My main areas of investigations are: 1. Aspect-perception -- the phenomena and their grammar 2. Moral philosophy -- with a focus on the the role of figurative language in moral thinking. 3. The philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein -- with some focus on his moral thought.
Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
Routledge - Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought (Edited by Reshef Agam-Segal, Edmund Dain), 2018
In ethics, Wittgenstein, early and late, emphasized changes of attitude over questions about how ... more In ethics, Wittgenstein, early and late, emphasized changes of attitude over questions about how to act. He once told his friend Rhees: “One of my sister’s characteristics is that whenever she hears of something awful that has happened, her impulse is to ask what one can do about it, what she can do to help or remedy. This is a tendency in her of which I disapprove.” Instead, he says elsewhere: “If life becomes hard to bear we think of improvements. But the most important & effective improvement, in our own attitude, hardly occurs to us […].” Such attitudinal changes involve a kind of clarity of thought for Wittgenstein, and his understanding of them can be explained in part by reference to his later discussion about aspect-perception. Moral problems can disappear in a way that resembles the disappearance of the rabbit-aspect of Jastrow's duck-rabbit when the duck-aspect dawns. I compare moral clarification to logical-philosophical clarification. Both cases involve propositions that say nothing, but rather shed light on what other propositions say—tautologies, grammatical remarks, and philosophical elucidations on the one hand, clarificatory moral remarks like ‘think of her as someone’s daughter’ on the other. I argue that this gives a practical edge to Wittgenstein’s moral thought, a tool with which to think through moral difficulties.
I defend the view that aspect-perception—seeing a face as courageous, or as a duck, etc.—typica... more I defend the view that aspect-perception—seeing a face as courageous, or as a duck, etc.—typically involves the application of concepts. This might seem obvious, but it has recently been contested by Avner Baz—to my mind one of the most important commentators on the phenomena of aspects. He writes: “aspects may not aptly be identified with, or in terms of, empirical concepts […]” In opposition, I claim that they may. Indeed, in many cases there is no other way to identify aspects.
I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall’s account of aspect-perception, to his more recent recruitment of the discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim that: “the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual.”
I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell, but argue that his arguments go too far. I argue that aspect-perception involves a special kind of application of concepts, and that denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is thus not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized world we normally have in perception that Baz wants to bring into view.
Morality in a Realistic Spirit, Craig Taylor & Andrew Gleeson (eds.) Routledge: London, 2019
In the conclusion to “Anything but Argument?”, after measuring her intellectual distance from Ono... more In the conclusion to “Anything but Argument?”, after measuring her intellectual distance from Onora O’Neill, Cora Diamond writes: “the arguments I have given are in a sense quite useless.” – I propose to elucidate Diamond’s treatment of distances (“Moral Difference and Distances,” “the Gulfs between Us,” to mention titles of two of Diamond’s papers)—in both metaphysics and ethics.
§1 presents Diamond’s suspicions regarding a conception of people as distant because they accept different thought-systems—“play different language-games.” We can make connections, Diamond argues, even across thought-systems; arguing with people who are different from us is not a priori useless. Things get trickier in philosophy, however, when the distances are between not thought-systems, but expectations from and conceptions of philosophy. §§2-3 discuss such distances between Diamond and O’Neill, and between Diamond and Saul Kripke. Here, I argue, bridging an intellectual gap, for Diamond, requires eliciting change in the philosopher’s will. §4 puts philosophical alongside moral distances. In ethics too, Diamond thinks, we typically need to examine wills—others’ but also our own. I discuss the personal aspect of this, the exposure and imaginative involvement it requires.
Inducing aspect-experiences—the sudden seeing of something in a completely new light, as when a f... more Inducing aspect-experiences—the sudden seeing of something in a completely new light, as when a face suddenly strikes one as familiar—can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any routine conceptualization of it. We can use that to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and reevaluate our ways of making sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other more typical Wittgensteinian philosophical methods.
