In: Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds), Burlesque of the Philosophers: Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser, Hamburg Buddhist Studies Series 19, Bochum/Freiburg: projekt verlag,... more
In: Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds), Burlesque of the Philosophers: Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser, Hamburg Buddhist Studies Series 19, Bochum/Freiburg: projekt verlag, 153–200.
Both volumes are in Open Access here:https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/publikationen/hamburg-buddhist-studies.html
In this paper I examine Phya pa’s account of the views regarding argumentation methods that he ascribes to “Candrakīrti, etc.” (sNying po §125.111.3 and §125.111.4) and attempt to identify Phya pa’s source(s). Two features of Phya pa’s portrayal are particularly relevant in this regard: the version of the translation of verses from Candrakīrti’s works cited in the sNying po and the logical notions and technical terms that are part of the opponent’s position.
Both volumes are in Open Access here:https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/publikationen/hamburg-buddhist-studies.html
In this paper I examine Phya pa’s account of the views regarding argumentation methods that he ascribes to “Candrakīrti, etc.” (sNying po §125.111.3 and §125.111.4) and attempt to identify Phya pa’s source(s). Two features of Phya pa’s portrayal are particularly relevant in this regard: the version of the translation of verses from Candrakīrti’s works cited in the sNying po and the logical notions and technical terms that are part of the opponent’s position.
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The accepted manuscript is available here: https://epub.oeaw.ac.at/?arp=0x003e6f50
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The final paper is available at https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3290293&journal_code=JIABS. The text edition is available on Academia under "online resources".
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The final paper is available at https://brill.com/view/journals/saih/3/2/article-p123_1.xml. The twelfth-century Tibetan scholar Gyamarwa Jangchupdrak (rgya dmar ba byang chub grags) is an important link in the Madhyamaka tradition that... more
The final paper is available at https://brill.com/view/journals/saih/3/2/article-p123_1.xml.
The twelfth-century Tibetan scholar Gyamarwa Jangchupdrak (rgya dmar ba byang chub grags) is an important link in the Madhyamaka tradition that stemmed from Ngok Loden Shérap (rngog blo ldan shes rab, 1059–1109). His recently recovered Analysis of the Essence of Madhyamaka offers significant insight into the diverse positions of numerous scholars who took part in the discussion before and around his time, but who are only identified in interlinear notes. In this paper I discuss the identity of these thinkers and the contribution of this text-cum-marginalia to the mapping of early Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars and ideas.
The twelfth-century Tibetan scholar Gyamarwa Jangchupdrak (rgya dmar ba byang chub grags) is an important link in the Madhyamaka tradition that stemmed from Ngok Loden Shérap (rngog blo ldan shes rab, 1059–1109). His recently recovered Analysis of the Essence of Madhyamaka offers significant insight into the diverse positions of numerous scholars who took part in the discussion before and around his time, but who are only identified in interlinear notes. In this paper I discuss the identity of these thinkers and the contribution of this text-cum-marginalia to the mapping of early Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars and ideas.
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This paper investigates the category “Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka,” a division of Madhyamaka characterized by adopting, at the level of conventional reality, a perspective akin to the Vaibhasika philosophical system. While “Yogacara-Madhyamaka”... more
This paper investigates the category “Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka,” a division of Madhyamaka characterized by adopting, at the level of conventional reality, a perspective akin to the Vaibhasika philosophical system. While “Yogacara-Madhyamaka” and “Sautrantika-Madhyamaka” are well-known doxographical categories, the mention of “Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka” is not as frequent in doxographies. This perspective does not seem to have attracted very many supporters. It was, however, adopted by several Tibetan scholars around the twelfth century.
In an earlier paper I discussed the adoption of this perspective by the famous Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and some of his followers, and their refutation of
other options (Hugon 2016). The present paper inquires into a likely source of
influence for Phya pa’s position in the newly recovered works of rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags (12th c.), one of Phya pa’s teachers. I examine in particular a section of rGya dmar ba’s dBu ma’i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa in which the author discusses the perspective to be adopted by Madhyamikas at the level of conventional reality and declares himself a partisan of Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka. This section, supplemented by numerous notes written on the manuscript, introduces us to a fascinating intra-Tibetan debate that involved a number of eleventh- and twelfth-century scholars whose works are no longer extant. To conclude, I address the question of the origin and support for the Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka perspective in Indian literature and reflect on the probable causes for its lack of popularity and its disappearance
from the Tibetan Madhyamaka landscape.
