as a normative problem-solving process, which would lead to a peaceful inclusion of religion into a secular society, it claims that IS’s postsecularity -and particularly its notion of ‘mobile territoriality’- appropriates and transforms secular structures and idioms, in order for the religious to become translatable to various sections of the society.
Articles by Marina Eleftheriadou
The Middle East Journal, 2021
In the wake of its relocation to Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) transformed... more In the wake of its relocation to Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) transformed from a guerrilla force into a state-builder. This article explores this transition and argues that the creation of the Palestinian proto-state in Lebanon was largely guided by the country's civil war–induced state collapse after 1975, which created both opportunities and needs that forced the Palestinian movement to engage in state-building. Enticed by new opportunities and constrained by the Lebanese Civil War's volatility, the Palestinian movement shifted its strategic priorities from cross-border campaigns against Israel to fighting within Lebanon. These new opportunities and needs also encouraged the PLO to transform itself into a semi-conventional force, which led to its defeat in 1982 and the collapse of the Palestinian proto-state.
International Politics, 2021
The 2015 civil war in Yemen has given rise to an assortment of local fiefdoms that contest the po... more The 2015 civil war in Yemen has given rise to an assortment of local fiefdoms that contest the power and authority of the internationally recognized government. Some of them resemble proto-states and exert a variety of sovereign functions, such as providing security and services. The Houthis have the most developed proto-state, but similar entities exist in areas, which are nominally under government’s control. This article claims that the rise of parallel sovereignties across Yemen stem from the legacy of neo-patrimonialism and hybrid security and political orders dating back to Saleh rule, but their specific character and the extensive fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp are the result of the particularities of the 2015 external intervention. Contrary to Houthis, who receive limited and focused support from Iran, the anti-Houthi camp is ‘blessed’ with several regional supporters that hold divergent interests and funnel support to their preferred local allies, leading to fragmentation and the multiplication of local fiefdoms.
Religions, 2020
The article explores the implications the rise of the 'Islamic State' (IS) had on the internation... more The article explores the implications the rise of the 'Islamic State' (IS) had on the international order and the salafi-jihadi movement. The main argument is that at the height of its activity (2014-2016) IS was a de facto revolutionary state. In this capacity, IS challenged the international order because contrary to revolutionary states in the past it negated the foundations of the Westphalian system. At the same time, the rise of IS had a tremendous impact on the jihadi (sub)system, as it initiated a period of fragmentation and alliance-building. The competition between IS and al-Qaeda for the hegemony of the movement did not revolve around direct fighting as much as efforts to outbid the rival group. One of the main conduits of this competition was the 'war of bay'as (pledges of allegiance)', which consisted of competitive oaths of allegiance from local jihadi forces to one of the two groups. In local contexts, the 'war of bay'as' increased tensions and factionalism within jihadi groups, as splinter groups decided to side with the new revolutionary foco. The fragmentation of local jihadi groups unfolded along pre-existing cleavages, grievances and resource-related motivations, increasing the levels of violence and complexity in these local conflicts.
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2020
Drawing on a survey of asylum seekers, the article provides a security assessment of the ‘refugee... more Drawing on a survey of asylum seekers, the article provides a security assessment of the ‘refugee experience’ in Greece. This exploration of the ‘refugee situation’ on Europe’s eastern shore touches upon refugees’ prior and present grievances, the local and imported ‘radical milieu’ and (Greek) host state’s will and capacity to implement sustainable and effective policies. The paper demonstrates that, although Greece lacks a developed radical milieu that could facilitate radicalization, Greece’s policy of ‘uninvolved tolerance’ creates a vacuum that might be filled by radical groups in the future. Also, with the exception of minors’ education, Greece scores low in most socio-economic indicators that delineate the ‘refugee experience’. In this environment, scarce employment opportunities and dependence on external sources for life-sustainment interweave with institutionalization and negative coping mechanisms. These silent and largely hidden from the public eye processes might become the ingredients of future radicalization.
