'[T]he present groundwork is nothing more than the identification and vindication of the supreme ... more '[T]he present groundwork is nothing more than the identification and vindication of the supreme principle of morality.'
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Immanuel Kant makes clear his two central intentions: first, to uncover the principle that underpins morality, and secondly to defend its applicability to human beings. The result is one of the most significant texts in the history of ethics, and a masterpiece of Enlightenment thinking. Kant argues that moral law tells us to act only in ways that others could also act, thereby treating them as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Kant contends that despite apparent threats to our freedom from science, and to ethics from our self-interest, we can nonetheless take ourselves to be free rational agents, who as such have a motivation to act on this moral law, and thus the ability to act as moral beings.
One of the most studied works of moral philosophy, this new translation by Robert Stern, Joe Saunders, and Christopher Bennett illuminates this famous text for modern readers.
Philosophical reflection on the emotions has a long history stretching back to classical Greek th... more Philosophical reflection on the emotions has a long history stretching back to classical Greek thought, even though at times philosophers have marginalized or denigrated them in favour of reason. Fourteen leading philosophers here offer a broad survey of the development of our understanding of the emotions. The thinkers they discuss include Aristotle, Aquinas, Ockham, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Brentano, Stumpf, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre. Central issues include the taxonomy of the emotions; the distinction between emotions, passions, feelings and moods; the relation between the emotions and reason; the relationship between the self and the emotions. At a metaphilosophical level, the collection also raises issues about the value of historical study of the discipline, and what light it can shed on contemporary concerns. Thinking about the Emotions is a fascinating and illuminating collective study of how philosophers have grappled with this most intriguing part of our nature as beings who feel as well as think and act.
This volume presents a selection of Robert Stern's work on the theme of Kantian ethics. It begins... more This volume presents a selection of Robert Stern's work on the theme of Kantian ethics. It begins by focusing on the relation between Kant's account of obligation and his view of autonomy, arguing that this leaves room for Kant to be a realist about value. Stern then considers where this places Kant in relation to the question of moral scepticism, and in relation to the principle of 'ought implies can', and examines this principle in its own right. The papers then move beyond Kant himself to his wider influence and to critics of his work, including Hegel, the British Idealists, and the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup, while also offering a comparison with William James's arguments for freedom. The collection concludes with a consideration of a broadly Kantian critique of divine command ethics offered by Stephen Darwall, arguing that the critique does not succeed. General themes considered in this volume therefore include value, perfectionism, agency, autonomy, moral motivation, moral scepticism, and obligation, as well as the historical place of Kant's ethics and its influence on thinkers up to the present day.
The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between
the Hegelian conception of recognition... more The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.
... or autonomy, thus seeming to realize the synthesis between Kant and Spinoza that a 'Spin... more ... or autonomy, thus seeming to realize the synthesis between Kant and Spinoza that a 'Spinozism of freedom ... a self-referential structure, whereby everything depends on an other to be itself, sucha structure cannot ... Hegel's approach is sim-ply bereft of these issues' (p. 329). ...
This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel ... more This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls “Secondness”, in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the issues Peirce raises go deep, in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst in others that criticism can be resisted by the Hegelian.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implie... more The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked.
The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition... more The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.
My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another i... more My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another in terms of vulnerability, we can better resolve the problem of overdemandingness – namely, that certain moral views and theories seem to require more of us than is reasonably acceptable. I will suggest that there is a way in which focusing on vulnerability, rather than merely needs or wants, can help address the issue of overdemandingness, largely because of the relational nature of vulnerability, and how this connects to our power over others. In arguing this case, I will draw on the work of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup.
'[T]he present groundwork is nothing more than the identification and vindication of the supreme ... more '[T]he present groundwork is nothing more than the identification and vindication of the supreme principle of morality.'
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Immanuel Kant makes clear his two central intentions: first, to uncover the principle that underpins morality, and secondly to defend its applicability to human beings. The result is one of the most significant texts in the history of ethics, and a masterpiece of Enlightenment thinking. Kant argues that moral law tells us to act only in ways that others could also act, thereby treating them as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Kant contends that despite apparent threats to our freedom from science, and to ethics from our self-interest, we can nonetheless take ourselves to be free rational agents, who as such have a motivation to act on this moral law, and thus the ability to act as moral beings.
One of the most studied works of moral philosophy, this new translation by Robert Stern, Joe Saunders, and Christopher Bennett illuminates this famous text for modern readers.