In an earlier paper I discussed the adoption of this perspective by the famous Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and some of his followers, and their refutation of
other options (Hugon 2016). The present paper inquires into a likely source of
influence for Phya pa’s position in the newly recovered works of rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags (12th c.), one of Phya pa’s teachers. I examine in particular a section of rGya dmar ba’s dBu ma’i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa in which the author discusses the perspective to be adopted by Madhyamikas at the level of conventional reality and declares himself a partisan of Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka. This section, supplemented by numerous notes written on the manuscript, introduces us to a fascinating intra-Tibetan debate that involved a number of eleventh- and twelfth-century scholars whose works are no longer extant. To conclude, I address the question of the origin and support for the Vaibhasika-Madhyamaka perspective in Indian literature and reflect on the probable causes for its lack of popularity and its disappearance
from the Tibetan Madhyamaka landscape.
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The final publication is available at medieval worlds via http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/medievalworlds_no12_2020s2
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The final publication is available at medieval worlds via http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/medievalworlds_no11_2020s187 As Buddhism was transmitted to Tibet, a huge number of texts were translated from Sanskrit, Chinese and other Asian... more
The final publication is available at medieval worlds via http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/medievalworlds_no11_2020s187
As Buddhism was transmitted to Tibet, a huge number of texts were translated from Sanskrit, Chinese and other Asian languages into Tibetan. Epistemological treatises composed by In dian Buddhist scholars-works focusing on the nature of »valid cognition« and exploring peripheral issues of philosophy of mind, logic, and language-were, from the very beginning, part of the translated corpus, and had a profound impact on Tibetan intellectual history. This paper looks into the progression of the translation of such works in the two phases of the diffusion of Buddhism to Tibet-the early phase in the seventh to the ninth centuries and the later phase starting in the late tenth century-on the basis of lists of translated works in various catalogues compiled in these two phases and the contents of the section »epistemo logy« of canonical collections (Tenjur). The paper inquires into the prerogatives that directed the choice of works that were translated, the broader or narrower diffusion of existing trans lations, and also highlights preferences regarding which works were studied in particular contexts. I consider in particular the contribution of the famous »Great translator«, Ngok Loden Shérap (rngog blo ldan shes rab, 10591109), who was also a pioneer exegete, and discuss some of the practicalities and methodology in the translation process, touching on the question of terminology and translation style. The paper also reflects on the status of translated works as authentic sources by proxy, and correlatively, on the impact of mistaken translations and the strategies developed to avoid them.
As Buddhism was transmitted to Tibet, a huge number of texts were translated from Sanskrit, Chinese and other Asian languages into Tibetan. Epistemological treatises composed by In dian Buddhist scholars-works focusing on the nature of »valid cognition« and exploring peripheral issues of philosophy of mind, logic, and language-were, from the very beginning, part of the translated corpus, and had a profound impact on Tibetan intellectual history. This paper looks into the progression of the translation of such works in the two phases of the diffusion of Buddhism to Tibet-the early phase in the seventh to the ninth centuries and the later phase starting in the late tenth century-on the basis of lists of translated works in various catalogues compiled in these two phases and the contents of the section »epistemo logy« of canonical collections (Tenjur). The paper inquires into the prerogatives that directed the choice of works that were translated, the broader or narrower diffusion of existing trans lations, and also highlights preferences regarding which works were studied in particular contexts. I consider in particular the contribution of the famous »Great translator«, Ngok Loden Shérap (rngog blo ldan shes rab, 10591109), who was also a pioneer exegete, and discuss some of the practicalities and methodology in the translation process, touching on the question of terminology and translation style. The paper also reflects on the status of translated works as authentic sources by proxy, and correlatively, on the impact of mistaken translations and the strategies developed to avoid them.
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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-language-tibetan/
(First published Wed Feb 2, 2011; substantive revision Wed Mar 18, 2020)
(First published Wed Feb 2, 2011; substantive revision Wed Mar 18, 2020)
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This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Pandita (1182–1251) on the division of arguments by consequence (thal ʾgyur) of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type... more
This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Pandita (1182–1251) on the division of arguments by consequence (thal ʾgyur) of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be shown to derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Pandita’s Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210) (see Hugon, in J Indian Philos 44(5):883–938, 2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Pandita’s discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic
versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Pandita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings.
versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Pandita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings.