Terrorism & Political Violence, 2020
This article constitutes an effort to examine the prospect of long-term refugee radicalization, b... more This article constitutes an effort to examine the prospect of long-term refugee radicalization, beyond the dominant “short-sighted” debate on the possibility of radical Islamist militants posing as refugees. The main argument of the article is that refugees are inherently different from second-generation economic migrants, on whom most radicalization models are based. The article proposes a composite model that enriches our understanding of radicalization drivers with insights from refugee militarization studies. The model demonstrates that not only do some radicalization drivers present different dynamics in refugee populations, but that there are also other important factors, such as refugees’ cause of flight or prior political organization, which are absent in traditional radicalization models. Moreover, the article highlights the importance of a host state’s will and capacity to address refugees’ needs and the influence of external actors in policy formulation, particularly in weak or struggling host states. One implication of this study is that early-stage policies largely predetermine future radicalization. Another implication is that the possibility of refugee radicalization is not the same for every refugee population and in every (European) country. Thus, the policies the European Union or specific states adopt should be tailored to the specific needs of each community and state.
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Jul 2015
Greek cinema has documented and debated the civil war and its repercussions under different angle... more Greek cinema has documented and debated the civil war and its repercussions under different angles, largely defined by censorship, the general political climate, and cinematic trends. This article, first, offers a retrospective that traces the evolution of Greek cinema's ‘takes’ on the civil war vis-à-vis the political changes. Second, it provides an in-depth analysis of Costas Gavras’s film Z, examining its relevance to Greece and how political conflict, in general, is cinematically depicted. The article argues that Z and Gavras’s cinema have been affected and have affected the Greek political situation. However, while Z has spearheaded an international cinematic genre (political thriller), it had minimal effect on the Greek cinema.
Small Wars & Insurgencies, Jun 2014
Over the past few years there is an apparent re-regionalization of al-Qaeda activity, intensified... more Over the past few years there is an apparent re-regionalization of al-Qaeda activity, intensified by the ongoing Middle East turmoil. Its main characteristic is a trend towards the abandonment of focoist strategies and their replacement by more popular-based ones. This article aims at evaluating their capacity to implement such a strategy shift and sustain the required level of violence. As a means of evaluating this capacity, this article proposes the use of a DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) framework, which will hopefully provide an alternative angle of theorizing and understanding ‘armed non-state actors’ (ANSAs). The model is applied in the case of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which appears to have effectively developed the military and informational dimensions, due partly to its own prowess and partly to the Yemeni state's weaknesses and the shortcomings of counterinsurgency. In contrast, the economic and diplomatic dimensions suffer from the lack of resources and the anti-systemic nature of AQAP.
Negócios Estrangeiros, Apr 2009
Lately there has been a heated debate about Iranian efforts to spread Shiism to Sunni countries. ... more Lately there has been a heated debate about Iranian efforts to spread Shiism to Sunni countries. Many Sunni religious and political figures have contributed to this latest addition of anti -Iranian rhetoric, exaggerating the actual extent of the phenomenon of Shia conversions. It seems that once again Iran’s rising regional status challenges Sunni predominance in the region. However, although politically more prolific, religiously, the Iranian example, at least for now, flourishes only under very specific circumstances.
Papers by Marina Eleftheriadou
Middle East Bulletin, 2024
Every first-year student of Strategic Studies learns that a strategy entails the effective use of... more Every first-year student of Strategic Studies learns that a strategy entails the effective use of available means to attain specific ends. They also learn that ends, both short-term and long-term, are inextricably linked to a political goal and, as a result, the effectiveness of a strategy is judged by how well it manages to achieve this overarching goal. What happens then when the goal is vague, unfeasible or blind to reality? Not only is the strategy bound to fail, but it is doomed -even when ostensibly victorious- to move from one tactical victory to another until it collapses under the weight of its own strategically meaningless successes. This paradoxical facet of strategy has been brilliantly described by Edward Luttwak in his book Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, where he meticulously showcases how technical superiority and tactical victories might culminate in defeats at the levels of strategy and grand strategy. It is against this background that we may evaluate the Israeli cul-de-sac strategy before and after the October 7 Hamas attack.
Middle East Bulletin, Jul 2023
2023 marks the 20th anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq. The invasion had important repercussi... more 2023 marks the 20th anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq. The invasion had important repercussions for Iraq and the region as a whole. It had a profound impact on the salafi-jihadist movement as well, arguably more perennial than that of the 9/11 attacks. The article focuses on two specific aspects of this impact. First, the sectarianisation of politics and conflicts in the region, which engulfed equally the salafi-jihadist movement. Second, the 'reinvention' of terrorist spectacle and its introduction into the Internet era via decapitation and attack videos by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In sum, the US invasion provided the space for the introduction of jihadist innovations that were further developed by AQI's successor group, ISIS, and left a lasting impact on the jihadist conflict paradigm.
