- www.NathanNobis.com
- 404-825-1740
Nathan Nobis
Morehouse College, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Ethics, Medical Ethics, and 42 morePhilosophy Of Religion, Epistemology, Critical Thinking, Animal Ethics, Public Health, Moral Philosophy, Bioethics, Analytic Philosophy, Meta-Ethics, Research Ethics, Biology Education, Vegetarianism, Political Philosophy, African Philosophy, Psychology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Psychology, Animal Studies, Applied Philosophy, Environmental Philosophy, Feminist Ethics, Family Law, Shared Parenting, Animal Rights/Liberation, Animal Rights, Veganism, Animal Agriculture, Abolitionist Animal Rights, Matthew C. Halteman, Halteman, Animal Use, Philosophy Of Race, Philosophical Counseling, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy, REBT, CBT, David Benatar, Food ethics, Abortion, and Moral Statusedit
- I'm a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA USA. My main philosophical interests are in ethics. I... moreI'm a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA USA. My main philosophical interests are in ethics. I'm also an Editor at 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology: www.1000WordPhilosophy.com ; www.NathanNobis.comedit
What is torture? In 2002 the media began to carry stories that U.S. military officers were engaging in torturing a large number of prisoners at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. At first, the American government denied that torture methods... more
What is torture?
In 2002 the media began to carry stories that U.S. military officers were engaging in torturing a
large number of prisoners at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. At first, the American government
denied that torture methods were being used, but soon they had to admit that some torture was used as
“an enhanced interrogation technique” to obtain information in the war on terrorism (Fletcher et al.,
2008:4). In 2004, The Justice Department advised the White House that torture “may be justified” for
interrogations conducted in the war on terrorism
In 2002 the media began to carry stories that U.S. military officers were engaging in torturing a
large number of prisoners at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. At first, the American government
denied that torture methods were being used, but soon they had to admit that some torture was used as
“an enhanced interrogation technique” to obtain information in the war on terrorism (Fletcher et al.,
2008:4). In 2004, The Justice Department advised the White House that torture “may be justified” for
interrogations conducted in the war on terrorism
Research Interests: Terrorism and Ethnography
This book introduces readers to the many arguments and controversies concerning abortion. While it argues for ethical and legal positions on the issues, it focuses on how to think about the issues, not just what to think about them. It is... more
This book introduces readers to the many arguments and controversies concerning abortion. While it argues for ethical and legal positions on the issues, it focuses on how to think about the issues, not just what to think about them. It is an ideal resource to improve your understanding of what people think, why they think that and whether their (and your) arguments are good or bad, and why. It's ideal for classroom use, discussion groups, organizational learning, and personal reading.
From the Preface
To many people, abortion is an issue for which discussions and debates are frustrating and fruitless: it seems like no progress will ever be made towards any understanding, much less resolution or even compromise.
Judgments like these, however, are premature because some basic techniques from critical thinking, such as carefully defining words and testing definitions, stating the full structure of arguments so each step of the reasoning can be examined, and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different explanations can help us make progress towards these goals.
When emotions run high, we sometimes need to step back and use a passion for calm, cool, critical thinking. This helps us better understand the positions and arguments of people who see things differently from us, as well as our own positions and arguments. And we can use critical thinking skills help to try to figure out which positions are best, in terms of being supported by good arguments: after all, we might have much to learn from other people, sometimes that our own views should change, for the better.
Here we use basic critical thinking skills to argue that abortion is typically not morally wrong. We begin with less morally-controversial claims: adults, children and babies are wrong to kill and wrong to kill, fundamentally, because they, we, are conscious, aware and have feelings. We argue that since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus.
Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—which she has the right to—and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalizing actions that are not wrong.
In the course of arguing for these claims, we:
1. discuss how to best define abortion;
2. dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusions, instead of giving genuine reasons for them;
3. refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion, on all sides;
4. explain why the most influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful;
5. provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong;
6. briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more.
This essay is not a “how to win an argument” piece or a tract or any kind of apologetics. It is not designed to help anyone “win” debates: everybody “wins” on this issue when we calmly and respectfully engage arguments with care, charity, honesty and humility. This book is merely a reasoned, systematic introduction to the issues that we hope models these skills and virtues. Its discussion should not be taken as absolute “proof” of anything: much more needs to be understood and carefully discussed—always.
From the Preface
To many people, abortion is an issue for which discussions and debates are frustrating and fruitless: it seems like no progress will ever be made towards any understanding, much less resolution or even compromise.
Judgments like these, however, are premature because some basic techniques from critical thinking, such as carefully defining words and testing definitions, stating the full structure of arguments so each step of the reasoning can be examined, and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different explanations can help us make progress towards these goals.
When emotions run high, we sometimes need to step back and use a passion for calm, cool, critical thinking. This helps us better understand the positions and arguments of people who see things differently from us, as well as our own positions and arguments. And we can use critical thinking skills help to try to figure out which positions are best, in terms of being supported by good arguments: after all, we might have much to learn from other people, sometimes that our own views should change, for the better.
Here we use basic critical thinking skills to argue that abortion is typically not morally wrong. We begin with less morally-controversial claims: adults, children and babies are wrong to kill and wrong to kill, fundamentally, because they, we, are conscious, aware and have feelings. We argue that since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus.
Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—which she has the right to—and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalizing actions that are not wrong.
In the course of arguing for these claims, we:
1. discuss how to best define abortion;
2. dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusions, instead of giving genuine reasons for them;
3. refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion, on all sides;
4. explain why the most influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful;
5. provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong;
6. briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more.
This essay is not a “how to win an argument” piece or a tract or any kind of apologetics. It is not designed to help anyone “win” debates: everybody “wins” on this issue when we calmly and respectfully engage arguments with care, charity, honesty and humility. This book is merely a reasoned, systematic introduction to the issues that we hope models these skills and virtues. Its discussion should not be taken as absolute “proof” of anything: much more needs to be understood and carefully discussed—always.
Research Interests:
In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York. Under... more
In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York. Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted a profound wrong that demanded remedy by the courts. Soon thereafter, the NhRP filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagara Falls, and Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held in research facilities at Stony Brook University. Thus began the legal struggle to move these chimpanzees from captivity to a sanctuary, an effort that has led the NhRP to argue in multiple courts before multiple judges. The central point of contention has been whether Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo have legal rights. To date, no judge has been willing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Such a ruling would mean that these chimpanzees have rights that confinement might violate. Instead, the judges have argued that chimpanzees cannot be bearers of legal rights because they are not, and cannot be persons. In this book we argue that chimpanzees are persons because they are autonomous.
Research Interests:
Animals and Ethics 101 helps readers identify and evaluate the arguments for and against various uses of animals, such: - Is it morally wrong to experiment on animals? Why or why not? - Is it morally permissible to eat meat? Why or... more
Animals and Ethics 101 helps readers identify and evaluate the arguments for and against various uses of animals, such:
- Is it morally wrong to experiment on animals? Why or why not?
- Is it morally permissible to eat meat? Why or why not?
- Are we morally obligated to provide pets with veterinary care (and, if so, how much?)? Why or why not?
And other challenging issues and questions.
Developed as a companion volume to an online "Animals & Ethics" course, it is ideal for classroom use, discussion groups or self study. The book presupposes no conclusions on these controversial moral questions about the treatment of animals, and argues for none either. Its goal is to help the reader better engage the issues and arguments on all sides with greater clarity, understanding and argumentative rigor.
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College in Atlanta, GA USA.
NathanNobis.com
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016.
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
- Is it morally wrong to experiment on animals? Why or why not?
- Is it morally permissible to eat meat? Why or why not?
- Are we morally obligated to provide pets with veterinary care (and, if so, how much?)? Why or why not?
And other challenging issues and questions.
Developed as a companion volume to an online "Animals & Ethics" course, it is ideal for classroom use, discussion groups or self study. The book presupposes no conclusions on these controversial moral questions about the treatment of animals, and argues for none either. Its goal is to help the reader better engage the issues and arguments on all sides with greater clarity, understanding and argumentative rigor.
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College in Atlanta, GA USA.
NathanNobis.com
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016.
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Research Interests:
*SEEKING PEOPLE TO COMPLETE THIS BOOK* A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in... more
*SEEKING PEOPLE TO COMPLETE THIS BOOK*
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in their classes: they will learn more, have more enjoyable and rewarding class experiences, impress their professors with their involvement and quality work and, perhaps most importantly, get better grades.
College is an opportunity that can open the door to greater opportunities, and the more you make of your opportunities in college, the greater your chances for success beyond college, in many ways. Following these rules below will increase your likelihood of success, in many ways.
Below is first a list of rules, and below that list is a discussion of each rule. When any rule seems obvious, consider it a good reminder of what you should do. If any rule is new to you, think about how you can integrate into your practices as a student. And since a basic rule of college is to think critically, if you think some rule is a bad one, let us know why: you may be right!
With this all in mind, let us turn to the rules and the discussion of them.
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
Philosophy, Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Nathan.Nobis@Gmail.com
www.NathanNobis.com
20 TIPS FOR BECOMING A
BETTER UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT
Many undergraduate students perform below their potential in college courses, and even those who perform well often do so in very inefficient ways, usually by studying excessively and limiting their engagement in other activities. While some students simply lack the discipline to do what conventional wisdom suggests they ought to do (e.g., attending class frequently, avoiding allnighters), some so-called conventional wisdom is actually misguided, and students’ adherence to it actually hinders their ability to develop optimal study habits.
This list is my attempt, based on my experiences as an undergraduate student and as a teacher of undergraduate students, to help current undergrads develop better study habits, achieve higher grades in their courses, and have a more fulfilling educational experience in the process. A few tips are reiterations of messages that students have probably heard before, but many are not as widely known. And some of them even oppose traditional study norms. Tips 1-10 represent the advice that largely aligns with common sense, and most of this advice will be familiar to most readers (although some of these tips are rarely followed). Tips 11-20, in contrast, tend to either conflict with common sense, or – despite their intuitive plausibility – to be rather unknown to most students. I follow each tip with an explanation of how students (generally) will benefit from following it.
Trevor Hedberg
http://www.trevorhedberg.com/
trevor.hedberg@gmail.com
A RULEBOOK FOR STUDENTS
Some rules are meant to be broken and there are exceptions to many rules. For college students, though, there are rules they can follow that will contribute to success in their classes: they will learn more, have more enjoyable and rewarding class experiences, impress their professors with their involvement and quality work and, perhaps most importantly, get better grades.
College is an opportunity that can open the door to greater opportunities, and the more you make of your opportunities in college, the greater your chances for success beyond college, in many ways. Following these rules below will increase your likelihood of success, in many ways.
Below is first a list of rules, and below that list is a discussion of each rule. When any rule seems obvious, consider it a good reminder of what you should do. If any rule is new to you, think about how you can integrate into your practices as a student. And since a basic rule of college is to think critically, if you think some rule is a bad one, let us know why: you may be right!
With this all in mind, let us turn to the rules and the discussion of them.
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
Philosophy, Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Nathan.Nobis@Gmail.com
www.NathanNobis.com
20 TIPS FOR BECOMING A
BETTER UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT
Many undergraduate students perform below their potential in college courses, and even those who perform well often do so in very inefficient ways, usually by studying excessively and limiting their engagement in other activities. While some students simply lack the discipline to do what conventional wisdom suggests they ought to do (e.g., attending class frequently, avoiding allnighters), some so-called conventional wisdom is actually misguided, and students’ adherence to it actually hinders their ability to develop optimal study habits.
