Zakia Aqra
University of the Peloponnese, Pedis, Department Member
- Panteion University, International Political Economy, Graduate StudentPanteion University of Social and Political Sciences, International European and Regional Studies, UndergraduateSOAS University of London, Middle East Politics, Graduate Studentadd
The US occupation left Iraq too vulnerable and weak to have a sustainable foreign policy. In the two decades that passed since the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq vacillated between being the theatre for the Sunni-Shia divide and finding its... more
The US occupation left Iraq too vulnerable and weak to have a sustainable foreign policy. In the two decades that passed since the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq vacillated between being the theatre for the Sunni-Shia divide and finding its footing in the regional dynamics. Initially Iraq's foreign policy was steered towards the former, mainly under the authoritarian tendencies of Nouri al-Maliki's premiership that infused Iraq with sectarianism. Thereafter, successive Iraqi governments have been attempting-rather successfully-to rectify Iraq's foreign policy and channel it towards a more balanced orientation.
Research Interests:
T he way the Arab and Muslim people in the region react to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) reveals the boundaries of the Islamic State (IS) identity formation.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The aim of the CME report is to present and address the main features related to Christians living in the Middle East in regard to religious plularism and peaceful coexistence. The region of focus includes Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel... more
The aim of the CME report is to present and address the main features related to Christians living in the Middle East in regard to religious plularism and peaceful coexistence. The region of focus includes Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Moreover, emphasis is attributed to the relationship between the state and its institutions with the Christian communities, as well as in pinpoiting the factors and effects related to the Christian exodus from the Middle East. The documentation of the report reflects the research openly available on the CME website and serves as a database for the living conditions of the Christians in the Middle East. The CME reports are an ongoing endeavour, aiming at providing continuous updates on the state of religious pluralism for the Christians of the Middle East. The findings presented, therefore, are not exhaustive, but highlight main trends and continuities.
Research Interests:
Syria’s foreign policy has been in a penumbra caused by regional developments and shifts in the international balance of power, which at times granted Damascus with opportunities to promote its interests, while, at other times, deprived... more
Syria’s foreign policy has been in a penumbra caused by regional developments and shifts in the international balance of power, which at times granted Damascus with opportunities to promote its interests, while, at other times, deprived it from room-for-manoeuvre. Simultaneously, distrust was a constant factor in foreign policy formation, which derived from the perception of continuous betrayal from Arab allies especially after the 1973 War, which left Syria alone to strive for the return of the Golan Heights. The elements of mistrust along with the volatility of the regional and international system forced Syria to rely on strong allies in order to promote its interests and retain (or improve) its position in the region. In this sense, Damascus’ foreign policy balanced on a tightrope; a paradoxical state in between not capitulating what was vital for its strategic interests and its prestige and bargaining from a relatively weaker position.
Research Interests:
The objective of the report is addressing the main developments concerning religious pluralism in the Middle East and highlighting the challenges that religious coexistence faces in the region. Building on the findings of the previous... more
The objective of the report is addressing the main developments concerning religious pluralism in the Middle East and highlighting the challenges that religious coexistence faces in the region. Building on the findings of the previous three CRPME reports, the analysis at hand focuses on featuring events and phenomena that have occurred in the past six months. The region covered includes Iraq and Syria, Egypt, Turkey and the Gulf Arab states. Additionally, the analysis of foreign actors’ humanitarian and diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis religious minorities in the Middle East is also part of this study. The documentation work carried out by the CRPME and published on the centre’s website serves as the basis for the report and is an ongoing endeavour, aiming at providing continuous updates on the state of religious pluralism in the Middle East. The findings presented, therefore, are not exhaustive, but highlight main trends and continuities.
