In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere ani... more In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge.To do sowebring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In chal... more We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue. The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:
• What would it take to be a moral expert? • Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one? • Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own? • What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?
In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.
In this paper, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this pri... more In this paper, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this principle, we should exercise moral caution, at least when we can. More formally, the principle claims that if you should believe or suspend judgment that doing an action is a serious moral wrong, while knowing that not doing that action is not morally wrong, then you should not do that action. After motivating this principle, I argue that it has significant application in applied ethics. The application to applied ethics comes by way of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I argue that we are in an impoverished epistemic position with respect to a number of morally controversial actions resulting from the widespread and persistent disagreement on those issues among intelligent, informed, and open-minded individuals on disparate sides of the debate. In doing so, I build on the emerging literature in epistemology on the epistemic significance of disagreement. However, while disagreement should make us skeptical about the moral status of some actions, there needn't be disagreement about the permissibility of refraining from doing those very actions. When there is not, our principle instructs us to exercise moral caution and not take the controversial course of action. Though such a principle has perhaps a number of applications in applied ethics, my focus here is limited to the question of whether it is morally permissible to eat animals for pleasure.
This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following q... more This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following questions: (1) How does discovering that an epistemic equal disagrees with you affect your justification for holding your belief? and (2) Can you rationally maintain your belief in the face of such disagreement? This article explains and motivates each of the central positions in this debate, while at the same time, raising challenges for each of them. It concludes by speculating about new directions that the debate will take.
The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several rec... more The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the generality problemwell-founded reliabilism. According to Comesaña, the solution to the generality problem lies in solving the basing problem, such that any solution to the basing problem will give a solution to the generality problem. Comesaña utilizes Conee and Feldman's evidentialist account of basing (Conee and Feldman's well-foundedness principle) in forming his version of reliabilism. In this paper I show that Comesaña's proposed solution to the generality problem is inadequate. Well-founded reliabilism both fails to solve the generality problem and subjects reliabilism to new damning verdicts. In addition, I show that evidentialism does not face any parallel problems, so the generality problem remains a reason to prefer evidentialism to reliabilism.
Relativists claim that there are no absolute facts-facts which don't differ from individual to in... more Relativists claim that there are no absolute facts-facts which don't differ from individual to individual or from community to community-within some domain. Their relativism can be either global or local. Global relativists claim that there are no absolute facts at all, whereas local relativists restrict the domain of relative facts. While ethical relativism is a rather familiar sort of local relativism, epistemic relativism is another type of local relativism, and one which is beginning to receive more attention. Whereas ethical relativism claims that there are no absolute ethical facts, epistemic relativism claims that there are no absolute epistemic facts. So, according to epistemic relativism facts about what an individual is justifi ed in believing or what an individual knows are not absolute, but rather relative to individuals or communities. It is clearly true that not every individual knows or is justifi ed in believing the same propositions, and that what any individual knows or is justifi ed in believing often changes over time, however, epistemic relativism, at least as it is being understood here, is making a more radical claim that this. Epistemic relativism claims that the very standards for knowledge and justifi cation are not absolute, but rather relative to individuals or communities. Since the standards of knowledge and justifi cation are thought to be relative, the truth of epistemic claims are also thought to be relative. So, according to the epistemic relativist, we can fi x what information a particular individual has at a particular time, and there are still no absolute facts about what that individual knows or is justifi ed in believing at that time. According to epistemic relativism there may be some standards or rationality by which the individual is epistemically justifi ed in believing some proposition and other standards of rationality by which the individual is not epistemically justifi ed in believing that proposition, and no absolute facts regarding one of these sets of standards being more correct or better than the other. So, the epistemic relativist claims that whether some belief is justifi ed or an item of knowledge is in some sense relative to some set of standards of rationality that can vary from individual to individual or community to community.
The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains... more The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one's doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can't reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can't what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can't it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn't the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn't a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).
Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common ... more Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology-that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty's argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. ... more Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn. We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.
Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement re... more Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one’s evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).
Articles
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOS... more Articles
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOSIAN, A Simple Solution to the two Envelope Problem
Jonathan MATHESON, The Case for Rational Uniqueness
Christian MÖCKEL, “Lebendige Formen.” Zu Ernst Cassirers Konzept der “Formwissenschaft”
Hamid VAHID, Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
Mark Owen WEBB, A Peace Plan for the Science Wars
Debate
Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE, On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
Guy AXTELL, Recovering Responsibility
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales
Reviews
Scott Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem, reviewed by Eugen Huzum
In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere ani... more In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge.To do sowebring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In chal... more We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue. The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:
• What would it take to be a moral expert? • Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one? • Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own? • What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?
In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.
