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Michelle Miao
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    Stanford, CA 94305
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This article investigates the longevity of health QR codes, a digital instrument of pandemic surveillance, in post-COVID China. From 2020 to 2022, China widely used this tri-color tool to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. A commonly held... more
This article investigates the longevity of health QR codes, a digital instrument of pandemic surveillance, in post-COVID China. From 2020 to 2022, China widely used this tri-color tool to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. A commonly held assumption is that health QR codes have become obsolete in post-pandemic China. This study challenges such an assumption. It reveals their persistence and integration-through mobile apps and online platforms-beyond the COVID-19 public health emergency. A prolonged, expanded and normalized use of tools that were originally intended for contact tracing and pandemic surveillance raises critical legal and ethical concerns. Moreover, their functional transformation from epidemiological risk assessment tools to instruments of behavior modification and social governance heralds the emergence of a Data Leviathan. This transformation is underpinned by a duality of underlying political and commercial forces. These include 1) a structural enabler: a powerful alliance between political authorities and tech giants and 2) an ideological legitimizer: a commitment to collective security over individual autonomy. In contrast to the rights-centric approach embraced by Western democracies to regulate AI-driven biometric surveillance, China adopts a stateindustry dominance model of governance.
This article, theoretically and empirically, articulates the rising role of criminal law as a regulatory tool of China's digital platform economy. This unique Chinese model of digital platform governance is described as platform... more
This article, theoretically and empirically, articulates the rising role of criminal law as a regulatory tool of China's digital platform economy. This unique Chinese model of digital platform governance is described as platform regulation through sanctions. Based on a comprehensive survey of a wide range of digital platforms, e.g., financial fundraising platforms, e-commerce, taxi-hailing and video-sharing platforms, and criminal cases involving such platforms, I reveal the logic of regulation through sanctions: it shifts state regulatory burden and accountability, redistributes risks and responsibility, and enhances political legitimacy. Compared with the direct regulatory model adopted by European countries and the indirect, self-regulatory model employed in the U.S., China's hybridity of platform governance saw the merger between direct intervention and indirect control through threats and sanctions. The centrality of criminal law as a regulatory device in the governance of platform-derived risks has been achieved through the imposition of three types of positive duties: the duty to review, the duty to manage, and the duty to protect. This legal and regulatory of ecology exerts pressure on digital platforms but also allows its power to extend upward to serve public management functions as well as downward to modify individual behavior.
Capital punishment is a topic that has long attracted international legal, media and public policy discourses. As a global champion in administering the ultimate penalty in the past decades, China has yet to conduct any national public... more
Capital punishment is a topic that has long attracted international legal, media and public policy discourses. As a global champion in administering the ultimate penalty in the past decades, China has yet to conduct any national public opinion surveys on the death penalty. Existing academic studies on the status of public opinion in China have not gained much traction in shaping public policy in China. Why doesn't public opinion matter in China? This article explains that the scientific measurement of public opinion does not matter for at least three reasons: the two-tier opacity of the death penalty policies in China; the populist political need for constructing (rather than empirically measuring) public opinion; and the fluid and illinformed nature of public sentiments that sometimes (but not always) affect judicial decisions. The implications of the research are not limited to China but can also facilitate our understanding of the death penalty policies and practices in many retentionist countries with similar political and cultural configurations to China.
Does legal representation affect critical judicial decisions? This article highlights a paradox at the heart of court sentencing of death-eligible drug offenders in China. On the one hand, lawyers are regarded as a staple of due process.... more
Does legal representation affect critical judicial decisions? This article highlights a paradox at the heart of court sentencing of death-eligible drug offenders in China. On the one hand, lawyers are regarded as a staple of due process. On the other, court decisions are insensitive to the availability (whether drug offenders have access to legal assistance) and the quality (the varieties and conditions of legal services provided by private vs court-appointed attorneys) of legal representation. I argue that this perplexing contradiction derives from the institutional alienation of criminal lawyers in China, a theory containing three main dimensions: power deficit, identity confliction, and procedural-based legitimacy. The defense lawyer has little control over or power to determine capital drug sentencing decisions; at the same time, criminal defense lawyers are unable to fully realize themselves in their professional activities; they are used as instruments to advance bureaucratic and political interests and are therefore exposed to impoverished and instrumental relations with judicial institutions and their own activities. This paradox-the insignificance of differences-takes place in China's non-adversarial judicial settings and its authoritarian political environment. It is differentiated but connected with a paradox between eradicating inequality and providing adequate assistance to the most marginalized defendants in adversarial criminal justice systems. This article adopts mixed research methods, including qualitative interviews of legal professionals across China and quantitative analysis based on a regression analysis of national-level (N=10,132) and provincial-specific (N=3,955) samples of court judgments.