Philosophical reflection on the emotions has a long history stretching back to classical Greek th... more Philosophical reflection on the emotions has a long history stretching back to classical Greek thought, even though at times philosophers have marginalized or denigrated them in favour of reason. Fourteen leading philosophers here offer a broad survey of the development of our understanding of the emotions. The thinkers they discuss include Aristotle, Aquinas, Ockham, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Brentano, Stumpf, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre. Central issues include the taxonomy of the emotions; the distinction between emotions, passions, feelings and moods; the relation between the emotions and reason; the relationship between the self and the emotions. At a metaphilosophical level, the collection also raises issues about the value of historical study of the discipline, and what light it can shed on contemporary concerns. Thinking about the Emotions is a fascinating and illuminating collective study of how philosophers have grappled with this most intriguing part of our nature as beings who feel as well as think and act.
This volume presents a selection of Robert Stern's work on the theme of Kantian ethics. It begins... more This volume presents a selection of Robert Stern's work on the theme of Kantian ethics. It begins by focusing on the relation between Kant's account of obligation and his view of autonomy, arguing that this leaves room for Kant to be a realist about value. Stern then considers where this places Kant in relation to the question of moral scepticism, and in relation to the principle of 'ought implies can', and examines this principle in its own right. The papers then move beyond Kant himself to his wider influence and to critics of his work, including Hegel, the British Idealists, and the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup, while also offering a comparison with William James's arguments for freedom. The collection concludes with a consideration of a broadly Kantian critique of divine command ethics offered by Stephen Darwall, arguing that the critique does not succeed. General themes considered in this volume therefore include value, perfectionism, agency, autonomy, moral motivation, moral scepticism, and obligation, as well as the historical place of Kant's ethics and its influence on thinkers up to the present day.
The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between
the Hegelian conception of recognition... more The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.
... or autonomy, thus seeming to realize the synthesis between Kant and Spinoza that a 'Spin... more ... or autonomy, thus seeming to realize the synthesis between Kant and Spinoza that a 'Spinozism of freedom ... a self-referential structure, whereby everything depends on an other to be itself, sucha structure cannot ... Hegel's approach is sim-ply bereft of these issues' (p. 329). ...
This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel ... more This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls “Secondness”, in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the issues Peirce raises go deep, in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst in others that criticism can be resisted by the Hegelian.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implie... more The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked.
The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition... more The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.
My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another i... more My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another in terms of vulnerability, we can better resolve the problem of overdemandingness – namely, that certain moral views and theories seem to require more of us than is reasonably acceptable. I will suggest that there is a way in which focusing on vulnerability, rather than merely needs or wants, can help address the issue of overdemandingness, largely because of the relational nature of vulnerability, and how this connects to our power over others. In arguing this case, I will draw on the work of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2019
This paper draws out from Kierkegaard’s work a distinctive critical perspective on an influentia... more This paper draws out from Kierkegaard’s work a distinctive critical perspective on an influential contemporary approach in moral philosophy: namely, Christine Korsgaard’s transcendental argument for the value of humanity. From Kierkegaard’s perspective, we argue, Korsgaard argument goes too far, in attributing absolute value to humanity – but also that she is required to make this claim if her transcendental argument is to work. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, to place this sort of value in humanity is problematic since it threatens to make the relation between individuals too claustrophobic. Finally, we explore the possibility of a rival approach, in which we should view others as ethically significant because they too are related to the kind of ‘third’ which Kierkegaard argues is needed to bring stability to the structure of the self. In this way, we claim, a different and more successful transcendental argument to the value of humanity can be found in the work of Kierkegaard.
Although William James formed his philosophical views in direct reaction to the Hegelianism then ... more Although William James formed his philosophical views in direct reaction to the Hegelianism then dominant in American and British institutions, modern critics have tended to reject James’s criticism of G. W. F. Hegel as superficial and outdated. This is in part due to James’s energetic rhetorical style, but also because James at his most polemical tends to present his pluralistic and pragmatist empiricism as diametrically opposed to Hegel’s monistic and intellectualistic idealism, so that it is not clear how the two theories could engage in any meaningful dialogue. This chapter presents a different interpretation of the engagement between James and Hegel. On this interpretation, James’s criticisms of Hegel emerge from what he perceives to be a common starting point: the attempt to find the world to be “a home.” As such, James’s criticisms of Hegel should be understood as offering a kind of internal critique. According to James, Hegel offers too narrow an account of what it is for beings like us to “feel at home” in the world. This is a unique and internal criticism of Hegel which deserves to be taken seriously.
