Papers by David Brock Katz
The First World War in Africa has been considered a sideshow compared to the catastrophe that too... more The First World War in Africa has been considered a sideshow compared to the catastrophe that took place in European theatre of war. As a result, the historiography of South Africa's participation in the First World War has reflected this relative lack of interest. South Africa's contribution to the First World War is dominated by Jan Smuts who played a leading role during the campaign in Africa and later in the British War Cabinet and at the Paris peace conference. Smuts has been harshly criticised by British historians, a situation that has persisted for decades. However, there are positive signs that South Africa's role in the First World War is finally being reassessed.
GENERAL J.C. SMUTS AND HIS FIRST WORLD WAR IN AFRICA 1914-1917, 2021
Jan Smuts began his military career in the most unlikely place. He was a young student volunteer ... more Jan Smuts began his military career in the most unlikely place. He was a young student volunteer at Victoria College in Stellenbosch in the Victoria College Volunteer Rifle Corps. Here he donned a British army uniform for the first, but not the last time. Years passed between his first military experience and service as a gifted general in the Boer Republican Army of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR). He spent
The surrender of Tobruk 70 years ago was a major catastrophe for the Allied war effort, considera... more The surrender of Tobruk 70 years ago was a major catastrophe for the Allied war effort, considerably weakening their military position in North Africa, as well as causing political embarrassment to the leaders of South Africa and the United Kingdom. This article re-examines the circumstances surrounding and leading to the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, in what amounted to the largest reversal of arms suffered by South Africa in its military history. By making use of primary documents and secondary sources as evidence, the article seeks a better understanding of the events that surrounded this tragedy. A brief background is given in the form of a chronological synopsis of the battles and manoeuvres leading up to the investment of Tobruk, followed by a detailed account of the offensive launched on 20 June 1942 by the Germans on the hapless defenders. The sudden and unexpected surrender of the garrison is examined and an explanation for the rapid collapse offered, as well as conside...
Journal of African Military History, 2021
The battle of Sandfontein November 26, 1914 marked the fledgeling Union Defence Force’s first def... more The battle of Sandfontein November 26, 1914 marked the fledgeling Union Defence Force’s first defeat. Historians have used this long-forgotten battle as a lens to view the divisive political and military aspects of the Union’s early history. Unfortunately, some of their scholarship has passed through a distorted lens. Official histories were the first to obfuscate military and leadership shortcomings and interfere with the operational context surrounding Sandfontein. Theirs was for political reasons—a mission to protect delicate reputations and mollify a divided population. Historians have erroneously assumed that General J.C. Smuts’ initial plan for the invasion of German South West Africa 1914 was modified to exclude Walvis Bay/Swakopmund’s occupation. Instead, delays in occupyingWalvis Bay/Swakopmund placed the UDF’s forces at Lüderitzbucht in a precarious position. Sandfontein, a desperate attempt to distract the Schutztruppe, was an operational failure, rather than the tactical faux pas portrayed by historians
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2020
The initial stages of the Second Anglo Boer War demonstrated the efficacy of the Boer tactical sy... more The initial stages of the Second Anglo Boer War demonstrated the efficacy of the Boer tactical system, which produced some astounding results. Boer mobility, coupled with directive command, individual initiative, and logistical flexibility allowed the Boers to practice an effective form of manoeuvre warfare. The Boers neither reduced their way of war to writing nor produced manuals on their tactical or operational doctrine. Their doctrine existed as an institutional belief system evolved over centuries of conflict with the tribes of southern Africa and the British. The Boer military lacked insight at the strategic level, and early brilliant Boer successes at the tactical level were not enough to swing a strategic victory. This article aims to reveal the Boer way of war through its evolution and development at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels using the lens of the Second Anglo Boer War and the German South West African campaign 1915.
Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson (1866–1946) received his commission into the Royal Artillery i... more Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson (1866–1946) received his commission into the Royal Artillery in 1886 and transferred to the Indian Army in 1904. He was relatively inexperienced in combat having served on the staff of Field Marshal Kitchener as part of the British military mission in Afghanistan. Malleson was later transferred to East Africa where the 2nd South African Division fell under his overall command during the catastrophic attack on Salaita Hill. This was the first occasion, since the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1912, where a British officer commanded South African troops in battle – with disastrous consequences. There were deep underlying reasons behind the fledgling UDF's first defeat at the hands of the veteran Germans, commanded by the wily Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964). Malleson's lack of combat experience was a factor in the defeat, but more importantly, the uninspired plan of attack doomed the UDF to failure.
