Kristin Andrews
York University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- I am York Research Chair in Philosophy of Animal Minds and Associate Professor of Philosophy at York University (Toro... moreI am York Research Chair in Philosophy of Animal Minds and Associate Professor of Philosophy at York University (Toronto), where I also help coordinate the Cognitive Science program and the Toronto Area Animal Cognition Discussion Group. I am the author author of a book on normative folk psychology (Do Chimpanzees Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology MIT 2012) and a book on animal minds (The Animal Mind, Routledge 2015) and co-editor with Jacob Beck of The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds (2017). I was elected a Member of the Royal Society of Canada’s College of New Scholars in 2015, and my research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I received my PhD in Philosophy from the University of Minnesota in 2000, and hold a BA in philosophy from Antioch College, and an MA in philosophy from Western Michigan University. In addition to my academic duties, I serve as a member of the Executive Board for The Borneo Orangutan Society Canada, which has the mission to promote conservation of orangutans and their habitat as well as to educate the public.edit
- Ronald Giereedit
Amicus curiae brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project's efforts to secure recognition of legal personhood and rights for two chimpanzees. Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases As Nonhuman Rights Project Seeks To... more
Amicus curiae brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project's efforts to secure recognition of legal personhood and rights for two chimpanzees.
Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases As Nonhuman Rights Project Seeks To Appeal To New York’s Highest Court
– Experts in animal ethics, animal political theory, the philosophy of animal cognition and behavior, and the philosophy of biology urge the Court of Appeals to recognize chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko as persons –
Feb. 26, 2018—New York, NY—After the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a motion for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in the cases of captive chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko, a group of prominent philosophers submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the NhRP’s efforts to secure recognition of their clients’ legal personhood and rights.
The NhRP argues in its Memorandum of Law, filed on Friday, that the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department’s June 2017 ruling requires review by the state’s highest court, not only because it conflicts with New York’s common law habeas corpus statute and previous rulings of the Court of Appeals, the First Department, and other Appellate Departments on issues pertaining to common law personhood and habeas corpus relief, but also “based on the novelty, difficulty, importance, and effect of the legal and public policy issues raised.”
Engaging directly with a core issue raised by the NhRP’s appeal—the question of who is a “person” capable of possessing any legal rights—the philosophers’ brief maintains that the First Department’s ruling “uses a number of incompatible conceptions of person which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or in fact compatible with Kiko and Tommy’s personhood.” The philosophers who authored the brief are:
Kristin Andrews (York University)
Gary Comstock (North Carolina State University)
G.K.D. Crozier (Laurentian University)
Sue Donaldson (Queen’s University)
Andrew Fenton (Dalhousie University)
Tyler M. John (Rutgers University)
L. Syd M Johnson (Michigan Technological University)
Robert C. Jones (California State University, Chico)
Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University)
Letitia Meynell (Dalhousie University)
Nathan Nobis (Morehouse College)
David Peña-Guzmán (California State University, San Francisco)
James Rocha (California State University, Fresno)
Bernard Rollin (Colorado State)
Jeffrey Sebo (New York University)
Adam Shriver (University of British Columbia)
Rebecca L. Walker (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“We submit this brief in our shared interest in ensuring a more just co-existence with other animals who live in our communities,” they write. “We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as nonhuman persons, Kiko and Tommy should be granted a writ of habeas corpus and their detainers should have the burden of showing the lawful justification of their current confinement.”
Tommy is a male chimpanzee whom the NhRP discovered living alone in a cage in a shed on a used trailer lot along Route 30 in Gloversville, New York.
Kiko is a male chimpanzee, who, to the best of the NhRP’s knowledge, is held in captivity in a cage in a cement storefront attached to a home in a residential area in Niagara Falls, New York.
The NhRP has been fighting since 2013 to free them to Save the Chimps sanctuary, where they can live with other chimpanzees in a more natural environment where their fundamental right to bodily liberty will be respected.
The NhRP expects the Court to rule on its motion for permission to appeal in 6-8 weeks.
Philosophers Offer Support For Chimpanzee Rights Cases As Nonhuman Rights Project Seeks To Appeal To New York’s Highest Court
– Experts in animal ethics, animal political theory, the philosophy of animal cognition and behavior, and the philosophy of biology urge the Court of Appeals to recognize chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko as persons –
Feb. 26, 2018—New York, NY—After the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a motion for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in the cases of captive chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko, a group of prominent philosophers submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the NhRP’s efforts to secure recognition of their clients’ legal personhood and rights.
The NhRP argues in its Memorandum of Law, filed on Friday, that the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department’s June 2017 ruling requires review by the state’s highest court, not only because it conflicts with New York’s common law habeas corpus statute and previous rulings of the Court of Appeals, the First Department, and other Appellate Departments on issues pertaining to common law personhood and habeas corpus relief, but also “based on the novelty, difficulty, importance, and effect of the legal and public policy issues raised.”