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This paper examines the philosophical position adopted by the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) within a fourfold set defined by the options idealism vs. realism and representationalism vs.... more
This paper examines the philosophical position adopted by the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) within a fourfold set defined by the options idealism vs. realism and representationalism vs. non-representationalism. These represent positions pertaining to the conventional level in a Madhyamaka framework. Based on parallel discussions on this topic in four of Phya pa's works (his doxography, his Summary of Madhyamaka, his Summary of Epistemology and his commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya), I examine Phya pa's arguments against three of these views and the tenets involved in the view he himself adopts, non-representational external realism. I discuss to what extent the later description of Phya pa's view in terms of "Vaibhāṣika-Madhyamaka" is substantiated, and the problems raised by the adoption of such a view in the framework of the exegesis of Dharmakīrti's epistemology. In the appendices, I provide an edition and an English translation of the relevant passages from the four texts considered.
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This paper is part of a series of articles on the theory of argumentation proposed by the Tibetan thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), and in particular on his views on argumentation “by consequence” (Tib. thal ʾgyur/thal ba). I... more
This paper is part of a series of articles on the theory of argumentation proposed by the Tibetan thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), and in particular on his views on argumentation “by consequence” (Tib. thal ʾgyur/thal ba). I examine in detail the sections of Phya pa’s epistemological summary and of his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya that deal with the identification and definition of various kinds of consequences: fallacious consequences, genuine consequences and, among the latter, proving consequences and refuting consequences. I highlight the existence of two distinct frameworks in Phya pa’s discussion. In the first, Phya pa exclusively deals with consequences that fulfill a probative function. In the second, more extended framework, he establishes a thirteenfold typology of consequences that also includes consequences that fail to prove the proponent’s thesis but still succeed in refuting the opponent. I examine Phya pa’s criteria for proving consequences, and discuss the specific cases of consequences with a true conclusion and consequences with a true premise. I argue that the juxtaposition of the two frameworks reflects a gradual process of composition in which an earlier model was integrated and updated.
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The paper can be viewed freely at: http://rdcu.be/pCG4.
The final version is available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-014-9244-5
The accepted manuscript version is available here for download.
The final version is available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-014-9244-5
The accepted manuscript version is available here for download.
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The recent publication of the Bka' gdams gsung 'bum collection is opening the way for new research in the field of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology by giving us access to some of the earliest indigenous compositions in the domain. This paper... more
The recent publication of the Bka' gdams gsung 'bum collection is opening the way for new research in the field of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology by giving us access to some of the earliest indigenous compositions in the domain. This paper focuses on one of the two recovered epistemological works by the great scholar and translator Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109): his concise guide to the Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary composed by Dharmottara (8th c.) on Dharmakīrti's (7th c. or earlier) Nyāyabindu. The first part of my paper provides a general introduction to Rngog Blo ldan shes rab's concise guide, which I am in the process of editing and translating. Leaving for the introduction to this forthcoming study the description of the manuscript and a detailed presentation of the contents of the text, I concentrate here on its place within Rngog Blo ldan shes rab's contributions as a translator and exegete and in relation with the spread of Dharmakīrti's works in Tibet. I discuss in particular the circumstances of its composition, its intended function and potential impact. In the second part of the paper I show how such compositions allow shedding light on the emergence of categories that became building blocks for the Tibetan indigenous epistemological system. I illustrate this process for a well-known feature that stands as the trademark of the mainstream system developed by thinkers associated with Gsang phu monastery and the Rngog tradition of epistemology: the fivefold typology of invalid cognitions.
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The published paper can be viewed freely at: http://rdcu.be/m4K0. This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga)... more
The published paper can be viewed freely at: http://rdcu.be/m4K0.
This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic.
This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic.
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This paper examines strategies of informal argumentation at play in the Tshad ma rigs gter, an epistemological work by the famous Tibetan Buddhist scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita. In particular, it considers Sa skya Paṇḍita’s representation and... more
This paper examines strategies of informal argumentation at play in the Tshad ma rigs gter, an epistemological work by the famous Tibetan Buddhist scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita. In particular, it considers Sa skya Paṇḍita’s representation and criticism of two kinds of opponents: inherited opponents (whose views are already criticized in Indian Buddhist epistemological works) and new opponents who are part of the Tibetan cultural and intellectual context. I distinguish several strategical devices applied by the author when dealing with the second group, devices that include resort to ad personam arguments, the creation of a generic “Tibetan” opponent, and the comparison of these Tibetan views with those of inherited opponents. I discuss the pertinence of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s arguments and their intended impact, and point out the need to distinguish the figure of the opponent as represented in a text and the actual addressee of an author’s argument.