In this paper, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this pri... more In this paper, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this principle, we should exercise moral caution, at least when we can. More formally, the principle claims that if you should believe or suspend judgment that doing an action is a serious moral wrong, while knowing that not doing that action is not morally wrong, then you should not do that action. After motivating this principle, I argue that it has significant application in applied ethics. The application to applied ethics comes by way of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I argue that we are in an impoverished epistemic position with respect to a number of morally controversial actions resulting from the widespread and persistent disagreement on those issues among intelligent, informed, and open-minded individuals on disparate sides of the debate. In doing so, I build on the emerging literature in epistemology on the epistemic significance of disagreement. However, while disagreement should make us skeptical about the moral status of some actions, there needn't be disagreement about the permissibility of refraining from doing those very actions. When there is not, our principle instructs us to exercise moral caution and not take the controversial course of action. Though such a principle has perhaps a number of applications in applied ethics, my focus here is limited to the question of whether it is morally permissible to eat animals for pleasure.
This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following q... more This article examines the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It pursues the following questions: (1) How does discovering that an epistemic equal disagrees with you affect your justification for holding your belief? and (2) Can you rationally maintain your belief in the face of such disagreement? This article explains and motivates each of the central positions in this debate, while at the same time, raising challenges for each of them. It concludes by speculating about new directions that the debate will take.
The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several rec... more The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the generality problemwell-founded reliabilism. According to Comesaña, the solution to the generality problem lies in solving the basing problem, such that any solution to the basing problem will give a solution to the generality problem. Comesaña utilizes Conee and Feldman's evidentialist account of basing (Conee and Feldman's well-foundedness principle) in forming his version of reliabilism. In this paper I show that Comesaña's proposed solution to the generality problem is inadequate. Well-founded reliabilism both fails to solve the generality problem and subjects reliabilism to new damning verdicts. In addition, I show that evidentialism does not face any parallel problems, so the generality problem remains a reason to prefer evidentialism to reliabilism.
Relativists claim that there are no absolute facts-facts which don't differ from individual to in... more Relativists claim that there are no absolute facts-facts which don't differ from individual to individual or from community to community-within some domain. Their relativism can be either global or local. Global relativists claim that there are no absolute facts at all, whereas local relativists restrict the domain of relative facts. While ethical relativism is a rather familiar sort of local relativism, epistemic relativism is another type of local relativism, and one which is beginning to receive more attention. Whereas ethical relativism claims that there are no absolute ethical facts, epistemic relativism claims that there are no absolute epistemic facts. So, according to epistemic relativism facts about what an individual is justifi ed in believing or what an individual knows are not absolute, but rather relative to individuals or communities. It is clearly true that not every individual knows or is justifi ed in believing the same propositions, and that what any individual knows or is justifi ed in believing often changes over time, however, epistemic relativism, at least as it is being understood here, is making a more radical claim that this. Epistemic relativism claims that the very standards for knowledge and justifi cation are not absolute, but rather relative to individuals or communities. Since the standards of knowledge and justifi cation are thought to be relative, the truth of epistemic claims are also thought to be relative. So, according to the epistemic relativist, we can fi x what information a particular individual has at a particular time, and there are still no absolute facts about what that individual knows or is justifi ed in believing at that time. According to epistemic relativism there may be some standards or rationality by which the individual is epistemically justifi ed in believing some proposition and other standards of rationality by which the individual is not epistemically justifi ed in believing that proposition, and no absolute facts regarding one of these sets of standards being more correct or better than the other. So, the epistemic relativist claims that whether some belief is justifi ed or an item of knowledge is in some sense relative to some set of standards of rationality that can vary from individual to individual or community to community.
The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains... more The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one's doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can't reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can't what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can't it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn't the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn't a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).
Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common ... more Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology-that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty's argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. ... more Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn. We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.
Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement re... more Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one’s evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).
Articles
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOS... more Articles
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOSIAN, A Simple Solution to the two Envelope Problem
Jonathan MATHESON, The Case for Rational Uniqueness
Christian MÖCKEL, “Lebendige Formen.” Zu Ernst Cassirers Konzept der “Formwissenschaft”
Hamid VAHID, Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
Mark Owen WEBB, A Peace Plan for the Science Wars
Debate
Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE, On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
Guy AXTELL, Recovering Responsibility
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales
Reviews
Scott Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem, reviewed by Eugen Huzum
Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence, but how does discovering that anot... more Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence, but how does discovering that another person disagrees with you about something affect the rationality of your beliefs on that topic? This is the question of epistemic significance of disagreement, which Matheson seeks to answer here. Beginning with a survey of the literature on this issue, Matheson maps out the conceptual space, presents the central examples, and explains the key arguments. At the same time, he develops and defends a particular account of the epistemic significance of disagreement – a version of the Equal Weight View. Compared to previous discussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement, this book extends beyond idealized cases of peer disagreement to real-life cases of disagreement and in so doing offers the reader a more complete view of the topic.