As states that use the death penalty liberally in a world that increasingly favours abolition, the Muslim-majority jurisdictions that are strict exponents of Islamic Law and the People's Republic of China share a crucial commonality:... more
As states that use the death penalty liberally in a world that increasingly favours abolition, the Muslim-majority jurisdictions that are strict exponents of Islamic Law and the People's Republic of China share a crucial commonality: their frequent use of victim-perpetrator reconciliation agreements to remove convicted murderers from the threat of execution. In both cases, rather than a prisoner's last chance at escaping execution being recourse to executive clemency, victim-perpetrator reconciliation agreements fulfil largely the same purpose, together with providing means of compensating victims for economic loss, and enabling the state concerned to reduce execution numbers without formally limiting the death penalty's scope in law. Utilizing the functionalist approach of comparative law methodology, this article compares the thirteen death penalty retentionist nations that have incorporated Islamic Law principles into their positive criminal law with the People's Republic of China, as to the functions underpinning victim-perpetrator reconciliation agreements in death penalty cases.
Penal populism has become a much discussed characteristic of punishment in modern society. Most such commentaries, however, take the rather myopic view that this phenomenon represents some localized event within the social body, to be... more
Penal populism has become a much discussed characteristic of punishment in modern society. Most such commentaries, however, take the rather myopic view that this phenomenon represents some localized event within the social body, to be diagnosed, theorized and exorcized there. This article, however, argues that the emergence of penal populism is neither the endpoint of nor the limits to populism and its consequences in modern society. Rather, it marks only the beginnings of its more general resurgence in the early twenty first century. In these respects, penal populism should be understood as only a convenient incubating phase in which populist forces found vigour and strength before flowing much deeper into mainstream society from that gestation. If it might be thought that penal populism represents an attack on the long established link between reason and modern punishment, this has been only the prelude to the way in which a much more free flowing political populism now threatens to bring an end to Reason itself, the foundation stone of modernity. This shift from penal to political populism has been precipitated by two interconnected factors: the impact of the 2008 global fiscal crisis and the mass movement of peoples across the globe. The article concludes with a discussion of how political populism continues to transform punishment in modern society, as well as the broader social consequences and implications of its emergence.
The investment and trade facilitated by China’s OBOR initiative provides the “hardware” for economic growth across the Eurasian continent. It promises to bring immense opportunities for development and prosperity to all OBOR countries.... more
The investment and trade facilitated by China’s OBOR initiative provides the “hardware” for economic growth across the Eurasian continent. It promises to bring immense opportunities for development and prosperity to all OBOR countries. Furthermore, if successful, the overseas dispersion of China’s overcapacity will facilitate a smooth transition of the Chinese economy from one driven by exports and investment to one where domestic consumption plays a greater role. In contrast, anti-corruption measures represent the “software” solution to many social problems in both China and other OBOR countries. This chapter argues that despite the huge risks involved, both initiatives will
boost the legitimacy of the Chinese Party-state. Indeed, they have and
will continue to enhance the prestige of the Xi Jinping administration.
The implementation of OBOR requires legal structures that are suited to the complex and unprecedented issues that may arise in such an enormous international undertaking. Solutions to rights-related issues must be formulated through strict and fair legal procedures. China’s criminal law and practice still have plenty of room to improve and achieve these standards.
It has been widely recognized that the restriction of the death penalty has found its way into positive international human rights law. Although historically the death penalty was essentially a state's own choice of a suitable punishment... more
It has been widely recognized that the restriction of the death penalty has found its way into positive international human rights law. Although historically the death penalty was essentially a state's own choice of a suitable punishment for the most heinous criminal wrongdoings, it is no more restricted by transnational norms as well as domestic policies today. In some states, the death penalty has become primarily a human rights issue, in lieu of an exclusive criminal justice topic. As a general trend, the historical arch of the administration of the death penalty has bent towards human rights worldwide. The human rights standard-setting, as guarantee to protect the rights of those facing the death penalty, has become a now well-established area of international law. Human rights standards, guidelines and principles serve as principal forces which influence, curtail, and limit retentionists’ practices on the death penalty.