Engaging directly with a core issue raised by the NhRP’s appeal—the question of who is a “person” capable of possessing any legal rights—the philosophers’ brief maintains that the First Department’s ruling “uses a number of incompatible conceptions of person which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or in fact compatible with Kiko and Tommy’s personhood.” The philosophers who authored the brief are:
Kristin Andrews (York University)
Gary Comstock (North Carolina State University)
G.K.D. Crozier (Laurentian University)
Sue Donaldson (Queen’s University)
Andrew Fenton (Dalhousie University)
Tyler M. John (Rutgers University)
L. Syd M Johnson (Michigan Technological University)
Robert C. Jones (California State University, Chico)
Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University)
Letitia Meynell (Dalhousie University)
Nathan Nobis (Morehouse College)
David Peña-Guzmán (California State University, San Francisco)
James Rocha (California State University, Fresno)
Bernard Rollin (Colorado State)
Jeffrey Sebo (New York University)
Adam Shriver (University of British Columbia)
Rebecca L. Walker (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“We submit this brief in our shared interest in ensuring a more just co-existence with other animals who live in our communities,” they write. “We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as nonhuman persons, Kiko and Tommy should be granted a writ of habeas corpus and their detainers should have the burden of showing the lawful justification of their current confinement.”
Tommy is a male chimpanzee whom the NhRP discovered living alone in a cage in a shed on a used trailer lot along Route 30 in Gloversville, New York.
Kiko is a male chimpanzee, who, to the best of the NhRP’s knowledge, is held in captivity in a cage in a cement storefront attached to a home in a residential area in Niagara Falls, New York.
The NhRP has been fighting since 2013 to free them to Save the Chimps sanctuary, where they can live with other chimpanzees in a more natural environment where their fundamental right to bodily liberty will be respected.
The NhRP expects the Court to rule on its motion for permission to appeal in 6-8 weeks.
Research Interests:
Tommy was a child actor, starring in a Hollywood movie and performing live in New York. It sounds like a dream come true, but as for many child actors, as he got older things started going wrong. Tommy’s downfall wasn’t due to financial... more
Tommy was a child actor, starring in a Hollywood movie and performing live in New York. It sounds like a dream come true, but as for many child actors, as he got older things started going wrong. Tommy’s downfall wasn’t due to financial excess or substance abuses. Rather, he was just growing up into a normal guy. So, he was treated like a normal guy in this culture—he was locked away in a cage. Tommy was left behind bars, fed and watered, but kept in hiatus until someone might want to use him again. Because Tommy is a chimpanzee, and chimpanzees are property under the law. We have some limitations on how we handle them—like the limitations we have handling hazardous materials. But Tommy doesn’t have any legal rights, because he is not a legal person.
The Nonhuman Rights Project, headed by lawyer Stephen Wise, has been filing lawsuits on behalf of Tommy and other chimpanzees who are being held in terrible conditions that don’t suit their interest. In one such case, NY County Supreme Court Justice Barbara Jaffee decided against considering chimpanzees legal persons under the common law, writing, “the parameters of legal personhood… [will be focused] on the proper allocation of rights under the law, asking, in effect, who counts under our law.” Justice Jaffee didn’t want to make this decision via legal fiat, but instead she suggests that it is a matter of public policy that needs to be decided by society, rather than the court. This leaves room for philosophers to enter the conversation, and consider whether chimpanzees are metaphysical persons, regardless of how the common law concept is understood....
The Nonhuman Rights Project, headed by lawyer Stephen Wise, has been filing lawsuits on behalf of Tommy and other chimpanzees who are being held in terrible conditions that don’t suit their interest. In one such case, NY County Supreme Court Justice Barbara Jaffee decided against considering chimpanzees legal persons under the common law, writing, “the parameters of legal personhood… [will be focused] on the proper allocation of rights under the law, asking, in effect, who counts under our law.” Justice Jaffee didn’t want to make this decision via legal fiat, but instead she suggests that it is a matter of public policy that needs to be decided by society, rather than the court. This leaves room for philosophers to enter the conversation, and consider whether chimpanzees are metaphysical persons, regardless of how the common law concept is understood....
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Apes can correctly determine how to help a person with a false belief. But they may not need a concept of belief to do so. The recent study by Buttelmann and colleagues (2017) is the first interactive test of whether apes can respond... more
Apes can correctly determine how to help a person with a false belief. But they may not need a concept of belief to do so. The recent study by Buttelmann and colleagues (2017) is the first interactive test of whether apes can respond appropriately when a social partner has a false belief. While this work, like gaze tracking studies (Krupenye et al. 2016), finds that apes can anticipate people's actions and goals when they have a false belief, we still don't know how the apes do so. Buttelmann et al. claim that they offer converging evidence supporting Krupenye et al.'s claim that apes understand other agent's beliefs While these studies are consistent with the claim that great apes understand beliefs, other mentalistic explanations are consistent with both findings. The 2017 study is a modification of the active helping task initially developed for 18-month-old infants (Buttelmann et al. 2009). The current experimental situation goes like this. The apes were exposed to two boxes, and with the help of a human assistant, learned that the boxes can be locked by sliding a bolt on the front. After demonstrating competence unlocking the boxes, an experimenter entered the scene carrying an object, and showed the object to the ape. The experimenter opened one box and placed the object inside and left the room. In the true belief condition, the experimenter returned to the room to witness the assistant move the object from its original location to the other box. Importantly, the experimenter looked away when the boxes were locked and unlocked, so the ape could infer that the experimenter didn't know how to unlock the box. In the false belief condition the experimenter remained outside the room while the assistant " sneakily " moved the object to the other box, and locked it. Next, in both conditions, the experimenter tried to open the now-empty locked box. He was unable to open the box (since he didn't know how to unlock it), made a helpless gesture, and then pushed the tray of boxes toward the ape. As in the test with the infants, the apes opened the box containing the object significantly more often in the false belief condition than in the true belief condition. Both populations appeared to be able to determine the experimenter's goal in the false belief condition, namely that the experimenter wanted the object. In the true belief condition, they found a difference between the children and the apes. Children opened the empty
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We examine the recent attention to animal morality by philosophers and animal cognition researchers and argue that their approach risks underestimating the distribution of normative practice in animals by focusing on highly developed... more
We examine the recent attention to animal morality by philosophers and animal cognition researchers and argue that their approach risks underestimating the distribution of normative practice in animals by focusing on highly developed versions of morality. Our approach is to look for the moral foundations and normative thinking found across cultures in humans, following the work of Haidt, Graham, and Joseph (2009), Krebs and Janicki (2002) and Shweder and Haidt (1993). We argue for applying this approach to examining animal normative participation that begins with a categorization of the practices that may evidence valuing. Finally, we review behavioral evidence that great apes and cetaceans participate in normative practice.