This list is my attempt, based on my experiences as an undergraduate student and as a teacher of undergraduate students, to help current undergrads develop better study habits, achieve higher grades in their courses, and have a more fulfilling educational experience in the process. A few tips are reiterations of messages that students have probably heard before, but many are not as widely known. And some of them even oppose traditional study norms. Tips 1-10 represent the advice that largely aligns with common sense, and most of this advice will be familiar to most readers (although some of these tips are rarely followed). Tips 11-20, in contrast, tend to either conflict with common sense, or – despite their intuitive plausibility – to be rather unknown to most students. I follow each tip with an explanation of how students (generally) will benefit from following it.
Trevor Hedberg
http://www.trevorhedberg.com/
trevor.hedberg@gmail.com
Research Interests:
"Real Life: This is not a Game - Personal Finance for Young Adults" is a learning activity for young people about income and expenses, needs and wants and the jobs and careers needed to pay for daily life and beyond. It introduces kids... more
"Real Life: This is not a Game - Personal Finance for Young Adults" is a learning activity for young people about income and expenses, needs and wants and the jobs and careers needed to pay for daily life and beyond. It introduces kids and young adults to some basic concerns about personal finance: making money, paying bills, and more.
Real life, hopefully, is full of lots of fun and exciting and special activities and events with family and friends, and just by yourself sometimes.
But real life happens in the foreground of ordinary daily life. And lots of daily life is pretty ordinary stuff that many people often take for granted and don’t notice: living somewhere, sleeping somewhere, eating, deciding what to wear, not getting too hot or cold, and having some fun and relaxation too, among much more.
For most adults, daily life happens because they have a job. They go usually somewhere (or they work from home), about 5 days a week, often for about 8 hours a day (or more!), to do work to get paid money so that they can pay for what they need and, sometimes, want for daily life.
This is a game to introduce young people to what’s involved in daily life, specifically paying for what’s needed for daily life. What people need for daily life isn’t free - they have to pay for it, with money -- and money doesn’t grow on trees: nearly always, people have to work for it.
This game focuses on expenses of daily living. This game involves a lot of internet research and fact finding: how much do the things required for daily life cost? And how much money does someone typically earn at different jobs? And it involves some basic math: what can someone afford, given a particular income (money earned) at a particular job?
Thinking about these issues, and becoming aware of them, will help you get prepared for thinking about other financial (that is, money-related) questions, specifically those related to college and jobs. Real life is not a game!
Real life, hopefully, is full of lots of fun and exciting and special activities and events with family and friends, and just by yourself sometimes.
But real life happens in the foreground of ordinary daily life. And lots of daily life is pretty ordinary stuff that many people often take for granted and don’t notice: living somewhere, sleeping somewhere, eating, deciding what to wear, not getting too hot or cold, and having some fun and relaxation too, among much more.
For most adults, daily life happens because they have a job. They go usually somewhere (or they work from home), about 5 days a week, often for about 8 hours a day (or more!), to do work to get paid money so that they can pay for what they need and, sometimes, want for daily life.
This is a game to introduce young people to what’s involved in daily life, specifically paying for what’s needed for daily life. What people need for daily life isn’t free - they have to pay for it, with money -- and money doesn’t grow on trees: nearly always, people have to work for it.
This game focuses on expenses of daily living. This game involves a lot of internet research and fact finding: how much do the things required for daily life cost? And how much money does someone typically earn at different jobs? And it involves some basic math: what can someone afford, given a particular income (money earned) at a particular job?
Thinking about these issues, and becoming aware of them, will help you get prepared for thinking about other financial (that is, money-related) questions, specifically those related to college and jobs. Real life is not a game!
Research Interests:
Reviews of of Christine Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to Other Animals at 850 words, 2050 words and 2800 words. Forthcoming.
Research Interests:
Review of Bob Fischer, ed., College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues That Affect You Teaching Ethics Volume 17, Issue 2, Fall 2017 Nathan Nobis Pages 259-262 DOI: 10.5840/tej201717250 Bob Fischer, ed. College Ethics: A Reader on... more
Review of Bob Fischer, ed., College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues That Affect You
Teaching Ethics
Volume 17, Issue 2, Fall 2017
Nathan Nobis
Pages 259-262
DOI: 10.5840/tej201717250
Bob Fischer, ed. College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues that Affect You
Teaching Ethics
Volume 17, Issue 2, Fall 2017
Nathan Nobis
Pages 259-262
DOI: 10.5840/tej201717250
Bob Fischer, ed. College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues that Affect You
Research Interests:
In this book, law professors Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf argue that: 1. many non-human animals, at least vertebrates, are morally considerable and prima facie wrong to harm because they are sentient, i.e., conscious and capable of... more
In this book, law professors Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf argue that:
1. many non-human animals, at least vertebrates, are morally considerable and prima facie wrong to harm because they are sentient, i.e., conscious and capable of experiencing pains and pleasures;
2. most aborted human fetuses are not sentient -- their brains and nervous systems are not yet developed enough for sentience -- and so the motivating moral concern for animals doesn't apply to most abortions;
3. later abortions affecting sentient fetuses, while rare, raise serious moral concerns, but these abortions -- like all abortions -- invariably involve the interests and rights of the pregnant woman, which can make these abortions morally permissible.
For a book claiming to explore the "connections" between debates about the two issues, just the summary from the book flap -- basically, what's above -- makes it appear that there really isn't much connection between the topics, at least at the core ethical level. Animals are sentient, early fetuses are not, and so the moral arguments about the two issues don't overlap or share premises. While the authors hope to use insights from one issue to shed light on the other, I find that differences in the issues limit these insights.
1. many non-human animals, at least vertebrates, are morally considerable and prima facie wrong to harm because they are sentient, i.e., conscious and capable of experiencing pains and pleasures;
2. most aborted human fetuses are not sentient -- their brains and nervous systems are not yet developed enough for sentience -- and so the motivating moral concern for animals doesn't apply to most abortions;
3. later abortions affecting sentient fetuses, while rare, raise serious moral concerns, but these abortions -- like all abortions -- invariably involve the interests and rights of the pregnant woman, which can make these abortions morally permissible.
For a book claiming to explore the "connections" between debates about the two issues, just the summary from the book flap -- basically, what's above -- makes it appear that there really isn't much connection between the topics, at least at the core ethical level. Animals are sentient, early fetuses are not, and so the moral arguments about the two issues don't overlap or share premises. While the authors hope to use insights from one issue to shed light on the other, I find that differences in the issues limit these insights.
Research Interests: Ethics, Applied Ethics, Bioethics, Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, and 7 moreCritical Animal Studies, Reproductive Ethics, Animal Rights/Liberation, Human-Animal Studies, Abortion, Animal Rights, and Animal Rights, Animal Ecology, Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, Animal Cognition, Animal Liberation, Animals in Culture, Philosophy Of Animals, Animals & Society studies, Ethics of Animals, and Laboratory Animal Welfare, Animal Law
Review of Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle: The Story of BiDil and Racialized Medicine in the Post-Genomic Age
Research Interests:
In Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen argue that terminal, destructive experimentation on human embryos is morally wrong and should not be supported with state funds. Here I summarize their case... more
In Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen argue that terminal, destructive experimentation on human embryos is morally wrong and should not be supported with state funds. Here I summarize their case which implies that abortion is wrong also. While they admirably explain why many arguments in favor of embryo experimentation fail, I argue that their positive argument against embryo experimentation fails, as do their criticisms of perspectives that justify embryo experimentation. Thus, they do not give good reasons to believe that embryo experimentation is wrong and should be legally prohibited.
Keywords: Bioethics, ethics, biomedical ethics, research ethics, abortion, embryo, personhood
Bio:
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College. He has written extensively on ethical topics concerning animals, as well as abortion and other topics in bio-medical ethics. He is the author of the open access textbook Ethics & Animals 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights, and a short booklet on personal finance for young adults. His webpage is at NathanNobis.com
Keywords: Bioethics, ethics, biomedical ethics, research ethics, abortion, embryo, personhood
Bio:
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College. He has written extensively on ethical topics concerning animals, as well as abortion and other topics in bio-medical ethics. He is the author of the open access textbook Ethics & Animals 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights, and a short booklet on personal finance for young adults. His webpage is at NathanNobis.com
Research Interests:
In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal, “Defending Abortion Philosophically”(2006), Francis Beckwith argues that fetuses are, from conception, prima facie wrong to... more
In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal, “Defending Abortion Philosophically”(2006), Francis Beckwith argues that fetuses are, from conception, prima facie wrong to kill. His arguments are based on what he calls a “metaphysics of the human person” known as “The Substance View.” I argue that Beckwith’s metaphysics does not support his abortion ethic: Moral, not metaphysical, claims that are part of this Substance View are the foundation of the argument, and Beckwith inadequately defends these moral claims. Thus, Beckwith’s arguments do not provide strong support for what he calls the “pro-life” view of abortion.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
What are we going to do about ChatGPT? Some philosophical reflections and arguments in general opposition to students using ChatGPT.
Research Interests:
An argument for pro-choice advocates engaging the ethical arguments about abortion, and more. Public philosophy on abortion and the value of philosophy. With Jonathan Dudley, MD.
Research Interests:
An introduction of the ethics of belief and application to current political debates, with the observation that people of all political persuasions have beliefs that are not based on strong evidence.
Research Interests:
Checking ‘Check Your Privilege’ for Veganism: Why the ‘Privilege,’ ‘Food Deserts,’ and ‘Cost’ Excuses Usually Don’t Excuse A too-common objection to veganism, vegetarianism and otherwise plant-based eating is that it’s a privilege: “Go... more
Checking ‘Check Your Privilege’ for Veganism:
Why the ‘Privilege,’ ‘Food Deserts,’ and ‘Cost’ Excuses Usually Don’t Excuse
A too-common objection to veganism, vegetarianism and otherwise plant-based eating is that it’s a privilege: “Go vegan? ‘Check your privilege!’”
A narrower version of the objection is that not everyone can be vegan since, even in well-off countries, there are “food deserts,” urban and rural areas where there are too few food options to eat vegan in healthy ways.
A related objection is that vegan diets are just too expensive: not everybody can afford to eat vegan.
[I respond]
Why the ‘Privilege,’ ‘Food Deserts,’ and ‘Cost’ Excuses Usually Don’t Excuse
A too-common objection to veganism, vegetarianism and otherwise plant-based eating is that it’s a privilege: “Go vegan? ‘Check your privilege!’”
A narrower version of the objection is that not everyone can be vegan since, even in well-off countries, there are “food deserts,” urban and rural areas where there are too few food options to eat vegan in healthy ways.
A related objection is that vegan diets are just too expensive: not everybody can afford to eat vegan.