Journal of Philosophical Research, Volume 38, pp. 43–68, 2013
I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and sug... more I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a language of ‘self-constitution.’ I challenge that, and claim that the language of legislation and judgment was, for Kant, more than a metaphor: The recognition of the moral law, he says, motivates us as if it were “the bidding of another person.” Legislation is typically remote in this way. It typically requires a distance between lawgiver and law-receiver—a distance that allows, for instance, for self-inspection and judgment. For Kant, these are the terms in which to explain the forms of the moral judgment and the sources of moral normativity. It is questionable, however, whether we can be remote from our own actions in the way required—whether we can observe our own actions. We cannot, for example, raise our hand and wonder how far it will go up. I develop this claim into an Anscombean challenge to Kant, and I call upon Kantians to take it seriously.
I propose a philosophical reading of Hanoch Levin’s *A Man Standing Behind a Seated Woman*. Philo... more I propose a philosophical reading of Hanoch Levin’s *A Man Standing Behind a Seated Woman*. Philosophizing is forced on Levin’s protagonists, who find themselves entangled by a central question: Which is more hurtful, scorn or indifference? When one is scorned it hurts; but at least someone pays attention. When one is met with indifference it hurts too; but at least one isn’t scorned. Levin thus describes and expresses a chronicle of radical helplessness—not just inability to shape one’s reality, but mainly inability to even consolidate a conception of that reality: to act, communicate effectively, and even have coherent desires. Unlike other readers, who identify the breakdown of meaning in Levin’s prose, I argue that Levin’s protagonist seeks to understand his life in absolute terms, or at least tie himself to something exalted, and thereby grace his reality with value. This, even though he knows his existence is relative and temporal. Levin’s protagonist’s struggle is thus not a class-struggle. It is rather a struggle against the very fact that he is situated in class-relationships—a pointless struggle, with religious aspects, to surpass the conditions of his existence.
I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucid... more I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate the grammar of aspect-seeing. In the typical Wittgensteinian method, we examine meaning in use: We practice language, and note the logical ramifications. I argue that the effectiveness of this method is hindered in the case of aspect-seeing by the fact that aspect-seeing involves an aberrant activity of seeing: Whereas it is normally nonsense to say that we choose what to see (decide to see the White House red, for instance), it is possible to see aspects at will—e.g. to decide to see Jastrow’s duck-rabbit as a duck. I suggest an alternative method of investigation, one that reflects on language from a disengaged standpoint: a method that allows us to entertain a form of conceptualization of an object but does not commit us to adopting that way—namely, that does not involve us in a use of the object according to the norms that govern that conceptualization. This method, I argue, fits the subject matter of aspect-perception, since aspect-perception itself involves such a disengaged form of reflection.
I characterize aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant’s sense: a distinct way i... more I characterize aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant’s sense: a distinct way in which the mind contacts world and applies concepts. First, aspect-perception involves a mode of thinking about things apart from any established routine of conceptualizing them. It is thus a form of concept application that is essentially reflection about language. Second, this mode of reflection has an experiential, sometimes perceptual, element: In aspect-perception, that is, we experience meanings—bodies of norms. Third, aspect-perception can be “preparatory”: it may help us to decide what linguistic norms to develop and how to conceptualize—make the world thinkable. Fourth, I discuss the forms of justification for which aspect-perception allows—the necessity and normativity involved in employing this form of judgment.
I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language... more I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language may have: The first are “Boundaries” which lie on the edges of language, and distinguish what makes sense from what does not. These, I claim, are suitable in making theoretical generalizations. The second are “Contours,” which lie within language, and allow for contrasting and comparing meanings and shades of meanings that we capture in language. These are more suitable for characterizations of particulars, and for literary use. I claim that failure to draw this distinction is responsible for confusions in Sabina Lovibond’s and Richard Rorty’s views of moral thought and language.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2012
Aspect-seeing involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be l... more Aspect-seeing involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization.
I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception:
1) Preparatory: allows for development, criticism, and shaping of concepts.
2) Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing--per impossible--what it would take to properly conceptualize one’s experience.
I demonstrate the usefulness of the different kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments.""
Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of ... more Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of Aristotle’s. Such, for instance, is the main tone of Christine Korsgaard’s reading. I make a case for a different, non-Aristotelian, reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two senses of self-legislation: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is a general project we are involved in as humans, and in which we determine the organizing principle of our practical life. Every action of ours takes part in this project of self-determination, and the project is thus part of the principle of every action. As opposed to that, not all actions are acts of Kantian self-legislation. To legislate for ourselves is to be involved in an internal drama of legislation. It is to be bound to respect moral duties by a force that is akin to a force of nature, and is yet internal. Moral normativity is thus separated from practical normativity in general.
I discuss the relevance of aspect-seeing to mathematics. Mathematics, I argue, often involves re-... more I discuss the relevance of aspect-seeing to mathematics. Mathematics, I argue, often involves re-describing. Proofs, in particular, typically give us new ways of looking. This answers an old question: What is intellectually achieved by a mathematical proof? -- I claim that proofs lead us to a sort of reflective position, which is akin to the mental position from which we see aspects--see things anew, as we can re-see the duck-rabbit as a rabbit instead of a duck. From this position we examine our pre-linguistic, "primitive," sense of things, which, contingent as it is, guides the formation of our practices and grounds them. I conclude by positioning my view between realism and antirealism in mathematics.
The paper attemts to answer Anscombe's challenge to the Kantian notion of Self-Legislation, utili... more The paper attemts to answer Anscombe's challenge to the Kantian notion of Self-Legislation, utilizing Wittgenstein's ideas about figurative language.
I claim that the idea that we can self-legislate is best understood as a secondary use of language.
Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
Routledge - Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought (Edited by Reshef Agam-Segal, Edmund Dain), 2018
In ethics, Wittgenstein, early and late, emphasized changes of attitude over questions about how ... more In ethics, Wittgenstein, early and late, emphasized changes of attitude over questions about how to act. He once told his friend Rhees: “One of my sister’s characteristics is that whenever she hears of something awful that has happened, her impulse is to ask what one can do about it, what she can do to help or remedy. This is a tendency in her of which I disapprove.” Instead, he says elsewhere: “If life becomes hard to bear we think of improvements. But the most important & effective improvement, in our own attitude, hardly occurs to us […].” Such attitudinal changes involve a kind of clarity of thought for Wittgenstein, and his understanding of them can be explained in part by reference to his later discussion about aspect-perception. Moral problems can disappear in a way that resembles the disappearance of the rabbit-aspect of Jastrow's duck-rabbit when the duck-aspect dawns. I compare moral clarification to logical-philosophical clarification. Both cases involve propositions that say nothing, but rather shed light on what other propositions say—tautologies, grammatical remarks, and philosophical elucidations on the one hand, clarificatory moral remarks like ‘think of her as someone’s daughter’ on the other. I argue that this gives a practical edge to Wittgenstein’s moral thought, a tool with which to think through moral difficulties.
I defend the view that aspect-perception—seeing a face as courageous, or as a duck, etc.—typica... more I defend the view that aspect-perception—seeing a face as courageous, or as a duck, etc.—typically involves the application of concepts. This might seem obvious, but it has recently been contested by Avner Baz—to my mind one of the most important commentators on the phenomena of aspects. He writes: “aspects may not aptly be identified with, or in terms of, empirical concepts […]” In opposition, I claim that they may. Indeed, in many cases there is no other way to identify aspects.
I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall’s account of aspect-perception, to his more recent recruitment of the discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim that: “the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual.”
I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell, but argue that his arguments go too far. I argue that aspect-perception involves a special kind of application of concepts, and that denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is thus not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized world we normally have in perception that Baz wants to bring into view.
Morality in a Realistic Spirit, Craig Taylor & Andrew Gleeson (eds.) Routledge: London, 2019
In the conclusion to “Anything but Argument?”, after measuring her intellectual distance from Ono... more In the conclusion to “Anything but Argument?”, after measuring her intellectual distance from Onora O’Neill, Cora Diamond writes: “the arguments I have given are in a sense quite useless.” – I propose to elucidate Diamond’s treatment of distances (“Moral Difference and Distances,” “the Gulfs between Us,” to mention titles of two of Diamond’s papers)—in both metaphysics and ethics.
