The Naval War in South African Waters, 1939-1945 provides a critical reappraisal of the naval war... more The Naval War in South African Waters, 1939-1945 provides a critical reappraisal of the naval war waged in South African waters during the Second World War. The book investigates this broad topic by focussing on several interrelated aspects such as: the wartime strategic importance of South African waters; the rival Axis and Allied naval strategies in the southern oceans; the development of the South African coastal defence system; the full extent of the Axis naval operations in the southern oceans; the naval intelligence war; and, finally, the antisubmarine war waged in South African waters. Based on extensive archival research in South Africa and the United Kingdom, and supplemented by a wealth of secondary material, the book introduces a fresh, in-depth discussion on a largely forgotten episode of South African military history.
The story of the intelligence war in South Africa during the Second World War is one of suspense,... more The story of the intelligence war in South Africa during the Second World War is one of suspense, drama and dogged persistence. In 1939, when the Union of South Africa entered the war on Britain's side, the German government secretly reached out to the anti-war political opposition, and to the leadership of the pro-fascist Ossewabrandwag. The Nazis' aim was to spread sedition in South Africa and to undermine the Allied war effort. To this end, they even offered to supply weapons to the Ossewabrandwag. But the critical strategic importance of the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope meant that the Germans were also after naval intelligence. Soon U-boat packs were sent to operate in South African waters, to deadly effect. With the help of the Ossewabrandwag, a network of German spies was established to gather important political and military intelligence and relay it back to the Reich. Agents would use a variety of channels to send coded messages to Axis diplomats in nearby Mozambique. Meanwhile, police detectives and MI5 agents hunted in vain for illegal wireless transmitters. Drawing on numerous primary and archival sources, Hitler's South African Spies presents an unrivalled account of the German intelligence networks that operated in wartime South Africa and investigates the true threat level presented by Nazi Germany. It includes a fascinating account of the Royal Navy's signals intelligence network in southern Africa and also details the hunt in post-war Europe for witnesses to help the South African government bring charges of high treason against key Ossewabrandwag members.
The majority of academic and popular studies on the South African participation in the Second Wor... more The majority of academic and popular studies on the South African participation in the Second World War historically focus on the military operations of the Union Defence Force in East Africa, North Africa, Madagascar and Italy. Recently, there has been a renewed drive to study the South African participation from a more general war and society approach. The South African home front during the war, and in particular the Axis and Allied maritime war waged off the southern African coast, has, however, received scant historical attention from professional and amateur historians alike. The historical interrelated aspects of maritime insecurity evident in southern Africa during the war are largely cast aside by contemporary academics engaging with issues of maritime strategy and insecurity in southern Africa.
The all-encompassing nature and extent of the maritime war waged off southern Africa during the Second World War have been far more extensive than suggested in traditional sources. A key understanding of the maritime war is, in effect, incomplete without separate detailed discussions about the opposing Axis and Allied maritime strategies off the coast of southern Africa, the wartime shipping quandaries experienced by the Union of South Africa, and the South African coastal defences. The Axis maritime operations in southern African waters, the so-called maritime intelligence war, and the extended anti-submarine war waged in these waters are equally integral to the discussion.
This dissertation aims to provide a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the coast of southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. The study investigates this inclusive topic through the aforementioned research objectives. The study does not fall into the general ambit of a regimental, campaign or personal military history. Instead, it straddles the strata of war and offers fresh insights into an episode of the South African military history uncommonly investigated by contemporary military historians.
The dissertation finds that the Axis and Allied maritime operations off the southern African coast were complex in nature, especially regarding the several strategic, military and economic aspects that have always underpinned them. Moreover, in gaining an understanding of these complex operations, the study reveals the general interrelatedness between the rival Axis and Allied maritime strategies and operations around the southern African coast. Previous studies have failed to recognise this interrelatedness, and have instead offered a one-sided, compartmentalised discussion on single aspects associated with the maritime war waged off southern Africa. This study thus distances itself from previous academic and popular historiography on the subject. It offers, rather, a fresh, in-depth discussion underpinned by extensive archival research, access to previously classified material, and a wealth of secondary sources.
Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Fo... more Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war.
