My primary research interests include environmental ethics, procreative ethics, and epistemology. I have secondary research interests in other areas of applied ethics and in philosophy of religion. Address: 4202 E. Fowler Ave FAO 226 Tampa, FL 33620
Many environmental philosophers have argued that there is an obligation for individuals to reduce... more Many environmental philosophers have argued that there is an obligation for individuals to reduce their individual carbon footprints. However, few of them have addressed whether this obligation would entail a corresponding duty to limit one’s family size. In this paper, I examine several reasons that one might view procreative acts as an exception to a more general duty to reduce one’s individual greenhouse gas emissions. I conclude that none of these reasons are convincing. Thus, if there is an obligation to reduce one’s unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions, then people should also limit the size of their families when they have the means to do so.
In my contribution to this symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence, I chal... more In my contribution to this symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence, I challenge her claim that true beliefs are not valuable for their own sake. I argue that positing that true beliefs have at least some non-instrumental value better explains our attitudes toward the pursuit of truth than her alternative view. McCormick offers a response in the next segment of the symposium. The full symposium can be viewed at https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/believing-against-the-evidence/
John Nolt’s “Hope, Self-Transcendence, and Environmental Ethics” is a unique attempt to defend a ... more John Nolt’s “Hope, Self-Transcendence, and Environmental Ethics” is a unique attempt to defend a partial biocentrism – the view that we should regard a significant portion of non-sentient life (as well as sentient life) as having direct moral standing. After defending a general duty to optimize human hope, Nolt argues that this duty requires us to become self-transcendent toward living things in nature. Self-transcendence refers to an intentional state of valuing the good of some object other than yourself as an end. Thus, though Nolt begins from an anthropocentric starting point, his argument reaches a conclusion that biocentrists should find palatable (though some may feel it does not go far enough, since it does not grant direct moral standing to all life). Although Nolt’s argument is novel and thought-provoking, I contend that it is nevertheless unsuccessful because it cannot overcome three significant difficulties. First, it is not clear that self-transcendence toward living things in nature would actually optimize hope. Second, the general duty to optimize hope does not entail an individual duty to seek self-transcendence toward living things in nature. Third, the value of the hope attained by achieving self-transcendence toward non-sentient life seems astronomically minute compared to the hope attained by achieving self-transcendence toward sentient life and especially toward human life. In light of these difficulties, I conclude the essay by arguing that self-transcendence is best directed only toward sentient living things.
In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal e... more In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal ethics. One focuses on the morally relevant capacities that animals possess. The other is the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI): the claim that we have duties to assist domesticated animals but should (at least generally) leave wild animals alone. In this paper, I critique the arguments that Palmer offers in favour of the No-Contact LFI - the view that we have (prima facie) duties not to harm wild animals but no duties to assist them. I argue that Palmer's endorsement of the No-Contact LFI is unwarranted. Her arguments actually provide strong reasons to endorse what I call the Gradient View - a position that posits weak presumptive duties to assist wild animals that become stronger as our relations with the animals grow stronger.
The Asymmetry in procreative ethics consists of two claims. The first is that it is morally wrong... more The Asymmetry in procreative ethics consists of two claims. The first is that it is morally wrong to bring into existence a child who will have an abjectly miserable life; the second is that it is permissible not to bring into existence a child who will enjoy a very happy life. In this paper, I distinguish between two variations of the Asymmetry. The first is the Abstract Asymmetry, the idealized variation of the Asymmetry that many philosophers have been trying to solve. The second is the Real-World Asymmetry, a non-idealized variation that applies explicitly to cases of ordinary human reproduction. I argue that the Real-World Asymmetry can be defended by properly acknowledging the general wrongness of causing someone else to suffer, the limits of what morality can reasonably demand of us, and the significance of respecting women’s autonomy. I then argue that the Abstract Asymmetry is indefensible.
In this paper, I appeal to the concept of integrity to ground a fairly strong prima facie moral d... more In this paper, I appeal to the concept of integrity to ground a fairly strong prima facie moral duty to reduce individual GHG emissions. After presenting this argument and supporting each of its premises, I defend it from two major lines of objection: skepticism about integrity’s status as a virtue and concerns that the argument implies a position that is too demanding. I then consider the role that an appeal to integrity could play in galvanizing the American public to take personal and political action regarding climate change.
