- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences
The University of Edinburgh
Dugald Stewart Building
3 Charles Street
Edinburgh
EH8 9AD
Alix Cohen
University of Edinburgh, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- In January 2014, I joined the Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh as a Chancellor's Fellow. I am now... moreIn January 2014, I joined the Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh as a Chancellor's Fellow. I am now a Reader.
I am also Executive Member of the British Society for the History of Philosophy (http://www.bshp.org.uk/) and Newsletter editor for the UK Kant Society.
Previous posts
They include a Junior Research Fellowship at Newnham College, Cambridge (2005-8), a Lectureship at the University of Leeds (2008-11) and York (2011-13). In 2011-13, I spent some time at the University of Neuchâtel as a Research Fellow of the Swiss National Foundation, working on a joint project entitled ‘Imagination, Emotion and Value’.
Editorial work
• Deputy editor of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
(website: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/09608788.asp)
• Member of the Standing Editorial Board of Oxford Bibliographies OnLine: Philosophy, OUP.
(website: http://aboutobo.com/philosophy/)
• Member of the Editorial Board, Philosophical Quarterly.edit
Contributors: Frederick Beiser, Alix Cohen, Patrick Frierson, Paul Guyer, Pauline Kleingeld, Robert Louden, Rudolf Makkreel, Onora O’Neill, Claudia Schmidt, Thomas Sturm, John Zammito.
Research Interests:
The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it.... more
The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire (§2), I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition (§3) and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, the...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This chapter examines Kant’s general theory of affectivity, focusing in particular on his account of the nature of emotions, feelings, and desires. Cohen argues that while emotions may involve conative or cognitive states, they are... more
This chapter examines Kant’s general theory of affectivity, focusing in particular on his account of the nature of emotions, feelings, and desires. Cohen argues that while emotions may involve conative or cognitive states, they are distinct from them in a meaningful way since they involve a third faculty, the feeling of pleasure and pain, which differs from the faculty of cognition, which generates beliefs, and the faculty of desire, which generates volitions. On Cohen’s interpretation, its function is to enable the affective awareness of the effect of a representation on the subject and the interplay of its mental faculties.
Research Interests:
This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral... more
This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the af-fective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent's practice of virtue and the cultivation of her affective dispositions.
Research Interests:
Although it is a little known fact beyond the world of Kant scholars, the last book Kant published in his lifetime was titled Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.1 Moreover, the lecture course that he gave most frequently, from... more
Although it is a little known fact beyond the world of Kant scholars, the last book Kant published in his lifetime was titled Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.1 Moreover, the lecture course that he gave most frequently, from 1772–73 to 1795–96, was dedicated to anthropology. This subject was thus very prominent in his work as a practicing philosopher. And yet until recently, the anthropological part of his corpus has been for the most part overlooked both within and outside Kantian circles. Kant is, of course, better known for his three Critiques, and his Anthropology, together with his more empirical works more generally, has often been thought of as outside of, if not irrelevant to, the Kantian system as such — starting from Schleiermacher’s 1799 review that describes it as a “collection of trivialities.”2 In the last few years however, this has started to change. A number of commentators have begun to take it into account, first in order to understand or flesh out his ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In Kant and the Human Sciences, I present an epistemic model of the human sciences according to which Kant’sAntinomy of reflective judgment is the “foremost” “basis of the method of human sciences” (Cohen, 2009, p. 29). In this paper, I... more
In Kant and the Human Sciences, I present an epistemic model of the human sciences according to which Kant’sAntinomy of reflective judgment is the “foremost” “basis of the method of human sciences” (Cohen, 2009, p. 29). In this paper, I set out to defend this model against recent objections. In the first section, I show that Kant’s anthropology is modelled on his philosophy of biology due to the fact that the development of the human species shares a number of peculiar features with thefunctioning of organisms, these features entailing important methodological characteristics. In the second section, I support this claim by addressing a number of issues that have been raised by Robert Louden in his contribution to this volume. Finally, I discuss a difficulty that is entailed by Louden’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropological project. Namely, pragmatic anthropologyis methodologically and metaphysically incompatible with the claim that human beings are causally determined.
Research Interests:
Kant’s ethics is traditionally portrayed as unequivocal on one issue: natural drives, including feelings, emotions, and inclinations, are intrinsically at odds with morality. However, this does not entail that there is no moral role for... more
Kant’s ethics is traditionally portrayed as unequivocal on one issue: natural drives, including feelings, emotions, and inclinations, are intrinsically at odds with morality. However, this does not entail that there is no moral role for them in Kant’s ethics. For instance, he writes ‘while it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys) of others, it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate’ [6:456–7].This statement is not only in conflict with traditional portrayals of his ethics, but more importantly it may seem surprising for Kantian morality to endorse the claim that we have duties, albeit indirect, to cultivate feelings of sympathy in order to use them as a means to moral ends. The aim of this chapter is to spell out and defend the claim that the cultivation of certain emotions is one of our moral duties.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Kant’s remark about the impossibility of there ever being a Newton of a blade of grass has often been interpreted as a misguided pre-emptive strike against Darwin and evolutionary theories in general. This chapter aims to re-evaluate this... more
Kant’s remark about the impossibility of there ever being a Newton of a blade of grass has often been interpreted as a misguided pre-emptive strike against Darwin and evolutionary theories in general. This chapter aims to re-evaluate this claim in the context of Kant’s account of organic generation and argue that, contrary to what is usually thought, it does leave room for the possibility of evolution. To do so, I examine Kant’s theory of generation and draw its implications for biological heredity, species diversity, and the role played by environmental factors in organic development. On this basis, I suggest that, first, evolution is a possible albeit far-fetched hypothesis for Kant, and second, Darwin’s theory of natural selection would have turned a far-fetched possibility into a plausible candidate. As I go on to argue, however, despite its explanatory success, the Darwinian account would not have disposed of the need for teleology. This is why Darwin could never have been a Ne...