The suspended death sentence is a unique form of penal punishment in Chinese criminal regime. In the context of the recent death penalty reform, an increasing resort to the suspended death sentences has been acclaimed to facilitate a... more
The suspended death sentence is a unique form of penal punishment in Chinese criminal regime. In the context of the recent death penalty reform, an increasing resort to the suspended death sentences has been acclaimed to facilitate a substantial reduction in the use of the death sentences and executions. While most academic attention has been paid to its utility as an alternative to the death penalty, little is devoted to examining its penological grounds and practical use. This article seeks to fill this gap by describing the unduly complicated penal landscapes and discussing problematic consequences concerning the use of the suspended death penalty in contemporary China. It investigates its ambiguous nature, fuzzy boundaries and problematic implementation processes. It is the hope that the article will inspire further empirical exploration on this topic of great theoretical and policy import.
Penal populism has become a much discussed characteristic of punishment in modern society. Most such commentaries, however, take the rather myopic view that this phenomenon represents some localized event within the social body, to be... more
Penal populism has become a much discussed characteristic of punishment in modern society. Most such commentaries, however, take the rather myopic view that this phenomenon represents some localized event within the social body, to be diagnosed, theorized and exorcized there. This article, however, argues that the emergence of penal populism is neither the endpoint of nor the limits to populism and its consequences in modern society. Rather, it marks only the beginnings of its more general resurgence in the early twenty first century. In these respects, penal populism should be understood as only a convenient incubating phase in which populist forces found vigour and strength before flowing much deeper into mainstream society from that gestation. If it might be thought that penal populism represents an attack on the long established link between reason and modern punishment, this has been only the prelude to the way in which a much more free flowing political populism now threatens to bring an end to Reason itself, the foundation stone of modernity. This shift from penal to political populism has been precipitated by two interconnected factors: the impact of the 2008 global fiscal crisis and the mass movement of peoples across the globe. The article concludes with a discussion of how political populism continues to transform punishment in modern society, as well as the broader social consequences and implications of its emergence.
Capital punishment has been a topic that has long attracted international legal, media, and public policy discourses. As a global champion in administering the ultimate penalty in the past decades, China has yet to conduct any national... more
Capital punishment has been a topic that has long attracted international legal, media, and public policy discourses. As a global champion in administering the ultimate penalty in the past decades, China has yet to conduct any national public opinion surveys on the death penalty. Existing academic studies on the status of public opinion in China have not gained much traction in shaping public policy in China. Why doesn't public opinion matter in China? This article explains that the scientific measurement of public opinion does not matter for at least three reasons: the two-tier opacity of the death penalty policies in China, the populist political need for constructing (rather than empirically measuring) public opinion, and the fluid and ill-informed nature of public sentiments that sometimes but not always affect judicial decisions. The implication of the research is not limited to China only but will also facilitate our understanding of the death penalty policies and practices in many retentionist countries with similar political and cultural configurations to China.
In the context of evolving global drug policies, notable shifts have occurred, yet Asia persists as a region marked by stringent approaches to drug use and distribution. Analyzing recalcitrant jurisdictions offers insights into potential... more
In the context of evolving global drug policies, notable shifts have occurred, yet Asia persists as a region marked by stringent approaches to drug use and distribution. Analyzing recalcitrant jurisdictions offers insights into potential trajectories of global drug policy. Asia's entrenched political and legal systems, resistant to harm reduction and human rights paradigms, wield substantial influence in shaping drug policy dialogues and reforms. This chapter provides an Asian drug policy overview, examining prevailing myths. Firstly, the causal link between historical trajectories and current reliance on prohibition is debunked. Secondly, the compatibility of criminal justice and harm reduction as complementary regulatory strategies is asserted, though transitioning remains intricate. Lastly, the pivotal role of human rights approaches in molding future Asian drug policy reform is underscored, refuting assertions of limited normative impact.