[I respond]
Research Interests: Animal Studies, Critical Animal Studies, Animal Rights/Liberation, Veganism (Anthropology), Human-Animal Studies, and 4 moreAnimal Rights, Ethical veganism, Veganism, and Animal Rights, Animal Ecology, Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, Animal Cognition, Animal Liberation, Animals in Culture, Philosophy Of Animals, Animals & Society studies, Ethics of Animals, and Laboratory Animal Welfare, Animal Law
Is your Opinion on Abortion Wrong? Critical Thinking & Abortion For the past few years in the United States, almost daily there’s a headline about new proposed abortions restrictions. Conservatives cheer, liberals despair. But who is... more
Is your Opinion on Abortion Wrong? Critical Thinking & Abortion
For the past few years in the United States, almost daily there’s a headline about new proposed abortions restrictions. Conservatives cheer, liberals despair.
But who is right here? Should abortion be generally legal or should it be banned? Is it usually immoral or is it usually not wrong at all? These same questions, of course, are asked in other countries.
To many people, answers to these questions seem obvious, and people with different or contrary answers are, well, just wrong.
But how can we know? In particular, could anyone know that abortion is not wrong and should be legal? If so, how? And how would anyone effectively, persuasively, communicate that knowledge?
One important set of answers depends on this idea: critical thinking. Critical thinking can help people know, not merely believe or feel, that their perspectives on issues are true or correct, and it can help them persuade others to understand and accept that knowledge. . .
For the past few years in the United States, almost daily there’s a headline about new proposed abortions restrictions. Conservatives cheer, liberals despair.
But who is right here? Should abortion be generally legal or should it be banned? Is it usually immoral or is it usually not wrong at all? These same questions, of course, are asked in other countries.
To many people, answers to these questions seem obvious, and people with different or contrary answers are, well, just wrong.
But how can we know? In particular, could anyone know that abortion is not wrong and should be legal? If so, how? And how would anyone effectively, persuasively, communicate that knowledge?
One important set of answers depends on this idea: critical thinking. Critical thinking can help people know, not merely believe or feel, that their perspectives on issues are true or correct, and it can help them persuade others to understand and accept that knowledge. . .
Research Interests:
Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what's best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes should be selfish. The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states... more
Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what's best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes should be selfish. The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states that we are always morally required to do what's in our own self-interest. The view isn't that we are selfish-this is psychological egoism-but that we ought to be. This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it.
Research Interests: Ethics, Prejudice, Discrimination, Ethical Theory, Altruism, and 3 moreAyn Rand, Rational egoism, and Egoism
Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore. When people like this are kept alive by... more
Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore.
When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die?
Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments.
When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die?
Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments.
Research Interests:
Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” Descartes had disturbing views about non-human... more
Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” Descartes had disturbing views about non-human animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. Unfortunately, these examples are just a start.
These philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful.
How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past? Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields, and people in general.
These philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful.
How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past? Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields, and people in general.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Ethics, Metaphilosophy, Applied Ethics, Race and Racism, and 12 moreStereotypes and Prejudice, Discrimination, Equality and Diversity, Racism, Philosophy Of Race, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Sex, Sexism, Equality and Non Discrimination, Philosophy of Love and Sex, History of Philosophy, and Critical Philosophy of Race
A variety of extra credit opportunities are often given as a way to raise grades on assignments and tests and overall course grades. But there are reasons why instructors should not offer extra credit, that doing so is unjustified and... more
A variety of extra credit opportunities are often given as a way to raise grades on assignments and tests and overall course grades. But there are reasons why instructors should not offer extra credit, that doing so is unjustified and unfair. Extra credit is common but is surprisingly controversial.
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Abortion involves the intentional killing of a fetus to end a pregnancy. These fetuses are human, biologically.1 It seems that fetuses are beings, albeit completely dependent beings: what else would they be? So, abortion involves the... more
Abortion involves the intentional killing of a fetus to end a pregnancy. These fetuses are human, biologically.1 It seems that fetuses are beings, albeit completely dependent beings: what else would they be? So, abortion involves the intentional killing of a human being. Killing human beings is often deeply wrong, so is abortion wrong? If so, when? And why? In this essay, we’ll look at some influential answers to these questions.
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We're professors who try to write well. We also try to help our students and colleagues write well. But, really, why bother? Among the standard answers: Because businesses want good writers. Because good writing is good thinking. Because... more
We're professors who try to write well. We also try to help our students and colleagues write well. But, really, why bother? Among the standard answers: Because businesses want good writers. Because good writing is good thinking. Because good writing is beautiful. Each of those explanations has merit. There is, however, another argument that's often neglected: Writing is an ethical activity, and becoming a better writer can make you a better person.
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Two chapters -- "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion" -- in one file, from the open access textbook "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource" edited by Noah Levin. Adults,... more
Two chapters -- "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion" -- in one file, from the open access textbook "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource" edited by Noah Levin.
Adults, children and babies are arguably wrong to kill, fundamentally, because we are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, we argue that they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body, and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body; this further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal.
In the course of arguing for these claims, we:
discuss how to best define abortion;
dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusion, instead of giving genuine reasons for them;
refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion;
explain why some influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful;
provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong;
briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more.
Little of this discussion should be taken as absolute “proof” of anything, as this is merely a reasoned introduction to the issues: much more needs to be discussed, always.
Adults, children and babies are arguably wrong to kill, fundamentally, because we are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, we argue that they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body, and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body; this further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal.
In the course of arguing for these claims, we:
discuss how to best define abortion;
dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusion, instead of giving genuine reasons for them;
refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion;
explain why some influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful;
provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong;
briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more.
Little of this discussion should be taken as absolute “proof” of anything, as this is merely a reasoned introduction to the issues: much more needs to be discussed, always.
Research Interests:
Arguments are nowadays often presented as soundbites: as slogans, tweets, memes and even gifs. Arguments developed in detail often meet the response TL;DR (Too Long, Didn’t Read). This is unfortunate—especially when tackling the topic of... more
Arguments are nowadays often presented as soundbites: as slogans, tweets, memes and even gifs. Arguments developed in detail often meet the response TL;DR (Too Long, Didn’t Read). This is unfortunate—especially when tackling the topic of abortion. Soundbites make many pro-life arguments seem stronger than they really are, while the complexities of pro-choice arguments can’t be readily reduced to soundbites.
Research Interests:
An argumentative introduction to the topic of euthanasia or mercy killing: Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be... more
An argumentative introduction to the topic of euthanasia or mercy killing:
Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore.
When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die?
Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments.
Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore.
When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die?
Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments.
Research Interests:
I’m a philosophy professor who specializes in medical ethics and I teach and write about the ethics of abortion. So I am very familiar with the medical, legal and – most importantly – ethical or moral issues related to HB 481, the... more
I’m a philosophy professor who specializes in medical ethics and I teach and write about the ethics of abortion. So I am very familiar with the medical, legal and – most importantly – ethical or moral issues related to HB 481, the so-called “heartbeat bill” that would effectively ban abortion in Georgia. At least hundreds of other philosophy, ethics and law professors in Georgia teach these ethical debates about abortion: they are also, to varying degrees, experts on the issues.
What is taught is the arguments about the ethics of abortion, that is, the reasons to think that abortion is wrong and the reasons to think that it’s not wrong. Evaluating these arguments requires understanding and skill. Much of these skills amount to consistently asking ‘What do you mean?’ and ‘Why think that?’ We need better arguments on these issues, and asking and answering these questions helps with that.
What is taught is the arguments about the ethics of abortion, that is, the reasons to think that abortion is wrong and the reasons to think that it’s not wrong. Evaluating these arguments requires understanding and skill. Much of these skills amount to consistently asking ‘What do you mean?’ and ‘Why think that?’ We need better arguments on these issues, and asking and answering these questions helps with that.
Research Interests:
A paper from 2003: In a recent letter (August 2001, p. 5), a " Veg-News " reader asked why she does not see the vegetarian and animal rights communities taking a stand against abortion. She said it seems to be a "great contradiction" to... more
A paper from 2003:
In a recent letter (August 2001, p. 5), a " Veg-News " reader asked why she does not see the vegetarian and animal rights communities taking a stand against abortion. She said it seems to be a "great contradiction" to respect animal life, but to not equally respect human life by opposing abortion. She asked that this issue be addressed. I would like to do so, especially since it's a common concern. Most animal rights advocates have been asked, 'Why don't you do something to save aborted babies?' although, surely nearly all the hecklers who ask this question have never done anything to oppose any abortions. [1] Although the hecklers usually don't stay for an answer, I provide one below.
In a recent letter (August 2001, p. 5), a " Veg-News " reader asked why she does not see the vegetarian and animal rights communities taking a stand against abortion. She said it seems to be a "great contradiction" to respect animal life, but to not equally respect human life by opposing abortion. She asked that this issue be addressed. I would like to do so, especially since it's a common concern. Most animal rights advocates have been asked, 'Why don't you do something to save aborted babies?' although, surely nearly all the hecklers who ask this question have never done anything to oppose any abortions. [1] Although the hecklers usually don't stay for an answer, I provide one below.
Research Interests:
Abstract: Arguments for moral nihilism – the view that there are no moral truths – are criticized by showing that their major premises suggest epistemic or intellectual nihilism – the view that no beliefs are reasonable, justified, ought... more
Abstract: Arguments for moral nihilism – the view that there are no moral truths – are criticized by showing that their major premises suggest epistemic or intellectual nihilism – the view that no beliefs are reasonable, justified, ought to be believed, and so on. Insofar as intellectual nihilism ought be rejected, this shows that the major premises of arguments for moral nihilisms ought to be rejected also.
Research Interests:
Should your views on abortion influence your views on animal rights? Should your views on the moral status of animals influence your views on the moral status of human fetuses? Generally, no. Most arguments against abortion have no... more
Should your views on abortion influence your views on animal rights? Should your views on the moral status of animals influence your views on the moral status of human fetuses?
Generally, no. Most arguments against abortion have no implications for animal rights and those that might seem to be poor arguments against abortion. And arguments for animal rights only have implications for rare, later abortions of conscious fetuses, not the majority of abortions that affect early, pre-conscious fetuses.
On the other sides, though, a common of objection to animal rights does support a pro-life view and an influential feminist pro-choice argument does suggest positive implications for animals, though.
Overall, the topic of abortion presents with an inherent complexity never analogously present in animal rights issues – the perspective of the pregnant woman whose life and body the fetus depends on – and so the issues are importantly distinct.
Generally, no. Most arguments against abortion have no implications for animal rights and those that might seem to be poor arguments against abortion. And arguments for animal rights only have implications for rare, later abortions of conscious fetuses, not the majority of abortions that affect early, pre-conscious fetuses.
On the other sides, though, a common of objection to animal rights does support a pro-life view and an influential feminist pro-choice argument does suggest positive implications for animals, though.
Overall, the topic of abortion presents with an inherent complexity never analogously present in animal rights issues – the perspective of the pregnant woman whose life and body the fetus depends on – and so the issues are importantly distinct.
Research Interests:
“Animal testing” involves experimenting on animals to try to determine whether drugs and medical treatments are safe and effective for humans. It’s wrong and should be banned. Why? First, and most obviously, drugs and medical procedures... more
“Animal testing” involves experimenting on animals to try to determine whether drugs and medical treatments are safe and effective for humans. It’s wrong and should be banned.
Why? First, and most obviously, drugs and medical procedures treat diseases, injuries, and other health problems. So, to see if a treatment works, a disease or injury must be created in animals. Understatement: this is often unpleasant. Heart attacks in dogs feel awful; bone cancers in mice are painful; pigs being burned, to test burn treatments, is agonizing. Animals living with the induced conditions is unpleasant also. And they are killed at the end of the experiments to study the treatments’ effects.