This paper addresses the plausibility of practical apatheism: an attitude of apathy or indifferen... more This paper addresses the plausibility of practical apatheism: an attitude of apathy or indifference about philosophical questions pertaining to God’s existence grounded in the belief that they lack practical significance. Since apatheism is rarely discussed, we begin by clarifying the position and explaining how it differs from some of the other positions one may take with regard to the existence of God. Afterward, we examine six distinct objections to practical apatheism. Each of these objections posits a different reason for thinking that belief in God is practically significant. Five of these objections prove unsuccessful. The sixth, which appeals to the practical significance of belief in God with respect to our fates in the afterlife, is more promising but nonetheless encounters significant obstacles. Since the success of this objection is controversial, whether we have good grounds to reject practical apatheism should be similarly controversial, and the view should be given further examination.
An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to speci... more An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to specially vulnerable populations in ways that take advantage of their vulnerabilities. In his signature article “Marketing and the Vulnerable,” George Brenkert (1998) provided the first substantive defense of this position, one which has become a well-established view in marketing ethics. In what follows, we throw new light on marketing to the vulnerable by critically evaluating key components of Brenkert’s general arguments. Specifically, we contend that Brenkert has failed to offer us any persuasive reasons to think that it is immoral to market to the vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability. Although Brenkert does highlight the fact that the specially vulnerable are at greater risk for being harmed by already immoral marketing practices (e.g., deception, manipulation), he fails to establish that the specially vulnerable are a unique moral category of market clients or that there are special moral standards that apply to them. Moreover, even if Brenkert’s position were theoretically defensible, the practical implications of his position are far less tenable than he suggests. If our criticisms are sound, then Brenkert and others who endorse his position are seriously mistaken regarding how one can permissibly market products to vulnerable populations and, in addition, they have improperly categorized certain morally permissible marketing practices as being immoral.
An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to speci... more An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to specially vulnerable populations in ways that take advantage of their vulnerabilities. In his signature article “Marketing and the Vulnerable,” George Brenkert (1998) provided the first substantive defense of this position, one which has become a well-established view in marketing ethics. In what follows, we throw new light on marketing to the vulnerable by critically evaluating key components of Brenkert’s general arguments. Specifically, we contend that Brenkert has failed to offer us any persuasive reasons to think that it is immoral to market to the vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability. Although Brenkert does highlight the fact that the specially vulnerable are at greater risk for being harmed by already immoral marketing practices (e.g., deception, manipulation), he fails to establish that the specially vulnerable are a unique moral category of market clients or that there are special moral standards that apply to them. Moreover, even if Brenkert’s position were theoretically defensible, the practical implications of his position are far less tenable than he suggests. If our criticisms are sound, then Brenkert and others who endorse his position are seriously mistaken regarding how one can permissibly market products to vulnerable populations and, in addition, they have improperly categorized certain morally permissible marketing practices as being immoral.
This empirically rigorous textbook serves as an introduction to food ethics and an overview of th... more This empirically rigorous textbook serves as an introduction to food ethics and an overview of the major issues currently discussed in this emerging subfield of environmental ethics. While the book may be too dense in places for introductory-level undergraduates, it is nonetheless a welcome addition to the scholarship in this area, since textbooks focusing specifically on food ethics remain relatively rare.
Environmental Ethics and Behavioral Change is a unique text that weaves together subject in ethic... more Environmental Ethics and Behavioral Change is a unique text that weaves together subject in ethics, moral psychology, and political philosophy to explore the ways in which people can be motivated to behave in more environmentally sustainable ways. In this review, I offer a short synopsis of the book and appraise its usefulness for teaching courses in environmental ethics and related areas.
In this review of Travis Reider's Toward a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Cha... more In this review of Travis Reider's Toward a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Change Are Affecting the Morality of Procreation, I provide an overview of this short book and highlight some areas where I think Reider's arguments could be challenged or expanded. Overall, despite its short length, I consider the book to be an important contribution to the ethics of procreation.