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The published paper can be viewed freely at: http://rdcu.be/m4KW. This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition (prameya) in various parts of his works, considering in... more
The published paper can be viewed freely at: http://rdcu.be/m4KW.
This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition (prameya) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya, and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya. It inquires into the relationship between
This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition (prameya) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya, and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya. It inquires into the relationship between
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The published paper can be viewed freely at : http://rdcu.be/m2Ta. This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” (apoha), namely, the charge... more
The published paper can be viewed freely at : http://rdcu.be/m2Ta.
This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” (apoha), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists.
This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” (apoha), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists.
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The published paper can be viewed freely at http://rdcu.be/m2SW. The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) make abundant use of a particular type of argument that I term ‘argument by parallels’. Their main... more
The published paper can be viewed freely at http://rdcu.be/m2SW.
The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) make abundant use of a particular type of argument that I term ‘argument by parallels’. Their main characteristic is that the instigator of the argument, addressing a thesis in a domain A, introduces a parallel thesis in an unrelated domain B. And in the ensuing dialogue, each of the instigator’s statements consists in replicating his interlocutor’s previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in the other domain (A or B). I show that such a dialogue involves two parallel arguments that develop in an intersecting zigzag pattern, and discuss the principles involved in the establishment of the conclusion from the perspective of parity of reasoning and analogical argument. I examine the overall rhetorical strategy directing the use of arguments by parallels and the pedagogical and explanatory functions they can serve. I also evaluate the plausibility of their use in Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s works mirroring a contemporary practice of oral debate, and reflect on the status of such arguments in the framework of Indo-Tibetan logic.
The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) make abundant use of a particular type of argument that I term ‘argument by parallels’. Their main characteristic is that the instigator of the argument, addressing a thesis in a domain A, introduces a parallel thesis in an unrelated domain B. And in the ensuing dialogue, each of the instigator’s statements consists in replicating his interlocutor’s previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in the other domain (A or B). I show that such a dialogue involves two parallel arguments that develop in an intersecting zigzag pattern, and discuss the principles involved in the establishment of the conclusion from the perspective of parity of reasoning and analogical argument. I examine the overall rhetorical strategy directing the use of arguments by parallels and the pedagogical and explanatory functions they can serve. I also evaluate the plausibility of their use in Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s works mirroring a contemporary practice of oral debate, and reflect on the status of such arguments in the framework of Indo-Tibetan logic.
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gTsang nag pa on Similar/Dissimilar Instances and Examples, in The Role of the Example (dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic, Sh. Katsura and E. Steinkellner (eds.), Vienna, 2004: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 58), pp. 53‒90more
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This new volume in the STTAR series follows up the publication of the critical edition of the third chapter of Dharmakīrti’s "Pramāṇaviniścaya" (on argumentation in philosophical debate), which was published in the same series as volume 8... more
This new volume in the STTAR series follows up the publication of the critical edition of the third chapter of Dharmakīrti’s "Pramāṇaviniścaya" (on argumentation in philosophical debate), which was published in the same series as volume 8 (2011). The current volume presents a diplomatic edition of the Sanskrit text of the corresponding chapter in the commentary by Dharmottara (8th c.), the "Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā", based on a Photostat copy of an incomplete palm-leaf manuscript in Proto Bengālī script. The edition is preceded by an introduction that includes a manuscript description, remarks on the Tibetan translation, a structural analysis with references to the "Pramāṇaviniścaya" edition, and indices of names of persons, texts and schools as found in the third chapter of the "Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā".