Research Interests: Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, Animal cognition (Psychology), Philosophy Of Animals, Animal minds, and 3 moreAnimal Rights, Animal Ecology, Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, Animal Cognition, Animal Liberation, Animals in Culture, Philosophy Of Animals, Animals & Society studies, Ethics of Animals, and Laboratory Animal Welfare, Animal Law, Philosophy and Sociology of Human/animal Relations, and Philosophy of Animal Minds
A number of scholars have offered behavioral and physiological arguments in favor of the existence of empathy in other species (see Bekoff & Pierce 2009, Flack & de Waal 2000, Plutchik 1987). While the evidence is compelling, claims about... more
A number of scholars have offered behavioral and physiological arguments in favor of the existence of empathy in other species (see Bekoff & Pierce 2009, Flack & de Waal 2000, Plutchik 1987). While the evidence is compelling, claims about empathy in nonhuman apes face two different challenges. The first challenge comes from a set of empirical findings that suggest great apes are not able to think about other’s beliefs. The argument here is based on a view that empathy is associated with folk psychological understanding of others’ mental states, or mindreading, and the existence of mindreading among the other apes is a matter of some dispute. The second worry comes from a host of recent experiments suggesting that nonhuman great ape communities lack certain social norms that we might expect empathic creatures to have, namely cooperation norms, norms of fairness, and punishment in response to violations of norms (especially third party punishment). If apes are empathetic, yet they do not use this capacity to help or punish, what is the role of empathy? We think that both these challenges can be answered by getting clearer about what empathy is and how it functions as well as considering the nature of empathic societies. We also believe that this analysis will clarify the relationship between being empathetic and being ethical.
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For almost forty years psychologists and philosophers have been devising experiments and testing chimpanzees on the question first asked by Premack and Woodruff in 1978: " Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? " With this question,... more
For almost forty years psychologists and philosophers have been devising experiments and testing chimpanzees on the question first asked by Premack and Woodruff in 1978: " Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? " With this question, they meant to ask whether chimpanzees do what they assumed we do, namely attribute beliefs and desires in order to predict behavior. This capacity is known as mindreading or theory of mind. After thirty years of chimpanzees failing all the tests we put to them, some researchers concluded that chimpanzees probably don't reason about belief (Call and Tomasello 2008). 1 Ten years later, those same researchers were part of a team that reversed course: " our results, in concert with existing data, suggest that apes solved the task by ascribing a false belief to the actor, challenging the view that the ability to attribute reality-incongruent mental states is specific to humans " (Krupenye et al. 2016). 2 The claim that passing the false belief task is evidence of false belief ascription is one that requires critical scrutiny. For one, there is no consensus on what is involved in ascribing belief, given the lack of agreement regarding the nature of belief. And, given that we don't directly observe anyone ascribing belief, but infer it from behavior, we must consider alternative explanations for the behavior. However, the typical alternative explanations considered are all of the variety that apes are not mentalists. There is good reason to think that apes are mentalists who see other apes and other animals as intentional agents. Nonetheless, they may not be 1 At the end of their review of the status of chimpanzee theory of mind research program after 30 years of research, Call and Tomasello wrote, " chimpanzees probably do not understand others in terms of a fully human-like belief–desire psychology in which they appreciate that others have mental representations of the world that drive their actions even when those do not correspond to reality. And so in a more narrow definition of theory of mind as an understanding of false beliefs, the answer to Premack and Woodruff's question might be no, they do not. Why chimpanzees do not seem to understand false beliefs in particular – or if there might be some situations in which they do understand false beliefs – are topics of ongoing research " (Call and Tomasello 2008: 191). 2 An important lesson to be taken away from the 40 years of testing chimpanzees on false belief tracking is that we need to be very cautious making claims of inability; not finding evidence of a capacity in an experimental setting can say more about the researchers than the chimpanzees. It took people who understand the chimpanzee's point of view-who think like a chimpanzee-to create materials that would interest a chimpanzee. The development of eye-tracking technology was also crucial.