Most quarters of the Allied camp greeted the fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1942 with incredulity. The... more Most quarters of the Allied camp greeted the fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1942 with incredulity. The epitome of a heroic defence conducted the year before had now deteriorated into a military debacle, resulting in thousands of Allied soldiers sent ‘into the bag’. The enormity of the defeat, at first greeted in muted fashion by a stunned press, soon turned into outrage at yet another Allied military fiasco. The British and South African papers began to demand answers from politicians and military leaders for this shocking and unexpected catastrophe. The press, normally sensitive to maintaining positive home front morale, discarded their wartime cosseting approach and embarked on a quest to find a scapegoat. Those captured at Tobruk were equally outraged that their freedom had been traded cheaply with hardly a fight. To many of these prisoners of war, the blame for their ignominious surrender rested squarely with the fortress commander, Major General HB Klopper. It was of little consequence to those now languishing behind the wire that the reasons for defeat were much more intricate and went beyond the performance of one man. This article examines a selection of representative press reports in the weeks immediately preceding and following the rout, and the oral reminiscences of former prisoners-of-war taken at Tobruk, which together, have contributed towards an enduring memory of the so-called Tobruk ‘debacle’.
Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history... more Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory.
Journal for Contemporary History
The surrender of Tobruk70 years ago was a major catastrophe for the Allied war effort, considerab... more The surrender of Tobruk70 years ago was a major catastrophe for the Allied war effort, considerably weakening their military position in North Africa, as well as causing political embarrassment to the
leaders of South Africa and the United Kingdom. This article re-examines the circumstances surrounding and leading to the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, in what amounted to the largest reversal of arms suffered by South Africa in its military history. By making use of primary documents and secondary sources as evidence, the article seeks a better understanding of the events that surrounded this tragedy. A brief background is given in the form of a chronological synopsis of the battles and manoeuvres
leading up to the investment of Tobruk, followed by a detailed account of the offensive launched on 20 June 1942 by the Germans on the hapless defenders. The sudden and unexpected surrender of the garrison is examined and an explanationfor the rapid collapse offered, as well as considering what may have transpired had the garrison been better prepared and led.
Scientia Militaria
The quantity and quality of military historical work on the participation of South Africa in the ... more The quantity and quality of military historical work on the participation of South Africa in the Second World War, with few exceptions, namely that of a few significant academic contributions over the last decade, lags appreciably compared to the plethora of titles offered on all aspects of the war in the buoyant international market. This article investigates and evaluates more important South African primary and secondary sources pertaining to the Union Defence Force’s participation in the Second World War, highlighting available sources and limitations in published material. Possible opportunities for further research are identified where there are areas of historiographical hiatus. Reasons are offered for what amounts to a rather threadbare South African historiography, especially when compared to the prolific historiographical output of other belligerents. The article offers a brief survey of primary sources, identifying some of the archives that have received scant attention. Then follows an analysis of secondary sources broken down into official, semi-official and general history that examines their methodological integrity and completeness with a view to identifying what historical contributions may still be made in the light of what has been produced.
Conference Presentations by David Brock Katz
This paper will highlight the South African military's historical role-from the forming of the Un... more This paper will highlight the South African military's historical role-from the forming of the Union Defence Force in 1912 to the present day-as a force for unification, nation-building, internal stability, territorial defence and expansion, as well as its latest iteration, as a peacekeeper and peace enforcer in Africa. The scope uses the lens of nation-building, expansionism, internal stability, empire defence, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the quest for international status and recognition. Interesting continuities and discontinuities will emerge. With each iteration of military conflict, whether a civil or international war, South Africa moved ever closer to becoming a unified country. Military conflict has played a fundamental role in shaping the geographical and political landscape of South Africa.
The Military Smuts: Expansionism and the Legacy of Manoeuvre Doctrine
David Brock Katz, ‘The Military Smuts: Expansionism and the Legacy of Manoeuvre Doctrine.’
Recen... more David Brock Katz, ‘The Military Smuts: Expansionism and the Legacy of Manoeuvre Doctrine.’
Recent biographers of Smuts still need to identify the essence of the man, his loadstar or driving force. Many remain confused by the capricious political nature that saw him jump Rhodes’s ship to join the Republican Boer cause, only once again to become one of the empire’s staunchest proponents. One can better comprehend the enigma of the holistic Smuts once his overriding objective of territorial expansion is placed as the cornerstone of his 50-year career. He subsumed all else in his desire to unite South Africa, expand its borders northward, and fulfil Rhodes’s dream of a contiguous British territory from Cape to Cairo. His quest for a “Greater South Africa” began to unravel almost immediately after the Union of South Africa’s formation in 1910, where he failed to incorporate the High Commission Territories and later Rhodesia into the Union. The military Smuts, who achieved much at the operational level of war in conquering German South West Africa in 1915 and 90% of German East Africa in 1916, was unable to permanently annex the former nor swap the latter for the Portuguese territory of Delagoa Bay. Ironically, a byproduct of Smuts’s sub-imperialism was the formation of the Union Defence Force in 1912 and his gift of a South African manoeuvre doctrine which has endured through to the South African Defence Force and the current South African National Defence Force. This paper examines the military Smuts, his strategic quest for a Greater South Africa, and his legacy regarding South African manoeuvre warfare.
There are immutable concepts of warfare that go beyond those famously identified by Carl von Clau... more There are immutable concepts of warfare that go beyond those famously identified by Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller and Antoine-Henri Jomini. These immutable concepts of warfare are profitably identified in a quest to rediscover the South African way of war and the resulting unique manoeuvre doctrine adopted and evolved by South Africans in the South Africa War, First and Second World Wars, and the Border Wars.