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The study of Phya pa’s thought and of his key role in the early development of Tibetan scholasticism has been made possible by the recent discovery of eighteen of his works, including his most famous work in the area of logic and... more
The study of Phya pa’s thought and of his key role in the early development of Tibetan scholasticism has been made possible by the recent discovery of eighteen of his works, including his most famous work in the area of logic and epistemology, the "Dispeller of the Mind’s Darkness" (Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel). This monograph contains a critical edition of the portions of Phya pa’s Dispeller devoted to explicating the nature of mental episodes and their objects. It also includes an accessible English translation, thus giving a wider audience direct access to Phya pa’s ideas. The translation and critical edition are preceded by a two-part introduction that examines the contributions of this scholar both from a contemporary philosophical perspective and from the viewpoint of the development of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought. This material is supplemented by an in-depth analysis of Phya pa’s fivefold typology of mental episodes that do not qualify as knowledge. Because the chapter of the Dispeller dealing with mind and its objects presupposes familiarity with many topics that Phya pa discusses elsewhere in the text, a series of appendices are included that provide background information, tables, as well as supplementary textual materials. This study, the joint work of two scholars, one a philosophically oriented Tibetologist and the other a Tibetologically oriented philosopher, will contribute to a deeper understanding of Tibetan intellectual history, while also promoting a wider appreciation of Phya pa’s theory of mind as well as its significance within the global history of philosophy.
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The Sanskrit original of the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya, a fundamental work of Buddhist epistemology and logic by the Indian philosopher Dharmakīrti, who was active in the first half of the 7th century CE, is presented here for... more
The Sanskrit original of the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya, a fundamental work of Buddhist epistemology and logic by the Indian philosopher Dharmakīrti, who was active in the first half of the 7th century CE, is presented here for the first time in the form of a critical edition. The first two chapters of this work, devoted to perception and inference, respectively, have already been edited by Prof. Ernst Steinkellner and appeared in the same series in 2007. In the third and final chapter (parārthānumāna-pariccheda) of his work, Dharmakīrti deals with the subject of argumentation in the context of philosophical debate. The present edition is based on two complete and three incomplete manuscripts that are in the collection of photocopies at the China Tibetology Research Center, Beijing, as well as a single folio from the National Archives, Kathmandu. The introduction explains the editorial conventions, adduces additional information regarding the available sources and their relationships, and discusses in particular the relevance of using the 11th-century Tibetan translation by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab as a testimonium. The appendices include corrections to the Tibetan text, a register of the marginalia, and a list of the verses recording the variants in the Pramāṇavārttika. A detailed synoptic analysis, a bibliography, and indices of names, textual references and verses complete the work.
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This two-volume study on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s (1182-1251) Treasure of Reasoning (Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter) focuses on two topics addressed in this famous work on epistemology (tshad ma): the distinction between two operating modes of... more
This two-volume study on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s (1182-1251) Treasure of Reasoning (Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter) focuses on two topics addressed in this famous work on epistemology (tshad ma): the distinction between two operating modes of cognition, appearance and exclusion, and the rules that support correct inferences. As Sa skya Paṇḍita introduces his work by stating his critical intentions, namely, the rectification of the numerous and widespread erroneous Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s thought, the present study pays particular attention to the various controversies involved. Thanks to the recent re-surfacing of several works by Sa skya Paṇḍita’s predecessors, it has become possible to identify the opponents targeted in the Treasure of Reasoning and to examine their views on the basis of first-hand material. In addition to throwing light on the often complex discussions found in the Treasure of Reasoning, the study of these texts has also allowed for a more precise evaluation of the developments of epistemology in 11th to 13th century Tibet, as well as for a reconsideration of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s place therein.
The first part of volume 1 focuses on the intellectual context of this period, presenting Sa skya Paṇḍita and the key figures who preceded him (rNgog Blo ldan shes rab, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, gTsang nag pa brTson ʼgrus seng ge, mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge), giving also an overview of the texts that have now become available. Several “myths” pertaining to Phya pa are re-evaluated, as are the continuity within the gSang phu tradition of interpretation and Sa skya Paṇḍita’s break therefrom.
The second part of volume 1 provides a detailed analysis of several major issues pertaining to the two above-mentioned topics: the typology of objects and cognitions, the strict divide between the operating modes of conceptual and non-conceptual cognition, the process of concept formation within the framework of the apoha theory (Tib. gzhan sel), and, turning to inference, the nature of the logical reason’s triple characteristic (trairūpya,Tib. tshul gsum) and of the elements involved in it, as well as gTsang nag pa’s idiosyncratic theory of the modes of inference.
The second volume contains an edition and translation into French, with explanatory notes, of the fourth chapter and a portion of the tenth chapter of the Treasure of Reasoning, in which Sa skya Paṇḍita expounds on these themes. The appendices to this volume include the passages relevant to the understanding of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s opponents on these topics, a Tibetan-Sanskrit-French lexicon of technical terms, as well as several indices.