This paper considers A. W. Moore's treatment of Hegel in his book The Evolution of Modern Metaphy... more This paper considers A. W. Moore's treatment of Hegel in his book The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things. The paper begins by setting out the context that Moore gives to his discussion of Hegel, and the themes that he focuses on. It then considers the ways in which Moore judges Hegel to fall short, showing how they relate to Moore's reading of Spinoza and of Deleuze. It is argued that there are ways of conceiving of Hegel’s position that could be said to escape Moore’s objections, but at the very least he shows how they can be pressed against some important parts of Hegel’s text, if not others; thus one of the many ways in which Moore’s book is significant is in underlining the importance of this challenge.
This paper considers the prospects for the current revival of interest in Hegel, and the directio... more This paper considers the prospects for the current revival of interest in Hegel, and the direction it might take. Looking back to Richard J. Bernstein’s paper from 1977, on ‘Why Hegel Now?’, it contrasts his optimistic assessment of a rapprochement between Hegel and analytic philosophy with Sebastian Gardner’s more pessimistic view, where Gardner argues that Hegel’s idealist account of value makes any such rapprochement impossible. The paper explores Hegel’s account of value further, arguing for a middle way between these extremes of optimism and pessimism, proposing an Aristotelian reading which is more metaphysical than Bernstein recognizes, but not as at odds with thinking in current analytic philosophy as Gardner suggests, as it finds a counterpart in the work of Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, Rosalind Hursthouse and others.
Philosophers working within the pragmatist tradition have pictured their relation to Kant and Kan... more Philosophers working within the pragmatist tradition have pictured their relation to Kant and Kantianism in very diverse terms: some have presented their work as an appropriation and development of Kantian ideas, some have argued that pragmatism is an approach in complete opposition to Kant. This collection investigates the relationship between pragmatism, Kant, and current Kantian approaches to transcendental arguments in a detailed and original way. Chapters highlight pragmatist aspects of Kant’s thought and trace the influence of Kant on the work of pragmatists and neo-pragmatists, engaging with the work of Peirce, James, Lewis, Sellars, Rorty, and Brandom, among others. They also consider to what extent contemporary approaches to transcendental arguments are compatible with a pragmatist standpoint. The book includes contributions from renowned authors working on Kant, pragmatism and contemporary Kantian approaches to philosophy, and provides an authoritative and original perspective on the relationship between pragmatism and Kantianism.
This paper deals with the issue of self-determination and agency in moral action. On the one hand... more This paper deals with the issue of self-determination and agency in moral action. On the one hand, it seems that where possible, the moral agent should use their practical reason to identify what it is right for them to do, and act accordingly; on the other hand, this seems to leave little room for the agent to decide for themselves how to act, where this is often said to be a marker of freedom and how the will is exercised. In response to this difficulty, Ruth Chang has argued recently that at least some reasons themselves need to be seen as being created through an act of will. Looking at the work of Iris Murdoch, it is argued that this response is problematic. At the same time, it is also argued that Murdoch can provide a fruitful way of dealing with this problem through her account of the imagination. This gives a role to the will of the agent not in creating reasons, but in attuning us to those reasons, thereby locating the will within practical reasoning itself, and showing how the authority of the good can be made compatible with human freedom.
This article considers an apparent ‘Achilles’ heel’ for Kant’s transcendental idealism, concernin... more This article considers an apparent ‘Achilles’ heel’ for Kant’s transcendental idealism, concerning his account of how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. The problem is that while Kant’s distinctive attempt to explain synthetic a priori knowledge lies at the heart of his transcendental idealism, this explanation appears to face a dilemma: either the explanation generates a problematic regress, or the explanation it offers gives us no reason to favour transcendental idealism over transcendental realism. In the article, I consider G. E. Moore’s version of the problem, which I argue has not yet received an adequate response. Instead, I offer a way out of this dilemma by focusing on the normativity rather than the metaphysics of the mind (sections 3–6).