The central purpose of this article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing process for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murders’ eligibility... more
The central purpose of this article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing process for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murders’ eligibility for execution. The reform heralded a substantial decline in the number of capital sentences, as well as a rise of the alternative to executions – the suspended death sentence. 1 In the reform era, how do Chinese courts determine who should be spared from execution and who deserves the ultimate punishment of death? This article uses quantitative analysis of 369 capital murder cases, as well as elite interviews with 40 judges − from China’s provincial-level Higher People’s Courts and the Supreme People’s Court − to analyze the political logic behind Chinese courts ’ approach to defining the execution-worthiness of convicted murderers. While there is rich literature on capital sentencing in the U.S., there is a dearth of comparative analysis of the challenges Chinese courts face in drawing the distinction between life and death sentences in the country ’s unique social and political context. This article seeks to make a contribution to this crucial topic.
Penal populism has radically reshaped and reorganised many aspects of punishment in modern society. It has also shifted the emphasis from protecting the rights of individuals from excessive use of the state’s power to punish to using... more
Penal populism has radically reshaped and reorganised many aspects of punishment in modern society. It has also shifted the emphasis from protecting the rights of individuals from excessive use of the state’s power to punish to using those powers to protect the public from individuals thought to put them at risk. In so doing, it has acted as a kind of dam, holding back the anxieties and uncertainties unleashed by the neo-liberal restructuring of these societies. However, the ascendancy of populist politics indicates that this containment role is ending. The toxic contents that had been stored behind the dam have now spread throughout the social body. This paper argues that the reasons for these developments lie in the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis and the mass movement of people around the globe. As this has occurred, penal populism has taken on a new role. It is incorporated within the broader thrust of populist politics and is used to punish and control its wider swe...
In recent years, the media exposure and judicial exoneration of wrongfully convicted defendants in a number of high-profile capital cases in China have attracted the attention of reformers, the general public, and policy makers—both... more
In recent years, the media exposure and judicial exoneration of wrongfully convicted defendants in a number of high-profile capital cases in China have attracted the attention of reformers, the general public, and policy makers—both domestic and international. Yet, until now, there has been merely a thin body of empirical literature on this salient research topic. This lack of academic attention is due to the political sensitivity of the topic and the lack of publicly-accessible data. This paper is aimed at filling this critical gap in the literature. Based on in-depth analysis of 122 death-sentenced innocents, of which 109 have been exonerated and five have been wrongly executed, the research findings reveal that: first, murder and robbery account for the majority of convictions; second, over half of those wrongfully convicted were sentenced to the death penalty with immediate execution; (c) third, innocent prisoners facing capital proceedings, on average, were incarcerated 3161.3 ...
Criminal law is being broadened from its normative and moral response to wrongdoing to include the capacity to act as a preventive force. As well as reacting to crime that has been committed, it also attempts to control the risk of future... more
Criminal law is being broadened from its normative and moral response to wrongdoing to include the capacity to act as a preventive force. As well as reacting to crime that has been committed, it also attempts to control the risk of future crime. In so doing, preventive criminal law makes use of hybrid and retrospective legislation, while reversing or lowering burdens of proof if these are thought to unfairly advantage offenders/defendants, raising important human rights issues. We argue that this emphasis on controlling risk was the response to issues of uncertainty and insecurity generated by post-1970s economic and social restructuring. Where, though, do these criminal law characteristics of “risk society” now sit, given the contemporary rise of populist politics? Populism promises an end to risk and its attendant uncertainties and anxieties, but it is already extending rather than reversing the preventive capacity of criminal law. This is because populism continuously needs to fi...
The central purpose of this Article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing regime for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murderer’s... more
The central purpose of this Article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing regime for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murderer’s eligibility for execution. The reform heralded a substantial decline in the number of capital sentences, as well as a rise of an alternative to execution: the suspended death sentence. In the reform era, how do Chinese courts determine who should be spared from execution and who deserves the ultimate punishment of death? This Article uses a quantitative analysis of 369 capital murder cases, as well as elite interviews with forty judges—from China’s provincial-level Higher People’s Courts and the Supreme People’s Court—to analyze the political logic behind Chinese courts’ approach to defining the execution worthiness of convicted murderers. While there is a rich literature on capital sentencing in the United States, there is a dearth of comparative analysis of...