In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and ec... more In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and economic conditions, several thousand white mine workers on the Witwatersrand in the Union of South Africa went on strike. These miners armed and organised themselves into commandos and took to the streets. During the opening phases of the unrest, these paramilitary units clashed with the South African Police. By the beginning of March, the strikes transformed into a violent insurrection with railway workers also joining its ranks after negotiations between the mine workers, mine owners, and the government failed and new militant leadership assumed command. As chaos and disorder engulfed large tracts of the Johannesburg goldfields and levels of violence assumed new proportions, the state’s legitimacy increasingly came under threat. In response, martial law was declared, and elements of the Union Defence Force were deployed to quell the so-called 1922 Rand Revolt. Historically unaccustomed to urban warfare and without an appropriate doctrine, the defence force became involved in several high-intensity urban counterinsurgency operations against the strike commandos. Drawing from a variety of archival material, this article investigates the combat operations undertaken by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt.
From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had bee... more From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had been deployed to suppress several internal disturbances. These unrests varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised parts of the population, both in the Union and South West Africa (now Namibia). The uprisings in turn tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force. The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, although brave and tragic, provides a lens through which to investigate the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operation conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War. These operations occurred only months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Revolt on the Witwatersrand. The reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern South West Africa. The result of this brief and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences. This article investigates the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.
During the Second World War, between 1941 and 1942, a large number of South African
troops were ... more During the Second World War, between 1941 and 1942, a large number of South African
troops were made prisoners of war (pow) by the Axis forces in the Western Desert. These troops were first interned in pow transit camps in North Africa, before being shipped to more permanent camps in Italy and later Germany. A large number of the South African captives decided to accept their newfound fates and make their internment as ‘pleasant’ as possible. However, a small nucleus of South African servicemen either tried to evade capture altogether, or, when captured, actively tried to escape. The first large scale attempts of escape and evasion by South African servicemen therefore occurred in North Africa between 1941 and 1942. This article provides an exploratory investigation into the varied experiences of the South African soldiers that either evaded capture altogether or escaped from internment in North Africa.
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2022
During the Second World War, the East African theatre was marked by extreme variations in terms o... more During the Second World War, the East African theatre was marked by extreme variations in terms of climate, terrain, communications, and disease ecology. The planning, scope and conduct of the Allied offensive operations in the theatre was largely determined by the physical environment. The deployment of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade (1 sa Bde) to East Africa occurred across three distinct operational environments – the deserts of north-eastern Kenya, the bush country of Somalia, and the mountains of Ethiopia. The distinct changes in the physical environment influenced the combat operations of 1 sa Bde, which alternated between highly mobile, combined arms, operations across favourable terrain to somewhat static operations dominated by infantry and artillery over exceedingly difficult terrain. This article investigates the varied combat operations of 1 sa Bde in East Africa, and critically reflects on the influence that the physical environment exerted on the unfolding South African offensive operations.
Germany desired to contact the wartime opposition in South Africa in order to obtain accurate pol... more Germany desired to contact the wartime opposition in South Africa in order to obtain accurate political and military intelligence. The arrival of Hans Rooseboom in South Africa in 1940 provided the Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinel), a quasi-cultural and anti-war movement, with the means through which to initiate two-way communication with Germany. The so-called Rooseboom secret service became the first German intelligence network to operate in South Africa during the early war years. This article investigates the nature and operation of the so-called Rooseboom secret service from 1941 to 1942 against the backdrop of the larger intelligence war waged in South Africa.
Sights, Sounds, Memories: South African Soldier Experiences of the Second World War, 2020
A drastic shift was observed in the academic study of war during the twentieth century. As a resu... more A drastic shift was observed in the academic study of war during the twentieth century. As a result, the traditional field of military history was broadened to include several new approaches to the historical study of warfare. The recording of the personal experience of war, especially as a key component of the broader framework of war and society, proved particularly popular. Traditionally, the South African deployments to East Africa, North Africa and Italy during the Second World War have received the bulk of local historical attention. Unfortunately, the deployment of the 7th South African Infantry Brigade (SA Inf Bde) to Madagascar remains largely ignored. The chance discovery of a series of wartime letters, written by Arthur Bintliff, offers a rare glimpse into the personal experience of a South African soldier during one of the forgotten campaigns of the war. The Bintliff correspondence provides an unprecedented account of the thrill of combat, the monotony of daily military routine, the leisure-time of soldiers, and the experience of wartime Madagascar in general. By analysing the Bintliff correspondence this chapter offers a rare in-depth, discussion on the South African military experience during the Madagascar campaign.