This paper is a book review of John Nolt's (2015) Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Intr... more This paper is a book review of John Nolt's (2015) Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Introduction. After reviewing the book's content and assessing its many pedagogical merits, I raise some criticisms of the arguments made in the book's final chapters.
This paper is a book review of Sarah Conly's (2016) One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More? B... more This paper is a book review of Sarah Conly's (2016) One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More? Beyond summarizing the book's main claims, I also offer some appraisal's of the book's main arguments and gesture at some issues that the book does not adequately address.
Routledge Explorations in Environmental Studies, 2020
This book examines the link between population growth and environmental impact and explores the i... more This book examines the link between population growth and environmental impact and explores the implications of this connection for the ethics of procreation.
In light of climate change, species extinctions, and other looming environmental crises, Trevor Hedberg argues that we have a collective moral duty to halt population growth to prevent environmental harms from escalating. This book assesses a variety of policies that could help us meet this moral duty, confronts the conflict between protecting the welfare of future people and upholding procreative freedom, evaluates the ethical dimensions of individual procreative decisions, and sketches the implications of population growth for issues like abortion and immigration. It is not a book of tidy solutions: Hedberg highlights some scenarios where nothing we can do will enable us to avoid treating some people unjustly. In such scenarios, the overall objective is to determine which of our available options will minimize the injustice that occurs.
This book will be of great interest to those studying environmental ethics, environmental policy, climate change, sustainability, and population policy.
*SEEKING PEOPLE TO COMPLETE THIS BOOK*
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broke... more *SEEKING PEOPLE TO COMPLETE THIS BOOK*
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in their classes: they will learn more, have more enjoyable and rewarding class experiences, impress their professors with their involvement and quality work and, perhaps most importantly, get better grades. College is an opportunity that can open the door to greater opportunities, and the more you make of your opportunities in college, the greater your chances for success beyond college, in many ways. Following these rules below will increase your likelihood of success, in many ways. Below is first a list of rules, and below that list is a discussion of each rule. When any rule seems obvious, consider it a good reminder of what you should do. If any rule is new to you, think about how you can integrate into your practices as a student. And since a basic rule of college is to think critically, if you think some rule is a bad one, let us know why: you may be right! With this all in mind, let us turn to the rules and the discussion of them.
20 TIPS FOR BECOMING A BETTER UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT
Many undergraduate students perform below their potential in college courses, and even those who perform well often do so in very inefficient ways, usually by studying excessively and limiting their engagement in other activities. While some students simply lack the discipline to do what conventional wisdom suggests they ought to do (e.g., attending class frequently, avoiding allnighters), some so-called conventional wisdom is actually misguided, and students’ adherence to it actually hinders their ability to develop optimal study habits. This list is my attempt, based on my experiences as an undergraduate student and as a teacher of undergraduate students, to help current undergrads develop better study habits, achieve higher grades in their courses, and have a more fulfilling educational experience in the process. A few tips are reiterations of messages that students have probably heard before, but many are not as widely known. And some of them even oppose traditional study norms. Tips 1-10 represent the advice that largely aligns with common sense, and most of this advice will be familiar to most readers (although some of these tips are rarely followed). Tips 11-20, in contrast, tend to either conflict with common sense, or – despite their intuitive plausibility – to be rather unknown to most students. I follow each tip with an explanation of how students (generally) will benefit from following it.
Many environmental philosophers have argued that there is an obligation for individuals to reduce... more Many environmental philosophers have argued that there is an obligation for individuals to reduce their individual carbon footprints. However, few of them have addressed whether this obligation would entail a corresponding duty to limit one’s family size. In this paper, I examine several reasons that one might view procreative acts as an exception to a more general duty to reduce one’s individual greenhouse gas emissions. I conclude that none of these reasons are convincing. Thus, if there is an obligation to reduce one’s unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions, then people should also limit the size of their families when they have the means to do so.