Middle East Bulletin, Jan 2022
Taliban’s successful campaign to bring Afghanistan back under their rule reverberates far beyond ... more Taliban’s successful campaign to bring Afghanistan back under their rule reverberates far beyond the country’s borders. While international attention shifts to the rising great power competition, Islamist groups across the globe celebrate the failure of yet another superpower to subdue Afghanistan. Taliban’s success bears the possibility to turn Afghanistan into a new lighthouse of Islamist activism. While Afghanistan becoming once again a meeting point for jihadists from across the world seems more “logical”, what is more probable—and in the long run more dangerous—is Taliban’s success to evolve into a new model of strategy that other Islamist/jihadist groups will try to emulate.
Το Aφγανιστάν μετά τις ΗΠΑ: Οι Ταλιμπάν, οι Μεγάλες Δυνάμεις & οι γεωπολιτικές προεκτάσεις, Sep 9, 2021
Η αποχώρηση των τελευταίων συμμαχικών στρατευμάτων από την Καμπούλ ρίχνει την αυλαία στην εικοσαε... more Η αποχώρηση των τελευταίων συμμαχικών στρατευμάτων από την Καμπούλ ρίχνει την αυλαία στην εικοσαετή επέμβαση των ΗΠΑ στο Αφγανιστάν. Η αποχώρηση της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης από τη χώρα πριν από 32 χρόνια πυροδότησε διεργασίες που οδήγησαν στη διαμόρφωση του τζιχαντιστικού κινήματος όπως το γνωρίζουμε σήμερα. Επομένως, έχει σημασία να διερευνήσουμε τον τρόπο με τον οποίο το τζιχαντιστικό κίνημα αντέδρασε στην θριαμβευτική είσοδο των Ταλιμπάν στην αφγανική πρωτεύουσα τον περασμένο Αύγουστο και τις επιπτώσεις που αναμένεται να έχει η νίκη των Ταλιμπάν στο ευρύτερο κίνημα.
Centre for Religious Pluralism in the Middle East, Jul 10, 2018
The CRPME report is addressing main features and challenges regarding religious pluralism in the ... more The CRPME report is addressing main features and challenges regarding religious pluralism in the Middle East during the first half of 2018. The region of focus includes the countries of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon and the Maghreb region with an added emphasis on each country’s institutional framework. The aim of the report is, on the one hand, to pinpoint the challenges related to religious pluralism in the region. On the other hand, it strives to highlight positive state and community initiatives that promote religious co-existence and pluralism. The documentation work leading to the report reflects the research already published on the CRPME site, which is being constantly updated with the developments regarding the religious communities in the region. It is, thus, neither exhaustive nor discursive in covering all the relevant events but it focuses on the events that could reveal certain issues, trends, continuities and discontinuities.
Centre for Religious Pluralism in the Middle East, Nov 14, 2017
The objective of this report is to highlight the main themes featured in the speeches of the part... more The objective of this report is to highlight the main themes featured in the speeches of the participants of the 2nd Athens International Conference on “Religious and Cultural Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Middle East”, which took place from 30 to 31 October 2017. The conference aimed at overviewing main features and developments of religious pluralism in the Middle East in the past two years and proposed positive initiatives to promote religious coexistence and pluralism in the region.
Centre for Religious Pluralism in the Middle East, Oct 10, 2017
The objective of the report is addressing the main developments concerning religious pluralism in... more The objective of the report is addressing the main developments concerning religious pluralism in the Middle East and highlighting the challenges that religious coexistence faces in the region. Building on the findings of the previous three CRPME reports, the analysis at hand focuses on featuring events and phenomena that have occurred in the past six months. The region covered includes Iraq and Syria, Egypt, Turkey and the Gulf Arab states. Additionally, the analysis of foreign actors’ humanitarian and diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis religious minorities in the Middle East is also part of this study. The documentation work carried out by the CRPME and published on the centre’s website serves as the basis for the report and is an ongoing endeavour, aiming at providing continuous updates on the state of religious pluralism in the Middle East. The findings presented, therefore, are not exhaustive, but highlight main trends and continuities.
Special Report, Dec 28, 2016
Executive Summary
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and econ... more Executive Summary
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh.
The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the ‘Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan’ is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic.
The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq.