This was a module presented on junior staff officers course at the SANDF College February 2022
Smuts’s military conduct of the German East African campaign has been the subject of considerable... more Smuts’s military conduct of the German East African campaign has been the subject of considerable criticism, bordering at times on censure. This critical proclivity found its roots during the course of the campaign, and can be traced through to the immediate post First World War historiography up to present day historical works. The reminiscences of Richard Meinertzhagen, who served as chief of British military intelligence for the East Africa theatre, has added grist to the mill for those seeking evidence of Smuts’s supposed lack of performance. H.C. Armstrong’s biography of Smuts continued in the same vein, reflecting on Smuts’s military ability, or lack thereof, in a less than flattering light. Most modern authors continue to perpetuate this critical viewpoint and draw heavily upon these early works to arrive at much the same conclusion. General lack of original thought has resulted in few new perspectives offered on Smuts’s military ability or for that matter the campaign in general.
Criticism of Smuts usually takes the form of his unwillingness to fight and therefore suffer heavy casualties, his inexperience in command of large forces, his indifference to logistics and health of his soldiers, his insistence of placing his command HQ too close to the front, tactical ineptitude and a disregard for seapower in not taking advantage of amphibious operations to seize German East African coastal towns. He has even been accused of nepotism regarding his preference in appointing South Africans to key command positions. Smuts is also judged against Lettow-Vorbeck whose military abilities have at times been measured in a manner approaching hagiographic rapture.
This paper reexamines Smuts’s performance as a general, taking into consideration that in ten months of campaigning in German East Africa, he managed to capture virtually the entire territory, including all of the centers of population and food production. Smuts’s tactical shortcomings are appraised taking into consideration that he achieved both his strategic aim of securing the territory and his operational aim of eliminating Lettow-Vorbeck as a military threat.
Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson (1866–1946) was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1886 ... more Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson (1866–1946) was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1886 and transferred to the Indian Army in 1904. He was relatively inexperienced in combat having served on the staff of Field Marshal Kitchener as part of the British military mission to Afghanistan. Malleson was later transferred to East Africa and placed in charge of the 2nd South African Division for the ill-fated attack on Salaita Hill. This was the first occasion, since the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1912, where a British officer commanded South African troops in battle, and with disastrous consequences. There were deep underlying reasons behind the fledgling UDF’s first defeat at the hands of the veteran Germans commanded by the wily Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964). Malleson’s lack of combat experience was an important factor in the defeat, but more importantly, the uninspired plan of attack doomed the UDF to failure. The plan of attack was the product of an age-old British doctrine, inculcated in Malleson, which favoured frontal assaults and believed that elan, esprit de corps and superior morale could gain the ascendency over an enemy’s defensive firepower. The UDF, its doctrinal roots being an amalgamation of Boer, Colonial and British systems, had a distinctly different way of war. The UDF favoured a war of maneuver and using the mobility of its mounted infantry preferred to outflank or envelope an enemy rather than become involved in a costly frontal assault. The UDF, as demonstrated in their highly successful campaign in German South West Africa, maneuvered in order to fight while the British, tied into their large logistic needs, fought in order to maneuver. This paper seeks to highlight the clash of doctrine by using Malleson and Salaita Hill as a lens, thereby tracing the doctrinal development of the UDF.
South Africa’s Desert War, 2020
The course will cover the build-up and deployment of South Africa’s Union Defence Force (UDF) to ... more The course will cover the build-up and deployment of South Africa’s Union Defence Force (UDF) to the Western Desert in 1941 forming an essential component of the British Eighth Army. Answers will be sought explaining the disastrous setbacks the South Africans suffered at the hands of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) led by Rommel.
Before North Africa, the South Africans enjoyed considerable military success and gained much-needed experience in their campaign against the Italians in East Africa. The South Africans developed a doctrine of manoeuvre warfare which was a hybrid of the successful amalgamation (when Smuts formed the UDF in 1912) of the old Boer Republic armies and the British and Colonial Forces. General Dan Pienaar became the pre-eminent exponent of this type of South African warfare and made good use of combined arms operations. His manoeuvre approach to warfare allowed him to defeat numerically superior, but static Italian armies on almost every encounter. However, the first signs of discord between the British and South Africans emerged in East Africa when a frustrated and volatile Pienaar openly vented his anger with British Generals on the campaign.
The clash of military doctrine and the British penchant for creating large tank divisions bereft of integrated supporting arms cost the South Africans dearly at Sidi Rezegh 23 November 1941 and again at Tobruk 21 June 1942. The South Africans ventured into the desert during Operation Crusader 1941, unsupported by British armour and quickly found themselves surrounded by the cream of the German and Italian Panzer divisions. The 1st South African Division under General George Brink, poorly trained and mesmerised by the Italian Ariete tank division, adopted a static posture with the result that the South African 5th Brigade was annihilated at Sidi Rezegh. History repeated itself Seven months later when an inexperienced General Hendrik Klopper was forced to surrender Tobruk with 13000 South Africans. His South African Division was ill-suite to the task of defending a static fortress and was overwhelmed by an audacious Rommel’s rampant Panzers. Pienaar made good his opportunity to regain pride at First Alamein July 1942when the South Africans finally shared in the defeat of the Afrika Korps.