In my contribution to this symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence, I chal... more In my contribution to this symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence, I challenge her claim that true beliefs are not valuable for their own sake. I argue that positing that true beliefs have at least some non-instrumental value better explains our attitudes toward the pursuit of truth than her alternative view. McCormick offers a response in the next segment of the symposium. The full symposium can be viewed at https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/believing-against-the-evidence/
John Nolt’s “Hope, Self-Transcendence, and Environmental Ethics” is a unique attempt to defend a ... more John Nolt’s “Hope, Self-Transcendence, and Environmental Ethics” is a unique attempt to defend a partial biocentrism – the view that we should regard a significant portion of non-sentient life (as well as sentient life) as having direct moral standing. After defending a general duty to optimize human hope, Nolt argues that this duty requires us to become self-transcendent toward living things in nature. Self-transcendence refers to an intentional state of valuing the good of some object other than yourself as an end. Thus, though Nolt begins from an anthropocentric starting point, his argument reaches a conclusion that biocentrists should find palatable (though some may feel it does not go far enough, since it does not grant direct moral standing to all life). Although Nolt’s argument is novel and thought-provoking, I contend that it is nevertheless unsuccessful because it cannot overcome three significant difficulties. First, it is not clear that self-transcendence toward living things in nature would actually optimize hope. Second, the general duty to optimize hope does not entail an individual duty to seek self-transcendence toward living things in nature. Third, the value of the hope attained by achieving self-transcendence toward non-sentient life seems astronomically minute compared to the hope attained by achieving self-transcendence toward sentient life and especially toward human life. In light of these difficulties, I conclude the essay by arguing that self-transcendence is best directed only toward sentient living things.
In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal e... more In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal ethics. One focuses on the morally relevant capacities that animals possess. The other is the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI): the claim that we have duties to assist domesticated animals but should (at least generally) leave wild animals alone. In this paper, I critique the arguments that Palmer offers in favour of the No-Contact LFI - the view that we have (prima facie) duties not to harm wild animals but no duties to assist them. I argue that Palmer's endorsement of the No-Contact LFI is unwarranted. Her arguments actually provide strong reasons to endorse what I call the Gradient View - a position that posits weak presumptive duties to assist wild animals that become stronger as our relations with the animals grow stronger.
The Asymmetry in procreative ethics consists of two claims. The first is that it is morally wrong... more The Asymmetry in procreative ethics consists of two claims. The first is that it is morally wrong to bring into existence a child who will have an abjectly miserable life; the second is that it is permissible not to bring into existence a child who will enjoy a very happy life. In this paper, I distinguish between two variations of the Asymmetry. The first is the Abstract Asymmetry, the idealized variation of the Asymmetry that many philosophers have been trying to solve. The second is the Real-World Asymmetry, a non-idealized variation that applies explicitly to cases of ordinary human reproduction. I argue that the Real-World Asymmetry can be defended by properly acknowledging the general wrongness of causing someone else to suffer, the limits of what morality can reasonably demand of us, and the significance of respecting women’s autonomy. I then argue that the Abstract Asymmetry is indefensible.
In this paper, I appeal to the concept of integrity to ground a fairly strong prima facie moral d... more In this paper, I appeal to the concept of integrity to ground a fairly strong prima facie moral duty to reduce individual GHG emissions. After presenting this argument and supporting each of its premises, I defend it from two major lines of objection: skepticism about integrity’s status as a virtue and concerns that the argument implies a position that is too demanding. I then consider the role that an appeal to integrity could play in galvanizing the American public to take personal and political action regarding climate change.
This paper addresses the plausibility of practical apatheism: an attitude of apathy or indifferen... more This paper addresses the plausibility of practical apatheism: an attitude of apathy or indifference about philosophical questions pertaining to God’s existence grounded in the belief that they lack practical significance. Since apatheism is rarely discussed, we begin by clarifying the position and explaining how it differs from some of the other positions one may take with regard to the existence of God. Afterward, we examine six distinct objections to practical apatheism. Each of these objections posits a different reason for thinking that belief in God is practically significant. Five of these objections prove unsuccessful. The sixth, which appeals to the practical significance of belief in God with respect to our fates in the afterlife, is more promising but nonetheless encounters significant obstacles. Since the success of this objection is controversial, whether we have good grounds to reject practical apatheism should be similarly controversial, and the view should be given further examination.