§1 presents Diamond’s suspicions regarding a conception of people as distant because they accept different thought-systems—“play different language-games.” We can make connections, Diamond argues, even across thought-systems; arguing with people who are different from us is not a priori useless. Things get trickier in philosophy, however, when the distances are between not thought-systems, but expectations from and conceptions of philosophy. §§2-3 discuss such distances between Diamond and O’Neill, and between Diamond and Saul Kripke. Here, I argue, bridging an intellectual gap, for Diamond, requires eliciting change in the philosopher’s will. §4 puts philosophical alongside moral distances. In ethics too, Diamond thinks, we typically need to examine wills—others’ but also our own. I discuss the personal aspect of this, the exposure and imaginative involvement it requires.
Inducing aspect-experiences—the sudden seeing of something in a completely new light, as when a f... more Inducing aspect-experiences—the sudden seeing of something in a completely new light, as when a face suddenly strikes one as familiar—can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any routine conceptualization of it. We can use that to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and reevaluate our ways of making sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other more typical Wittgensteinian philosophical methods.
Journal of Philosophical Research, Volume 38, pp. 43–68, 2013
I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and sug... more I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a language of ‘self-constitution.’ I challenge that, and claim that the language of legislation and judgment was, for Kant, more than a metaphor: The recognition of the moral law, he says, motivates us as if it were “the bidding of another person.” Legislation is typically remote in this way. It typically requires a distance between lawgiver and law-receiver—a distance that allows, for instance, for self-inspection and judgment. For Kant, these are the terms in which to explain the forms of the moral judgment and the sources of moral normativity. It is questionable, however, whether we can be remote from our own actions in the way required—whether we can observe our own actions. We cannot, for example, raise our hand and wonder how far it will go up. I develop this claim into an Anscombean challenge to Kant, and I call upon Kantians to take it seriously.
I propose a philosophical reading of Hanoch Levin’s *A Man Standing Behind a Seated Woman*. Philo... more I propose a philosophical reading of Hanoch Levin’s *A Man Standing Behind a Seated Woman*. Philosophizing is forced on Levin’s protagonists, who find themselves entangled by a central question: Which is more hurtful, scorn or indifference? When one is scorned it hurts; but at least someone pays attention. When one is met with indifference it hurts too; but at least one isn’t scorned. Levin thus describes and expresses a chronicle of radical helplessness—not just inability to shape one’s reality, but mainly inability to even consolidate a conception of that reality: to act, communicate effectively, and even have coherent desires. Unlike other readers, who identify the breakdown of meaning in Levin’s prose, I argue that Levin’s protagonist seeks to understand his life in absolute terms, or at least tie himself to something exalted, and thereby grace his reality with value. This, even though he knows his existence is relative and temporal. Levin’s protagonist’s struggle is thus not a class-struggle. It is rather a struggle against the very fact that he is situated in class-relationships—a pointless struggle, with religious aspects, to surpass the conditions of his existence.
I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucid... more I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate the grammar of aspect-seeing. In the typical Wittgensteinian method, we examine meaning in use: We practice language, and note the logical ramifications. I argue that the effectiveness of this method is hindered in the case of aspect-seeing by the fact that aspect-seeing involves an aberrant activity of seeing: Whereas it is normally nonsense to say that we choose what to see (decide to see the White House red, for instance), it is possible to see aspects at will—e.g. to decide to see Jastrow’s duck-rabbit as a duck. I suggest an alternative method of investigation, one that reflects on language from a disengaged standpoint: a method that allows us to entertain a form of conceptualization of an object but does not commit us to adopting that way—namely, that does not involve us in a use of the object according to the norms that govern that conceptualization. This method, I argue, fits the subject matter of aspect-perception, since aspect-perception itself involves such a disengaged form of reflection.