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2020
Mountainous terrain has distinctly influenced combat operations throughout history. Warfare at hi... more Mountainous terrain has distinctly influenced combat operations throughout history. Warfare at high altitude often takes place in extreme weather conditions and over difficult terrain, which is largely considered to be inaccessible, inhospitable, and at times lacking any apparent strategic or operational value. As a result, combat operations at high altitudes are traditionally infantry affairs. The South African deployment to East Africa during the Second World War was for the most part characterised by highly mobile operations, across deserts and scrubland, where infantry, armour and artillery deployed in a mutually supportive role. The penultimate battles of the East African campaign were, however, fought in extremely severe terrain, where the South African troops would experience the harsh realities of mountain warfare for the first time during the war. This article broadly investigates the exigencies of mountain warfare, and critically reflects on the South African wartime experience of mountain warfare in East Africa.
The entry of the Union of South Africa into the First World War, as well as the subsequent invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA), served as a trigger to the Afrikaner Rebellion. In September 1914 the Union Defence Force (UDF) suffered a major reverse at the Battle of Sandfontein. However, in addition to the German threat, South Africa faced a second, more serious internal threat. The socio-economic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly among rural Afrikaners, magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown. The Union’s entry into the war was a step too far for many Nationalist Afrikaners and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the rebellion. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion brought about the first counterinsurgency operation of the UDF within the borders of South Africa. By harnessing its operational and tactical mobility, and operating from the central position and along internal lines of communication, the UDF swiftly dealt with the rebel revolt. This article evaluates the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF in suppressing the Afrikaner Rebellion.
KEYWORDS: South Africa, First World War, Union Defence Force, Afrikaner Rebellion, insurgency, counterinsurgency
The Department of Defence Archive in Pretoria is the repository of all military documents generat... more The Department of Defence Archive in Pretoria is the repository of all military documents generated by the Union Defence Force, the South African Defence Force and the South African National Defence Force. This makes it the foremost source of primary information for researchers of South African military history. However, an almost total ban on access to archival documents from 1 January 1970 onwards complicates research into later periods. In fact, anyone researching post-1970 military-related topics has to apply for access to archival documents through the Promotion of Access to Information Act. The traditional weapon in the armoury of the historian – the systematic trawling of archives – is thereby negated, while the methodology of post-1970 historical research differs significantly from commonly accepted historical practices. Finding aids, the only access route to classified information in this analogue archive, offer only the briefest descriptions of the content of files, and researchers need almost esoteric intuition to identify documents that are even remotely relevant to their research. Additionally, a fee is payable for declassification, and the process can take several months to complete. This review article reports on the theoretical workings of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, and uses an actual research example as a case study to illustrate the practical implications of conducting research at the Department of Defence Archive in South Africa based on classified military documentation.
The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the government of South-West Africa (SWA), ... more The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the government of South-West Africa (SWA), ordered the creation of a local youth movement during 1975. The primary aim of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ (youth movement) was to prevent the spread of communist propaganda, foster a sense of Kavango nationalism, and limit the political influence of the South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) amongst the local Kavango youth. The Institute for African Studies at the then Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (PU for CHE) played a crucial role in the formative years of the movement, by providing key sociocultural knowledge on the ‘human terrain’ of the Kavango people to the government of SWA. The creation of this movement coincided with the start of the conventional military involvement of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Angolan Civil War during 1975, as well as with the escalation of the SWAPO insurgency in northern SWA. The South African government hence developed a total national strategy to combat these threats in the military, social, political, economic and educational spheres. The ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ formed an integral part of this strategy in the Kavangoland.