Uploads
Papers by David Brock Katz
leaders of South Africa and the United Kingdom. This article re-examines the circumstances surrounding and leading to the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, in what amounted to the largest reversal of arms suffered by South Africa in its military history. By making use of primary documents and secondary sources as evidence, the article seeks a better understanding of the events that surrounded this tragedy. A brief background is given in the form of a chronological synopsis of the battles and manoeuvres
leading up to the investment of Tobruk, followed by a detailed account of the offensive launched on 20 June 1942 by the Germans on the hapless defenders. The sudden and unexpected surrender of the garrison is examined and an explanationfor the rapid collapse offered, as well as considering what may have transpired had the garrison been better prepared and led.
Conference Presentations by David Brock Katz
Recent biographers of Smuts still need to identify the essence of the man, his loadstar or driving force. Many remain confused by the capricious political nature that saw him jump Rhodes’s ship to join the Republican Boer cause, only once again to become one of the empire’s staunchest proponents. One can better comprehend the enigma of the holistic Smuts once his overriding objective of territorial expansion is placed as the cornerstone of his 50-year career. He subsumed all else in his desire to unite South Africa, expand its borders northward, and fulfil Rhodes’s dream of a contiguous British territory from Cape to Cairo. His quest for a “Greater South Africa” began to unravel almost immediately after the Union of South Africa’s formation in 1910, where he failed to incorporate the High Commission Territories and later Rhodesia into the Union. The military Smuts, who achieved much at the operational level of war in conquering German South West Africa in 1915 and 90% of German East Africa in 1916, was unable to permanently annex the former nor swap the latter for the Portuguese territory of Delagoa Bay. Ironically, a byproduct of Smuts’s sub-imperialism was the formation of the Union Defence Force in 1912 and his gift of a South African manoeuvre doctrine which has endured through to the South African Defence Force and the current South African National Defence Force. This paper examines the military Smuts, his strategic quest for a Greater South Africa, and his legacy regarding South African manoeuvre warfare.
This was a module presented on junior staff officers course at the SANDF College February 2022
Criticism of Smuts usually takes the form of his unwillingness to fight and therefore suffer heavy casualties, his inexperience in command of large forces, his indifference to logistics and health of his soldiers, his insistence of placing his command HQ too close to the front, tactical ineptitude and a disregard for seapower in not taking advantage of amphibious operations to seize German East African coastal towns. He has even been accused of nepotism regarding his preference in appointing South Africans to key command positions. Smuts is also judged against Lettow-Vorbeck whose military abilities have at times been measured in a manner approaching hagiographic rapture.
This paper reexamines Smuts’s performance as a general, taking into consideration that in ten months of campaigning in German East Africa, he managed to capture virtually the entire territory, including all of the centers of population and food production. Smuts’s tactical shortcomings are appraised taking into consideration that he achieved both his strategic aim of securing the territory and his operational aim of eliminating Lettow-Vorbeck as a military threat.
Before North Africa, the South Africans enjoyed considerable military success and gained much-needed experience in their campaign against the Italians in East Africa. The South Africans developed a doctrine of manoeuvre warfare which was a hybrid of the successful amalgamation (when Smuts formed the UDF in 1912) of the old Boer Republic armies and the British and Colonial Forces. General Dan Pienaar became the pre-eminent exponent of this type of South African warfare and made good use of combined arms operations. His manoeuvre approach to warfare allowed him to defeat numerically superior, but static Italian armies on almost every encounter. However, the first signs of discord between the British and South Africans emerged in East Africa when a frustrated and volatile Pienaar openly vented his anger with British Generals on the campaign.
The clash of military doctrine and the British penchant for creating large tank divisions bereft of integrated supporting arms cost the South Africans dearly at Sidi Rezegh 23 November 1941 and again at Tobruk 21 June 1942. The South Africans ventured into the desert during Operation Crusader 1941, unsupported by British armour and quickly found themselves surrounded by the cream of the German and Italian Panzer divisions. The 1st South African Division under General George Brink, poorly trained and mesmerised by the Italian Ariete tank division, adopted a static posture with the result that the South African 5th Brigade was annihilated at Sidi Rezegh. History repeated itself Seven months later when an inexperienced General Hendrik Klopper was forced to surrender Tobruk with 13000 South Africans. His South African Division was ill-suite to the task of defending a static fortress and was overwhelmed by an audacious Rommel’s rampant Panzers. Pienaar made good his opportunity to regain pride at First Alamein July 1942when the South Africans finally shared in the defeat of the Afrika Korps.
leaders of South Africa and the United Kingdom. This article re-examines the circumstances surrounding and leading to the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, in what amounted to the largest reversal of arms suffered by South Africa in its military history. By making use of primary documents and secondary sources as evidence, the article seeks a better understanding of the events that surrounded this tragedy. A brief background is given in the form of a chronological synopsis of the battles and manoeuvres
leading up to the investment of Tobruk, followed by a detailed account of the offensive launched on 20 June 1942 by the Germans on the hapless defenders. The sudden and unexpected surrender of the garrison is examined and an explanationfor the rapid collapse offered, as well as considering what may have transpired had the garrison been better prepared and led.
