False Belief Test
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Recent papers in False Belief Test
La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi... more
Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two... more
According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative... more
According to a widely shared view, experience plays only a limited role in children’s acquisition of the capacity to pass the false belief test: at most, it facilitates or attunes the development of mindreading abilities from infancy to... more
I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants’ social cognitive abilities (SCAs) manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds... more
For almost forty years psychologists and philosophers have been devising experiments and testing chimpanzees on the question first asked by Premack and Woodruff in 1978: " Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? " With this question,... more
This paper addresses a challenge proposed against non-mindreading explanations of infant spontaneous-response task data. The challenge is a foundational assumption of mindreading explanations best summed up by Carruthers' (2013; 2015)... more
Evidence from the knowledge access task and the diverse belief task suggests that, before age four, children may find it difficult to attribute false beliefs to others, despite demonstrating a basic comprehension of the concept of belief.... more
The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent... more
In this paper, I comment on Shaun Gallagher's "The problem with 3-year-olds", where he gives his enactive interpretation of the latest developments of research on children's understanding of other minds through false belief tests. I argue... more
We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false belief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most... more
DANIEL CLEMENT DENNETT (1942, Boston, MA) is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. His research work mostly concerns the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of biology. He has been one of W. V. O.... more
Theory of Mind is an inferential system central to human–human communication by which people ascribe mental states to self and other, and then use those deductions to make predictions about others’ behaviors. Despite the likelihood that... more
How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called... more
"Empirical research showing that infants’ are sensitive to others’ false beliefs in their second year of life (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Luo, 2011) has recently questioned the traditional assumption... more
According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months of age can attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I will advance... more
In this dissertation, I argue that children’s acquisition of the concept of belief depends on a cluster of cognitive abilities developing at different stages. In particular, early social cognitive abilities are provided by the endogenous... more
Intensionality (or opacity) is a core property of mental representations and sometimes understanding opacity is claimed to be a part of children's theory of mind (evidenced with the false belief task). Children, however, pass the... more
I review a variety of theories that attempt to explain how young infants are able to pass spontaneous false belief tests, and then ask whether any of these approaches can explain the 3-year-olds’ failure on standard, elicited FB tests. I... more