Research Interests:
The objective of this report is to highlight the main themes featured in the speeches of the participants of the 2nd Athens International Conference on “Religious and Cultural Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Middle East”, which... more
The objective of this report is to highlight the main themes featured in the speeches of the participants of the 2nd Athens International Conference on “Religious and Cultural Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Middle East”, which took place from 30 to 31 October 2017. The conference aimed at overviewing main features and developments of religious pluralism in the Middle East in the past two years and proposed positive initiatives to promote religious coexistence and pluralism in the region.
Research Interests:
The report is addressing main features and challenges of religious pluralism in the Middle East in the last six months. The region covered is mostly the Middle East including the Arabian Peninsula. Sometimes it may also include countries... more
The report is addressing main features and challenges of religious pluralism in the Middle East in the last six months. The region covered is mostly the Middle East including the Arabian Peninsula. Sometimes it may also include countries of the Maghreb, when there are developments of particular interest. The report is focusing on the great challenges religious pluralism faces in the region but, at the same time, it is highlighting positive state and community initiatives that promote religious co-existence and pluralism. The documentation work leading to the report reflects the research already posted in the Centre’s website, which is being constantly updated with the developments regarding the religious communities in the region. It is, thus, neither exhaustive nor discursive in covering all the relevant events but it focuses on the events that could reveal certain issues, trends, continuities and discontinuities.
Research Interests:
The CRPME report is addressing main features and challenges regarding religious pluralism in the Middle East during the first half of 2018. The region of focus includes the countries of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Saudi... more
The CRPME report is addressing main features and challenges regarding religious pluralism in the Middle East during the first half of 2018. The region of focus includes the countries of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon and the Maghreb region with an added emphasis on each country’s institutional framework. The aim of the report is, on the one hand, to pinpoint the challenges related to religious pluralism in the region. On the other hand, it strives to highlight positive state and community initiatives that promote religious co-existence and pluralism. The documentation work leading to the report reflects the research already published on the CRPME site, which is being constantly updated with the developments regarding the religious communities in the region. It is, thus, neither exhaustive nor discursive in covering all the relevant events but it focuses on the events that could reveal certain issues, trends, continuities and discontinuities.
Research Interests:
Executive Summary Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul... more
Executive Summary
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh.
The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the ‘Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan’ is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic.
The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq.
The research team noted the phenomenon of militarization of the communities, as a result of the aforementioned polarization. With the exception of Zoroastrians and Jews, all the other communities have established military units or militias to fight against ISIS, either on KRG’s side or the central government’s side. Given that these militias do not intend to disband after the ousting of ISIS, they will play an important role in the Erbil-Baghdad rivalry. Meanwhile, the Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities are highly likely to be driven into conflict.
In the case of the Christian community, the religious leadership opposes militarization, as it deems that the protection of Christians is the mandate of the official state authorities. In addition, the religious leadership has been accused of having a ‘passive’ stance, an accusation, which together with its opposition to the arming of Christians, has engendered a rift between the political and the religious leadership.
Particularly vulnerable are the over 2 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraqi Kurdistan, whose population is estimated to be 5 million. The refugees and IDPs seem to be affected by the aid budget reductions, but they are also at risk of drawing the hostility of the host community, who might consider hem passive recipients of governmental assistance.
The return of IDPs is a thorny issue, not only because of the possible revenge attacks, but also due to the total destruction of some regions. The lack of resources and, in some cases, the lack of willingness to reconstruct the regions renders the return of IDPs a point of contention. In this context, the emigration flows are expected to increase significantly, particularly among the Christian and the Yazidi communities.
The cooperation between the communities is rudimentary. The initiatives for dialogue are limited both between the communities and within each community, either because dialogue comes second in the urgency of fighting ISIS or because similar initiatives have failed in the past. In general, the communities seem to promote their interests separately from each other and, at times, at expense of each other, particularly when it comes to the issue of the autonomous zone in the Nineveh region.
Cooperation and dialogue is of significant importance in the context of discussions for the creation of an autonomous zone in the Nineveh region, an idea that is very popular among the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities. Nevertheless, while the majority supports the idea, they seem to lack a clear and common plan vis-a-vis the status of the autonomous zone, whether it will be under the administrative control of KRG or the central government, the role of the international community and the specific arrangements for the coexistence between the different communities.