It’s now easy to see why animal testing is wrong: it violates basic principles of ethical research: it is maleficent, or harmful to the research subjects; it is not beneficial to them; it is forced on them since they don’t consent; and it is unjust in that animals are burdened with problems not their own. Research – at least with animals who are conscious, and so are able to be harmed or made worse off – is wrong for reasons that comparable human research would be wrong.
Some argue that the benefits to humans justify animal testing. But when one group benefits at the major expense of another group, that’s usually wrong. And how exactly might anyone know that humans benefit more than animals are harmed? And there is scientific evidence that animal testing often is not beneficial for humans and that clinical research, public health research, and technology-based research are more useful: see the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine and Americans for Medical Advancement for more information.
Some claim there are “no alternatives” to animal testing, that it is “necessary.” But there are alternatives (mentioned above) and it’s not literally necessary that anyone do it: they can refrain. But suppose someone wanted to rob a bank and needed a getaway car: there is “no alternative” to a car and so it is “necessary” for the robbery. Does that make using the car OK? No. Even if something is “necessary” and there are “no alternatives” to doing it to achieve a particular end, that doesn’t make doing the action right: the end determines that.
Finally, some say that this reasoning is all beside the point: if your child was dying and animal testing would save him or her, wouldn’t you want the testing done? Many would and that’s an understandable feeling. But it’s unlikely that animal experimentation would help their child much: other methods are likely more fruitful. And more importantly, if my child were dying and I tried to experiment on my neighbor’s children to try to save my own child, that would be wrong.
Why? Simply because those children would be harmed and treated as mere things to be used (and abused) for my and my child’s benefit, which they are not. Since those reasons apply to many animals experimented upon, animal testing is also wrong.
Why? First, and most obviously, drugs and medical procedures treat diseases, injuries, and other health problems. So, to see if a treatment works, a disease or injury must be created in animals. Understatement: this is often unpleasant. Heart attacks in dogs feel awful; bone cancers in mice are painful; pigs being burned, to test burn treatments, is agonizing. Animals living with the induced conditions is unpleasant also. And they are killed at the end of the experiments to study the treatments’ effects.
It’s now easy to see why animal testing is wrong: it violates basic principles of ethical research: it is maleficent, or harmful to the research subjects; it is not beneficial to them; it is forced on them since they don’t consent; and it is unjust in that animals are burdened with problems not their own. Research – at least with animals who are conscious, and so are able to be harmed or made worse off – is wrong for reasons that comparable human research would be wrong.
Some argue that the benefits to humans justify animal testing. But when one group benefits at the major expense of another group, that’s usually wrong. And how exactly might anyone know that humans benefit more than animals are harmed? And there is scientific evidence that animal testing often is not beneficial for humans and that clinical research, public health research, and technology-based research are more useful: see the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine and Americans for Medical Advancement for more information.
Some claim there are “no alternatives” to animal testing, that it is “necessary.” But there are alternatives (mentioned above) and it’s not literally necessary that anyone do it: they can refrain. But suppose someone wanted to rob a bank and needed a getaway car: there is “no alternative” to a car and so it is “necessary” for the robbery. Does that make using the car OK? No. Even if something is “necessary” and there are “no alternatives” to doing it to achieve a particular end, that doesn’t make doing the action right: the end determines that.
Finally, some say that this reasoning is all beside the point: if your child was dying and animal testing would save him or her, wouldn’t you want the testing done? Many would and that’s an understandable feeling. But it’s unlikely that animal experimentation would help their child much: other methods are likely more fruitful. And more importantly, if my child were dying and I tried to experiment on my neighbor’s children to try to save my own child, that would be wrong.
Why? Simply because those children would be harmed and treated as mere things to be used (and abused) for my and my child’s benefit, which they are not. Since those reasons apply to many animals experimented upon, animal testing is also wrong.
Research Interests:
In "No monkey business: Chimps don’t have human rights, philosophers say" (Friday, May 11, 2018; "Before It's News" website) the recent case for believing that chimpanzees are persons and so should have legal rights is engaged (see also... more
In "No monkey business: Chimps don’t have human rights, philosophers say" (Friday, May 11, 2018; "Before It's News" website) the recent case for believing that chimpanzees are persons and so should have legal rights is engaged (see also NhRP). Two philosophy professors are quoted, arguing that chimpanzees are not persons and cannot have rights. Let's think about what they have to say.
http://www.nathannobis.com/2018/05/a-response-to-no-monkey-business-chimps.html
http://www.nathannobis.com/2018/05/a-response-to-no-monkey-business-chimps.html
Research Interests:
Are you the same thing as your body? Did you begin at conception? Do you have a rational and free “nature” or “essence”? Some answer ‘yes’ to all and argue that this means that abortion is wrong: Your "essence" is that of a free and... more
Are you the same thing as your body? Did you begin at conception? Do you have a rational and free “nature” or “essence”? Some answer ‘yes’ to all and argue that this means that abortion is wrong:
Your "essence" is that of a free and rational being; that essence*makes* it wrong to kill you; you have always existed whenever your body existed; your body began at conception; and so you existed at conception and were wrong to kill; and the same is true for all other human fetuses.
This argument is discussed here.
Your "essence" is that of a free and rational being; that essence*makes* it wrong to kill you; you have always existed whenever your body existed; your body began at conception; and so you existed at conception and were wrong to kill; and the same is true for all other human fetuses.
This argument is discussed here.
Research Interests:
Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and... more
Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and probably all abortions, should be legal. I begin by observing that people sometimes respond to the issue by describing the circumstances of abortion, not offering reasons for their views about those circumstances; I then dismiss " question-begging " arguments about abortion that merely assume the conclusions they are given to support; most importantly, I evaluate many arguments: both common, often-heard arguments and arguments developed by philosophers. My defense of abortion is based on facts about early fetuses' not yet possessing consciousness or any mental life, awareness or feeling, as well as concerns about rights to one's own body.
Research Interests:
“Excellent philosophy of religion” is, unsurprisingly, excellent philosophy, about religion. But what’s excellent philosophy and what are the norms and values associated with it? And what are the philosophical aspects of religion,... more
“Excellent philosophy of religion” is, unsurprisingly, excellent philosophy, about religion.
But what’s excellent philosophy and what are the norms and values associated with it? And what are the philosophical aspects of religion, whatever religions are?
To begin answering these questions, I suggest that philosophy of religion that emphasizes at least these features tends to be more excellent: (1) experiential, (2) integrated, (3) truthful and fair, and (4) done from a sense of wonder.
http://philosophyofreligion.org/?p=525361
But what’s excellent philosophy and what are the norms and values associated with it? And what are the philosophical aspects of religion, whatever religions are?
To begin answering these questions, I suggest that philosophy of religion that emphasizes at least these features tends to be more excellent: (1) experiential, (2) integrated, (3) truthful and fair, and (4) done from a sense of wonder.
http://philosophyofreligion.org/?p=525361
Research Interests:
What are we going to do about ChatGPT?* Summarizing theme: “Anything students can’t do, ChatGPT shouldn’t do for them.” DRAFT, 5/31/2023, available here in Google Docs for comments. By Nathan Nobis, Philosophy, Morehouse College,... more
What are we going to do about ChatGPT?*
Summarizing theme:
“Anything students can’t do, ChatGPT shouldn’t do for them.”
DRAFT, 5/31/2023, available here in Google Docs for comments.
By Nathan Nobis, Philosophy, Morehouse College, nathan.nobis@morehouse.edu
Summarizing theme:
“Anything students can’t do, ChatGPT shouldn’t do for them.”
DRAFT, 5/31/2023, available here in Google Docs for comments.
By Nathan Nobis, Philosophy, Morehouse College, nathan.nobis@morehouse.edu
Research Interests:
Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that... more
Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that philosophical ethicists have the expertise that makes them the likely best candidates for these tasks. I review the skills, knowledge and perspectives that philosophical ethicists tend to have which makes them ethical experts. I argue that, insofar as IACUCs are expected to ensure that research is ethical, they must have philosophical ethicists as members.
(forthcoming)
(forthcoming)
Research Interests:
forthcoming..
Research Interests:
Collected and edited by Noah Levin Table of Contents UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2... more
Collected and edited by Noah Levin
Table of Contents
UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION
1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin)
2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba)
3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr)
4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin)
5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge)
6 The Ethics of our Digital Selves (Noah Levin)
UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD”
7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas)
8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge)
9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis)
10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin)
11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob)
12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob)
UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS
13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar)
14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies)
15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman)
16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin)
17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar)
18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes)
UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS
19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh)
20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill)
21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge)
22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin)
23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton)
24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill)
UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY
25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato)
26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley)
27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant)
28 The Virtues (Aristotle)
29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche)
30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko)
Table of Contents
UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION
1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin)
2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba)
3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr)
4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin)
5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge)
6 The Ethics of our Digital Selves (Noah Levin)
UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD”
7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas)
8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge)
9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis)
10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin)
11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob)
12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob)
UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS
13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar)
14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies)
15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman)
16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin)
17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar)
18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes)
UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS
19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh)
20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill)
21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge)
22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin)
23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton)
24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill)
UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY
25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato)
26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley)
27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant)
28 The Virtues (Aristotle)
29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche)
30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko)
Research Interests:
Amicus curiae brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project's efforts to secure recognition of legal personhood and rights for two chimpanzees. Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases As Nonhuman Rights Project Seeks To... more
Amicus curiae brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project's efforts to secure recognition of legal personhood and rights for two chimpanzees.
Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases As Nonhuman Rights Project Seeks To Appeal To New York’s Highest Court
– Experts in animal ethics, animal political theory, the philosophy of animal cognition and behavior, and the philosophy of biology urge the Court of Appeals to recognize chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko as persons –
Feb. 26, 2018—New York, NY—After the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a motion for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in the cases of captive chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko, a group of prominent philosophers submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the NhRP’s efforts to secure recognition of their clients’ legal personhood and rights.
The NhRP argues in its Memorandum of Law, filed on Friday, that the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department’s June 2017 ruling requires review by the state’s highest court, not only because it conflicts with New York’s common law habeas corpus statute and previous rulings of the Court of Appeals, the First Department, and other Appellate Departments on issues pertaining to common law personhood and habeas corpus relief, but also “based on the novelty, difficulty, importance, and effect of the legal and public policy issues raised.”
Engaging directly with a core issue raised by the NhRP’s appeal—the question of who is a “person” capable of possessing any legal rights—the philosophers’ brief maintains that the First Department’s ruling “uses a number of incompatible conceptions of person which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or in fact compatible with Kiko and Tommy’s personhood.” The philosophers who authored the brief are:
Kristin Andrews (York University)
Gary Comstock (North Carolina State University)
G.K.D. Crozier (Laurentian University)
Sue Donaldson (Queen’s University)
Andrew Fenton (Dalhousie University)
Tyler M. John (Rutgers University)
L. Syd M Johnson (Michigan Technological University)
Robert C. Jones (California State University, Chico)
Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University)
Letitia Meynell (Dalhousie University)
Nathan Nobis (Morehouse College)
David Peña-Guzmán (California State University, San Francisco)
James Rocha (California State University, Fresno)
Bernard Rollin (Colorado State)
Jeffrey Sebo (New York University)
Adam Shriver (University of British Columbia)
Rebecca L. Walker (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“We submit this brief in our shared interest in ensuring a more just co-existence with other animals who live in our communities,” they write. “We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as nonhuman persons, Kiko and Tommy should be granted a writ of habeas corpus and their detainers should have the burden of showing the lawful justification of their current confinement.”