This chapter has three specific aims. First, to investigate the reasons behind the establishment of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ in 1975, by providing a brief historical background to the South African counterinsurgency campaign in northern SWA. Second, to explain the nature, extent and the development of this youth movement between 1975 and 1985, with a specific focus on the role that the Institute for African Studies at the PU for CHE played in the formative years of the movement. Last, the chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of this youth movement, as a counterinsurgency tool, within the framework of the South African counterinsurgency strategy deployed in northern SWA during the so-called ‘Border War’. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, from both governmental and private institutions, as well as private and official correspondence, along with a host of secondary sources, the background, nature and development of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ are elucidated. In doing so, the chapter uncovers an aspect of the South African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA which has received little or no scholarly attention to date.
African Military Geosciences: Military History and the Physical Environment, 2018
It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physica... more It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physical environment. Throughout history, key elements of geography have served as decisive factors in the conduct and outcome of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In each area of military operations, a number of geographic characteristics, unique to that area, combine to create a distinctive operational environment. The elements making this operational environment unique, provide useful tools for the study of the historical impact of climate and terrain on warfare. The deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre during 1940, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian forces in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and Somaliland (Somalia). This article shows that the East African operational environment, best described as complex and hybrid, distinctly influenced the operational deployment of the UDF throughout the campaign. From the sprawling deserts of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) to the coastal plains of Somaliland and the mountainous bastions of central and northern Abyssinia, the East African climate and terrain served as crucial determinants during the planning and execution of the South African and Allied military operations throughout the campaign.
Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo ... more Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo a rapid transformation from an ageing defence force to one that could project offensive power across Africa. The formation of the 1 st South African Division (1 st SA Div) during 1940, and the subsequent deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre, afforded the UDF the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian threat in Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) and Somalia (then Italian Somaliland). It had been 21 years since the Union of South Africa was last in a state of war, and the UDF's first battle in East Africa is a prime tool by which to measure concepts such as force design, military innovation and the operational employment of forces, to name but a few. The Battle of El Wak was not only the UDF's initial battle in the East African campaign, but also South Africa's first battle during the Second World War. By drawing from primary archival material and secondary sources, the article concludes that the Battle of El Wak had a definite impact on the entire South African campaign in East Africa.
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2018
The Italian declaration of war in June 1940 placed the British possessions in East Africa under t... more The Italian declaration of war in June 1940 placed the British possessions in East Africa under threat of invasion from the neighbouring Italian colonies. In July 1940, the Italians launched limited offensives towards the frontiers of Kenya and the Sudan, and completely overran British Somaliland by August. By November 1940 the First South African Division (1st SA Div) deployed to the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, ready to launch offensive operations into Southern Abyssinia against the Mega-Moyale complex. The South African belief in mobile warfare found expression in the ensuing operation, where Maj Gen George E. Brink, the Division’s commander, essentially manoeuvred to fight during the offensive operations. This article critically discusses the objectives allotted to Brink for his offensive operations in Southern Abyssinia. The objectives allocated to the Division are measured against the overall successes of the
South African operations in the south of Abyssinia during 1941.
The South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) during the First World War largely ... more The South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) during the First World War largely depended on the access to, the availability of, and control over all water sources within the operational area. The Union Defence Force (UDF) appreciated the strategic nature of water before the invasion of GSWA in 1914, as it was well-known that no permanent water sources existed along all possible routes of advance into the country. Fears over German sabotage and poisoning of the available water resources remained a constant concern to the South African defence planners throughout the campaign. As such, adequate water supplies fit for both human and animal consumption, became a strategic military concern. This necessitated the defence force to adopt a number of ways to meet this growing demand. Bore holes were sunk across the operational area, and fresh water was transported across the Kalahari Desert by motor vehicles, and via shipping from Cape Town. In essence, the provision of safe drinking water, to some extent, dictated the pace of the South African campaign in GSWA.