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In the discussion of the evolution of human morality, the question has arisen about whether any other species enjoy properties of moral agency. While some psychologists and biologists have argued that they do, some moral theorists worry... more
In the discussion of the evolution of human morality, the question has arisen about whether any other species enjoy properties of moral agency. While some psychologists and biologists have argued that they do, some moral theorists worry that animals cannot be autonomous agents without a theory of mind, or the ability to understand acting for reasons, and there is no evidence that any nonhuman animal has this ability. I argue that this concern should not lead one to conclude that great apes cannot be moral agents, even for those who think it unlikely that any other species has a theory of mind. Rather, I argue that great apes have other cognitive capacities that can fulfill the same functions that are sometimes seen as requirements for moral agency, such as knowing the likely consequences of an action by predicting the participants’ behaviors and emotional responses. Further, I present my arguments that a theory of mind evolved from an understanding of moral norms, so that humans were within the moral domain before they were able to consider their reasons for actions.
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How much continuity is there between the social cognition of humans and other animals? To answer this question, we first need accurate descriptions of the kinds of social cognition that exist in humans, and the kinds of social cognition... more
How much continuity is there between the social cognition of humans and other animals? To answer this question, we first need accurate descriptions of the kinds of social cognition that exist in humans, and the kinds of social cognition that exist in other animals. Offering such descriptions, it turns out, is surprisingly difficult. Nonetheless, claims of discontinuities abound. Michael Tomasello's research on the abilities of children and nonhuman great apes leads him to conclude that only humans are true cooperators, who share a joint goal and work together to achieve it (Tomasello 2014). Kim Sterelny's apprenticeship hypothesis shares such a commitment to human uniqueness in cooperation and mindreading, for these skills are what facilitate the uniquely human practice of active teaching (Sterelny 2012). Tad Zawidzki argues that the uniquely human sociocognitive syndrome, which consists of language, cooperation, imitation, and mindreading, developed due to our intrinsic motivation to shape others and be shaped by others in a way that demonstrates norm following (Zawidzki 2013). And according to Gergely Csibra and György Gergely's (2011) Natural Pedagogy Hypothesis, humans alone engage in active teaching, because humans alone have an innate mechanism that produces and responds to signals indicating that a learning opportunity is at hand. I aim to challenge the view that there are stark discontinuities between the social psychology of humans and other animals—in particular between humans and the other great apes—by downgrading the mechanisms for human social cognition. Humans often rely on a relatively simple set of mechanisms that, together with the ability to identify intentional action, permit much of our sophisticated-looking social cognitive practices. Our social cognition involves a process of model building and forming expectations of how intentional agents should live up to these models. The models include normative elements—aspirational stereotypes of how people and groups should act—rather than mere descriptions of how people do in fact act. At least some other animals also have elements of pluralistic folk psychology—something that becomes apparent when we look for the right sorts of similarities and differences. I will start this chapter by arguing that mindreading beliefs is not the place to look for continuity between human and nonhuman social cognition, because mindreading beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes is a small and late-developing piece of our social cognitive skill set.1 Next, I will argue that a better account of human social cognition is pluralistic. There are three elements to the account of Pluralistic Folk Psychology that I defend: we understand other people in a variety of ways, we build models of individual people and groups, and the models are largely prescriptive rather than descriptive. After sketching the position of pluralistic folk psychology, I will present 1 In this paper I am going to use the term " mindreading " in this narrow sense of ascribing propositional attitudes such as belief and desire to others. There is no handy term for this subset of mindreading capacity, and " mindreading propositional attitudes " is unwieldy to repeat. " Mindreading " could be used in a wider sense, too, and include ascribing mental content such as perceptions, emotions, and sensations.
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Since the question " Do chimpanzees have a theory of mind? " was raised in 1978, scientists have attempted to answer it, and philosophers have attempted to clarify what the question means and whether it has been, or could be, answered.... more
Since the question " Do chimpanzees have a theory of mind? " was raised in 1978, scientists have attempted to answer it, and philosophers have attempted to clarify what the question means and whether it has been, or could be, answered. Mindreading (a term used mostly by philosophers) or theory of mind (a term preferred by scientists) refer to the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. Some versions of the question focus on whether chimpanzees engage in belief reasoning, or can think about false belief, and chimpanzees have been given nonverbal versions of the false belief moved-object task (also known as the Sally-Ann task); there are no published reports of chimpanzees passing that task. Other versions of the question focus on whether chimpanzee understand what others can see, and chimpanzees can pass those tests. From this data, some claim that chimpanzees know something about perceptions, but nothing about belief. Others claim that chimpanzees don't understand belief or perceptions, because the data fails to overcome the " logical problem " , and permits an alternative, non-mentalistic interpretation. I will argue that neither view is warranted. Belief reasoning in chimpanzees has focused on examining false belief in a moved object scenario, but has largely ignored other functions of belief. The first part of the paper is an argument for how to best understand belief reasoning, and offers suggestion for future investigation. The second part of the paper addresses, and diffuses, the " logical problem ". I conclude that chimpanzees may reason about belief, but that there is already compelling evidence that they reason about perceptions.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Self-knowledge is one of the oldest topics of western philosophy, with the ancient Greeks advising us to know thyself. But what does this advice amount to? What sort of knowledge are we being advised to gain, exactly? In discussions... more
Self-knowledge is one of the oldest topics of western philosophy, with the ancient Greeks advising us to know thyself. But what does this advice amount to? What sort of knowledge are we being advised to gain, exactly?