Tommy is a male chimpanzee whom the NhRP discovered living alone in a cage in a shed on a used trailer lot along Route 30 in Gloversville, New York.
Kiko is a male chimpanzee, who, to the best of the NhRP’s knowledge, is held in captivity in a cage in a cement storefront attached to a home in a residential area in Niagara Falls, New York.
The NhRP has been fighting since 2013 to free them to Save the Chimps sanctuary, where they can live with other chimpanzees in a more natural environment where their fundamental right to bodily liberty will be respected.
The NhRP expects the Court to rule on its motion for permission to appeal in 6-8 weeks.
Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases As Nonhuman Rights Project Seeks To Appeal To New York’s Highest Court
– Experts in animal ethics, animal political theory, the philosophy of animal cognition and behavior, and the philosophy of biology urge the Court of Appeals to recognize chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko as persons –
Feb. 26, 2018—New York, NY—After the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a motion for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in the cases of captive chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko, a group of prominent philosophers submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the NhRP’s efforts to secure recognition of their clients’ legal personhood and rights.
The NhRP argues in its Memorandum of Law, filed on Friday, that the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department’s June 2017 ruling requires review by the state’s highest court, not only because it conflicts with New York’s common law habeas corpus statute and previous rulings of the Court of Appeals, the First Department, and other Appellate Departments on issues pertaining to common law personhood and habeas corpus relief, but also “based on the novelty, difficulty, importance, and effect of the legal and public policy issues raised.”
Engaging directly with a core issue raised by the NhRP’s appeal—the question of who is a “person” capable of possessing any legal rights—the philosophers’ brief maintains that the First Department’s ruling “uses a number of incompatible conceptions of person which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or in fact compatible with Kiko and Tommy’s personhood.” The philosophers who authored the brief are:
Kristin Andrews (York University)
Gary Comstock (North Carolina State University)
G.K.D. Crozier (Laurentian University)
Sue Donaldson (Queen’s University)
Andrew Fenton (Dalhousie University)
Tyler M. John (Rutgers University)
L. Syd M Johnson (Michigan Technological University)
Robert C. Jones (California State University, Chico)
Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University)
Letitia Meynell (Dalhousie University)
Nathan Nobis (Morehouse College)
David Peña-Guzmán (California State University, San Francisco)
James Rocha (California State University, Fresno)
Bernard Rollin (Colorado State)
Jeffrey Sebo (New York University)
Adam Shriver (University of British Columbia)
Rebecca L. Walker (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“We submit this brief in our shared interest in ensuring a more just co-existence with other animals who live in our communities,” they write. “We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as nonhuman persons, Kiko and Tommy should be granted a writ of habeas corpus and their detainers should have the burden of showing the lawful justification of their current confinement.”
Tommy is a male chimpanzee whom the NhRP discovered living alone in a cage in a shed on a used trailer lot along Route 30 in Gloversville, New York.
Kiko is a male chimpanzee, who, to the best of the NhRP’s knowledge, is held in captivity in a cage in a cement storefront attached to a home in a residential area in Niagara Falls, New York.
The NhRP has been fighting since 2013 to free them to Save the Chimps sanctuary, where they can live with other chimpanzees in a more natural environment where their fundamental right to bodily liberty will be respected.
The NhRP expects the Court to rule on its motion for permission to appeal in 6-8 weeks.
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We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as... more
We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue.
The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:
• What would it take to be a moral expert?
• Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one?
• Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own?
• What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?
In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.
The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:
• What would it take to be a moral expert?
• Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one?
• Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own?
• What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?
In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.
Research Interests: Ethics and Epistemology
Nobis, Nathan M. (2018) "Xenotransplantation, Subsistence Hunting and the Pursuit of Health: Lessons for Animal Rights-Based Vegan Advocacy," Between the Species: Vol. 21: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at:... more
Nobis, Nathan M. (2018) "Xenotransplantation, Subsistence Hunting and the Pursuit of Health: Lessons for Animal Rights-Based Vegan Advocacy," Between the Species: Vol. 21: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol21/iss1/8
I argue that, contrary to what Tom Regan suggests, his rights view implies that subsistence hunting is wrong, that is, killing animals for food is wrong even when they are the only available food source, since doing so violates animal rights. We can see that subsistence hunting is wrong on the rights view by seeing why animal experimentation, specifically xenotransplanation, is wrong on the rights view: if it's wrong to kill an animal to take organs to save a human life, it's wrong to kill an animal to eat that animal to save a human life or improve human health. I discuss these arguments' implications for animal rights-based vegan advocacy, insofar as some people claim that they don't feel their best on vegan diets and so their eating meat is morally justified. I argue that such an attempt to justify consuming animal products fails on Regan's rights view, but discuss some attempts to morally excuse such violations of animals' rights. These attempts are inspired by Regan's attempts at potentially excusing animal rights advocates' using medications developed using animals.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol21/iss1/8
I argue that, contrary to what Tom Regan suggests, his rights view implies that subsistence hunting is wrong, that is, killing animals for food is wrong even when they are the only available food source, since doing so violates animal rights. We can see that subsistence hunting is wrong on the rights view by seeing why animal experimentation, specifically xenotransplanation, is wrong on the rights view: if it's wrong to kill an animal to take organs to save a human life, it's wrong to kill an animal to eat that animal to save a human life or improve human health. I discuss these arguments' implications for animal rights-based vegan advocacy, insofar as some people claim that they don't feel their best on vegan diets and so their eating meat is morally justified. I argue that such an attempt to justify consuming animal products fails on Regan's rights view, but discuss some attempts to morally excuse such violations of animals' rights. These attempts are inspired by Regan's attempts at potentially excusing animal rights advocates' using medications developed using animals.
Research Interests:
See also my "Carl Cohen's 'Kind' Argument FOR Animal Rights and AGAINST Human Rights" : https://www.academia.edu/823781/Carl_Cohens_kindarguments_FOR_animal_rights_and_AGAINST_human_rights Abstract: Tom Regan argues that human... more
See also my "Carl Cohen's 'Kind' Argument FOR Animal Rights and AGAINST Human Rights" :
https://www.academia.edu/823781/Carl_Cohens_kindarguments_FOR_animal_rights_and_AGAINST_human_rights
Abstract:
Tom Regan argues that human beings and some non-human animals have moral rights because they are
“subjects of lives,” that is, roughly, conscious, sentient beings with an experiential welfare. A prominent critic, Carl Cohen, objects: he argues that only moral agents have rights and so animals, since they are not moral agents, lack rights. An objection to Cohen’s argument is that his theory of rights seems to imply that human beings who are not moral agents have no moral rights, but since these human beings have rights, his theory of rights is false, and so he fails to show that animals lack rights. Cohen responds that this objection fails because human beings who are not moral agents nevertheless are the “kind” of beings who are moral agents and so have rights, but animals are not that “kind” of being and so lack rights. Regan argues that Cohen’s “kind” arguments fail : they fail to explain why human beings who are not moral agents have rights and they fail to show that animals lack rights. Since Cohen’s “kind” arguments are
influential, I review and critique Regan’s objections
. I offer suggestions for stronger responses to arguments like Cohen’s.
https://www.academia.edu/823781/Carl_Cohens_kindarguments_FOR_animal_rights_and_AGAINST_human_rights
Abstract:
Tom Regan argues that human beings and some non-human animals have moral rights because they are
“subjects of lives,” that is, roughly, conscious, sentient beings with an experiential welfare. A prominent critic, Carl Cohen, objects: he argues that only moral agents have rights and so animals, since they are not moral agents, lack rights. An objection to Cohen’s argument is that his theory of rights seems to imply that human beings who are not moral agents have no moral rights, but since these human beings have rights, his theory of rights is false, and so he fails to show that animals lack rights. Cohen responds that this objection fails because human beings who are not moral agents nevertheless are the “kind” of beings who are moral agents and so have rights, but animals are not that “kind” of being and so lack rights. Regan argues that Cohen’s “kind” arguments fail : they fail to explain why human beings who are not moral agents have rights and they fail to show that animals lack rights. Since Cohen’s “kind” arguments are
influential, I review and critique Regan’s objections
. I offer suggestions for stronger responses to arguments like Cohen’s.
Research Interests:
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Forthcoming in _Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments on the Ethics of Eating_
Research Interests:
What is the moral status of animals? What’s the moral status of fetuses? What’s the moral status of the permanently comatose? While questions like these are sometimes asked, I argue that the term “moral status” shouldn’t be used. Claims... more
What is the moral status of animals? What’s the moral status of fetuses? What’s the moral status of the permanently comatose? While questions like these are sometimes asked, I argue that the term “moral status” shouldn’t be used. Claims involving moral status are “worthless”: we can always say something clearer that directly addresses any moral questions and so we shouldn’t use the term.
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To determine what are considered acceptable standards for animal research (AR) methodology and translation rate to humans, a validated survey was sent to: a) a sample of the general public, via Sampling Survey International (SSI; Canada),... more
To determine what are considered acceptable standards for animal research (AR) methodology and translation rate to humans, a validated survey was sent to: a) a sample of the general public, via Sampling Survey International (SSI; Canada), Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; USA), a Canadian city festival (CF) and a Canadian children's hospital (CH); b) a sample of medical students (two first-year classes); and c) a sample of scientists (corresponding authors and academic paediatricians). There were 1379 responses from the general public sample (SSI, n = 557; AMT, n = 590; CF, n = 195; CH, n = 102), 205/330 (62%) medical student responses, and 23/323 (7%, too few to report) scientist responses. Asked about methodological quality, most of the general public and medical student respondents expect that: AR is of high quality (e.g. anaesthesia and analgesia are monitored, even overnight, and 'humane' euthanasia, optimal statistical design, comprehensive literature review, randomisation and blinding, are performed), and costs and difficulty are not acceptable justifications for lower quality (e.g. costs of expert consultation, or more laboratory staff). Asked about their expectations of translation to humans (of toxicity, carcinogenicity, teratogenicity and treatment findings), most expect translation more than 60% of the time. If translation occurred less than 20% of the time, a minority disagreed that this would "significantly reduce your support for AR". Medical students were more supportive of AR, even if translation occurred less than 20% of the time. Expectations for AR are much higher than empirical data show to have been achieved.
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Introduction Pediatric health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR). We aim to determine whether HCW consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of... more
Introduction
Pediatric health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR). We aim to determine whether HCW consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of AR convincing.
Design
After development and validation, an e-mail survey was sent to all pediatricians and pediatric intensive care unit nurses and respiratory therapists (RTs) affiliated with a Canadian University. We presented questions about demographics, support for AR, and common arguments (with their counterarguments) to justify the moral permissibility (or not) of AR. Responses are reported using standard tabulations. Responses of pediatricians and nurses/RTs were compared using Chi-square, with P < .05 considered significant.