By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-boats (BdU) realised that the ‘sinki... more By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-boats (BdU) realised that the ‘sinking results’ of the North Atlantic had decreased immensely. The successes of the Allied anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic precluded the successful employment of the German submarines in said waters. It was realised that the ‘sinking potential’ of the Cape Town–Freetown convoy route, in terms of tonnage, had increased exponentially by the latter half of 1942. This sudden increase was a direct result of the successful German submarine operations in the North Atlantic during 1939–1942. The first German submarine offensive in South African waters during 1942, Operation Eisbär, was aimed at striking a devastating blow to shipping off the South African coast. By the end of December 1942, an estimated 310 864 tons of shipping had been sunk through Operation Eisbär and the first U-cruiser operation alone. The success of Operation Eisbär led to a further two German submarine offensives being launched by the BdU in South African waters during the remainder of the Second World War, with a number of opportunistic attacks also made by submarines travelling to the Far East. This article has three specific aims. First, to discuss the Union Defence Force’s (UDF) threat perception and operational readiness in terms of the maritime defence of its coast, and the merchant shipping that rounded it, over the period September 1939 to October 1942. Second, to explain the nature and extent of the German submarine operations in South African waters between October 1942 and February 1945. Last, the South African and Allied counter-measures to the German submarine threat off the South African coast will be discussed. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, private and official correspondence, and a host of secondary sources, the background, nature, successes and failures of the German submarine operations, and the South African counter-measures are elucidated.
The historical sources detailing South Africa’s participation in the First World War are vast, an... more The historical sources detailing South Africa’s participation in the First World War are vast, and range from official publications to regimental histories, private diaries and first-hand accounts. The Department of Defence (DOD) Documentation Centre is the custodian of all military archival material generated since the inception of the Department on 1 July 1912. Nonetheless, the material in the repository remains underutilised, despite the number of researchers who have worked or those who are now working on the military history of the Union Defence Force (UDF) during the Afrikaner Rebellion, as well as the campaigns fought in German South West Africa (GSWA), German East Africa (GEA), the Middle East and Europe. The centennial commemoration of the First World War gave rise to an increase in both professional and amateur military historical research, and a resurgence in First World War studies globally. A large number of researchers are expected to consult the First World War material at the Documentation Centre. An increase in interest in a variety of themes relating to South Africa and South African participation in the war is already detected. This article reports on a review of the Documentation Centre’s First World War holdings in relation to South Africa’s participation in the war by using Deneys Reitz, of Commando fame as a lens to illustrate the range of information available to researchers.
The Naval War in South African Waters, 1939-1945 provides a critical reappraisal of the naval war... more The Naval War in South African Waters, 1939-1945 provides a critical reappraisal of the naval war waged in South African waters during the Second World War. The book investigates this broad topic by focussing on several interrelated aspects such as: the wartime strategic importance of South African waters; the rival Axis and Allied naval strategies in the southern oceans; the development of the South African coastal defence system; the full extent of the Axis naval operations in the southern oceans; the naval intelligence war; and, finally, the antisubmarine war waged in South African waters. Based on extensive archival research in South Africa and the United Kingdom, and supplemented by a wealth of secondary material, the book introduces a fresh, in-depth discussion on a largely forgotten episode of South African military history.
The story of the intelligence war in South Africa during the Second World War is one of suspense,... more The story of the intelligence war in South Africa during the Second World War is one of suspense, drama and dogged persistence. In 1939, when the Union of South Africa entered the war on Britain's side, the German government secretly reached out to the anti-war political opposition, and to the leadership of the pro-fascist Ossewabrandwag. The Nazis' aim was to spread sedition in South Africa and to undermine the Allied war effort. To this end, they even offered to supply weapons to the Ossewabrandwag. But the critical strategic importance of the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope meant that the Germans were also after naval intelligence. Soon U-boat packs were sent to operate in South African waters, to deadly effect. With the help of the Ossewabrandwag, a network of German spies was established to gather important political and military intelligence and relay it back to the Reich. Agents would use a variety of channels to send coded messages to Axis diplomats in nearby Mozambique. Meanwhile, police detectives and MI5 agents hunted in vain for illegal wireless transmitters. Drawing on numerous primary and archival sources, Hitler's South African Spies presents an unrivalled account of the German intelligence networks that operated in wartime South Africa and investigates the true threat level presented by Nazi Germany. It includes a fascinating account of the Royal Navy's signals intelligence network in southern Africa and also details the hunt in post-war Europe for witnesses to help the South African government bring charges of high treason against key Ossewabrandwag members.