While hope is one of the three theological virtues within the Christian tradition, alongside fait... more While hope is one of the three theological virtues within the Christian tradition, alongside faith and love, its position as a virtue outside that tradition is more contested. Indeed, doubts about the value of hope have been raised from Hesiod onwards, through to Byron's claim that it is 'nothing but the paint on the face of existence', and Nietzsche's denunciation of hope as 'the worst of all evils, because it prolongs the torments of man', while a character from a Terence Rattigan play declares: 'if you can live without hope, you can live without despair'. While not completely critical, both Plato and Aristotle seem to have shared these reservations, Plato worrying that hope can make us gullible, while Aristotle refrained from listing it among the virtues, though he did explore its relation to courage and megalopsychia. In this paper, we examine in more detail the case against hope as a secular virtue, focusing on three main criteria of what makes something a virtue: namely, it is good for its possessor; stands between two vices; and can be cultivated and exercised. The status of hope as a virtue can be questioned on each of these counts, but we aim to rebut these doubts, arguing that hope can and should be accorded this status after all. We will begin by briefly explaining what we take a virtue to be and so what it might mean to conceive of hope as a virtue, and then we will attempt to show how hope can meet each of the criteria of virtue outlined above, thereby defending this way of conceiving of hope as a virtue. Just as patience helps us to navigate the temporal, hope helps us to navigate the possible, and to flourish in situations of uncertainty.
Hope (Oxford University Press, ed. Nancy Snow), 2021
While hope is one of the three theological virtues within the Christian tradition, alongside fait... more While hope is one of the three theological virtues within the Christian tradition, alongside faith and love, its position as a virtue outside that tradition is more contested.1 Indeed, doubts about the value of hope have been raised from Hesiod onwards, through to Byron's claim that it is 'nothing but the paint on the face of existence',2 and Nietzsche's denunciation of hope as 'the worst of all evils, because it prolongs the torments of man',3 while a character from a Terence Rattigan play declares: 'if you can live without hope, you can live without despair'.4 While not completely critical, both Plato and Aristotle seem to have shared these reservations, Plato worrying that hope can make us gullible, while Aristotle refrained from listing it among the virtues, though he did explore its relation to courage and megalopsychia.5 In this paper, we examine in more detail the case against hope as a secular virtue, focusing on three main criteria of what makes something a virtue: namely, it is good for its possessor; stands between two vices; and can be cultivated and exercised. The status of hope as a virtue can be questioned on each of these counts, but we aim to rebut these doubts, arguing that hope can and should be accorded this status after all. We will begin by briefly explaining what we take a virtue to be and so what it might mean to conceive of hope as a virtue, and then we will attempt to show how hope can meet each of the criteria of virtue outlined above, thereby defending this way of conceiving of hope as a virtue. Just as patience helps us to navigate the temporal, hope helps us to navigate the possible, and to flourish in situations of uncertainty.
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Books by Robert Stern
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Immanuel Kant makes clear his two central intentions: first, to uncover the principle that underpins morality, and secondly to defend its applicability to human beings. The result is one of the most significant texts in the history of ethics, and a masterpiece of Enlightenment thinking. Kant argues that moral law tells us to act only in ways that others could also act, thereby treating them as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Kant contends that despite apparent threats to our freedom from science, and to ethics from our self-interest, we can nonetheless take ourselves to be free rational agents, who as such have a motivation to act on this moral law, and thus the ability to act as moral beings.
One of the most studied works of moral philosophy, this new translation by Robert Stern, Joe Saunders, and Christopher Bennett illuminates this famous text for modern readers.
Papers by Robert Stern
the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is
championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception
of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen
Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary,
they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect
or hope, and in particular that an individual can be
granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being
granted second-personal authority. This view is defended
by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's
Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness,
and of the master/slave dialectic.
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Immanuel Kant makes clear his two central intentions: first, to uncover the principle that underpins morality, and secondly to defend its applicability to human beings. The result is one of the most significant texts in the history of ethics, and a masterpiece of Enlightenment thinking. Kant argues that moral law tells us to act only in ways that others could also act, thereby treating them as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Kant contends that despite apparent threats to our freedom from science, and to ethics from our self-interest, we can nonetheless take ourselves to be free rational agents, who as such have a motivation to act on this moral law, and thus the ability to act as moral beings.
One of the most studied works of moral philosophy, this new translation by Robert Stern, Joe Saunders, and Christopher Bennett illuminates this famous text for modern readers.
the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is
championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception
of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen
Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary,
they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect
or hope, and in particular that an individual can be
granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being
granted second-personal authority. This view is defended
by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's
Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness,
and of the master/slave dialectic.
generates a problematic regress, or the explanation it offers gives us no reason to favour transcendental idealism over transcendental realism. In the article, I consider G. E. Moore’s version of the problem, which I argue has not yet received an adequate response. Instead, I offer a way out of this dilemma by focusing on the normativity rather than the metaphysics of
the mind (sections 3–6).