Results
Response rate was 53/115(46%) (pediatricians), and 73/120(61%) (nurses/RTs). Pediatricians and nurses/RTs are supportive of AR. Most considered ‘benefits arguments’ sufficient to justify AR; however, most acknowledged that counterarguments suggesting alternative research methods may be available, or that it is unclear why the same ‘benefits arguments’ do not apply to using humans in research, significantly weakened ‘benefits arguments’. Almost all were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘characteristics of non-human-animals arguments’, including that non-human-animals may not be sentient, or are simply property. Most were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘human exceptionalism’ arguments, including that humans have more advanced mental abilities, are of a special ‘kind’, can enter into social contracts, or face a ‘lifeboat situation’. Counterarguments explained much of this, including that not all humans have these more advanced abilities [the argument from species overlap], and that the notion of ‘kind’ is arbitrary [e.g., why are we not of the kind ‘sentient animal’ or ‘subject-of-a-life’]. Pediatrician and nurse/RT responses were similar.
Conclusions
Most respondents were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR when given common arguments and counterarguments from the literature. HCW should seriously consider arguments on both sides of the AR debate.
Keywords: Survey; Animals; Animal research; Ethics
Pediatric health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR). We aim to determine whether HCW consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of AR convincing.
Design
After development and validation, an e-mail survey was sent to all pediatricians and pediatric intensive care unit nurses and respiratory therapists (RTs) affiliated with a Canadian University. We presented questions about demographics, support for AR, and common arguments (with their counterarguments) to justify the moral permissibility (or not) of AR. Responses are reported using standard tabulations. Responses of pediatricians and nurses/RTs were compared using Chi-square, with P < .05 considered significant.
Results
Response rate was 53/115(46%) (pediatricians), and 73/120(61%) (nurses/RTs). Pediatricians and nurses/RTs are supportive of AR. Most considered ‘benefits arguments’ sufficient to justify AR; however, most acknowledged that counterarguments suggesting alternative research methods may be available, or that it is unclear why the same ‘benefits arguments’ do not apply to using humans in research, significantly weakened ‘benefits arguments’. Almost all were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘characteristics of non-human-animals arguments’, including that non-human-animals may not be sentient, or are simply property. Most were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘human exceptionalism’ arguments, including that humans have more advanced mental abilities, are of a special ‘kind’, can enter into social contracts, or face a ‘lifeboat situation’. Counterarguments explained much of this, including that not all humans have these more advanced abilities [the argument from species overlap], and that the notion of ‘kind’ is arbitrary [e.g., why are we not of the kind ‘sentient animal’ or ‘subject-of-a-life’]. Pediatrician and nurse/RT responses were similar.
Conclusions
Most respondents were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR when given common arguments and counterarguments from the literature. HCW should seriously consider arguments on both sides of the AR debate.
Keywords: Survey; Animals; Animal research; Ethics
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Annette Dula is one of few African American bioethicists in the United States who has written extensively on racial aspects of bioethics, including those related to health disparities among different races. This article reviews... more
Annette Dula is one of few African American bioethicists in the United States who has written extensively on racial aspects of bioethics, including those related to health disparities among different races. This article reviews philosophical and bioethical aspects of Dula’s writings, in particular those aspects that offer what might be called a “radical critique” of mainstream bioethical thinking and practice, and offers some criticisms and suggestions for development of the research agenda set forth by her work.
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This chapter engages some bioethical issues raised by cancer biomarker research. We discuss some of the actual and potential benefits and harms from cancer biomarker research, concerns that individuals are treated with respect in the... more
This chapter engages some bioethical issues raised by cancer biomarker research. We discuss some of the actual and potential benefits and harms from cancer biomarker research, concerns that individuals are treated with respect in the course of such research, and concerns that such research is fair and just. Our focus on bioethical issues specific to cancer biomarkers will include the validation of biomarkers; confidentiality, specimen identification, and data protection; and the return of research results. We do not discuss any legal or regulatory aspects of cancer biomarker research. This is because law and regulations vary by place and time and, more importantly, laws and regulations are not a reliable guide to what is ethical: laws can permit, and even require, immoral and unjust behaviors and morally permissible and just actions can be illegal. Our discussion focuses only on ethical or moral aspects of biomarker research.
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Ethical concerns about nonhuman animals arise from the recognition that many animals, such as mammals, birds, and vertebrates generally, as well as some invertebrate species, are conscious and sentient, that is, capable of negative and... more
Ethical concerns about nonhuman animals arise from the recognition that many animals, such as mammals, birds, and vertebrates generally, as well as some invertebrate species, are conscious and sentient, that is, capable of negative and positive sensations. Further mental states attributed to many animals include beliefs, desires, reasoning, memory, expectations for the future, rich and varied negative and positive emotions, social engagement, self-awareness, and a psychological unity that enables identity over time.
A growing body of research in cognitive ethology, the branch of scientific research focused on animal minds, is providing increasingly stronger reasons—beyond common sense, observations, and arguments from analogy to human behavior, physiology, and evolution—to believe that many animals are, like human beings, minded, psychologically complex beings whose lives can go better and worse for them and thus are capable of being harmed (Armstrong and Botzler 2008). Little scientific research supports an opposing view that all animals are mindless, incapable of suffering or experiencing negative emotions, or are otherwise incapable of being harmed or made worse off.
In light of this understanding of animals' cognitive and emotional lives, most contemporary ethicists who address these issues argue that there are some direct moral duties owed to conscious, sentient animals, although they disagree on the extent and seriousness of these obligations. And there are debates about what difference the cognitive sophistication of the species might make to our obligations concerning individuals of that species: for example, might a prima facie obligation to not harm be stronger concerning chimpanzees, less toward chickens, and even less for fish? Answers here depend on our scientific understanding of the mental lives of the species, as well as our moral theorizing.
A growing body of research in cognitive ethology, the branch of scientific research focused on animal minds, is providing increasingly stronger reasons—beyond common sense, observations, and arguments from analogy to human behavior, physiology, and evolution—to believe that many animals are, like human beings, minded, psychologically complex beings whose lives can go better and worse for them and thus are capable of being harmed (Armstrong and Botzler 2008). Little scientific research supports an opposing view that all animals are mindless, incapable of suffering or experiencing negative emotions, or are otherwise incapable of being harmed or made worse off.
In light of this understanding of animals' cognitive and emotional lives, most contemporary ethicists who address these issues argue that there are some direct moral duties owed to conscious, sentient animals, although they disagree on the extent and seriousness of these obligations. And there are debates about what difference the cognitive sophistication of the species might make to our obligations concerning individuals of that species: for example, might a prima facie obligation to not harm be stronger concerning chimpanzees, less toward chickens, and even less for fish? Answers here depend on our scientific understanding of the mental lives of the species, as well as our moral theorizing.
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Let’s say that a feminist ethics is (among other things) one that takes considerations of gender to be highly significant (if not crucial) in many determinations of moral right and wrong. Must one accept some form of feminist theory in... more
Let’s say that a feminist ethics is (among other things) one that takes considerations of gender to be highly significant (if not crucial) in many determinations of moral right and wrong. Must one accept some form of feminist
theory in order to adopt a feminist ethical perspective? Nathan Nobis argues that one need not. He advocates what he calls a “minimal model” of feminist ethics, arguing that this model is sufficient to meet feminist goals. Nobis defends this minimalist model against the view that a feminist ethics must rest upon feminist theory.
theory in order to adopt a feminist ethical perspective? Nathan Nobis argues that one need not. He advocates what he calls a “minimal model” of feminist ethics, arguing that this model is sufficient to meet feminist goals. Nobis defends this minimalist model against the view that a feminist ethics must rest upon feminist theory.
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The Animal Rights Debate is structured as a debate. In the first round, Carl Cohen argues that animals do not and cannot have rights, while Tom Regan argues that they do. In the second round, Cohen and Regan respond to each other. The... more
The Animal Rights Debate is structured as a debate. In the first round, Carl Cohen argues that animals do not and cannot have rights, while Tom Regan argues that they do. In the second round, Cohen and Regan respond to each other. The book would make an ideal main ...
Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Ethics
Arguments for moral nihilism—the view that there are no moral truths—are criticized by showing that their major premises suggest epistemic or intellectual nihilism—the view that no beliefs are reasonable, justified, ought to be believed,... more
Arguments for moral nihilism—the view that there are no moral truths—are criticized by showing that their major premises suggest epistemic or intellectual nihilism—the view that no beliefs are reasonable, justified, ought to be believed, and so on. Insofar as intellectual nihilism ought be rejected, this shows that the major premises of arguments for moral nihilisms ought to be rejected also.
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Elizabeth Harman has presented a novel view on the moral status of early fetuses that she calls the “Actual Future Principle” (hereafter the AFP): An early fetus that will become a person has some moral status. An early fetus that will... more
Elizabeth Harman has presented a novel view on the moral status of early fetuses that she calls the “Actual Future Principle” (hereafter the AFP): An early fetus that will become a person has some moral status. An early fetus that will die while it is still an early fetus has no moral status. This view is said to justify a "very liberal" position on abortion, that "early abortion requires no moral justification whatsoever," and show this position to be "more attractive than has previously been thought." Harman concedes that the AFP "may appear to be incoherent or be plainly wrong on its face." I argue that she does not defeat this appearance: strong arguments are not given in its favor. I will undercut Harman's main argument for the AFP by showing that no defender of abortion needs to accept the AFP to reasonably retain her views. Since the AFP is not adequately defended, Harman does not provide a strong argument for her view on abortion. I will note, however, that Harman's liberal view on abortion may, in fact, imply very little about the morality of most actual abortions
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Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Ethics
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... 2009 May;9(5):27-9. Interests and harms in primate research. Nobis N. Philosophy, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA. nathan.nobis@gmail.com. Comment on: Am J Bioeth. 2009 May;9(5):3-12. PMID: 19396679 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE].... more
... 2009 May;9(5):27-9. Interests and harms in primate research. Nobis N. Philosophy, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA. nathan.nobis@gmail.com. Comment on: Am J Bioeth. 2009 May;9(5):3-12. PMID: 19396679 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]. Publication Types: ...
Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Ethics
In &#x27;The Problem of Infant Suffering&#x27;,1 Andrew Chignell considers the difficult question of why God sometimes allows infants to be brutally tortured to death. He notes that some might assume that (A) if God exists, then... more
In &#x27;The Problem of Infant Suffering&#x27;,1 Andrew Chignell considers the difficult question of why God sometimes allows infants to be brutally tortured to death. He notes that some might assume that (A) if God exists, then brutal infant torture and death is &#x27;redeemed&#x27;, &#x27;defeated&#x27;, or ...
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Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Ethics
Abstract: Shafer-Landau argues that occasional indeterminacy in the metaphysics of morals--ie that moral predicates are vague and, thus, that some moral judgments are neither true nor false (ie indeterminate in truth value)--is compatible... more
Abstract: Shafer-Landau argues that occasional indeterminacy in the metaphysics of morals--ie that moral predicates are vague and, thus, that some moral judgments are neither true nor false (ie indeterminate in truth value)--is compatible with &#x27;moral realism,&#x27; the view ...
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Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Ethics
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016. Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free. Reviews on Amazon and the... more
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016.
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Studies
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016. Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free. Reviews on Amazon and the... more
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016.
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Research Interests: Ethics and Animal Studies
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016. Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free. Reviews on Amazon and the... more
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016.
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Research Interests:
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016. Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free. Reviews on Amazon and the... more
Nathan Nobis. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights. Open Philosophy Press, 2016.