The majority of academic and popular studies on the South African participation in the Second Wor... more The majority of academic and popular studies on the South African participation in the Second World War historically focus on the military operations of the Union Defence Force in East Africa, North Africa, Madagascar and Italy. Recently, there has been a renewed drive to study the South African participation from a more general war and society approach. The South African home front during the war, and in particular the Axis and Allied maritime war waged off the southern African coast, has, however, received scant historical attention from professional and amateur historians alike. The historical interrelated aspects of maritime insecurity evident in southern Africa during the war are largely cast aside by contemporary academics engaging with issues of maritime strategy and insecurity in southern Africa.
The all-encompassing nature and extent of the maritime war waged off southern Africa during the Second World War have been far more extensive than suggested in traditional sources. A key understanding of the maritime war is, in effect, incomplete without separate detailed discussions about the opposing Axis and Allied maritime strategies off the coast of southern Africa, the wartime shipping quandaries experienced by the Union of South Africa, and the South African coastal defences. The Axis maritime operations in southern African waters, the so-called maritime intelligence war, and the extended anti-submarine war waged in these waters are equally integral to the discussion.
This dissertation aims to provide a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the coast of southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. The study investigates this inclusive topic through the aforementioned research objectives. The study does not fall into the general ambit of a regimental, campaign or personal military history. Instead, it straddles the strata of war and offers fresh insights into an episode of the South African military history uncommonly investigated by contemporary military historians.
The dissertation finds that the Axis and Allied maritime operations off the southern African coast were complex in nature, especially regarding the several strategic, military and economic aspects that have always underpinned them. Moreover, in gaining an understanding of these complex operations, the study reveals the general interrelatedness between the rival Axis and Allied maritime strategies and operations around the southern African coast. Previous studies have failed to recognise this interrelatedness, and have instead offered a one-sided, compartmentalised discussion on single aspects associated with the maritime war waged off southern Africa. This study thus distances itself from previous academic and popular historiography on the subject. It offers, rather, a fresh, in-depth discussion underpinned by extensive archival research, access to previously classified material, and a wealth of secondary sources.
Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Fo... more Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war.
In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and ec... more In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and economic conditions, several thousand white mine workers on the Witwatersrand in the Union of South Africa went on strike. These miners armed and organised themselves into commandos and took to the streets. During the opening phases of the unrest, these paramilitary units clashed with the South African Police. By the beginning of March, the strikes transformed into a violent insurrection with railway workers also joining its ranks after negotiations between the mine workers, mine owners, and the government failed and new militant leadership assumed command. As chaos and disorder engulfed large tracts of the Johannesburg goldfields and levels of violence assumed new proportions, the state’s legitimacy increasingly came under threat. In response, martial law was declared, and elements of the Union Defence Force were deployed to quell the so-called 1922 Rand Revolt. Historically unaccustomed to urban warfare and without an appropriate doctrine, the defence force became involved in several high-intensity urban counterinsurgency operations against the strike commandos. Drawing from a variety of archival material, this article investigates the combat operations undertaken by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt.
From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had bee... more From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had been deployed to suppress several internal disturbances. These unrests varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised parts of the population, both in the Union and South West Africa (now Namibia). The uprisings in turn tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force. The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, although brave and tragic, provides a lens through which to investigate the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operation conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War. These operations occurred only months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Revolt on the Witwatersrand. The reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern South West Africa. The result of this brief and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences. This article investigates the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.
During the Second World War, between 1941 and 1942, a large number of South African
troops were ... more During the Second World War, between 1941 and 1942, a large number of South African
troops were made prisoners of war (pow) by the Axis forces in the Western Desert. These troops were first interned in pow transit camps in North Africa, before being shipped to more permanent camps in Italy and later Germany. A large number of the South African captives decided to accept their newfound fates and make their internment as ‘pleasant’ as possible. However, a small nucleus of South African servicemen either tried to evade capture altogether, or, when captured, actively tried to escape. The first large scale attempts of escape and evasion by South African servicemen therefore occurred in North Africa between 1941 and 1942. This article provides an exploratory investigation into the varied experiences of the South African soldiers that either evaded capture altogether or escaped from internment in North Africa.
