Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought?... more What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought? My starting point in addressing these questions is Tamar Szabo Gendler’s ‘puzzle of imaginative resistance’, the problem of explaining the special difficulties we seem to encounter in imagining to be right what we take to be morally wrong (or vice versa) in fiction, and Gendler’s claim that those difficulties are due to our unwillingness to imagine these things, rather than our inability to imagine what is logically or conceptually impossible. Using a wide range of examples, I argue that there is no puzzle of imaginative resistance and that to think that there is such a puzzle is to miss almost entirely the role fiction plays in moral thought. That, however, does not mean that there are no limits to what we can imagine in morality. In fact, I argue, the imagination is limited in morality, as elsewhere, by what is logically or conceptually possible. Together, those claims suggest that fiction and the imagination play a fundamental role in shaping our conception of the moral landscape. The paper concludes by drawing some of the consequences of these views for the nature of moral thought.
Can we perceive others’ mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomeno... more Can we perceive others’ mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: he is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others’ emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not ‘Is this perception?’ but ‘What do we mean by “perception” here?’ and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call ‘perception’ here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein’s answer to the question ‘Can we perceive others’ mental states?’ is yes and no: both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.
What explains the difference between a proposition and a mere list of the words it contains, pres... more What explains the difference between a proposition and a mere list of the words it contains, presented in the same order? What unites the parts of a proposition to form a whole? José Zalabardo argues that Wittgenstein’s contextualism allows him to sidestep this problem in the Tractatus, by rejecting the compositional view of propositions that gives rise to it. This paper aims to show that Zalabardo’s account of Wittgenstein’s contextualism departs from Wittgenstein’s view, and does so in a way that leaves our ability to understand new propositions a mystery.
Moral foundations of Philosophy of Mind, ed. J. Backström et al (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 2019
My focus here is on the problem of other minds, and on a question about what is involved in belie... more My focus here is on the problem of other minds, and on a question about what is involved in believing that other people have minds. We tend to take it for granted that we know what is involved in belief in other minds, and that the real problem lies in trying to justify that belief. By contrast, I argue that we misunderstand what belief in other minds really involves, and that the problem of other minds itself has its source in that misunderstanding. My aim, then, is to rethink what is involved in belief in other minds, and I do so in terms of what Wittgenstein calls "an attitude towards a soul ". I argue that this not only shows what is wrong with the problem of other minds, but also has significant consequences for our understanding of what the mind itself is too. One such consequence is that ethical considerations have a much more fundamental role to play in thinking about the mind that is typically thought to be the case.
It is a simple truth about the ways in which we speak about others that we can see or hear or fee... more It is a simple truth about the ways in which we speak about others that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we cannot really see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling, might be developed.
In Wittgenstein's Moral Thought, ed. Reshef Agam-Segal and Edmund Dain. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. pp. 9-35
By far the most striking feature of Wittgenstein’s moral or ethical thought is his insistence, in... more By far the most striking feature of Wittgenstein’s moral or ethical thought is his insistence, in various places in his early philosophy, that there can be no such thing. There can be no ethical propositions for the early Wittgenstein, and therefore no ethical thoughts too. Instead, ethics is, in his view, transcendental. This chapter aims to do three things: first, to explain why there can be no ethical propositions for the early Wittgenstein (and so why ethics is, in his view, both inexpressible and unthinkable); second, to explain what the early Wittgenstein’s alternative vision of the ethical consists in (and so what he means in describing ethics as transcendental); and third, to explain what happens both to the claim that there can be no ethical propositions and to the accompanying vision of ethics in Wittgenstein’s later work, where they seem to many simply to drop out of the picture. Overall, this chapter aims to show what is both original and important about Wittgenstein’s moral or ethical thought, and so why it deserves to be taken seriously, in spite of the outlandishness of his claims.
The problem of other minds challenges us to justify our belief in other minds. I argue that we do... more The problem of other minds challenges us to justify our belief in other minds. I argue that we do not believe in other minds, and so that challenge is confused. Our understanding of others as human beings, not automata, is a matter of what Wittgenstein calls an “attitude towards a soul”, not a belief about them.
