Tomasz Sleziak

The modern South Korean society, having its cultural roots in Joseon-period (1392 – 1910) orthodox interpretation of Neo-Confucianism, naturally displays a high degree of hierarchism. The socio-economic transformation, brought by the end of feudalism during Japanese occupation period (1910 – 1945) and the post-World War II period, caused the re-alignment of the traditional social setting. Furthermore, the quick urbanization transformed Korea from a predominantly agricultural society into a technology-based one, which not only resulted in the typical city – village antinomy, but also became the main factor contributing to new types of social divisions. In the 1970s it was apparent that the elderly people living in rural areas – many of them direct descendants of the former Yangban (scholar – nobility) clans – could not keep with the rapidly changing world and processes of globalization, compared to the younger generations living in urban areas, who not only had access to newest techn...

Whatever topic a scholar may have in mind, avoiding references to Confucianism altogether in the discourse of both pre-modern and modern Korea is an exercise in futility. Indeed, throughout the long Joseon era (1392–1910), the Cheng-Chu NeoConfucianism was enforced as the official state orthodoxy and the government had exerted the entirety of its administrative power to disseminate tenets of the philosophy in local communities. Additionally, the extant public and private primary materials from Joseon, by and at large composed by members of the yangban class and secondary status groups connected with them, are saturated with the spirit of Confucianism. Consequently, it is no wonder that researchers of Joseon and the modern Korean Peninsula frequently focus on the influence of Confucianism on political, social, economic, religious and other dimensions. Especially in the case of South Korea, Confucianism features prominently as an aspect or main topic of research papers, conferences and newspaper articles, often presented in comparative context and as opposing side to the “forces of modernity”. The question is whether this Confucian-centric particularism constitutes a viable scholarly perspective. What are the main outlooks of researchers outside Korea on this methodology? What kind of alternatives may be provided? Certainly, not all social phenomena may be attributed to Confucianism, but how can the various strands of intellectual heritage be distinguished from each other? This paper will strive to find answers to these issues, primarily through examination of the presence of Confucian topics within selected Korean mass media as well as research papers and books of South Korean academicians.

Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, being by-products of socio-political and educational developments at various stages of Chinese history, have permeated to a varying degree several aspects of life in East Asian societies. China itself, along with its neighbouring states – such as Vietnam and Korea – despite political changes, globalization and adoption of non-traditional systems of governance, have retained hierarchic models of communication derived from Neo-Confucianism. The nature of the doctrine and the transformative processes it underwent in the course of history are still widely discussed issues, just like the degree to which the societies in China and Korean Peninsula consciously follow the ethnolinguistic, philosophical and moral principles of Confucianism. The goal of this paper is therefore not to focus on purely metaphysical aspects of Confucianism, but rather to examine communication patterns and modes of behaviour in various aspects of daily life in China and Korea introduced in processes of Confucianisation or influenced by Confucian philosophy, by the means of the combination of qualitative method and comparative analysis.

The modern South Korean society, having its cultural roots in Joseon-period (1392 – 1910) orthodox interpretation of Neo-Confucianism, naturally displays a high degree of hierarchism. The socio-economic transformation, brought by the end of feudalism during Japanese occupation period (1910 – 1945) and the post-World War II period, caused the re-alignment of the traditional social setting. Furthermore, the quick urbanization transformed Korea from a predominantly agricultural society into a technology-based one, which not only resulted in the typical city – village antinomy, but also became the main factor contributing to new types of social divisions. In the 1970s it was apparent that the elderly people living in rural areas – many of them direct descendants of the former Yangban (scholar – nobility) clans – could not keep with the rapidly changing world and processes of globalization, compared to the younger generations living in urban areas, who not only had access to newest technologies, but in fact were the main driving force behind democratization of the state and toppling of authoritarian rule of Park Chung-Hee and his followers. In the latter 1990s, it were young Koreans who spread the popular culture of their country worldwide and started utilizing internet technologies to form communities. Meanwhile, both the elderly living in rural areas and the former employees of the Chaebol conglomerates, many of them lacking sufficient education and economic funds, were often displaced in the new socio-economic system. This situation was influenced by two important factors – underdeveloped national pension system and the gradual downfall of the system of extended families, which stripped the elderly from the traditional support of their descendants.  The aim of this paper is to examine and outline the differences between mindsets and lifestyles of Korean young and elderly as well as pinpoint the main reasons for these differences, with additional focus being set on the gender and educational issues, in order to confirm or disprove existence of certain divisions and conflicts within South Korean society.