Recent biographers of Smuts still need to identify the essence of the man, his loadstar or driving force. Many remain confused by the capricious political nature that saw him jump Rhodes’s ship to join the Republican Boer cause, only once again to become one of the empire’s staunchest proponents. One can better comprehend the enigma of the holistic Smuts once his overriding objective of territorial expansion is placed as the cornerstone of his 50-year career. He subsumed all else in his desire to unite South Africa, expand its borders northward, and fulfil Rhodes’s dream of a contiguous British territory from Cape to Cairo. His quest for a “Greater South Africa” began to unravel almost immediately after the Union of South Africa’s formation in 1910, where he failed to incorporate the High Commission Territories and later Rhodesia into the Union. The military Smuts, who achieved much at the operational level of war in conquering German South West Africa in 1915 and 90% of German East Africa in 1916, was unable to permanently annex the former nor swap the latter for the Portuguese territory of Delagoa Bay. Ironically, a byproduct of Smuts’s sub-imperialism was the formation of the Union Defence Force in 1912 and his gift of a South African manoeuvre doctrine which has endured through to the South African Defence Force and the current South African National Defence Force. This paper examines the military Smuts, his strategic quest for a Greater South Africa, and his legacy regarding South African manoeuvre warfare.
This was a module presented on junior staff officers course at the SANDF College February 2022
Criticism of Smuts usually takes the form of his unwillingness to fight and therefore suffer heavy casualties, his inexperience in command of large forces, his indifference to logistics and health of his soldiers, his insistence of placing his command HQ too close to the front, tactical ineptitude and a disregard for seapower in not taking advantage of amphibious operations to seize German East African coastal towns. He has even been accused of nepotism regarding his preference in appointing South Africans to key command positions. Smuts is also judged against Lettow-Vorbeck whose military abilities have at times been measured in a manner approaching hagiographic rapture.
This paper reexamines Smuts’s performance as a general, taking into consideration that in ten months of campaigning in German East Africa, he managed to capture virtually the entire territory, including all of the centers of population and food production. Smuts’s tactical shortcomings are appraised taking into consideration that he achieved both his strategic aim of securing the territory and his operational aim of eliminating Lettow-Vorbeck as a military threat.
Before North Africa, the South Africans enjoyed considerable military success and gained much-needed experience in their campaign against the Italians in East Africa. The South Africans developed a doctrine of manoeuvre warfare which was a hybrid of the successful amalgamation (when Smuts formed the UDF in 1912) of the old Boer Republic armies and the British and Colonial Forces. General Dan Pienaar became the pre-eminent exponent of this type of South African warfare and made good use of combined arms operations. His manoeuvre approach to warfare allowed him to defeat numerically superior, but static Italian armies on almost every encounter. However, the first signs of discord between the British and South Africans emerged in East Africa when a frustrated and volatile Pienaar openly vented his anger with British Generals on the campaign.
The clash of military doctrine and the British penchant for creating large tank divisions bereft of integrated supporting arms cost the South Africans dearly at Sidi Rezegh 23 November 1941 and again at Tobruk 21 June 1942. The South Africans ventured into the desert during Operation Crusader 1941, unsupported by British armour and quickly found themselves surrounded by the cream of the German and Italian Panzer divisions. The 1st South African Division under General George Brink, poorly trained and mesmerised by the Italian Ariete tank division, adopted a static posture with the result that the South African 5th Brigade was annihilated at Sidi Rezegh. History repeated itself Seven months later when an inexperienced General Hendrik Klopper was forced to surrender Tobruk with 13000 South Africans. His South African Division was ill-suite to the task of defending a static fortress and was overwhelmed by an audacious Rommel’s rampant Panzers. Pienaar made good his opportunity to regain pride at First Alamein July 1942when the South Africans finally shared in the defeat of the Afrika Korps.
The Boer Way of War in the Second Anglo-Boer War.
Few expected the inconsequential Boer Republics to survive let alone to overwhelm the might of the British Empire when war broke out on the 11 October 1899. It started well enough for the Boers who enjoying a significant numerical advantage and fielding 33 000 highly mobile mounted infantry faced a British frontline strength of 13 000 soldiers. Jan Smuts, President Kruger’s right-hand-man and one of the few Boer leaders with an inspired grasp of strategy, devised a bold war-winning plan. Boer forces would seize the slight window of opportunity and taking advantage of British unpreparedness, and their significant numerical advantage would conduct a lightning campaign. Smuts boldly proposed the invasion of Natal coupled with a daring strike to grab the Port of Durban. Occupying Natal would cut the British railway to Rhodesia and place the entire empire in jeopardy. Boer audaciousness was sure to attract the attention of foreign powers and rouse inert Cape Afrikaners looking for an opportunity to pounce on a weakened British Empire. It was masterful if perhaps somewhat fanciful, but it offered the Boers a glimmer of hope to defeat the enemy.