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2022
During the Second World War, the East African theatre was marked by extreme variations in terms o... more During the Second World War, the East African theatre was marked by extreme variations in terms of climate, terrain, communications, and disease ecology. The planning, scope and conduct of the Allied offensive operations in the theatre was largely determined by the physical environment. The deployment of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade (1 sa Bde) to East Africa occurred across three distinct operational environments – the deserts of north-eastern Kenya, the bush country of Somalia, and the mountains of Ethiopia. The distinct changes in the physical environment influenced the combat operations of 1 sa Bde, which alternated between highly mobile, combined arms, operations across favourable terrain to somewhat static operations dominated by infantry and artillery over exceedingly difficult terrain. This article investigates the varied combat operations of 1 sa Bde in East Africa, and critically reflects on the influence that the physical environment exerted on the unfolding South African offensive operations.
Germany desired to contact the wartime opposition in South Africa in order to obtain accurate pol... more Germany desired to contact the wartime opposition in South Africa in order to obtain accurate political and military intelligence. The arrival of Hans Rooseboom in South Africa in 1940 provided the Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinel), a quasi-cultural and anti-war movement, with the means through which to initiate two-way communication with Germany. The so-called Rooseboom secret service became the first German intelligence network to operate in South Africa during the early war years. This article investigates the nature and operation of the so-called Rooseboom secret service from 1941 to 1942 against the backdrop of the larger intelligence war waged in South Africa.
Sights, Sounds, Memories: South African Soldier Experiences of the Second World War, 2020
A drastic shift was observed in the academic study of war during the twentieth century. As a resu... more A drastic shift was observed in the academic study of war during the twentieth century. As a result, the traditional field of military history was broadened to include several new approaches to the historical study of warfare. The recording of the personal experience of war, especially as a key component of the broader framework of war and society, proved particularly popular. Traditionally, the South African deployments to East Africa, North Africa and Italy during the Second World War have received the bulk of local historical attention. Unfortunately, the deployment of the 7th South African Infantry Brigade (SA Inf Bde) to Madagascar remains largely ignored. The chance discovery of a series of wartime letters, written by Arthur Bintliff, offers a rare glimpse into the personal experience of a South African soldier during one of the forgotten campaigns of the war. The Bintliff correspondence provides an unprecedented account of the thrill of combat, the monotony of daily military routine, the leisure-time of soldiers, and the experience of wartime Madagascar in general. By analysing the Bintliff correspondence this chapter offers a rare in-depth, discussion on the South African military experience during the Madagascar campaign.
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2020
Mountainous terrain has distinctly influenced combat operations throughout history. Warfare at hi... more Mountainous terrain has distinctly influenced combat operations throughout history. Warfare at high altitude often takes place in extreme weather conditions and over difficult terrain, which is largely considered to be inaccessible, inhospitable, and at times lacking any apparent strategic or operational value. As a result, combat operations at high altitudes are traditionally infantry affairs. The South African deployment to East Africa during the Second World War was for the most part characterised by highly mobile operations, across deserts and scrubland, where infantry, armour and artillery deployed in a mutually supportive role. The penultimate battles of the East African campaign were, however, fought in extremely severe terrain, where the South African troops would experience the harsh realities of mountain warfare for the first time during the war. This article broadly investigates the exigencies of mountain warfare, and critically reflects on the South African wartime experience of mountain warfare in East Africa.
The entry of the Union of South Africa into the First World War, as well as the subsequent invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA), served as a trigger to the Afrikaner Rebellion. In September 1914 the Union Defence Force (UDF) suffered a major reverse at the Battle of Sandfontein. However, in addition to the German threat, South Africa faced a second, more serious internal threat. The socio-economic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly among rural Afrikaners, magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown. The Union’s entry into the war was a step too far for many Nationalist Afrikaners and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the rebellion. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion brought about the first counterinsurgency operation of the UDF within the borders of South Africa. By harnessing its operational and tactical mobility, and operating from the central position and along internal lines of communication, the UDF swiftly dealt with the rebel revolt. This article evaluates the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF in suppressing the Afrikaner Rebellion.