An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to speci... more An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to specially vulnerable populations in ways that take advantage of their vulnerabilities. In his signature article “Marketing and the Vulnerable,” George Brenkert (1998) provided the first substantive defense of this position, one which has become a well-established view in marketing ethics. In what follows, we throw new light on marketing to the vulnerable by critically evaluating key components of Brenkert’s general arguments. Specifically, we contend that Brenkert has failed to offer us any persuasive reasons to think that it is immoral to market to the vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability. Although Brenkert does highlight the fact that the specially vulnerable are at greater risk for being harmed by already immoral marketing practices (e.g., deception, manipulation), he fails to establish that the specially vulnerable are a unique moral category of market clients or that there are special moral standards that apply to them. Moreover, even if Brenkert’s position were theoretically defensible, the practical implications of his position are far less tenable than he suggests. If our criticisms are sound, then Brenkert and others who endorse his position are seriously mistaken regarding how one can permissibly market products to vulnerable populations and, in addition, they have improperly categorized certain morally permissible marketing practices as being immoral.
An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to speci... more An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to specially vulnerable populations in ways that take advantage of their vulnerabilities. In his signature article “Marketing and the Vulnerable,” George Brenkert (1998) provided the first substantive defense of this position, one which has become a well-established view in marketing ethics. In what follows, we throw new light on marketing to the vulnerable by critically evaluating key components of Brenkert’s general arguments. Specifically, we contend that Brenkert has failed to offer us any persuasive reasons to think that it is immoral to market to the vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability. Although Brenkert does highlight the fact that the specially vulnerable are at greater risk for being harmed by already immoral marketing practices (e.g., deception, manipulation), he fails to establish that the specially vulnerable are a unique moral category of market clients or that there are special moral standards that apply to them. Moreover, even if Brenkert’s position were theoretically defensible, the practical implications of his position are far less tenable than he suggests. If our criticisms are sound, then Brenkert and others who endorse his position are seriously mistaken regarding how one can permissibly market products to vulnerable populations and, in addition, they have improperly categorized certain morally permissible marketing practices as being immoral.
This empirically rigorous textbook serves as an introduction to food ethics and an overview of th... more This empirically rigorous textbook serves as an introduction to food ethics and an overview of the major issues currently discussed in this emerging subfield of environmental ethics. While the book may be too dense in places for introductory-level undergraduates, it is nonetheless a welcome addition to the scholarship in this area, since textbooks focusing specifically on food ethics remain relatively rare.
Environmental Ethics and Behavioral Change is a unique text that weaves together subject in ethic... more Environmental Ethics and Behavioral Change is a unique text that weaves together subject in ethics, moral psychology, and political philosophy to explore the ways in which people can be motivated to behave in more environmentally sustainable ways. In this review, I offer a short synopsis of the book and appraise its usefulness for teaching courses in environmental ethics and related areas.
In this review of Travis Reider's Toward a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Cha... more In this review of Travis Reider's Toward a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Change Are Affecting the Morality of Procreation, I provide an overview of this short book and highlight some areas where I think Reider's arguments could be challenged or expanded. Overall, despite its short length, I consider the book to be an important contribution to the ethics of procreation.
This paper is a book review of John Nolt's (2015) Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Intr... more This paper is a book review of John Nolt's (2015) Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Introduction. After reviewing the book's content and assessing its many pedagogical merits, I raise some criticisms of the arguments made in the book's final chapters.
This paper is a book review of Sarah Conly's (2016) One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More? B... more This paper is a book review of Sarah Conly's (2016) One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More? Beyond summarizing the book's main claims, I also offer some appraisal's of the book's main arguments and gesture at some issues that the book does not adequately address.
Routledge Explorations in Environmental Studies, 2020
This book examines the link between population growth and environmental impact and explores the i... more This book examines the link between population growth and environmental impact and explores the implications of this connection for the ethics of procreation.
In light of climate change, species extinctions, and other looming environmental crises, Trevor Hedberg argues that we have a collective moral duty to halt population growth to prevent environmental harms from escalating. This book assesses a variety of policies that could help us meet this moral duty, confronts the conflict between protecting the welfare of future people and upholding procreative freedom, evaluates the ethical dimensions of individual procreative decisions, and sketches the implications of population growth for issues like abortion and immigration. It is not a book of tidy solutions: Hedberg highlights some scenarios where nothing we can do will enable us to avoid treating some people unjustly. In such scenarios, the overall objective is to determine which of our available options will minimize the injustice that occurs.