In discussions among contemporary analytic philosophers, we find talk of two rough categories of knowledge types: sensations and thoughts. So we might interpret the know thyself advice as directing us to attend to our thoughts and sensations. However, advice is usually given in order to direct us to do things that we might not already be doing, so we should interpret the ancient Greek advice as directing us to do something new. Furthermore, advice is usually given to direct us to do things that we can do.... The starting position in this paper is that adopting the methods of Pluralistic Folk Psychology for our own minds will lead us toward understanding the types of self-knowledge we can have. Once we know what self-knowledge is knowledge about, we will be in a better position to begin analyzing whether any types of knowledge of the self are accurate, or whether accuracy is achievable. The end result of this investigation will offer us insights into what is of value in self-knowledge, and into the nature of the self.
In discussions among contemporary analytic philosophers, we find talk of two rough categories of knowledge types: sensations and thoughts. So we might interpret the know thyself advice as directing us to attend to our thoughts and sensations. However, advice is usually given in order to direct us to do things that we might not already be doing, so we should interpret the ancient Greek advice as directing us to do something new. Furthermore, advice is usually given to direct us to do things that we can do.... The starting position in this paper is that adopting the methods of Pluralistic Folk Psychology for our own minds will lead us toward understanding the types of self-knowledge we can have. Once we know what self-knowledge is knowledge about, we will be in a better position to begin analyzing whether any types of knowledge of the self are accurate, or whether accuracy is achievable. The end result of this investigation will offer us insights into what is of value in self-knowledge, and into the nature of the self.
Research Interests:
According to the theory of natural pedagogy, humans have a set of cognitive adaptations specialized for transmitting and receiving knowledge through teaching; young children can acquire generalizable knowledge from ostensive signals even... more
According to the theory of natural pedagogy, humans have a set of cognitive adaptations specialized for transmitting and receiving knowledge through teaching; young children can acquire generalizable knowledge from ostensive signals even in a single interaction, and adults also actively teach young children. In this article, we critically examine the theory and argue that ostensive signals do not always allow children to learn generalizable knowledge more efficiently, and that the empirical evidence provided in favor of the theory of natural pedagogy does not defend the theory as presented, nor does it support a weakened version of the theory. We argue that these problems arise because the theory of natural pedagogy is grounded in a misguided assumption, namely that learning about the world and learning about people are two distinct and independent processes. If, on the other hand, we see the processes as interrelated, then we have a better explanation for the empirical evidence.
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Abstract The debates about the form of folk psychology and the potential eliminability of folk psychology rest on a particular view about how humans understand other minds. That is, though folk psychology is described as “ourcom monsense... more
Abstract The debates about the form of folk psychology and the potential eliminability of folk psychology rest on a particular view about how humans understand other minds. That is, though folk psychology is described as “ourcom monsense conception ofpsychological phenomena”(Churchland 1981, p. 67), there havebeen implicit assumptions regarding the nature of that commonsense conception. It has been assumed that folk psychology involves two practices, the prediction and explanation of behavior. And it has been assumed that one cognitive mechanism subsumes both these practices. I argue for a new conception of folk psychology, one which challenges these assumptions. There is reason to think that folk psychology is more diverse than is typically thought, both insofar as there are a heterogeneous collection of heuristics that are used, and as our folk psychological practices include more than prediction and explanation. While these practices remain central in the philosophical discussion...
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We present an exploratory study of forest-living orangutan pantomiming, i.e. gesturing in which they act out their meaning, focusing on its occurrence, communicative functions, and complexities. Studies show that captive great apes may... more
We present an exploratory study of forest-living orangutan pantomiming, i.e. gesturing in which they act out their meaning, focusing on its occurrence, communicative functions, and complexities. Studies show that captive great apes may elaborate messages if communication fails, and isolated reports suggest that great apes occasionally pantomime. We predicted forest-living orangutans would pantomime spontaneously to communicate, especially to elaborate after communication failures. Mining existing databases on free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans’ behaviour identified 18 salient pantomimes. These pantomimes most often functioned as elaborations of failed requests, but also as deceptions and declaratives. Complexities identified include multimodality, re-enactments of past events and several features of language (productivity, compositionality, systematicity). These findings confirm that free- ranging rehabilitant orangutans pantomime and use pantomime to elaborate on their messages. Further, they use pantomime for multiple functions and create complex pantomimes that can express propositionally structured content. Thus, orangutan pantomime serves as a medium for communication, not a particular function. Mining cases of complex great ape communication originally reported in functional terms may then yield more evidence of pantomime.
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We recently demonstrated, by mining observational data, that forest-living orangutans can communicate using gestures that qualify as pantomime (Russon and Andrews 2010). Pantomimes, like other iconic gestures, physically resemble their... more
We recently demonstrated, by mining observational data, that forest-living orangutans can communicate using gestures that qualify as pantomime (Russon and Andrews 2010). Pantomimes, like other iconic gestures, physically resemble their referents. Here we sketch evidence of pantomime in other great apes, address some methodological concerns, and draw conclusions about the cognitive capacities implicated in pantomime communication.
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We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing ‘‘anthropomorphic’’ properties to animals. This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk... more
We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing ‘‘anthropomorphic’’ properties to animals. This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I errors, the bias is not the result of proper use of the Neyman and Pearson hypothesis testing method. Psychologists’ preference for false negatives over false positives cannot justify a preference for avoiding anthropomorphic errors over anthropectic (Gk. anthropos—human; ektomia—to cut out) errors.