My focus in this paper is on the problem of other minds. In particular, I want to focus on the qu... more My focus in this paper is on the problem of other minds. In particular, I want to focus on the question of what is involved in believing that other people have minds or souls, or that they are conscious beings and not automata. (For my purposes here, I will be treating these terms as roughly synonymous.) My aim is to develop an account of what belief in other minds involves in terms of what Wittgenstein calls, in Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, “an attitude towards a soul” (PPF §22 / PI, Part II, iv, p.178), and to use that account to undermine one of the central premises behind the traditional problem of other minds.
This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’... more This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’s opposition or hostility to that tradition. My aim will be to argue that ethics, or a large part of what we think of as ethics, is nonsense, and in doing so I shall be developing the line of argument that I take to lie behind Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that there can be no ethical propositions. That argument has its basis in the simple thought that value is not arbitrary or accidental, and what I shall show is how thinking through what is involved in that thought leads to a radically different conception of the possibilities open to ethical thinking than that which is assumed within the prevailing conception of ethics today.
This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they la... more This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that the work they are intended to do is already being done by other features of our language, and that they are harmful, insofar as they prevent us from appreciating what is of genuine ethical significance in our lives. Its aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination of “ethical propositions”, to reconnect us with the ethical commitments embodied in our ordinary “non-ethical” language, and so the ways in which ordinary language might be taken to be ethically revealing.
Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism:... more Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism: in such a case, a form of moral fictionalism, combining a descriptivist account of moral sentences with a noncognitivist account of the attitudes involved in their acceptance or rejection, might seem an attractive alternative. This paper argues against the use of moral fictionalism as a strategy for defending noncognitivism in ethics. It argues, first, that the view is implausible as it stands and, second, that it does not enjoy the benefits over standard—expressivist—noncognitivism both that it claims to enjoy and that make up the principal rationale for the view. The paper then turns to the grounds for noncognitivism itself before showing how far the criticisms developed extend to alternative forms of moral fictionalism and developing independent objections to each.
What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the cent... more What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the central questions in the current debate between those—such as Cora Diamond, James Conant and Michael Kremer—who favour a “resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s work, and those—such as P. M. S. Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock—who instead favour a more “traditional” approach. What answer we give to these questions will determine the nature and force of his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and so the very shape Wittgenstein’s work has for us, as well as, to some extent, what the lesson of the Tractatus might be. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed defence of the austere view of nonsense, that lies at the heart of the resolute approach, against a range of influentialcriticisms developed by Hans-Johann Glock and which focus on Wittgenstein’s contextualism. In so doing, I hope also to shed some light on the kind of view the austere view is, as well as how it might relate to certain other crucial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought.
Journal of Applied Philosophy [Reprinted in Morgan, 2018. Ethics in Sport, 3rd edition. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics], 2007
Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether ... more Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether or not to boycott Zimbabwe, this paper seeks to explore the moral complexities surrounding the case of the sporting boycott in general as a response to morally odious regimes. Rather than attempting to provide some easy formula by which to determine justifiable from unjustifiable boycotts, we take as our starting point many of the arguments raised in the national press and explore and develop these arguments in order to shed light on the fundamental problems underlying the use of sporting boycotts as moral tools. The paper thus aims to show the inadequacy of the standard responses on both sides of the fence and, hopefully, clears the ground for future, more informed approaches to the issue.
What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the cent... more What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the central questions in the current debate between those—such as Cora Diamond, James Conant and Michael Kremer—who favour a “resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s work, and those—such as P. M. S. Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock—who instead favour a more “traditional” approach. What answer we give to these questions will determine the nature and force of his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and so the very shape Wittgenstein’s work has for us, as well as, to some extent, what the lesson of the Tractatus might be. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed defence of the austere view of nonsense, that lies at the heart of the resolute approach, against a range of influentialcriticisms developed by Hans-Johann Glock and which focus on Wittgenstein’s contextualism. In so doing, I hope also to shed some light on the kind of view the austere view is, as well as how it might relate to certain other crucial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought.
Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought?... more What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought? My starting point in addressing these questions is Tamar Szabo Gendler’s ‘puzzle of imaginative resistance’, the problem of explaining the special difficulties we seem to encounter in imagining to be right what we take to be morally wrong (or vice versa) in fiction, and Gendler’s claim that those difficulties are due to our unwillingness to imagine these things, rather than our inability to imagine what is logically or conceptually impossible. Using a wide range of examples, I argue that there is no puzzle of imaginative resistance and that to think that there is such a puzzle is to miss almost entirely the role fiction plays in moral thought. That, however, does not mean that there are no limits to what we can imagine in morality. In fact, I argue, the imagination is limited in morality, as elsewhere, by what is logically or conceptually possible. Together, those claims suggest that fiction and the imagination play a fundamental role in shaping our conception of the moral landscape. The paper concludes by drawing some of the consequences of these views for the nature of moral thought.
Can we perceive others’ mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomeno... more Can we perceive others’ mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: he is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others’ emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not ‘Is this perception?’ but ‘What do we mean by “perception” here?’ and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call ‘perception’ here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein’s answer to the question ‘Can we perceive others’ mental states?’ is yes and no: both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.
What explains the difference between a proposition and a mere list of the words it contains, pres... more What explains the difference between a proposition and a mere list of the words it contains, presented in the same order? What unites the parts of a proposition to form a whole? José Zalabardo argues that Wittgenstein’s contextualism allows him to sidestep this problem in the Tractatus, by rejecting the compositional view of propositions that gives rise to it. This paper aims to show that Zalabardo’s account of Wittgenstein’s contextualism departs from Wittgenstein’s view, and does so in a way that leaves our ability to understand new propositions a mystery.
Moral foundations of Philosophy of Mind, ed. J. Backström et al (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 2019
My focus here is on the problem of other minds, and on a question about what is involved in belie... more My focus here is on the problem of other minds, and on a question about what is involved in believing that other people have minds. We tend to take it for granted that we know what is involved in belief in other minds, and that the real problem lies in trying to justify that belief. By contrast, I argue that we misunderstand what belief in other minds really involves, and that the problem of other minds itself has its source in that misunderstanding. My aim, then, is to rethink what is involved in belief in other minds, and I do so in terms of what Wittgenstein calls "an attitude towards a soul ". I argue that this not only shows what is wrong with the problem of other minds, but also has significant consequences for our understanding of what the mind itself is too. One such consequence is that ethical considerations have a much more fundamental role to play in thinking about the mind that is typically thought to be the case.
It is a simple truth about the ways in which we speak about others that we can see or hear or fee... more It is a simple truth about the ways in which we speak about others that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we cannot really see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling, might be developed.
In Wittgenstein's Moral Thought, ed. Reshef Agam-Segal and Edmund Dain. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. pp. 9-35
By far the most striking feature of Wittgenstein’s moral or ethical thought is his insistence, in... more By far the most striking feature of Wittgenstein’s moral or ethical thought is his insistence, in various places in his early philosophy, that there can be no such thing. There can be no ethical propositions for the early Wittgenstein, and therefore no ethical thoughts too. Instead, ethics is, in his view, transcendental. This chapter aims to do three things: first, to explain why there can be no ethical propositions for the early Wittgenstein (and so why ethics is, in his view, both inexpressible and unthinkable); second, to explain what the early Wittgenstein’s alternative vision of the ethical consists in (and so what he means in describing ethics as transcendental); and third, to explain what happens both to the claim that there can be no ethical propositions and to the accompanying vision of ethics in Wittgenstein’s later work, where they seem to many simply to drop out of the picture. Overall, this chapter aims to show what is both original and important about Wittgenstein’s moral or ethical thought, and so why it deserves to be taken seriously, in spite of the outlandishness of his claims.
The problem of other minds challenges us to justify our belief in other minds. I argue that we do... more The problem of other minds challenges us to justify our belief in other minds. I argue that we do not believe in other minds, and so that challenge is confused. Our understanding of others as human beings, not automata, is a matter of what Wittgenstein calls an “attitude towards a soul”, not a belief about them.