The first part of volume 1 focuses on the intellectual context of this period, presenting Sa skya Paṇḍita and the key figures who preceded him (rNgog Blo ldan shes rab, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, gTsang nag pa brTson ʼgrus seng ge, mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge), giving also an overview of the texts that have now become available. Several “myths” pertaining to Phya pa are re-evaluated, as are the continuity within the gSang phu tradition of interpretation and Sa skya Paṇḍita’s break therefrom.
The second part of volume 1 provides a detailed analysis of several major issues pertaining to the two above-mentioned topics: the typology of objects and cognitions, the strict divide between the operating modes of conceptual and non-conceptual cognition, the process of concept formation within the framework of the apoha theory (Tib. gzhan sel), and, turning to inference, the nature of the logical reason’s triple characteristic (trairūpya,Tib. tshul gsum) and of the elements involved in it, as well as gTsang nag pa’s idiosyncratic theory of the modes of inference.
The second volume contains an edition and translation into French, with explanatory notes, of the fourth chapter and a portion of the tenth chapter of the Treasure of Reasoning, in which Sa skya Paṇḍita expounds on these themes. The appendices to this volume include the passages relevant to the understanding of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s opponents on these topics, a Tibetan-Sanskrit-French lexicon of technical terms, as well as several indices.
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Le rTags kyi rnam gzhag rigs lam gsal baʼi sgron me de Glo bo mkhan chen bSod nams lhun grub. Un manuel tibétain dʼintroduction à la logique. Édition et traduction annotée. Vienna, 2002: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 55).more
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Research Interests: Tibetan History and Numen
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The ERC-funded project TibSchol - The dawn of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism (11th-13th c.) (Cog 101001002) - hosted at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences will be the first... more
The ERC-funded project TibSchol - The dawn of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism (11th-13th c.) (Cog 101001002) - hosted at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences will be the first wide-ranging exploration of the formative phase of the Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition. Its ground-breaking study of an exceptionally active period of Tibetan scholarly creativity will integrate Tibetan thinkers into world intellectual history and the global history of philosophy.
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A summarized presentation of HTR tools in the framework of the ERC project TibSchol – “The Dawn of Tibetan Buddhist Scholasticism (11th-13th c.) (H2020-Cog-101001002).
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Presented here is the collated edition of the passage of Phya pa's discussion on the invalidating argument in the proof of momentariness that is translated and discussed in Pascale Hugon & Kyeongjin Choi, "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on the... more
Presented here is the collated edition of the passage of Phya pa's discussion on the invalidating argument in the proof of momentariness that is translated and discussed in Pascale Hugon & Kyeongjin Choi, "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on the Invalidating Argument in the Proof of Momentariness," JIABS 44 (2021), 209-274
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Table of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's dBu ma bden pa gnyis kyi don bsdus pa Version 3.0 (2020) by Pascale Hugon The table below represents the hierarchical organization applied to Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti by Phya pa Chos kyi... more
Table of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's dBu ma bden pa gnyis kyi don bsdus pa Version 3.0 (2020) by Pascale Hugon The table below represents the hierarchical organization applied to Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge in his synoptic table (don bsdus). The sa bcad titles from Phya pa's dBu ma bden pa gnyis kyi don bsdus pa and the pratīkas (column 2) follow the version of the text published in the bKa' gdams gsung ʼbum phyogs bsgrigs thengs dang po, dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib ʼjug khang (ed.), Chengdu, 2006, vol. 6, pp. 251-257. The references in the third column follow the numbering of the kārikās (in green) and intermediated verses (in blue) given in Malcolm David Eckel, Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths-An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy, Delhi, 1992: Motilal Banarsidass [1st edition : State University of New York, 1987]; variant readings indicated in this column refer to Eckel's edition. The fourth column gives the folio and line number in the manuscript of Phya pa's commentary on the Satyadvayavibhaṅga published in the bKa' gdams gsung ʼbum phyogs bsgrigs thengs dang po, dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib ʼjug khang (ed.), Chengdu, 2006, vol. 6, pp. 185-250. Orange indicates that the sa bcad is found in Phya pa's commentary with the exact same wording; green that it is found with a somewhat modified wording; black references indicate corresponding passages that are not introduced by a sa bcad title in the commentary.