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Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part... more
Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable to self-ascribe due to an early stage of development or impairment, and can be used to describe social and emotional development as well as personality. I describe how instruments such as the Child Behavior Checklist, which relies on intersubjective expert opinion, could be modified to assess other species subjects. The measures are validated via the accuracy of the predictions that are derived, which is an example of the functionality of attribution. I respond to theoretical criticisms against use of this method, and argue that if the method counts as good science for infant cognition research, then it should count as good science for animal cognition research as well. Correspondingly, if the method doesn’t count as good science for animal cognition research, then we must be very skeptical of its use with nonverbal humans.
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This article discusses “anthropomorphism” in the sense of the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to nonhuman animals. One philosophical problem is to figure out how we can identify which properties are uniquely human.... more
This article discusses “anthropomorphism” in the sense of the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to nonhuman animals. One philosophical problem is to figure out how we can identify which properties are uniquely human. The discussion maintains that one goal of animal cognition studies is to determine which cognitive abilities animals use and whether some identifiable cognitive properties are found only in the human species. If the properties are uniquely human, then asserting that some other animal has that property would be false and an example of anthropomorphism. In the empirical and the philosophical literatures, features that have been described as uniquely human include psychological states such as beliefs and desires, personality traits such as confidence or timidity, emotions such as happiness or anger, social-organizational properties such as culture or friendship, and moral behavior such as punishment or rape.
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If we consider that the field of animal cognition research began with Darwin’s stories about clever animals, we can see that over the 150 years of work done in this field, there has been a slow swing back and forth between two extreme... more
If we consider that the field of animal cognition research began with Darwin’s stories about clever animals, we can see that over the 150 years of work done in this field, there has been a slow swing back and forth between two extreme positions. One extreme is the view that other animals are very much like us, that we can use introspection in order to understand why other animals act as they do, and that no huge interpretive leap is required to understand animal minds. On the other extreme we have the view that other animals are utterly different from us, that no matter how similar their behaviors may appear, the mechanisms they use to act and the reasons for their actions are utterly unlike humans behavior; it would be anthropocentric to assume otherwise. In this paper I want to defend a middle ground that involves the use of folk psychology in the science of animal cognition research, in order to investigate both similarities and differences. Further, I will argue that the use of folk psychology need not involve a problematic anthropomorphism. I will show how the animal cognition research benefits by appeal to folk psychology by discussing the study the psychologist Anne Russon and I conducted on orangutan pantomime communication (Russon and Andrews 2010).
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This paper examines the meaningfulness of pointing in great apes. We appeal to Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of primitive normativity, which provides an adequate criterion for establishing whether a response is meaningful, and we attempt... more
This paper examines the meaningfulness of pointing in great apes. We appeal to Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of primitive normativity, which provides an adequate criterion for establishing whether a response is meaningful, and we attempt to make room for a conception according to which there is no fundamental difference between the responses of human infants and those of other great apes to pointing gestures. This conception is an alternative to Tomasello’s view that pointing gestures and reactions to them reveal a fundamental difference between humans and other apes.
I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk... more
I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn’t endorse, and so could not serve as the target’s reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits—who the person is—rather than by beliefs and desires—what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed.
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Commentary for "The Psychology of Cows" by Lori Marino and Kristin Allen If we come to find that cows have rich mental lives, are there ethically important consequences for how we relate to and treat them? A positive answer to this... more
Commentary for "The Psychology of Cows" by Lori Marino and Kristin Allen
If we come to find that cows have rich mental lives, are there ethically important consequences for how we relate to and treat them? A positive answer to this question motivates the review paper, but the question itself remains unexamined. While it might seem obvious that anything with a mental life is worthy of moral considerability, what that moral considerability amounts to will differ depending on the moral theory we accept, the context, and the particular mental capacities that the individual has. Furthermore, as we learn more about plants, it has become tempting to talk about plant minds, feelings, learning and cognition, and to examine the ethical implications (
If we come to find that cows have rich mental lives, are there ethically important consequences for how we relate to and treat them? A positive answer to this question motivates the review paper, but the question itself remains unexamined. While it might seem obvious that anything with a mental life is worthy of moral considerability, what that moral considerability amounts to will differ depending on the moral theory we accept, the context, and the particular mental capacities that the individual has. Furthermore, as we learn more about plants, it has become tempting to talk about plant minds, feelings, learning and cognition, and to examine the ethical implications (
Research Interests: Philosophy, Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, Animal Cognition, Animal cognition (Psychology), and Animal Rights, Animal Ecology, Animal Studies, Animal Ethics, Animal Cognition, Animal Liberation, Animals in Culture, Philosophy Of Animals, Animals & Society studies, Ethics of Animals, and Laboratory Animal Welfare, Animal Law
I offer an alternative account of the relationship between mindreading and the development of community social norms and individual autonomous agency. Mindreading is not needed for teaching, developing some cumulative culture, or agency.... more
I offer an alternative account of the relationship between mindreading and the development of community social norms and individual autonomous agency. Mindreading is not needed for teaching, developing some cumulative culture, or agency. Rather, I have argued that the foundational role for mindreading is based in its usefulness for explaining behavior (Andrews 2009, 2012). It is the need to explain behavior that drove the evolution of mindreading, and this, in turn, required a prior understanding of social norms. Looking at the behavior of the nonhuman great apes in this light, it appears that the core elements required for agency are fairly well established in great ape communities. One consequence of this position is that mindreading should not be a requirement for either moral or legal standing.