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
Buy the book on Amazon in paperback for $5.99 or Kindle for $2.99, or download the book for free.
Reviews on Amazon and the Open Textbook Library.
Available through www.AnimalEthics101.com
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Research Interests: Drugs and War on Drugs
Is Your Opinion on Abortion Wrong?
Are Your Arguments Good or Bad?
On Abortion, Ethics and the Law
Are Your Arguments Good or Bad?
On Abortion, Ethics and the Law
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Reasonable Beliefs and Experiences : What are the Connections? Some beliefs (or thoughts , opinions. . ) are reasonable (or rational , justified, should be held . .) Other other beliefs are unreasonable.... more
Reasonable Beliefs and Experiences : What are the Connections? Some beliefs (or thoughts , opinions. . ) are reasonable (or rational , justified, should be held . .) Other other beliefs are unreasonable. Examples: ____________________________________ WHY? A partial answer: our experiences ! "This belief is reasonable for me to have because of these experiences I've had!" "That belief is unreasonable for us to have because of these experiences we've had!" Sounds scientific! An empiricist epistemology sees knowledge as ultimately based on experience. Questions: when (and how) do experiences justify beliefs? When do they not? What should we look for and look out for? Background information for our questions:
A brief overview of some moral theories or major moral concerns.
Common arguments on abortion worksheet .. old and in need of improvement!
General ethics assignment for finding and evaluating arguments.
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How to Have a Philosophical Discussion
Someone recently asked me how to have philosophical conversations or discussions. Here are some quick guidelines, focusing on philosophical discussions about moral issues:
Someone recently asked me how to have philosophical conversations or discussions. Here are some quick guidelines, focusing on philosophical discussions about moral issues:
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PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS – Almost Everything You Need to Know!
A NARRATED POWERPOINT presentation of my article "The harmful, nontherapeutic use of animals in research is morally wrong" Nobis, N. (2011). The harmful, nontherapeutic use of animals in research is morally wrong. The American Journal of... more
A NARRATED POWERPOINT presentation of my article "The harmful, nontherapeutic use of animals in research is morally wrong"
Nobis, N. (2011). The harmful, nontherapeutic use of animals in research is morally wrong. The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 342(4), 297-304.
Available at
https://www.academia.edu/1788598/The_Harmful_Nontherapeutic_Use_of_Animals_in_Research_Is_Morally_Wrong
ABSTRACT
It is argued that using animals in research is morally wrong when the research is nontherapeutic and harmful to the animals. This article discusses methods of moral reasoning and discusses how arguments on this and other bioethical issues might be defended and critiqued. A basic method of moral argument analysis is presented and used to show that common objections to the view that “animal research is morally wrong” fail: ie, common arguments for the view that “animal research is morally permissible” are demonstrably unsound or in need of defense. It is argued that the best explanations why harmful,
nontherapeutic research on human beings is wrong, ie, what it is about humans that makes such experimentation wrong, apply to many animals as well. Thus, harmful and nontherapeutic animal experimentation is wrong for reasons similar to the reasons that harmful and nontherapeutic human
experimentation is wrong.
Nobis, N. (2011). The harmful, nontherapeutic use of animals in research is morally wrong. The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 342(4), 297-304.
Available at
https://www.academia.edu/1788598/The_Harmful_Nontherapeutic_Use_of_Animals_in_Research_Is_Morally_Wrong
ABSTRACT
It is argued that using animals in research is morally wrong when the research is nontherapeutic and harmful to the animals. This article discusses methods of moral reasoning and discusses how arguments on this and other bioethical issues might be defended and critiqued. A basic method of moral argument analysis is presented and used to show that common objections to the view that “animal research is morally wrong” fail: ie, common arguments for the view that “animal research is morally permissible” are demonstrably unsound or in need of defense. It is argued that the best explanations why harmful,
nontherapeutic research on human beings is wrong, ie, what it is about humans that makes such experimentation wrong, apply to many animals as well. Thus, harmful and nontherapeutic animal experimentation is wrong for reasons similar to the reasons that harmful and nontherapeutic human
experimentation is wrong.
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For an online magazine for general readers. Any feedback would be appreciated! Is your opinion on abortion wrong? Nine states are in the process of trying to make most abortions illegal. Advocates of these laws are usually motivated by... more
For an online magazine for general readers. Any feedback would be appreciated!
Is your opinion on abortion wrong?
Nine states are in the process of trying to make most abortions illegal. Advocates of these laws are usually motivated by the belief that abortion is morally wrong. Opponents argue that personal moral views on controversial issues shouldn’t influence law, or that abortion isn’t wrong, or both.
Who is correct here? How can anyone tell?
Critical thinking may help.
We are philosophy professors who use our training in critical thinking to assess the reasoning people use to form their opinions about controversial issues like abortion. In our recent open-access book “Thinking Critically About Abortion”, we use these skills to examine the moral and legal arguments about abortion.
These same skills can help us better see what we should think, and do, about other topics of moral and political importance.
Is your opinion on abortion wrong?
Nine states are in the process of trying to make most abortions illegal. Advocates of these laws are usually motivated by the belief that abortion is morally wrong. Opponents argue that personal moral views on controversial issues shouldn’t influence law, or that abortion isn’t wrong, or both.
Who is correct here? How can anyone tell?
Critical thinking may help.
We are philosophy professors who use our training in critical thinking to assess the reasoning people use to form their opinions about controversial issues like abortion. In our recent open-access book “Thinking Critically About Abortion”, we use these skills to examine the moral and legal arguments about abortion.
These same skills can help us better see what we should think, and do, about other topics of moral and political importance.
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Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. They philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs... more
Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. They philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful.
How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past?
How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past?
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Atlanta Veg Fest:
Debating Vegan Ethics: Peaceful and Productive Moral Discussions
Debating Vegan Ethics: Peaceful and Productive Moral Discussions
Presentation on Open Access Textbooks / Open Educational Resources
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1000-Word Philosophy is seeking submissions! Essay Categories Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Ethics Epistemology Historical Philosophy Metaphilosophy Metaphysics Phenomenology and Existentialism Philosophy of Race, Sex &... more
1000-Word Philosophy is seeking submissions!
Essay Categories
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
Ethics
Epistemology
Historical Philosophy
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Phenomenology and Existentialism
Philosophy of Race, Sex & Gender
Philosophy of Mind and Language
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Science
Philosophical Traditions & Global Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy
* New categories are likely to be added as the project expands.
. . We’re always looking for authors to contribute and seek a diverse set of essays, on a wide range of philosophical issues, questions, figures and traditions. If you’re interested in contributing a 1000-word essay (or essays) on a philosophical topic that interest you and that you think would interest our readers, email us. Please either send us your full essay for review, or an essay proposal, or any other inquiries regarding the appropriateness and desirability of your topic and approach.
We are especially interested in essays on topics frequently addressed in introductory courses, as well as topics that are difficult to cover in introductory courses because the relevant literature is difficult for first-year students. We especially welcome material addressing under-represented philosophical traditions, including global philosophy, philosophy of race, LGBTQIA issues, and more. . .
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Essay Categories
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
Ethics
Epistemology
Historical Philosophy
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Phenomenology and Existentialism
Philosophy of Race, Sex & Gender
Philosophy of Mind and Language
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Science
Philosophical Traditions & Global Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy
* New categories are likely to be added as the project expands.
. . We’re always looking for authors to contribute and seek a diverse set of essays, on a wide range of philosophical issues, questions, figures and traditions. If you’re interested in contributing a 1000-word essay (or essays) on a philosophical topic that interest you and that you think would interest our readers, email us. Please either send us your full essay for review, or an essay proposal, or any other inquiries regarding the appropriateness and desirability of your topic and approach.
We are especially interested in essays on topics frequently addressed in introductory courses, as well as topics that are difficult to cover in introductory courses because the relevant literature is difficult for first-year students. We especially welcome material addressing under-represented philosophical traditions, including global philosophy, philosophy of race, LGBTQIA issues, and more. . .
1000WordPhilosophy.com
Please share this post!
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Aesthetics, Ethics, and 19 moreEpistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy Of Religion, Applied Ethics, Logic, African Philosophy, Bioethics, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy Of Law, Philosophy Of Race, Moral Philosophy, Argumentation Theory and Critical Thinking, Teaching Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN, Practical Ethics, Public Philosophy, Philosophy of Love and Sex, and History of Philosophy
Between the Species Volume 21, Issue 1 (2018) Tom Regan: In Memoriam Articles Reflections on Tom Regan and the Animal Rights Movement That Once Was Gary L. Francione "Subjects-of-a-Life," Entelechy, and Intrinsic Teleology Josephine... more
Between the Species
Volume 21, Issue 1 (2018) Tom Regan: In Memoriam
Articles
Reflections on Tom Regan and the Animal Rights Movement That Once Was
Gary L. Francione
"Subjects-of-a-Life," Entelechy, and Intrinsic Teleology
Josephine Donovan
Nozick’s Libertarian Critique of Regan
Josh Milburn
Harming (Respectfully) Some to Benefit Others: Animal Rights and the Moral Imperative of Trap-Neuter-Release Programs
Cheryl E. Abbate
Chasing Secretariat's Consent: The Impossibility of Permissible Animal Sports
James Rocha
We Are All Noah: Tom Regan's Olive Branch to Religious Animal Ethics
Matthew C. Halteman
Demystifying Animal Rights
Mylan Engel Jr.
Xenotransplantation, Subsistence Hunting and the Pursuit of Health: Lessons for Animal Rights-Based Vegan Advocacy
Nathan M. Nobis
Animal Rights and Incredulous Stares
Bob Fischer
Tom Regan: A Visionary Changing the World
Carolyn Bailey
Evidence of Sexism and Male Privilege in the Animal Liberation/Rights Movement
Lisa Kemmerer
Book Review
Review of Nathan Nobis's Animals & Ethics 101
Bob Fischer
Volume 21, Issue 1 (2018) Tom Regan: In Memoriam
Articles
Reflections on Tom Regan and the Animal Rights Movement That Once Was
Gary L. Francione
"Subjects-of-a-Life," Entelechy, and Intrinsic Teleology
Josephine Donovan
Nozick’s Libertarian Critique of Regan
Josh Milburn
Harming (Respectfully) Some to Benefit Others: Animal Rights and the Moral Imperative of Trap-Neuter-Release Programs
Cheryl E. Abbate
Chasing Secretariat's Consent: The Impossibility of Permissible Animal Sports
James Rocha
We Are All Noah: Tom Regan's Olive Branch to Religious Animal Ethics
Matthew C. Halteman
Demystifying Animal Rights
Mylan Engel Jr.