The friction of inept Boer generalship whittled away Smuts’s daring plan. Generals Joubert and Cronje were satisfied to lay siege to Mafeking, Kimberly and Ladysmith and repeat the same strategy of the First Anglo-Boer War. The strategic offensive coupled with the tactical defence yielded magnificent victories in the First Anglo-Boer War. Now the momentum was lost through uninspired strategy and lacklustre leadership. The much hoped-for Cape Afrikaner rising evaporated as the British grew stronger by the day. Transports landed thousands of troops and supplies in Durban and Cape Town and swiftly redressed the numerical imbalance. Initial and brilliant Boer successes on the tactical level were not fundamental enough to swing a strategic victory, and the chance of winning the conventional war lay in tatters.
This paper examines Boer military doctrine at the three levels of war and explores why superior mobility and exceptional tactical abilities ultimately failed to deliver a strategic victory.
The campaign in German East Africa amounted to a mere sideshow compared to the colossal efforts and enormous carnage inflicted on the Western Front. It is a campaign that until recently has received little attention. The accounts which have emerged often have a political agenda. Most are overwhelmingly from an Allied point of view, heavily steeped in myth, with the biographical works long on self-aggrandisement, and short on objectivity. The sources emanating from the German side are few and far between. Many modern-day accounts are merely a rehash of the old secondary sources and as a result little has been added to the pool of knowledge. Die Operationen in Ostafrika: Weltkrieg 1914-1918 by Ludwig Boell is the closest that the Germans came to producing an official history of the campaign. Boell served for the duration of the campaign as a staff officer in the Shutztruppe. His monumental work has never been translated into English and therefore this important document remains relatively unknown and inaccessible. Boell’s book is presently being translated into English as a joint venture between David Katz and Anne Samson. This presentation will highlight some of the interesting new perspectives revealed during the course of translation.
“The scope, reach, and impact of Military Geosciences”
Stellenbosch, South Africa
June 2017
The desert, like the jungle, is essentially neutral. Harsh, bleak and unforgiving, it presents military prospects to the astute and resolute tactician. Desert warfare is the ultimate expression of manoeuvre warfare. It is an endeavour to concentrate one’s forces in space and time, while splitting the enemy forces spatially and then destroying them piecemeal at different times. Desert warfare has been described as a tactician's paradise and a quartermaster's nightmare. Manoeuvre warfare assumed its most advanced form in the North African deserts of the Second World War. There, devoid of civilian population, rivers, dense forests, built up cities and dominant terrain features, mechanised armies swept unhindered across wide open featureless expanses. The vast expanse ensured that opposing armies always had an open flank to defend or attack. Rommel, the finest practitioner and proponent of desert-style, mobile warfare, described the obstruction-free desert environment as offering undreamed-of possibilities. However, in the desert the manoeuvreist’s dream is at risk of descending into a nightmare at all levels of warfare. The desert presents unprecedented logistical challenges with every drop of water, of fuel, and every morsel of food having to be transported to the front. The inhospitable climate tests the mettle and endurance of men and machines beyond the harshest norms of warfare. Barren featureless wastes offer few natural defensive positions and even less opportunities for concealment. Armies have resorted to planting vast minefields for protection and night movement for concealment. In an environment where the tank is king, vehicle recovery teams play a critical role equal to, if not exceeding, that of the combat teams in gaining advantageous force ratios. Conserving precious resources, while inflicting maximum damage, is more important than territorial conquest. The Italians, the British, more recently the Israelis and Iraqis, have all tried to impose static warfare by building fortifications, but to no avail. Here battles are won by the side who conducts operations at a higher tempo than the adversary. Commanders resorting to static warfare are dearly punished by those who adopt a free-flowing war of movement. This paper uses the North African Campaign of 1941-1943 as a lens to examine the art of manoeuvre warfare under desert conditions.
South Africa harboured a deep seated desire, shared by most white South Africans, for expanding the territorial assets of the Union of South Africa. One of the cornerstones of the South Africa Act 1909 was the United Kingdom’s undertaking to incorporate the British Protectorates of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland, together with Rhodesia, into the Union. However the dream of a Greater South Africa began to unravel when South Africa failed to formulate an acceptable “native policy”, causing the United Kingdom to baulk at the incorporation of the High Commission Territories.
The First World War presented South Africa with a unique opportunity to renew her stalled program of territorial expansion. Smuts and Botha found the lure of incorporating German South West Africa an extremely attractive option in terms of their expansionist vision. Another of South Africa’s long time territorial ambitions was the incorporation of Mozambique’s Delagao Bay into South Africa. Smuts’ underlying motivation for conquering German East Africa was the facilitation of a land swap, whereby Mozambique would be deprived of Delagoa Bay and be recompensed with a portion of former German East African territory.
This presentation examines South Africa in World War One in terms her expansionist aims and Smuts’ vision of a Greater South Africa.