This book will be of great interest to those studying environmental ethics, environmental policy, climate change, sustainability, and population policy.
*SEEKING PEOPLE TO COMPLETE THIS BOOK*
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broke... more *SEEKING PEOPLE TO COMPLETE THIS BOOK*
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in their classes: they will learn more, have more enjoyable and rewarding class experiences, impress their professors with their involvement and quality work and, perhaps most importantly, get better grades. College is an opportunity that can open the door to greater opportunities, and the more you make of your opportunities in college, the greater your chances for success beyond college, in many ways. Following these rules below will increase your likelihood of success, in many ways. Below is first a list of rules, and below that list is a discussion of each rule. When any rule seems obvious, consider it a good reminder of what you should do. If any rule is new to you, think about how you can integrate into your practices as a student. And since a basic rule of college is to think critically, if you think some rule is a bad one, let us know why: you may be right! With this all in mind, let us turn to the rules and the discussion of them.
20 TIPS FOR BECOMING A BETTER UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT
Many undergraduate students perform below their potential in college courses, and even those who perform well often do so in very inefficient ways, usually by studying excessively and limiting their engagement in other activities. While some students simply lack the discipline to do what conventional wisdom suggests they ought to do (e.g., attending class frequently, avoiding allnighters), some so-called conventional wisdom is actually misguided, and students’ adherence to it actually hinders their ability to develop optimal study habits. This list is my attempt, based on my experiences as an undergraduate student and as a teacher of undergraduate students, to help current undergrads develop better study habits, achieve higher grades in their courses, and have a more fulfilling educational experience in the process. A few tips are reiterations of messages that students have probably heard before, but many are not as widely known. And some of them even oppose traditional study norms. Tips 1-10 represent the advice that largely aligns with common sense, and most of this advice will be familiar to most readers (although some of these tips are rarely followed). Tips 11-20, in contrast, tend to either conflict with common sense, or – despite their intuitive plausibility – to be rather unknown to most students. I follow each tip with an explanation of how students (generally) will benefit from following it.
Uploads
Papers by Trevor Hedberg
a corresponding duty to limit one’s family size. In this paper, I examine several reasons that one might view procreative acts as an exception to a more general duty to reduce one’s individual greenhouse gas
emissions. I conclude that none of these reasons are convincing. Thus, if there is an obligation to reduce one’s unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions, then people should also limit the size of their families when
they have the means to do so.
Book Reviews by Trevor Hedberg
Books by Trevor Hedberg
In light of climate change, species extinctions, and other looming environmental crises, Trevor Hedberg argues that we have a collective moral duty to halt population growth to prevent environmental harms from escalating. This book assesses a variety of policies that could help us meet this moral duty, confronts the conflict between protecting the welfare of future people and upholding procreative freedom, evaluates the ethical dimensions of individual procreative decisions, and sketches the implications of population growth for issues like abortion and immigration. It is not a book of tidy solutions: Hedberg highlights some scenarios where nothing we can do will enable us to avoid treating some people unjustly. In such scenarios, the overall objective is to determine which of our available options will minimize the injustice that occurs.
This book will be of great interest to those studying environmental ethics, environmental policy, climate change, sustainability, and population policy.
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in their classes: they will learn more, have more enjoyable and rewarding class experiences, impress their professors with their involvement and quality work and, perhaps most importantly, get better grades.
College is an opportunity that can open the door to greater opportunities, and the more you make of your opportunities in college, the greater your chances for success beyond college, in many ways. Following these rules below will increase your likelihood of success, in many ways.
Below is first a list of rules, and below that list is a discussion of each rule. When any rule seems obvious, consider it a good reminder of what you should do. If any rule is new to you, think about how you can integrate into your practices as a student. And since a basic rule of college is to think critically, if you think some rule is a bad one, let us know why: you may be right!
With this all in mind, let us turn to the rules and the discussion of them.