I characterize aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant’s sense: a distinct way i... more I characterize aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant’s sense: a distinct way in which the mind contacts world and applies concepts. First, aspect-perception involves a mode of thinking about things apart from any established routine of conceptualizing them. It is thus a form of concept application that is essentially reflection about language. Second, this mode of reflection has an experiential, sometimes perceptual, element: In aspect-perception, that is, we experience meanings—bodies of norms. Third, aspect-perception can be “preparatory”: it may help us to decide what linguistic norms to develop and how to conceptualize—make the world thinkable. Fourth, I discuss the forms of justification for which aspect-perception allows—the necessity and normativity involved in employing this form of judgment.
I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language... more I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language may have: The first are “Boundaries” which lie on the edges of language, and distinguish what makes sense from what does not. These, I claim, are suitable in making theoretical generalizations. The second are “Contours,” which lie within language, and allow for contrasting and comparing meanings and shades of meanings that we capture in language. These are more suitable for characterizations of particulars, and for literary use. I claim that failure to draw this distinction is responsible for confusions in Sabina Lovibond’s and Richard Rorty’s views of moral thought and language.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2012
Aspect-seeing involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be l... more Aspect-seeing involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization.
I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception:
1) Preparatory: allows for development, criticism, and shaping of concepts.
2) Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing--per impossible--what it would take to properly conceptualize one’s experience.
I demonstrate the usefulness of the different kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments.""
Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of ... more Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of Aristotle’s. Such, for instance, is the main tone of Christine Korsgaard’s reading. I make a case for a different, non-Aristotelian, reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two senses of self-legislation: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is a general project we are involved in as humans, and in which we determine the organizing principle of our practical life. Every action of ours takes part in this project of self-determination, and the project is thus part of the principle of every action. As opposed to that, not all actions are acts of Kantian self-legislation. To legislate for ourselves is to be involved in an internal drama of legislation. It is to be bound to respect moral duties by a force that is akin to a force of nature, and is yet internal. Moral normativity is thus separated from practical normativity in general.
I discuss the relevance of aspect-seeing to mathematics. Mathematics, I argue, often involves re-... more I discuss the relevance of aspect-seeing to mathematics. Mathematics, I argue, often involves re-describing. Proofs, in particular, typically give us new ways of looking. This answers an old question: What is intellectually achieved by a mathematical proof? -- I claim that proofs lead us to a sort of reflective position, which is akin to the mental position from which we see aspects--see things anew, as we can re-see the duck-rabbit as a rabbit instead of a duck. From this position we examine our pre-linguistic, "primitive," sense of things, which, contingent as it is, guides the formation of our practices and grounds them. I conclude by positioning my view between realism and antirealism in mathematics.
The paper attemts to answer Anscombe's challenge to the Kantian notion of Self-Legislation, utili... more The paper attemts to answer Anscombe's challenge to the Kantian notion of Self-Legislation, utilizing Wittgenstein's ideas about figurative language.
I claim that the idea that we can self-legislate is best understood as a secondary use of language.
Review for NDPR of John Collins and Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Lang... more Review for NDPR of John Collins and Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language Thought, and Perception, Oxford, 2108.
D.Phil dissertation
Parts of Part 1. of this dissertation are developed in:
* "Contours an... more D.Phil dissertation
Parts of Part 1. of this dissertation are developed in:
* "Contours and Barriers: What is it to Draw the Limits of Moral Language?"
Parts Part 2. of this dissertation are developed in two papers:
* "A Splitting 'Mind-Ache': An Anscombean Challenge to Kantian Self-Legislation" * "Self-Legislation and Other Figurative Dramas" .
General description:
Part 1. explains essential features of Cora Diamond’s philosophical methods, and explains what it takes to draw the limits of moral language--the language trough which moral reality is reflected. Based on that account I then argue that imaginative and figurative thinking--thinking grounded in metaphors and images--has an essential role in moral and religious understanding. Figurative language is not just a helpful guide to the understanding of some moral phenomena, but is constitutive of them. In Part 2. I show this in the case of the Kantian idea of self-legislation and in Part 3. in the case of Anselm’s idea of God as reflected in his Ontological Proof.