"
This presentation will highlight some of the work undertaken by the UWHS that remains unpublished (comprising the bulk of the collection) due to the premature closure of the section in 1961 for largely political reasons. The UWHS collection offers a rich primary source and areas that provide potential for further research on South Africa’s participation in the Second World War will be highlighted.
As the Crow Flies is the latest in a spate of border war books to hit the shelves and, no doubt, will be devoured by an ever growing and appreciative audience. Autobiographies of this kind amount to primary sources, and as such, they occupy a special niche in the Border War historiography. They contain valuable insights gleaned only by witnesses of the actual events as they unfolded.
Pen and Sword Publications, Barnsley, 2014
155 pp
ISBN 9781783463244’
19.99 GBP
Extremist groups provide a stipend to live on, health treatment for the recruit's family, status within the community and a sense of purpose. Extremists find a ready and willing audience in regions where the government is ineffectual and corrupt.
weight, South African soldiers have become known for their tenacity,
dash and ability to defy the odds. Their unique directive command
style has also helped them to excel in defining battles and operations,
from the campaign in German South West Africa in 1915 to the crossborder operations in Angola during the Border War.
In 20 Battles, military historians Evert Kleynhans and David Brock
Katz investigate the evolution of South Africa’s armed forces over a
century from 1913 to 2013. They track the evolution of the doctrine
and structure of the defence force, uncovering historical continuity
and the lessons learned from past battles and operations.
What is clear is that when South African soldiers have the freedom
to operate according to their manoeuvre doctrine, as they had in
East Africa in 1916 and southern Ethiopia in 1941, they can achieve
stunning results. But when hemmed in by rigid doctrine and a topdown command style, as at Delville Wood in 1916 and Tobruk in 1942,
the results can be tragic.
20 Battles combines both battlefield drama and crisp analysis
and in the process provides a much-needed perspective
on the South African way of war
World War I ushered in a renewed scramble for Africa. At its helm, Jan Smuts grabbed the opportunity to realize his ambition of a Greater South Africa. He set his sights upon the vast German colonies of South-West Africa and East Africa – the demise of which would end the Kaiser’s grandiose schemes for Mittelafrika. As part of his strategy to shift South Africa’s borders inexorably northward, Smuts even cast an eye toward Portuguese and Belgian African possessions.
Smuts, his abilities as a general much denigrated by both his contemporary and then later modern historians, was no armchair soldier. This cabinet minister and statesman donned a uniform and led his men into battle. He learned his soldiery craft under General Koos De la Rey's tutelage, and another soldier-statesman, General Louis Botha during the South African War 1899–1902. He emerged from that war, immersed in the Boer maneuver doctrine he devastatingly waged in the guerrilla phase of that conflict. His daring and epic invasion of the Cape at the head of his commando remains legendary. The first phase of the German South West African campaign and the Afrikaner Rebellion in 1914 placed his abilities as a sound strategic thinker and a bold operational planner on display. Champing at the bit, he finally had the opportunity to command the Southern Forces in the second phase of the German South West African campaign.
Placed in command of the Allied forces in East Africa in 1916, he led a mixed bag of South Africans and Imperial troops against the legendary Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his Shutztruppe. Using his penchant for Boer maneuver warfare together with mounted infantry led and manned by Boer Republican veterans, he proceeded to free the vast German territory from Lettow-Vorbeck’s grip. Often leading from the front, his operational concepts were an enigma to the British under his command, remaining so to modern-day historians. Although unable to bring the elusive and wily Lettow-Vorbeck to a final decisive battle, Smuts conquered most of the territory by the end of his tenure in February 1917.
General Jan Smuts and His First World War in Africa 1914-1917 makes use of multiple archival sources and the official accounts of all the participants to provide a long-overdue reassessment of Smuts’s generalship and his role in furthering the strategic aims of South Africa and the British Empire in Africa during World War I.
exercising expertise through written conversation remains essential to strengthening our profession throughout the military. I am confident that the reconstituted South African Army Journal will fulfil that role and stimulate innovative ideas and thoughts on our doctrine, structure, command style, and equipment. The South African Army Journal should also be seen as part of a vital training toolkit, especially under broader financial constraints. It is a cost-effective method of developing professional expertise. The journal creates an atmosphere where we can learn from each other’s experiences and apply our minds to specific and general challenges. It creates a platform where we can nurture and practice our institutional culture and pay homage to our diverse past. The journal should also stimulate and support professional writing as essential to how we communicate our orders, instructions, and ideas to one another. The journal will seek to promote an appetite for articles that advance our understanding and challenge our preconceived notions. In fact, he South African Army Journal should be at the forefront of innovation and change and nurture an intellectual discourse at all levels of our institution. Your contributions will help solve the real challenges we face.
identify the essence of the man, his loadstar or driving force.
Many remain confused by the capricious political nature that
saw him jump Rhodes’s ship to join the Republican Boer cause,
only once again to become one of the Empire’s staunchest
proponents. One can better comprehend the enigma of Smuts
at the strategic level of war once one places his overriding
objective of territorial expansion as the cornerstone of his 50-
year career. He subsumed all else in his desire to unite South
Africa, expand its borders northward, and fulfil Rhodes’s
dream of a contiguous British territory from Cape to Cairo.