The research team noted the phenomenon of militarization of the communities, as a result of the aforementioned polarization. With the exception of Zoroastrians and Jews, all the other communities have established military units or militias to fight against ISIS, either on KRG’s side or the central government’s side. Given that these militias do not intend to disband after the ousting of ISIS, they will play an important role in the Erbil-Baghdad rivalry. Meanwhile, the Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities are highly likely to be driven into conflict.
In the case of the Christian community, the religious leadership opposes militarization, as it deems that the protection of Christians is the mandate of the official state authorities. In addition, the religious leadership has been accused of having a ‘passive’ stance, an accusation, which together with its opposition to the arming of Christians, has engendered a rift between the political and the religious leadership.
Particularly vulnerable are the over 2 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraqi Kurdistan, whose population is estimated to be 5 million. The refugees and IDPs seem to be affected by the aid budget reductions, but they are also at risk of drawing the hostility of the host community, who might consider hem passive recipients of governmental assistance.
The return of IDPs is a thorny issue, not only because of the possible revenge attacks, but also due to the total destruction of some regions. The lack of resources and, in some cases, the lack of willingness to reconstruct the regions renders the return of IDPs a point of contention. In this context, the emigration flows are expected to increase significantly, particularly among the Christian and the Yazidi communities.
The cooperation between the communities is rudimentary. The initiatives for dialogue are limited both between the communities and within each community, either because dialogue comes second in the urgency of fighting ISIS or because similar initiatives have failed in the past. In general, the communities seem to promote their interests separately from each other and, at times, at expense of each other, particularly when it comes to the issue of the autonomous zone in the Nineveh region.
Cooperation and dialogue is of significant importance in the context of discussions for the creation of an autonomous zone in the Nineveh region, an idea that is very popular among the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities. Nevertheless, while the majority supports the idea, they seem to lack a clear and common plan vis-a-vis the status of the autonomous zone, whether it will be under the administrative control of KRG or the central government, the role of the international community and the specific arrangements for the coexistence between the different communities.
While the idea of creating an autonomous zone for the religious minorities has an overall positive reception, the scenario of a Sunni autonomous zone is treated with skepticism. Except from some Sunnis, the only other external supporter of this scenario is Turkey. In any case, the odds for such a scenario to materialize are poor, given the suspicion towards the Sunni community.
The notion of distrust and fear of the ‘other’ is rampant, especially against Arab Sunni Muslims and Sunni Muslims in general. Although there is a distinction – at least on a rhetorical level – between the Arab Sunni Muslims who fled and those who stayed and allied themselves with the ‘Islamic State’, the majority does not want to continue living next to Arab Sunni Muslims. Given the lack of a central command over the various armed groups, and the fact that there is no plan to bring those responsible to justice, revenge attacks will probably be inevitable. These acts of revenge may even occur against members of the same community, especially in the case of Turkmen.
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Books by Marina Eleftheriadou
Το πρώτο μέρος του βιβλίου προσεγγίζει το φαινόμενο στο πλαίσιο μιας κλιμακωτής διερεύνησης των παραγόντων ριζοσπαστικοποίησης. Εκκινώντας από το άτομο, το οποίο αποτελεί το πλέον σύνηθες πρίσμα μελέτης του φαινομένου, καταλήγει στους παράγοντες που αναπτύσσονται στο επίπεδο του διεθνούς περιβάλλοντος και συνήθως παραλείπονται εξολοκλήρου στις σχετικές μελέτες.
Το δεύτερο μέρος προσφέρει μια επισκόπηση της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης, η οποία με άξονα τα κύματα της τρομοκρατίας φτάνει ως την ισλαμιστική και την ακροδεξιά τρομοκρατία σήμερα. Σκιαγραφεί τη σημασία επιμέρους παραγόντων σε διαφορετικές μορφές και περιόδους πολιτικής βίας, επισημαίνοντας τις διαφορές αλλά κυρίως τις αναπάντεχες ομοιότητες που παρουσιάζει η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση σε εκ διαμέτρου αντίθετες και ενίοτε εχθρικές ομάδες και κινήματα.
Μια σύντομη και περιεκτική θεώρηση της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης και ένα έναυσμα για μια βαθύτερη και γονιμότερη μελέτη του φαινομένου.
Book chapters by Marina Eleftheriadou
Articles by Marina Eleftheriadou
Papers by Marina Eleftheriadou
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh.