Uploads
Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall’s account of aspect-perception, to his more recent recruitment of the discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim that: “the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual.”
I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell, but argue that his arguments go too far. I argue that aspect-perception involves a special kind of application of concepts, and that denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is thus not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized world we normally have in perception that Baz wants to bring into view.
§1 presents Diamond’s suspicions regarding a conception of people as distant because they accept different thought-systems—“play different language-games.” We can make connections, Diamond argues, even across thought-systems; arguing with people who are different from us is not a priori useless. Things get trickier in philosophy, however, when the distances are between not thought-systems, but expectations from and conceptions of philosophy. §§2-3 discuss such distances between Diamond and O’Neill, and between Diamond and Saul Kripke. Here, I argue, bridging an intellectual gap, for Diamond, requires eliciting change in the philosopher’s will. §4 puts philosophical alongside moral distances. In ethics too, Diamond thinks, we typically need to examine wills—others’ but also our own. I discuss the personal aspect of this, the exposure and imaginative involvement it requires.
Published in 'Philosophy' 84, 2009
I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception:
1) Preparatory: allows for development, criticism, and shaping of concepts.
2) Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing--per impossible--what it would take to properly conceptualize one’s experience.
I demonstrate the usefulness of the different kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments.""
I claim that the idea that we can self-legislate is best understood as a secondary use of language.
Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, contains the seeds of an original and important rethinking of moral or ethical thought that has, so far, yet to be fully appreciated. The ten essays in this collection, all specially commissioned for this volume, are united in the claim that Wittgenstein’s thought has much to contribute to our understanding of this fundamental area of philosophy and of our lives. They take up a variety of different perspectives on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work, and explore the significance of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Wittgenstein’s startling claim there that there can be no ethical propositions, to the Philosophical Investigations.
I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall’s account of aspect-perception, to his more recent recruitment of the discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim that: “the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual.”
I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell, but argue that his arguments go too far. I argue that aspect-perception involves a special kind of application of concepts, and that denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is thus not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized world we normally have in perception that Baz wants to bring into view.
§1 presents Diamond’s suspicions regarding a conception of people as distant because they accept different thought-systems—“play different language-games.” We can make connections, Diamond argues, even across thought-systems; arguing with people who are different from us is not a priori useless. Things get trickier in philosophy, however, when the distances are between not thought-systems, but expectations from and conceptions of philosophy. §§2-3 discuss such distances between Diamond and O’Neill, and between Diamond and Saul Kripke. Here, I argue, bridging an intellectual gap, for Diamond, requires eliciting change in the philosopher’s will. §4 puts philosophical alongside moral distances. In ethics too, Diamond thinks, we typically need to examine wills—others’ but also our own. I discuss the personal aspect of this, the exposure and imaginative involvement it requires.
Published in 'Philosophy' 84, 2009
I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception:
1) Preparatory: allows for development, criticism, and shaping of concepts.
2) Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing--per impossible--what it would take to properly conceptualize one’s experience.
I demonstrate the usefulness of the different kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments.""
I claim that the idea that we can self-legislate is best understood as a secondary use of language.
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-philosophy-of-charles-travis-language-thought-and-perception/#fn292
Parts of Part 1. of this dissertation are developed in:
* "Contours and Barriers: What is it to Draw the Limits of Moral Language?"
Parts Part 2. of this dissertation are developed in two papers:
* "A Splitting 'Mind-Ache': An Anscombean Challenge to Kantian Self-Legislation" * "Self-Legislation and Other Figurative Dramas" .
General description:
Part 1. explains essential features of Cora Diamond’s philosophical methods, and explains what it takes to draw the limits of moral language--the language trough which moral reality is reflected. Based on that account I then argue that imaginative and figurative thinking--thinking grounded in metaphors and images--has an essential role in moral and religious understanding. Figurative language is not just a helpful guide to the understanding of some moral phenomena, but is constitutive of them. In Part 2. I show this in the case of the Kantian idea of self-legislation and in Part 3. in the case of Anselm’s idea of God as reflected in his Ontological Proof.