While the idea of creating an autonomous zone for the religious minorities has an overall positive reception, the scenario of a Sunni autonomous zone is treated with skepticism. Except from some Sunnis, the only other external supporter of this scenario is Turkey. In any case, the odds for such a scenario to materialize are poor, given the suspicion towards the Sunni community.
The notion of distrust and fear of the ‘other’ is rampant, especially against Arab Sunni Muslims and Sunni Muslims in general. Although there is a distinction – at least on a rhetorical level – between the Arab Sunni Muslims who fled and those who stayed and allied themselves with the ‘Islamic State’, the majority does not want to continue living next to Arab Sunni Muslims. Given the lack of a central command over the various armed groups, and the fact that there is no plan to bring those responsible to justice, revenge attacks will probably be inevitable. These acts of revenge may even occur against members of the same community, especially in the case of Turkmen.
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh.
The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the ‘Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan’ is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic.
The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq.
The research team noted the phenomenon of militarization of the communities, as a result of the aforementioned polarization. With the exception of Zoroastrians and Jews, all the other communities have established military units or militias to fight against ISIS, either on KRG’s side or the central government’s side. Given that these militias do not intend to disband after the ousting of ISIS, they will play an important role in the Erbil-Baghdad rivalry. Meanwhile, the Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities are highly likely to be driven into conflict.
In the case of the Christian community, the religious leadership opposes militarization, as it deems that the protection of Christians is the mandate of the official state authorities. In addition, the religious leadership has been accused of having a ‘passive’ stance, an accusation, which together with its opposition to the arming of Christians, has engendered a rift between the political and the religious leadership.
Particularly vulnerable are the over 2 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraqi Kurdistan, whose population is estimated to be 5 million. The refugees and IDPs seem to be affected by the aid budget reductions, but they are also at risk of drawing the hostility of the host community, who might consider hem passive recipients of governmental assistance.
The return of IDPs is a thorny issue, not only because of the possible revenge attacks, but also due to the total destruction of some regions. The lack of resources and, in some cases, the lack of willingness to reconstruct the regions renders the return of IDPs a point of contention. In this context, the emigration flows are expected to increase significantly, particularly among the Christian and the Yazidi communities.
The cooperation between the communities is rudimentary. The initiatives for dialogue are limited both between the communities and within each community, either because dialogue comes second in the urgency of fighting ISIS or because similar initiatives have failed in the past. In general, the communities seem to promote their interests separately from each other and, at times, at expense of each other, particularly when it comes to the issue of the autonomous zone in the Nineveh region.
Cooperation and dialogue is of significant importance in the context of discussions for the creation of an autonomous zone in the Nineveh region, an idea that is very popular among the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities. Nevertheless, while the majority supports the idea, they seem to lack a clear and common plan vis-a-vis the status of the autonomous zone, whether it will be under the administrative control of KRG or the central government, the role of the international community and the specific arrangements for the coexistence between the different communities.
While the idea of creating an autonomous zone for the religious minorities has an overall positive reception, the scenario of a Sunni autonomous zone is treated with skepticism. Except from some Sunnis, the only other external supporter of this scenario is Turkey. In any case, the odds for such a scenario to materialize are poor, given the suspicion towards the Sunni community.
The notion of distrust and fear of the ‘other’ is rampant, especially against Arab Sunni Muslims and Sunni Muslims in general. Although there is a distinction – at least on a rhetorical level – between the Arab Sunni Muslims who fled and those who stayed and allied themselves with the ‘Islamic State’, the majority does not want to continue living next to Arab Sunni Muslims. Given the lack of a central command over the various armed groups, and the fact that there is no plan to bring those responsible to justice, revenge attacks will probably be inevitable. These acts of revenge may even occur against members of the same community, especially in the case of Turkmen.