Jon Matheson

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge.To do sowebring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.

We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue.
The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:

• What would it take to be a moral expert?
• Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one?
• Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own?
• What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?

In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.

Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma.  We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim.  First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma.  Second, we show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn.  We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn.  The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.

Articles
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOSIAN, A Simple Solution to the two Envelope Problem
Jonathan MATHESON, The Case for Rational Uniqueness
Christian MÖCKEL, “Lebendige Formen.” Zu Ernst Cassirers Konzept der “Formwissenschaft”
Hamid VAHID, Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
Mark Owen WEBB, A Peace Plan for the Science Wars

Debate
Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE, On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
Guy AXTELL, Recovering Responsibility
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales

Reviews
Scott Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem, reviewed by Eugen Huzum

How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic ends ought to be, and the way in which these issues are related to other traditional questions in epistemology. The section concludes by examining questions of epistemic value, of whether knowledge is in some sense primary, and of whether the ethics of belief falls within the domain of epistemology or ethics.
    The second section extends this traditional debate to issues concerning the social dimensions of belief formation. It begins with essays by social psychologists discussing the past three decades of research in 'lay epistemics'. It continues by examining Humean, Kantian, and feminist insights into the social aspects of belief formation, as well as questions concerning the ethics of assertion. The section concludes with a series of essays examining a topic that is currently of great interest to epistemologists: namely, the significance of peer disagreement.