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Humans have a folk psychology, without question. Paul Churchland used the term to describe “our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena” (Churchland 1981, p. 67), whatever that may be. When we ask the question whether animals... more
Humans have a folk psychology, without question. Paul Churchland used the term to describe “our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena” (Churchland 1981, p. 67), whatever that may be. When we ask the question whether animals have their own folk psychology, we’re asking whether any other species has a commonsense conception of psychological phenomenon as well. Different versions of this question have been discussed over the past 25 years, but no clear answer has emerged. Perhaps one reason for this lack of progress is that we don’t clearly understand the question. In asking whether animals have folk psychology, I hope to help clarify the concept of folk psychology itself, and in the process, to gain a greater understanding of the role of belief and desire attribution in human social interaction.
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I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is... more
I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary function of a theory of mind. I further argue that in order to be motivated to offer explanations of behavior, one must have at least an implicit understanding of appropriate behavior, which implies at least an implicit understanding of norms. The second argument looks at three cases of nonhuman animal societies that appear to operate within a system of norms. While there is no evidence that any species other than humans have a theory of mind, there is evidence that other species have sensitivity to the normative. Finally, I propose an explanation for the priority of norms over a theory of mind: given an understanding of norms in a society, and the ability to recognize and sanction violations, there developed a need to understand actions that violated the norms, and such explanations could only be given in terms of a person's reasons. There is a significant benefit to being able to explain behavior that violates norms, because explanations of the right sort can also serve to justify behavior.
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Colin Allen , Marc Bekoff, and George Lauder, eds., Nature's Purposes: Analysis of Function and Design in Biology Reviewed by.
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Symposium on Elliott Sober’s book Ockham’s Razors.. Advice about how to move forward on the mindreading debate, particularly when it comes to overcoming the logical problem, is much needed in comparative psychology. In chapter 4 Sober... more
Symposium on Elliott Sober’s book Ockham’s Razors..
Advice about how to move forward on the mindreading debate, particularly when it comes to overcoming the logical problem, is much needed in comparative psychology. In chapter 4 Sober takes on the task by suggesting how we might uncover the mechanism that mediates between the environmental stimuli that is visible to all, and chimpanzee social behavior...
Advice about how to move forward on the mindreading debate, particularly when it comes to overcoming the logical problem, is much needed in comparative psychology. In chapter 4 Sober takes on the task by suggesting how we might uncover the mechanism that mediates between the environmental stimuli that is visible to all, and chimpanzee social behavior...
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... Scott Sehon, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation Reviewed by. KristinAndrews. Bookmark and Share. This journal is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommerical 3.0 Unported license. ...
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The social milieus of animals can be complex, ranging from almost completely asocial to monogamous pairs (no mean feat) to entire societies. To adapt to a constantly shifting environment of individuals striving toward their own goals,... more
The social milieus of animals can be complex, ranging from almost completely asocial to monogamous pairs (no mean feat) to entire societies. To adapt to a constantly shifting environment of individuals striving toward their own goals, animals appear to have evolved specialized cognitive abilities. As appealing and intuitive as the idea of social cognition is, just defining it is difficult. We attempted to delineate social cognition, speculate on its adaptive value, and come to an understanding of what we mean when we talk about complexity. Transitive inference was often brought up as an example of a cognitive ability that is important for social animals, though the focus of much of the discussion was on theory of mind. For some, theory of mind is something of a Holy Grail, whereas for others, it is more of a McGuffin. There are a number of challenges and debates in trying to determine what cognitive abilities different animals use to solve their social problems. This chapter discusses methodological approaches and issues that are needed to propel the future of research into social knowledge.
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According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species.... more
According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that only humans use language and that language as such has no precursors in the animal kingdom. Moreover, language is quite often understood as a necessary tool for having representations and forming beliefs. As a consequence, by lacking language animals could not have developed representational systems or beliefs. In response to these worries, we aim to mount a limited defense of the MCC as an empirical hypothesis. First, we will provide a short historical overview of the origins of the MCC and examine some of the motives behind traditional arguments for and against it. Second, we will focus on one particular question, namely whether language as such is necessary for having beliefs. Our goal is to show that there is little reason to think language is necessary for belief. In doing so, we will challenge a view of belief that is widely accepted by those working in animal cognition, namely representational belief, and we will argue that if belief is non-representational, then different research questions and methods are required. We will conclude with an argument that to study the evolution of belief across species, it is essential to begin the study of subjects in their social and ecological environment rather than in contexts that are not ecologically valid along the social and ecological dimensions. Thus, rather than serving as a premise in an argument in favor of animal minds, the MCC can only be defended by empirical investigation, but importantly, empirical investigation of the right sort.
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A defense of equality for great apes must begin with an understanding of the opposition and an acknowledgement of the most basic point of disagreement. For great apes to gain status as persons in our community, we must begin by... more
A defense of equality for great apes must begin with an understanding of the opposition and an acknowledgement of the most basic point of disagreement. For great apes to gain status as persons in our community, we must begin by determining what the multitude of different definitions of "person" have in common. Finding that great apes fulfill the requirements of any one specific theory of personhood is insufficient, for these theories are highly controversial, and a critique of the theory will undermine the status of great apes as persons. Instead, the first step in the argument for ape equality must be a defense of their self-consciousness. This notion is one thing all plausible theories of personhood have in common.
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Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a ‘theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are... more
Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a ‘theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.
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Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental... more
Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one need not be a speaker in order to be a thinker. The falsity of these theses has consequences for other parts of Davidson's world-view; for example, it undermines his argument against animal thought.