The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the ‘Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan’ is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic.
The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq.
The research team noted the phenomenon of militarization of the communities, as a result of the aforementioned polarization. With the exception of Zoroastrians and Jews, all the other communities have established military units or militias to fight against ISIS, either on KRG’s side or the central government’s side. Given that these militias do not intend to disband after the ousting of ISIS, they will play an important role in the Erbil-Baghdad rivalry. Meanwhile, the Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities are highly likely to be driven into conflict.
In the case of the Christian community, the religious leadership opposes militarization, as it deems that the protection of Christians is the mandate of the official state authorities. In addition, the religious leadership has been accused of having a ‘passive’ stance, an accusation, which together with its opposition to the arming of Christians, has engendered a rift between the political and the religious leadership.
Particularly vulnerable are the over 2 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraqi Kurdistan, whose population is estimated to be 5 million. The refugees and IDPs seem to be affected by the aid budget reductions, but they are also at risk of drawing the hostility of the host community, who might consider hem passive recipients of governmental assistance.
The return of IDPs is a thorny issue, not only because of the possible revenge attacks, but also due to the total destruction of some regions. The lack of resources and, in some cases, the lack of willingness to reconstruct the regions renders the return of IDPs a point of contention. In this context, the emigration flows are expected to increase significantly, particularly among the Christian and the Yazidi communities.
The cooperation between the communities is rudimentary. The initiatives for dialogue are limited both between the communities and within each community, either because dialogue comes second in the urgency of fighting ISIS or because similar initiatives have failed in the past. In general, the communities seem to promote their interests separately from each other and, at times, at expense of each other, particularly when it comes to the issue of the autonomous zone in the Nineveh region.
Cooperation and dialogue is of significant importance in the context of discussions for the creation of an autonomous zone in the Nineveh region, an idea that is very popular among the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities. Nevertheless, while the majority supports the idea, they seem to lack a clear and common plan vis-a-vis the status of the autonomous zone, whether it will be under the administrative control of KRG or the central government, the role of the international community and the specific arrangements for the coexistence between the different communities.
While the idea of creating an autonomous zone for the religious minorities has an overall positive reception, the scenario of a Sunni autonomous zone is treated with skepticism. Except from some Sunnis, the only other external supporter of this scenario is Turkey. In any case, the odds for such a scenario to materialize are poor, given the suspicion towards the Sunni community.
The notion of distrust and fear of the ‘other’ is rampant, especially against Arab Sunni Muslims and Sunni Muslims in general. Although there is a distinction – at least on a rhetorical level – between the Arab Sunni Muslims who fled and those who stayed and allied themselves with the ‘Islamic State’, the majority does not want to continue living next to Arab Sunni Muslims. Given the lack of a central command over the various armed groups, and the fact that there is no plan to bring those responsible to justice, revenge attacks will probably be inevitable. These acts of revenge may even occur against members of the same community, especially in the case of Turkmen.
Το πρώτο μέρος του βιβλίου προσεγγίζει το φαινόμενο στο πλαίσιο μιας κλιμακωτής διερεύνησης των παραγόντων ριζοσπαστικοποίησης. Εκκινώντας από το άτομο, το οποίο αποτελεί το πλέον σύνηθες πρίσμα μελέτης του φαινομένου, καταλήγει στους παράγοντες που αναπτύσσονται στο επίπεδο του διεθνούς περιβάλλοντος και συνήθως παραλείπονται εξολοκλήρου στις σχετικές μελέτες.
Το δεύτερο μέρος προσφέρει μια επισκόπηση της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης, η οποία με άξονα τα κύματα της τρομοκρατίας φτάνει ως την ισλαμιστική και την ακροδεξιά τρομοκρατία σήμερα. Σκιαγραφεί τη σημασία επιμέρους παραγόντων σε διαφορετικές μορφές και περιόδους πολιτικής βίας, επισημαίνοντας τις διαφορές αλλά κυρίως τις αναπάντεχες ομοιότητες που παρουσιάζει η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση σε εκ διαμέτρου αντίθετες και ενίοτε εχθρικές ομάδες και κινήματα.
Μια σύντομη και περιεκτική θεώρηση της ριζοσπαστικοποίησης και ένα έναυσμα για μια βαθύτερη και γονιμότερη μελέτη του φαινομένου.
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh.
