Papers by Charles Goldhaber
Analytic Philosophy, 2018
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Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2021
In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume’s skeptical reflections have plunged hi... more In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume’s skeptical reflections have plunged him into melancholy. He then proceeds through a complex series of stages, resulting in renewed interest in philosophy. Interpreters have struggled to explain the connection between the stages. I argue that Hume’s repeated invocation of the four humors of ancient and medieval medicine explains the succession, and sheds a new light on the significance of skepticism. The humoral context not only reveals that Hume conceives of skepticism primarily as a temperament, not a philosophical view or system. It also resolves a puzzle about how Hume can view skepticism as both an illness and a cure. The skeptical temperament can, depending on its degree of predominance, either contribute to or upset the balance of temperaments required for proper mental functioning.
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Synthese, 2019
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Analytic Philosophy, 2018
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Analytic Philosophy, 2018
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The Court of Reason, 2021
I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical... more I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism.
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Synthese, 2021
Disjunctivist views in the theory of perception hold that genuine perceptions differ in some rele... more Disjunctivist views in the theory of perception hold that genuine perceptions differ in some relevant kind from misperceptions, such as illusions and hallucinations. In recent papers, Tyler Burge has argued that such views conflict with the basic tenets of perceptual psychology. According to him, perceptual psychology is committed to the view that genuine perceptions and misperceptions produced by the same proximal stimuli must be or involve perceptual states of the same kind. This, he argues, conflicts with disjunctivism. In this paper, I defend epistemological disjunctivism from Burge's inconsistency charge. To this end, I survey the perceptual psychological literature, and reveal that the perceptual kinds they tend to employ differ from and imply nothing about the kinds at issue to the epistemological disjunctivist. I then argue that Burge's concerns with epistemological disjunctivism are best interpreted as motivated not by his commitment to empirical science, but instead by his views in epistemology and human rationality. In "Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology" and "Disjunctivism Again," Tyler Burge wages a many-faced attack on a view about the nature of perceptual states which he calls 'disjunctivism.' Disjunctivism about perceptual states is the view that successful and unsuccessful perceptual states are different in some relevant kind.
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Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress: The Court of Reason (Oslo, 6–9 August 2019)
I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical... more I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism.
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Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philsophy, 2021
In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume's skeptical reflections have plunged hi... more In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume's skeptical reflections have plunged him into melancholy. He then proceeds through a complex series of stages, resulting in renewed interest in philosophy. Interpreters have struggled to explain the connection between the stages. I argue that Hume's repeated invocation of the four humors of ancient and medieval medicine explains the succession, and sheds a new light on the significance of skepticism. The humoral context not only reveals that Hume conceives of skepticism primarily as a temperament, not a philosophical view or system. It also resolves a puzzle about how Hume can view skepticism as both an illness and a cure. The skeptical temperament can, depending on its degree of predominance, either contribute to or upset the balance of temperaments required for proper mental functioning.
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Book Reviews by Charles Goldhaber
Hume Studies
Peter Fosl's new monograph offers a bold reading of Hume as a "radical," "coherent," and "hybrid"... more Peter Fosl's new monograph offers a bold reading of Hume as a "radical," "coherent," and "hybrid" skeptic, who draws influence from both the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptical traditions. I press some concerns about whether Fosl's reading of Hume can accommodate his scientific ambitions.
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Papers by Charles Goldhaber
Book Reviews by Charles Goldhaber