On the basis of 54 elite interviews with legislators, judges, attorneys and civil society advocates, as well a state-by-state data survey, this paper examines the complex linkage between the two major penal trends in American society... more
On the basis of 54 elite interviews with legislators, judges, attorneys and civil society advocates, as well a state-by-state data survey, this paper examines the complex linkage between the two major penal trends in American society during the past decades: a declining use of capital punishment across the United States and a growing population of prisoners serving life without the possibilities of parole (LWOP) sentences. The main contribution of the research is threefold. First, the research proposes to redefine the boundary between life and death in relation to penal discourses regarding the death penalty and LWOP. LWOP is a chronic and latent form of ultimate punishment which strips life of its most valuable existential character. Second, the findings explore the connection between the rise of LWOP and the nation-wide campaign against capital punishment. It explains that the abolition campaign normalized and accentuated LWOP as a symbolic substitute to the death penalty. The res...
The thesis seeks to enhance understanding of the recent reform of capital punishment law, policies and institutions in China by studying its causes, significance, and limits. The research surveys the reform initiated by China’s top... more
The thesis seeks to enhance understanding of the recent reform of capital punishment law, policies and institutions in China by studying its causes, significance, and limits. The research surveys the reform initiated by China’s top judiciary – the Supreme People’s Court - around 2006-2007. It demonstrates a changing domestic sociopolitical context, within which the external and internal impetus to reform is inevitable. Drawn from elite interview evidence with penal policy makers including judges, prosecutors, and legislators, the thesis concludes that Europe-inspired, cross-border abolitionist sentiments created motivation for change in China through soft mechanisms of shaming and persuasion, albeit to a limited degree. In the domestic realm, the research identified three pairs of interrelated tensions – the contradiction between elites and the public, the conflict between political intervention and judicial autonomy, and the divergent interests and priorities between top judicial organs and lower courts. These tensions are useful social, political and legal indicators to explain why and how China reformed its capital punishment machinery.
Contrary to the assumption that authoritarian authorities are insensitive to popular demands for justice, the Chinese penal regime has been highly attentive and responsive to public sentiments since its early days. As an instrument for... more
Contrary to the assumption that authoritarian authorities are insensitive to popular demands for justice, the Chinese penal regime has been highly attentive and responsive to public sentiments since its early days. As an instrument for the authorities to govern the country in the name of the people, capital punishment functioned as a tool for political struggles in Maoist China and later served as a tool to fight crimes in Deng’s reform era. Nowadays, the demands of the masses for revenge, justice and equality have been translated into a fervent passion for capital punishment for certain offences and offenders. By reaching out to satisfy these public demands and sentiments, the party-state hopes to enhance its political legitimacy. In this sense, the death penalty serves as a populist mechanism to strengthen the resilience of the authoritarian party-state by venting public anxiety and resentment towards social problems created in the processes of China’s rapid modernization and soci...
Can a jury-like institution be empowered to fully represent ordinary citizens under an authoritarian regime? This article evaluates the process and significance of China’s 2015-2018 pilot project to reform its people’s assessor regime.... more
Can a jury-like institution be empowered to fully represent ordinary citizens under an authoritarian regime? This article evaluates the process and significance of China’s 2015-2018 pilot project to reform its people’s assessor regime. The reform, at least nominally, was claimed to empower citizenry in two ways – to ensure that laypersons are randomly selected to represent the society in general, as well as to safeguard their meaningful role during trials and deliberation. My findings demonstrate that this recent experimentation has failed to fully empower lay participation. This failure has its roots in the twin difficulties within China’s authoritarian bureaucracy: power-sharing and political control. I support these theoretical arguments with empirical evidence obtained through surveys with people’s assessors and interview responses of Chinese judges. Overall, I claim that the institution of people’s assessors provides a double dividend of efficiency and legitimacy to the state. The path of the reform has been decisively shaped by interest-based bargaining processes among stakeholders.