Xenotransplantation, Subsistence Hunting and the Pursuit of Health: Lessons for Animal Rights-Based Vegan Advocacy
Nathan M. Nobis
Animal Rights and Incredulous Stares
Bob Fischer
Tom Regan: A Visionary Changing the World
Carolyn Bailey
Evidence of Sexism and Male Privilege in the Animal Liberation/Rights Movement
Lisa Kemmerer
Book Review
Review of Nathan Nobis's Animals & Ethics 101
Bob Fischer
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Research Interests: Epistemology and Abortion
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This video is a conversation with Dr. Nathan Nobis. Dr. Nobis talks about his paper, "The Harmful, Nontherapeutic use of Animals in Research is Morally Wrong." Brad Ost, AUC Woodruff Library, is the interviewer
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The authors of these eight essays attempt to defend animal research on moral and scientiac grounds. Advocates of vivisection should and the book a serious disappointment. Frey’s essay, “Justifying Animal Experimentation: The Starting... more
The authors of these eight essays attempt to defend animal research on moral and scientiac grounds. Advocates of vivisection should and the book a serious disappointment. Frey’s essay, “Justifying Animal Experimentation: The Starting Point,” should have been at the start of the book. Instead it is hidden as the last chapter. Frey notes that most supporters of vivisection attempt to justify it by appealing to its beneats for humans. But, he argues, this defense is subject to serious objections:
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This is a book review of Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights by Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf (Columbia University Press, 2016). KEYWORDS: abortion, animal rights, ethics, book review, Applied Ethics, Arts and Humanities,... more
This is a book review of Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights by Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf (Columbia University Press, 2016). KEYWORDS: abortion, animal rights, ethics, book review, Applied Ethics, Arts and Humanities, Philosoph
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In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that... more
In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that some animals have certain moral rights. For the most part the book is taken up with criticizing alternative views concerning our moral obligations to animals and explaining and defending “The Rights View”. In the final chapter, Regan draws out the implications ofthe rights view. These include arguing for an obligation to be a vegetarian, moral condemnation of hunting and trapping of wild animals as well as of most of the uses of animals for scientific purposes. Animals are not to be used for toxicity tests, in education contexts or in scientific research even though this may produce beneficial consequences for humans and other animals. The book is very clearly written and well argued. It covers all important positions and arguments related t o the q...
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Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and... more
Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and probably all abortions, should be legal. I begin by observing that people sometimes respond to the issue by describing the circumstances of abortion, not offering reasons for their views about those circumstances; I then dismiss “question-begging” arguments about abortion that merely assume the conclusions they are given to support; most importantly, I evaluate many arguments: both common, often-heard arguments and arguments developed by philosophers. My defense of abortion is based on facts about early fetuses’ not yet possessing consciousness or any mental life, awareness or feeling, as well as concerns about rights to one’s own body
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Are *you* the same thing as your body? Did *you* begin at conception? Do you have a rational and free "nature" or "essence"? Some answer 'yes' to all and argue that this means that abortion is wrong. This... more
Are *you* the same thing as your body? Did *you* begin at conception? Do you have a rational and free "nature" or "essence"? Some answer 'yes' to all and argue that this means that abortion is wrong. This argument is discussed here
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In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we... more
In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we describe and assess the four most prominent conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can be found in the rulings concerning Kiko and Tommy, with particular focus on the most recent decision, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery
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We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as... more
We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue.
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Two chapters -- "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion" -- in one file, from the open access textbook "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource"... more
Two chapters -- "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion" -- in one file, from the open access textbook "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource" edited by Noah Levin. Adults, children and babies are arguably wrong to kill, fundamentally, because we are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, we argue that they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body, and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body; this further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal. In the course of arguing for these claims, we: discuss how to best define abortion; dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusion, instead of giving genuine reasons for them; refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion; explain why some influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful; provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong; briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more. Little of this discussion should be taken as absolute “proof” of anything, as this is merely a reasoned introduction to the issues: much more needs to be discussed, always
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Grades on assignments and tests are reliable, yet imperfect, indicators of students’ knowledge and understanding of a subject matter. Overall course grades are also often influenced by students’ complying with class procedures: e.g., if... more
Grades on assignments and tests are reliable, yet imperfect, indicators of students’ knowledge and understanding of a subject matter. Overall course grades are also often influenced by students’ complying with class procedures: e.g., if attendance and participation are required, then students who rarely attend class may get poor grades, even if they understand the course content and have done well on the assignments and tests.
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Should people who believe in animal rights think that abortion is wrong? Should pro-lifers accept animal rights? If you think it’s wrong to kill fetuses to end pregnancies, should you also think it’s wrong to kill animals to, say, eat... more
Should people who believe in animal rights think that abortion is wrong? Should pro-lifers accept animal rights? If you think it’s wrong to kill fetuses to end pregnancies, should you also think it’s wrong to kill animals to, say, eat them? If you, say, oppose animal research, should you also oppose abortion? Some argue ‘yes’ and others argue ‘no’ to either or both sets of questions. The correct answer, however, seems to be, ‘it depends’: it depends on why someone accepts animal rights, and why someone thinks abortion is wrong: it depends on their reasons
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This chapter engages some bioethical issues raised by cancer biomarker research. We discuss some of the actual and potential benefits and harms from cancer biomarker research, concerns that individuals are treated with respect in the... more
This chapter engages some bioethical issues raised by cancer biomarker research. We discuss some of the actual and potential benefits and harms from cancer biomarker research, concerns that individuals are treated with respect in the course of such research, and concerns that such research is fair and just. Our focus on bioethical issues specific to cancer biomarkers will include the validation of biomarkers; confidentiality, specimen identification, and data protection; and the return of research results. We do not discuss any legal or regulatory aspects of cancer biomarker research. This is because law and regulations vary by place and time and, more importantly, laws and regulations are not a reliable guide to what is ethical: laws can permit, and even require, immoral and unjust behaviors and morally permissible and just actions can be illegal. Our discussion focuses only on ethical or moral aspects of biomarker research.
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Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that... more
Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that philosophical ethicists have the expertise that makes them the likely best candidates for these tasks. I review the skills, knowledge, and perspectives that philosophical ethicists tend to have that makes them ethical experts. I argue that, insofar as Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees are expected to ensure that research is ethical, they must have philosophical ethicists as members.
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The prolonged public debate on human embryonic stem cell (ECS) research has reflected a deepening moral divide in American society over the ontological status of the hu- man embryo and the morality of the use and creation of em- bryos for... more
The prolonged public debate on human embryonic stem cell (ECS) research has reflected a deepening moral divide in American society over the ontological status of the hu- man embryo and the morality of the use and creation of em- bryos for biomedical research. The ...
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Research Interests: Medical Sciences, Ethics, Experimental philosophy, Applied Ethics, Bioethics, and 15 moreAnimal Studies, Medical Education, Medicine, Animal Rights, Animals in biomedical research, Canada, Humans, Female, Animals, Male, Animal Experimentation, Adult, Animal Research, Health Personnel, and Morehouse College
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Cambridge mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford (1879/1999) concluded his famous essay, “The Ethics of Belief” with the bold claim that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”... more
Cambridge mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford (1879/1999) concluded his famous essay, “The Ethics of Belief” with the bold claim that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (p.77). Clifford’s enthusiasm for evidentialism—the principle that one should proportion one’s belief to the strength of the evidence—may have been overzealous, but a plausible interpretation of his view is this: Because beliefs often have serious moral consequences, one should base one’s beliefs on the evidence, and it is intellectually and morally irresponsible not to do so. This perspective motivates recent so-called “evidence-based” methods in the fields of medicine and education. Balcombe’s (2000, 2001) case for replacing learning methods that require pain, suffering, and death for animals with methods that do not (computer-assisted learning, three-dimensional models, videotapes, and other alternatives) can be seen as motivated by this evident...
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Collected and edited by Noah Levin Table of Contents UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2... more
Collected and edited by Noah Levin Table of Contents UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The Ethics of our Digital Selves (Noah Levin) UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD” 7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas) 8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge) 9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis) 10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin) 11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis &amp; Kristina Grob) 12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis &amp; Kristina Grob) UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS 13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar) 14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies) 15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman) 16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin) 17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar) 18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes) UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS 19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh) 20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill) 21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge) 22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin) 23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton) 24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill) UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY 25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato) 26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley) 27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant) 28 The Virtues (Aristotle) 29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche) 30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko)
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In The Politics, Aristotle tells us plainly, “the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled. This general principle must similarly hold good of all human beings generally”... more
In The Politics, Aristotle tells us plainly, “the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled. This general principle must similarly hold good of all human beings generally” (1254b14). In Aristotle, The Politics, R.F. Stalley (ed.). Ernest Barker (trans.), Oxford University Press, 1998. Cynthia Freeland discusses Aristotle’s misogyny in detail, “Aristotle says that the courage of a man lies in commanding, a woman’s lies in obeying; that ‘matter yearns for form, as the female for the male and the ugly for the beautiful’; that women have fewer teeth than men; that a female is an incomplete male or ‘as it were, a deformity.’” In “Nourishing Speculation: A Feminist Reading of Aristotelian Science,” in Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle, Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), State University of New York Press, 1994.
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Tom Regan argues that human beings and some non-human animals have moral rights because they are “subjects of lives,” that is, roughly, conscious, sentient beings with an experiential welfare. A prominent critic, Carl Cohen, objects: he... more
Tom Regan argues that human beings and some non-human animals have moral rights because they are “subjects of lives,” that is, roughly, conscious, sentient beings with an experiential welfare. A prominent critic, Carl Cohen, objects: he argues that only moral agents have rights and so animals, since they are not moral agents, lack rights. An objection to Cohen’s argument is that his theory of rights seems to imply that human beings who are not moral agents have no moral rights, but since these human beings have rights, his theory of rights is false, and so he fails to show that animals lack rights. Cohen responds that this objection fails because human beings who are not moral agents nevertheless are the “kind” of beings who are moral agents and so have rights, but animals are not that “kind” of being and so lack rights. Regan argues that Cohen’s “kind” arguments fail: they fail to explain why human beings who are not moral agents have rights and they fail to show that animals lack ...
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Philosophers and other theorists from a surprisingly wide range of ethical perspectives have argued that harming animals in agribusiness, in the fashion industry, in research labs, and in other arenas that is, causing animals to... more
Philosophers and other theorists from a surprisingly wide range of ethical perspectives have argued that harming animals in agribusiness, in the fashion industry, in research labs, and in other arenas that is, causing animals to experience pain, suffering, and death for these purposes is seriously morally wrong and that we individually and collectively ought not to support these practices. The range of ethical perspectives includes utilitarianism and other consequentialisms, rights-based deontologies, ideal contractarianisms, virtue ethics, common-sense moralities, religious moralities, feminist ethics, and more, indeed almost every major theoretical perspective in ethics.1 While there is a river of moral thinking in defense of animals, defenses of common beliefs and attitudes regarding animal use are but a trickle. Therefore, Tibor R. Machan's book, Putting Humans FirstWhy We Are Nature's Favorite , an attempt to justify the status quo regarding animal use and show why its ...
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... 1968 by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and quoted in Nathaniel Altman,Eating Jor Life ... The moral rightness or wrongness of a person's actions is different ... Some will complain that my argument is... more
... 1968 by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and quoted in Nathaniel Altman,Eating Jor Life ... The moral rightness or wrongness of a person's actions is different ... Some will complain that my argument is "too picky." They might say that cruelty has been interpreted ...
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(3) Therefore, each and every one of these animal-excluding criteria must be rejected as a criterion for the possession of rights (pp. 186-7). Frey's position is that premiss (2) 'is not obvious and requires defence', and... more
(3) Therefore, each and every one of these animal-excluding criteria must be rejected as a criterion for the possession of rights (pp. 186-7). Frey's position is that premiss (2) 'is not obvious and requires defence', and that 'the best defences of it, if they stand at all, specifically exclude ...