How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on... more How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic ends ought to be, and the way in which these issues are related to other traditional questions in epistemology. The section concludes by examining questions of epistemic value, of whether knowledge is in some sense primary, and of whether the ethics of belief falls within the domain of epistemology or ethics.
The second section extends this traditional debate to issues concerning the social dimensions of belief formation. It begins with essays by social psychologists discussing the past three decades of research in 'lay epistemics'. It continues by examining Humean, Kantian, and feminist insights into the social aspects of belief formation, as well as questions concerning the ethics of assertion. The section concludes with a series of essays examining a topic that is currently of great interest to epistemologists: namely, the significance of peer disagreement.
In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere ani... more In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections. Many have found it helpful to posit a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. On such accounts, animal knowledge is a kind of low-grade externalist knowledge that non-human animals and children are capable of possessing. In contrast, reflective knowledge is a more valuable state that requires the subject to have a certain perspective on her belief. It is intuitive to think that subjects capable of reflective knowledge sometimes only have animal knowledge with respect to some proposition; that is, that they have animal knowledge that p while simultaneously failing to have reflective knowledge that p. We argue that this intuitive thought is mistaken. We utilize plausible considerations about defeat and higher-order evidence to make the case that reflective subjects that lack reflective knowledge thereby have a defeater which prevents them from having mere animal knowledge.
The epistemology of disagreement focuses on the question of what it is rational to believe when y... more The epistemology of disagreement focuses on the question of what it is rational to believe when you discover that another disagrees with you. Much of the literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement has focused on examining a particular kind of disagreement -peer disagreement. Peer disagreement is a disagreement between epistemic equals of a sort. Two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to a proposition at a time just in case they are in an equally good epistemic position with respect to that proposition at that time. 1 So, epistemic peers regarding p at t are equally likely to be right about p at t. Here it is worth making a further distinction between evidentially equivalent peers and evidentially distinct peers. Two individuals can be in an equally good epistemic position on some matter without possessing exactly the same evidence. Distinct bodies of evidence can be equally good. 2 Evidentially equivalent peers are peers regarding p who share the same total evidence relevant to p. Evidentially distinct peers regarding p are peers regarding p that do not have the same total evidence with respect to p.
The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argu... more The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentative theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. To do so I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show how it entails that deep disagreements between epistemic peers are rationally resolvable. I will then examine a challenge to the Equal Weight View that claims that this consequence is untenable. Having motivated the challenge, I show that there is a viable response to make on behalf of the Equal Weight View. I conclude by considering and responding to several objections to this response.
The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is, apparently (to repeat it once more), that there ... more The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is, apparently (to repeat it once more), that there should be long obedience in the same direction, there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living; for instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality--anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or divine." -Nietzsche Recently there has been renewed philosophical interest in both the nature and value of faith. These debates are centered on two sets of questions. Questions in the first set are metaphysical in nature: What kind of a thing is faith? How is faith related to belief? Is faith voluntary? Etc. In contrast, questions in the second set are axiological: Is faith valuable? How and why is faith valuable? Can faith be rational? Etc. Answers to questions in the first set can have implications for answers in the 2 For defenses of non-doxastic accounts
Uploads
Papers by Jon Matheson
The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:
• What would it take to be a moral expert?
• Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one?
• Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own?
• What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?
In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOSIAN, A Simple Solution to the two Envelope Problem
Jonathan MATHESON, The Case for Rational Uniqueness
Christian MÖCKEL, “Lebendige Formen.” Zu Ernst Cassirers Konzept der “Formwissenschaft”
Hamid VAHID, Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
Mark Owen WEBB, A Peace Plan for the Science Wars
Debate
Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE, On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
Guy AXTELL, Recovering Responsibility
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales
Reviews
Scott Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem, reviewed by Eugen Huzum
The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:
• What would it take to be a moral expert?
• Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one?
• Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own?
• What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue?
In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise.
Cătălin BOBB, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics between Epistemology and Ontology
Ned MARKOSIAN, A Simple Solution to the two Envelope Problem
Jonathan MATHESON, The Case for Rational Uniqueness
Christian MÖCKEL, “Lebendige Formen.” Zu Ernst Cassirers Konzept der “Formwissenschaft”
Hamid VAHID, Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
Mark Owen WEBB, A Peace Plan for the Science Wars
Debate
Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE, On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
Guy AXTELL, Recovering Responsibility
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales
Reviews
Scott Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem, reviewed by Eugen Huzum
The second section extends this traditional debate to issues concerning the social dimensions of belief formation. It begins with essays by social psychologists discussing the past three decades of research in 'lay epistemics'. It continues by examining Humean, Kantian, and feminist insights into the social aspects of belief formation, as well as questions concerning the ethics of assertion. The section concludes with a series of essays examining a topic that is currently of great interest to epistemologists: namely, the significance of peer disagreement.