My focus in this paper is on the problem of other minds. In particular, I want to focus on the qu... more My focus in this paper is on the problem of other minds. In particular, I want to focus on the question of what is involved in believing that other people have minds or souls, or that they are conscious beings and not automata. (For my purposes here, I will be treating these terms as roughly synonymous.) My aim is to develop an account of what belief in other minds involves in terms of what Wittgenstein calls, in Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, “an attitude towards a soul” (PPF §22 / PI, Part II, iv, p.178), and to use that account to undermine one of the central premises behind the traditional problem of other minds.
This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’... more This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’s opposition or hostility to that tradition. My aim will be to argue that ethics, or a large part of what we think of as ethics, is nonsense, and in doing so I shall be developing the line of argument that I take to lie behind Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that there can be no ethical propositions. That argument has its basis in the simple thought that value is not arbitrary or accidental, and what I shall show is how thinking through what is involved in that thought leads to a radically different conception of the possibilities open to ethical thinking than that which is assumed within the prevailing conception of ethics today.
This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they la... more This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that the work they are intended to do is already being done by other features of our language, and that they are harmful, insofar as they prevent us from appreciating what is of genuine ethical significance in our lives. Its aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination of “ethical propositions”, to reconnect us with the ethical commitments embodied in our ordinary “non-ethical” language, and so the ways in which ordinary language might be taken to be ethically revealing.
Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism:... more Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism: in such a case, a form of moral fictionalism, combining a descriptivist account of moral sentences with a noncognitivist account of the attitudes involved in their acceptance or rejection, might seem an attractive alternative. This paper argues against the use of moral fictionalism as a strategy for defending noncognitivism in ethics. It argues, first, that the view is implausible as it stands and, second, that it does not enjoy the benefits over standard—expressivist—noncognitivism both that it claims to enjoy and that make up the principal rationale for the view. The paper then turns to the grounds for noncognitivism itself before showing how far the criticisms developed extend to alternative forms of moral fictionalism and developing independent objections to each.
What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the cent... more What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the central questions in the current debate between those—such as Cora Diamond, James Conant and Michael Kremer—who favour a “resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s work, and those—such as P. M. S. Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock—who instead favour a more “traditional” approach. What answer we give to these questions will determine the nature and force of his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and so the very shape Wittgenstein’s work has for us, as well as, to some extent, what the lesson of the Tractatus might be. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed defence of the austere view of nonsense, that lies at the heart of the resolute approach, against a range of influentialcriticisms developed by Hans-Johann Glock and which focus on Wittgenstein’s contextualism. In so doing, I hope also to shed some light on the kind of view the austere view is, as well as how it might relate to certain other crucial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought.
Journal of Applied Philosophy [Reprinted in Morgan, 2018. Ethics in Sport, 3rd edition. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics], 2007
Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether ... more Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether or not to boycott Zimbabwe, this paper seeks to explore the moral complexities surrounding the case of the sporting boycott in general as a response to morally odious regimes. Rather than attempting to provide some easy formula by which to determine justifiable from unjustifiable boycotts, we take as our starting point many of the arguments raised in the national press and explore and develop these arguments in order to shed light on the fundamental problems underlying the use of sporting boycotts as moral tools. The paper thus aims to show the inadequacy of the standard responses on both sides of the fence and, hopefully, clears the ground for future, more informed approaches to the issue.
What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the cent... more What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the central questions in the current debate between those—such as Cora Diamond, James Conant and Michael Kremer—who favour a “resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s work, and those—such as P. M. S. Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock—who instead favour a more “traditional” approach. What answer we give to these questions will determine the nature and force of his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and so the very shape Wittgenstein’s work has for us, as well as, to some extent, what the lesson of the Tractatus might be. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed defence of the austere view of nonsense, that lies at the heart of the resolute approach, against a range of influentialcriticisms developed by Hans-Johann Glock and which focus on Wittgenstein’s contextualism. In so doing, I hope also to shed some light on the kind of view the austere view is, as well as how it might relate to certain other crucial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought.
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Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.