The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the ‘Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan’ is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic.
The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq.
The research team noted the phenomenon of militarization of the communities, as a result of the aforementioned polarization. With the exception of Zoroastrians and Jews, all the other communities have established military units or militias to fight against ISIS, either on KRG’s side or the central government’s side. Given that these militias do not intend to disband after the ousting of ISIS, they will play an important role in the Erbil-Baghdad rivalry. Meanwhile, the Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities are highly likely to be driven into conflict.
In the case of the Christian community, the religious leadership opposes militarization, as it deems that the protection of Christians is the mandate of the official state authorities. In addition, the religious leadership has been accused of having a ‘passive’ stance, an accusation, which together with its opposition to the arming of Christians, has engendered a rift between the political and the religious leadership.
Particularly vulnerable are the over 2 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraqi Kurdistan, whose population is estimated to be 5 million. The refugees and IDPs seem to be affected by the aid budget reductions, but they are also at risk of drawing the hostility of the host community, who might consider hem passive recipients of governmental assistance.
The return of IDPs is a thorny issue, not only because of the possible revenge attacks, but also due to the total destruction of some regions. The lack of resources and, in some cases, the lack of willingness to reconstruct the regions renders the return of IDPs a point of contention. In this context, the emigration flows are expected to increase significantly, particularly among the Christian and the Yazidi communities.
The cooperation between the communities is rudimentary. The initiatives for dialogue are limited both between the communities and within each community, either because dialogue comes second in the urgency of fighting ISIS or because similar initiatives have failed in the past. In general, the communities seem to promote their interests separately from each other and, at times, at expense of each other, particularly when it comes to the issue of the autonomous zone in the Nineveh region.
Cooperation and dialogue is of significant importance in the context of discussions for the creation of an autonomous zone in the Nineveh region, an idea that is very popular among the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities. Nevertheless, while the majority supports the idea, they seem to lack a clear and common plan vis-a-vis the status of the autonomous zone, whether it will be under the administrative control of KRG or the central government, the role of the international community and the specific arrangements for the coexistence between the different communities.
While the idea of creating an autonomous zone for the religious minorities has an overall positive reception, the scenario of a Sunni autonomous zone is treated with skepticism. Except from some Sunnis, the only other external supporter of this scenario is Turkey. In any case, the odds for such a scenario to materialize are poor, given the suspicion towards the Sunni community.
The notion of distrust and fear of the ‘other’ is rampant, especially against Arab Sunni Muslims and Sunni Muslims in general. Although there is a distinction – at least on a rhetorical level – between the Arab Sunni Muslims who fled and those who stayed and allied themselves with the ‘Islamic State’, the majority does not want to continue living next to Arab Sunni Muslims. Given the lack of a central command over the various armed groups, and the fact that there is no plan to bring those responsible to justice, revenge attacks will probably be inevitable. These acts of revenge may even occur against members of the same community, especially in the case of Turkmen.
‘jihadsphere’. Al-Baghdadi’s open challenge to the salafi-jihadi status quo peaked with his June 2014 claim to the Caliphate, which further gnawed the failing power of al-Qaeda that until recently was the dominant power in the salafi-jihadi sub-system. ISIS’ recent attempts towards ‘remaining and expanding’ beyond the Syria-Iraq front, as its strategic design dictates, constitute a further escalation of the intra-jihadi power struggle that directly challenges al-Qaeda’s unipolar claim to jihadi branding and
franchise. The flurry of declarations of support and bay’ah (to al-Zawahiri or al-Baghdadi) has been dichotomizing the salafi-jihadi movement between loyal to al-Qaeda forces and the ‘defectors’ to the self-proclaimed Islamic State; thus, sealing the increasing bipolarity in the jihadi sub-system.
as the revolutionary and the Islamist groups as the political subjects of the uprisings, the new actor to catch the imagination of the Arab Spring observers is ‘tribes’. The resurrection of this pre-modern mode of organization bewilders the hopes of progressive post-modernity, illustrated in the social media totem; however, this anthropological entry in the Arab Spring discourse brings a little-examined actor in the ‘political field’ of the uprising-affected states.
στάσιμο περιφερειακό μέτωπο “μαθαίνονται” στο Ισραηλινο-Παλαιστινιακό.
Spring. Nevertheless, by one of those twists of history, the death of Osama may turn into a very timely development for the survival of “Jihad”.