This article outlines the way in which criminal law in the main English speaking ones especially is being broadened from its essentially normative and moral response to criminal wrongdoing to include the capacity to act as a preventive... more
This article outlines the way in which criminal law in the main English speaking ones especially is being broadened from its essentially normative and moral response to criminal wrongdoing to include the capacity to act as a preventive force. As well as reacting to crime that has been committed, it also attempts to control the risk of future crime. In explaining these developments, it is argued that the emphasis on controlling risk has become the response to issues of uncertainty and insecurity brought about by the post 1970s economic and social restructuring of these societies, reflecting the normalization of risk control. Its emphasis on utilitarianism and efficiency then overrides many of the modernist assumptions previously associated with criminal law. To control risk, it makes use, for example, of hybrid and retrospective legislation, while reversing or lowering burdens of proof if these are thought to unfairly advantage offenders/defendants. This reshaping of criminal law also necessitates a new understanding of human rights. Instead of the previous emphasis given to protecting individual rights from abuses of state power, the emphasis has shifted to protecting the public from those individuals thought to put their well-being at risk. But where do these criminal law characteristics of ‘risk society’ now sit, given the contemporary rise of populist politics? Populism promises an end to risk and the uncertainties and anxieties this has brought about. But rather than reversing the preventive capabilities of criminal law, the article argues that it is already extending them. This is because populism continuously needs to find new victims or potential victims that it embraces and pledges to defend to the utmost against their assailants, law-breakers or otherwise, real or imaginary. Now the focus of risk control measures embraces new populations – refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants of all kinds, legal or otherwise. Conventions such as the rule of law and the separation of powers that might previously have limited such intervention are brushed aside as outmoded examples of elitist thinking. Instead, security must be prioritized over residual concerns about due process, while also prioritizing public protection over individual rights.
It will be argued in this chapter that the rise and influence of what is known as penal populism lies behind these transformations. The chapter illustrates the extent of the transformations engineered by populist influences and explains... more
It will be argued in this chapter that the rise and influence of what is known as penal populism lies behind these transformations. The chapter illustrates the extent of the transformations engineered by populist influences and explains why these should have had so much purchase in this particular sector. Even though, over much the same period, crime rates in these societies (specifically here, the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have been in significant decline (see, for example, Zimring, 2012; Farrell et al, 2014), populism was able to feed on more general anxieties brought about by extensive social and economic change. One way to restore social cohesion, as well as giving the impression that government was still steering the ship of state, was to use the penal system as a receptacle for this anguish and suspicion, channelling it at those who seemed to pose the most obvious and direct threats to the well-being of the population at large: and then reconfiguring criminal law to impose new controls on those who pose such risks. This has also meant that, as populist forces have become more influential, law and policy have become increasingly diverse and amorphous, moving into territories of control that had previously been forbidden in democratic societies, and redrawing concepts of citizenship much more narrowly along the way.
The central purpose of this article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing process for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murderers’... more
The central purpose of this article is to illuminate the process and politics of China’s sentencing process for capital murder. Since 2007, China’s death penalty reform has resulted in a recalibration of the convicted murderers’ eligibility for execution. The reform heralded a substantial decline in the number of capital sentences, as well as a rise of the alternative to executions – the suspended death sentence. In the reform era, how do Chinese courts determine who should be spared from execution and who deserves the ultimate punishment of death? This article uses quantitative analysis of 369 capital murder cases, as well as elite interviews with 40 judges − from China’s provincial-level Higher People’s Courts and the Supreme People’s Court − to analyze the political logic behind Chinese courts’ approach to defining the execution-worthiness of convicted murderers. While there is rich literature on capital sentencing in the U.S., there is a dearth of comparative analysis of the challenges Chinese courts face in drawing the distinction between life and death sentences in the country’s unique social and political context. This article seeks to make a contribution to this crucial topic.
This article examines the penal construction of drug-related offenses as ‘the most serious offenses’ in the context of ‘Asian values’. It explains that there are at least three ways in which the serious nature of drug-related criminality... more
This article examines the penal construction of drug-related offenses as ‘the most serious offenses’ in the context of ‘Asian values’. It explains that there are at least three ways in which the serious nature of drug-related criminality is constructed – populism, moral culpability and security − all of which are deeply embedded in the political culture and practices in Asian countries which adopt a punitive approach to drug-related offenses. The article explores social and political discourses in support of state reliance on harsh penal sanctions to tackle complex drug-related problems. It shows that these discourses are frequently exploited and distorted for political motives. The article concludes that ‘Asian values’ can neither provide valid rationales for the campaigns of ‘war on drugs’ or offer solid justification for the erosion of the rights, liberty, and life of those who are involved in the ‘war’ against illicit drugs.