His quest for a ‘Greater South Africa’ began to unravel almost
immediately after the Union of South Africa’s formation in
1910, where he failed to incorporate the High Commission
Territories and later Rhodesia into the Union. The military
Smuts, who achieved much at the operational level of war
in conquering German South West Africa (GSWA) in 1915
and 90% of German East Africa (GEA) in 1916, could not
permanently annex the former nor swap the latter for the
Portuguese territory of Delagoa Bay. Ironically, a byproduct
of Smuts's sub-Imperialism was the formation of the
Union Defence Force in 1912 and his gift of a South African
manoeuvre doctrine, which has endured through to the South
African Defence Force and the current South African National
Defence Force. In seeking Smuts's legacy, his biographers have
tended to ignore or denigrate his career’s military aspects.
Having accumulated a wealth of military experience by
the time he took charge of the Allied campaign in GEA in 1916,
Smuts remained accused in many circles of inexperience and
being somewhat less than a gifted amateur. His experiences in
the Second Ango Boer War (1899-1902), the first phase of the
GSWA campaign in 1914, the 1914 Rebellion against the Union
government and the second phase of the GSWA campaign in
1915 allowed him to forge his skills at the operational level of
war. Yet the GSWA campaign, especially the first phase of which
Smuts played a leading role in its planning and execution,
has been forgotten. His role as the operational brains behind
suppressing the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government
is ignored or underestimated. Smuts, leading the Southern
Force in GSWA in 1915, unlocked the German defences, which
allowed Louis Botha to restore mobility to the Northern Force
and eventually defeat the Germans at Otavifontein 1915.
Historians have relegated Smuts's role in the second phase
of the GSWA campaign to a ‘symbolic role’. However, his
performance in GEA has attracted the most vitriolic attention.
Richard Meinertzhagen (1960), who served under Smuts in
GEA, led the charge. Harold Courtney Armstrong wrote a
scathing analysis of Smuts (Armstrong. 1937) questioning his
abilities as a general. Contemporary Smuts biographers have
almost exclusively drawn upon these two works for decades,
fuelling a skewed assessment of Smuts's generalship. Without
a balanced synthesis of secondary and primary sources, an
unhealthy academic cross-citation culture persists, which has
stymied research on the military Smuts.
Smuts enjoyed much public acclaim and interest
directly after both World Wars. Most of the attention given
by historians of these times took the form of biography and
followed the format of Thomas Carlyle’s Great Man (Schapiro,
1945:101, 102). Similarly, 85% of popular, published material
relating to Smuts's World War I service appeared during the
periods immediately after the World Wars. After that, a long
hiatus followed, and until recently, the subject has received
scant attention. The turn of the twenty-first century has
witnessed an uptake in interest, with books of varying quality
appearing in time for the 100th anniversary of World War I.
Contemporary works concerning World War I in Africa attempt
to elevate Africa from its long relegation as a mere sideshow.
These books follow Spencer’s approach and examine the
social impact of the war (Spencer, 1896:31). Smuts garners
a modicum of attention in some of them. Few books have
devoted much space to evaluating Smuts in terms of his
military career and performance as a general.
This overview comprehensively examines the
historiography surrounding Smuts's military career. It
includes an assessment of secondary and primary sources
and identifies how certain publications have achieved
primacy amongst historians, influencing their assessment
of Smuts's generalship. Other publications of those who
fought against him or under his command highlight his
competency differently. It has also been challenging for
Smuts to emerge from beneath the light of his opponent in
GEA, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, whose exploits have attracted
rapturous fervour in certain quarters. Popular historians
have misrepresented von Lettow-Vorbeck’s remarkable
survival against great odds in GEA as ‘guerilla warfare’, and
his achievements at evading annihilation have been grossly
exaggerated. Smuts's noteworthy campaign often takes a
back seat with the USA’s Army and War Colleges, who prefer
the German over the South African versions. This study
highlights other avenues of historiography that researchers
may profitably mine to render a more equitable assessment of
Smuts as general.
This chapter breaks the trend by using primary documents from the National Archives of South Africa Pretoria (NASAP), the South African National Defence Force Archives (DODA) and the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) and underutilized regimental histories to reconstruct the Union Defence Forces’ (UDF) first amphibious operation. The narrative is pitched at the strategic and operational levels of war as the landings were unopposed. The strategic aspects of the campaign were rooted in a long, deep-seated desire for territorial expansion shared successively by the colonial government of the Cape Colony, the British Empire, and then by the newly formed dominion, the Union of South Africa in 1910.
This chapter aims to reveal the operational concepts underpinning the amphibious invasion, conceived by the British as early as 1902, and examine the final iteration of the operational plan developed by the UDF’s defense minister, General Jan Smuts. Also under examination will be the performance of South Africa’s fledgling UDF, formed a mere two years before the outbreak of war in 1912. The deeply politically divided UDF was an imperfect instrument of war in many ways, not least in possessing a contested doctrine represented by the former enemies who made up the UDF’s numbers in 1914.