Research Interests:
This book comprises a collection of original papers that reflect on the philosophical understanding of emotions from Greek thinkers to the present day. Central figures discussed include Aristotle, Aquinas, Ockham, Descartes, Malebranche,... more
This book comprises a collection of original papers that reflect on the philosophical understanding of emotions from Greek thinkers to the present day. Central figures discussed include Aristotle, Aquinas, Ockham, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Brentano, Stumpf, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre. Central issues include the taxonomy of the emotions; the distinction between emotions, passions, feelings, and moods; the relation between the emotions and reason; the relationship between the self and the emotions. At a meta-philosophical level, the collection also raises issues about the value of historical study of the discipline, and what light it can shed on contemporary concerns.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Abbreviations Acknowledgment List of Tables Preface Freedom and The Human Sciences The Model of Biological Science What Is The Human Being? Pragmatic Anthropology Philosophical History Epilogue: A Pragmatic Counterpart to the... more
Abbreviations Acknowledgment List of Tables Preface Freedom and The Human Sciences The Model of Biological Science What Is The Human Being? Pragmatic Anthropology Philosophical History Epilogue: A Pragmatic Counterpart to the Transcendental Project? Bibliography Index
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
As one would expect, Kant believes that there is a tension, and even a conflict, between our bodily humanity and its ethical counterpa t: "Inclination to pleasurable living and inclination to virtue are in conflict with each... more
As one would expect, Kant believes that there is a tension, and even a conflict, between our bodily humanity and its ethical counterpa t: "Inclination to pleasurable living and inclination to virtue are in conflict with each other." What is more unexpected, however, is that he further claims that this tension can be resolved in what he calls an example of "civilized bliss," namely, dinner parties.1
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
On my interpretation of Kant, feeling plays a central role in the mind: it has the distinct function of tracking and evaluating our activity in relation to ourselves and the world so as to orient us. In this article, I set out to defend... more
On my interpretation of Kant, feeling plays a central role in the mind: it has the distinct function of tracking and evaluating our activity in relation to ourselves and the world so as to orient us. In this article, I set out to defend this view against a number of objections raised by Melissa Merritt and Uri Eran. I conclude with some reflections on the fact that, despite being very different, Merritt and Eran’s respective views of Kantian feelings turn out to have something potentially problematic in common: they blur the boundary between feelings and other kinds of mental states.
Research Interests: Philosophy and Kantian
Research Interests:
... Wilson, Holly Lyn. 2001. Kant's Views on Human Animality, Proceedings of the Ninth International Kant Congress, edited by V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horst-mann, and R. Schumacher (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). Wood, Allen. 1998. ... Alix... more
... Wilson, Holly Lyn. 2001. Kant's Views on Human Animality, Proceedings of the Ninth International Kant Congress, edited by V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horst-mann, and R. Schumacher (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). Wood, Allen. 1998. ... Alix A. Cohen 14
Research Interests:
Online Journal Abstract Information - Sabinet Online.
Research Interests:
The aim of this paper is to determine whether Kant's account of freedom fits with his theory of the human sciences. Several Kant scholars have recently acknowledged a tension between Kant's metaphysics and his works on... more
The aim of this paper is to determine whether Kant's account of freedom fits with his theory of the human sciences. Several Kant scholars have recently acknowledged a tension between Kant's metaphysics and his works on anthropology in particular. Jacobs and Kain write that ‘Kant made his intentions quite clear: he proposed a pragmatic empirical anthropology. The problem is, as commentators have noted, that it is not at all clear how these declared intentions fit with some central claims of his critical philosophy.’ Wood acknowledges the unexpected nature of Kant's anthropological endeavours: ‘The pragmatic approach to anthropology serves to indicate the great distance separating Kantian anthropology from […] what Kant's metaphysical theory of freedom and nature might lead us to expect.’ Louden actually holds that ‘Kant did not satisfactorily address these issues, and in order for [him] to do so it will be necessary to offer conjectures that occasionally go beyond his texts.’
Research Interests:
The aim of this paper is to determine whether Kant's account of freedom fits with his theory of the human sciences. Several Kant scholars have recently acknowledged a tension between Kant's metaphysics and his works on... more
The aim of this paper is to determine whether Kant's account of freedom fits with his theory of the human sciences. Several Kant scholars have recently acknowledged a tension between Kant's metaphysics and his works on anthropology in particular. Jacobs and Kain write that ‘Kant made his intentions quite clear: he proposed a pragmatic empirical anthropology. The problem is, as commentators have noted, that it is not at all clear how these declared intentions fit with some central claims of his critical philosophy.’ Wood acknowledges the unexpected nature of Kant's anthropological endeavours: ‘The pragmatic approach to anthropology serves to indicate the great distance separating Kantian anthropology from […] what Kant's metaphysical theory of freedom and nature might lead us to expect.’ Louden actually holds that ‘Kant did not satisfactorily address these issues, and in order for [him] to do so it will be necessary to offer conjectures that occasionally go beyond his...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Vincent Hope, Richard Gray, Hervé Fradet, and an anonymous referee of this journal. I would also like to thank Geneviève Brykman for her philosophical... more
For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Vincent Hope, Richard Gray, Hervé Fradet, and an anonymous referee of this journal. I would also like to thank Geneviève Brykman for her philosophical encouragements. ... 1. Especially in France ...
Research Interests:
English | 正體中文 | 简体中文 | 全文筆數/總筆數: 54291/54697 造訪人次: 43382 線上人數: 4. RC Version 4.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team. 搜尋範圍 全部OA 進階搜尋. ...