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
Philosophy, Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Nathan.Nobis@Gmail.com
www.NathanNobis.com
20 TIPS FOR BECOMING A
BETTER UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT
Many undergraduate students perform below their potential in college courses, and even those who perform well often do so in very inefficient ways, usually by studying excessively and limiting their engagement in other activities. While some students simply lack the discipline to do what conventional wisdom suggests they ought to do (e.g., attending class frequently, avoiding allnighters), some so-called conventional wisdom is actually misguided, and students’ adherence to it actually hinders their ability to develop optimal study habits.
This list is my attempt, based on my experiences as an undergraduate student and as a teacher of undergraduate students, to help current undergrads develop better study habits, achieve higher grades in their courses, and have a more fulfilling educational experience in the process. A few tips are reiterations of messages that students have probably heard before, but many are not as widely known. And some of them even oppose traditional study norms. Tips 1-10 represent the advice that largely aligns with common sense, and most of this advice will be familiar to most readers (although some of these tips are rarely followed). Tips 11-20, in contrast, tend to either conflict with common sense, or – despite their intuitive plausibility – to be rather unknown to most students. I follow each tip with an explanation of how students (generally) will benefit from following it.
Trevor Hedberg
http://www.trevorhedberg.com/
trevor.hedberg@gmail.com
a corresponding duty to limit one’s family size. In this paper, I examine several reasons that one might view procreative acts as an exception to a more general duty to reduce one’s individual greenhouse gas
emissions. I conclude that none of these reasons are convincing. Thus, if there is an obligation to reduce one’s unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions, then people should also limit the size of their families when
they have the means to do so.
In light of climate change, species extinctions, and other looming environmental crises, Trevor Hedberg argues that we have a collective moral duty to halt population growth to prevent environmental harms from escalating. This book assesses a variety of policies that could help us meet this moral duty, confronts the conflict between protecting the welfare of future people and upholding procreative freedom, evaluates the ethical dimensions of individual procreative decisions, and sketches the implications of population growth for issues like abortion and immigration. It is not a book of tidy solutions: Hedberg highlights some scenarios where nothing we can do will enable us to avoid treating some people unjustly. In such scenarios, the overall objective is to determine which of our available options will minimize the injustice that occurs.
This book will be of great interest to those studying environmental ethics, environmental policy, climate change, sustainability, and population policy.
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in their classes: they will learn more, have more enjoyable and rewarding class experiences, impress their professors with their involvement and quality work and, perhaps most importantly, get better grades.
College is an opportunity that can open the door to greater opportunities, and the more you make of your opportunities in college, the greater your chances for success beyond college, in many ways. Following these rules below will increase your likelihood of success, in many ways.
Below is first a list of rules, and below that list is a discussion of each rule. When any rule seems obvious, consider it a good reminder of what you should do. If any rule is new to you, think about how you can integrate into your practices as a student. And since a basic rule of college is to think critically, if you think some rule is a bad one, let us know why: you may be right!
With this all in mind, let us turn to the rules and the discussion of them.
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
Philosophy, Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Nathan.Nobis@Gmail.com
www.NathanNobis.com
20 TIPS FOR BECOMING A
BETTER UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT
Many undergraduate students perform below their potential in college courses, and even those who perform well often do so in very inefficient ways, usually by studying excessively and limiting their engagement in other activities. While some students simply lack the discipline to do what conventional wisdom suggests they ought to do (e.g., attending class frequently, avoiding allnighters), some so-called conventional wisdom is actually misguided, and students’ adherence to it actually hinders their ability to develop optimal study habits.
This list is my attempt, based on my experiences as an undergraduate student and as a teacher of undergraduate students, to help current undergrads develop better study habits, achieve higher grades in their courses, and have a more fulfilling educational experience in the process. A few tips are reiterations of messages that students have probably heard before, but many are not as widely known. And some of them even oppose traditional study norms. Tips 1-10 represent the advice that largely aligns with common sense, and most of this advice will be familiar to most readers (although some of these tips are rarely followed). Tips 11-20, in contrast, tend to either conflict with common sense, or – despite their intuitive plausibility – to be rather unknown to most students. I follow each tip with an explanation of how students (generally) will benefit from following it.
Trevor Hedberg
http://www.trevorhedberg.com/
trevor.hedberg@gmail.com