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I contend that neither the simulation theory nor the theory theory provide us with an acceptable account of how we understand our minds or the minds of others. Both theories fail owing to their dependence on what I refer to as the... more
I contend that neither the simulation theory nor the theory theory provide us with an acceptable account of how we understand our minds or the minds of others. Both theories fail owing to their dependence on what I refer to as the symmetry of psychological prediction and explanation.
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I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue... more
I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should lead them to accept this new approach, and that experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for anomalous behavior should be explored.
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A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally... more
A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally heinous actions. Human folk psychology in this area is prone to a specific error of conflating an explanation for behaviour with a justification of it. An analysis of the error leads me to conclude that simulation is used to generate both explanations and justifications of heinous acts. It is needed in both these cases because most of us lack theoretical information about evil actors. I will argue that it is difficult to simulate such acts, and hence difficult to develop explanations for behaviour widely accepted as evil. This difficulty explains the judgements made against successful simulators by those who don't succeed, and so explains the common problem of conflating an explanation with a justification.
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We clarify some points previously made by Andrews, and defend the claim that Davidson's account of belief can be and is challenged by the existence of some people with autism. We argue that both Bouma and Andrews (Philosophical... more
We clarify some points previously made by Andrews, and defend the claim that Davidson's account of belief can be and is challenged by the existence of some people with autism. We argue that both Bouma and Andrews (Philosophical Psychology, 15) blurred the subtle distinctions between the psychological concepts of theory of mind and joint attention and the Davidsonian concepts of interpretation and triangulation. And we accept that appeal to control group studies is not the appropriate place to look for an individual who can speak but who has significant problems with interpretation. In this paper we argue that by turning to the clinical literature we can more readily find such a challenge to Davidson's account.
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Ramsey, Bastian, and van Schaik (RBS) have made a valiant effort to identify innovations in nature. As their theoretical perspective on innovation as a product largely conforms to Reader & Laland (2003), their novel contribution is... more
Ramsey, Bastian, and van Schaik (RBS) have made a valiant effort to identify innovations in nature. As their theoretical perspective on innovation as a product largely conforms to Reader & Laland (2003), their novel contribution is epistemological. They may well have considered as much information as possible on the ecological, individual, and historical factors that suggest innovations in nature. However, their method does not incorporate all the factors discussed in the text. For this reason, we believe that RBS face a dilemma. If their key takes any behavior as input, many behaviors that are not innovations will be identified as such. Alternatively, if it takes only behaviors that count as potential innovations, then the grain problem looms large. We conclude that the solution requires information on the innovation process.
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This volume collects 49 original essays that provide opinionated introductions to a variety of philosophical topics concerning (nonhuman) animal minds. The essays are written by established or emerging leaders in the field, and yet are... more
This volume collects 49 original essays that provide opinionated introductions to a variety of philosophical topics concerning (nonhuman) animal minds. The essays are written by established or emerging leaders in the field, and yet are accessible to newcomers who have some experience with philosophical writing. As the volume provides a broad snapshot of the state of the art in the philosophy of animal minds, our expectation is that it will also serve as a useful reference work for more seasoned scholars.
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In our daily interactions with other people—driving down the street, meeting up for lunch, coordinating childcare, delegating work—we rely on a commonsense understanding of how minds work, which we can call folk psychology. We develop... more
In our daily interactions with other people—driving down the street, meeting up for lunch, coordinating childcare, delegating work—we rely on a commonsense understanding of how minds work, which we can call folk psychology. We develop folk psychology through infancy and early childhood, but it continues to grow and change as we reach adulthood, when we get better at making predictions of what others will do, and better at explaining behavior. What accounts for our amazing abilities to understand other people? A traditional answer is that humans have an ability that may be unique to the species—we read minds. Not like a mentalist reads minds, but we interpret people’s behavior as being caused by hidden beliefs and desires. By carefully watching others, we are able to figure out others hidden mental states, and then we apply a theory of behavior in order to determine what the person will do next.
In my book Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology, I challenge this view, arguing that we don’t see others as bags of skin filled with hidden beliefs. Rather we see others as fully fleshed out people with histories, social contexts, personalities, moods, emotions, and so forth. Drawing on research from social psychology, developmental psychology, and animal cognition I draw a rich picture of human social cognition, and demonstrate how we solve our interpersonal predictive tasks much in the same way other apes (such as orangutans and chimpanzees) solve theirs. It turns out we are more like the other apes than we thought! While humans can read minds, we don’t need to do it very often to predict behavior, but rather we do it to explain behavior, and the evolution of this ability arose alongside the evolution of morality. Whether the other apes try to explain behavior, and hence whether they think about others’ thoughts or what others should do is an open research question.
In my book Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology, I challenge this view, arguing that we don’t see others as bags of skin filled with hidden beliefs. Rather we see others as fully fleshed out people with histories, social contexts, personalities, moods, emotions, and so forth. Drawing on research from social psychology, developmental psychology, and animal cognition I draw a rich picture of human social cognition, and demonstrate how we solve our interpersonal predictive tasks much in the same way other apes (such as orangutans and chimpanzees) solve theirs. It turns out we are more like the other apes than we thought! While humans can read minds, we don’t need to do it very often to predict behavior, but rather we do it to explain behavior, and the evolution of this ability arose alongside the evolution of morality. Whether the other apes try to explain behavior, and hence whether they think about others’ thoughts or what others should do is an open research question.