KEYWORDS: South Africa, First World War, Union Defence Force, Afrikaner Rebellion, insurgency, counterinsurgency
The Department of Defence Archive in Pretoria is the repository of all military documents generat... more The Department of Defence Archive in Pretoria is the repository of all military documents generated by the Union Defence Force, the South African Defence Force and the South African National Defence Force. This makes it the foremost source of primary information for researchers of South African military history. However, an almost total ban on access to archival documents from 1 January 1970 onwards complicates research into later periods. In fact, anyone researching post-1970 military-related topics has to apply for access to archival documents through the Promotion of Access to Information Act. The traditional weapon in the armoury of the historian – the systematic trawling of archives – is thereby negated, while the methodology of post-1970 historical research differs significantly from commonly accepted historical practices. Finding aids, the only access route to classified information in this analogue archive, offer only the briefest descriptions of the content of files, and researchers need almost esoteric intuition to identify documents that are even remotely relevant to their research. Additionally, a fee is payable for declassification, and the process can take several months to complete. This review article reports on the theoretical workings of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, and uses an actual research example as a case study to illustrate the practical implications of conducting research at the Department of Defence Archive in South Africa based on classified military documentation.
The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the government of South-West Africa (SWA), ... more The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the government of South-West Africa (SWA), ordered the creation of a local youth movement during 1975. The primary aim of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ (youth movement) was to prevent the spread of communist propaganda, foster a sense of Kavango nationalism, and limit the political influence of the South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) amongst the local Kavango youth. The Institute for African Studies at the then Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (PU for CHE) played a crucial role in the formative years of the movement, by providing key sociocultural knowledge on the ‘human terrain’ of the Kavango people to the government of SWA. The creation of this movement coincided with the start of the conventional military involvement of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Angolan Civil War during 1975, as well as with the escalation of the SWAPO insurgency in northern SWA. The South African government hence developed a total national strategy to combat these threats in the military, social, political, economic and educational spheres. The ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ formed an integral part of this strategy in the Kavangoland.
This chapter has three specific aims. First, to investigate the reasons behind the establishment of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ in 1975, by providing a brief historical background to the South African counterinsurgency campaign in northern SWA. Second, to explain the nature, extent and the development of this youth movement between 1975 and 1985, with a specific focus on the role that the Institute for African Studies at the PU for CHE played in the formative years of the movement. Last, the chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of this youth movement, as a counterinsurgency tool, within the framework of the South African counterinsurgency strategy deployed in northern SWA during the so-called ‘Border War’. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, from both governmental and private institutions, as well as private and official correspondence, along with a host of secondary sources, the background, nature and development of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ are elucidated. In doing so, the chapter uncovers an aspect of the South African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA which has received little or no scholarly attention to date.
African Military Geosciences: Military History and the Physical Environment, 2018
It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physica... more It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physical environment. Throughout history, key elements of geography have served as decisive factors in the conduct and outcome of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In each area of military operations, a number of geographic characteristics, unique to that area, combine to create a distinctive operational environment. The elements making this operational environment unique, provide useful tools for the study of the historical impact of climate and terrain on warfare. The deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre during 1940, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian forces in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and Somaliland (Somalia). This article shows that the East African operational environment, best described as complex and hybrid, distinctly influenced the operational deployment of the UDF throughout the campaign. From the sprawling deserts of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) to the coastal plains of Somaliland and the mountainous bastions of central and northern Abyssinia, the East African climate and terrain served as crucial determinants during the planning and execution of the South African and Allied military operations throughout the campaign.
Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo ... more Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo a rapid transformation from an ageing defence force to one that could project offensive power across Africa. The formation of the 1 st South African Division (1 st SA Div) during 1940, and the subsequent deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre, afforded the UDF the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian threat in Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) and Somalia (then Italian Somaliland). It had been 21 years since the Union of South Africa was last in a state of war, and the UDF's first battle in East Africa is a prime tool by which to measure concepts such as force design, military innovation and the operational employment of forces, to name but a few. The Battle of El Wak was not only the UDF's initial battle in the East African campaign, but also South Africa's first battle during the Second World War. By drawing from primary archival material and secondary sources, the article concludes that the Battle of El Wak had a definite impact on the entire South African campaign in East Africa.
International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2018
The Italian declaration of war in June 1940 placed the British possessions in East Africa under t... more The Italian declaration of war in June 1940 placed the British possessions in East Africa under threat of invasion from the neighbouring Italian colonies. In July 1940, the Italians launched limited offensives towards the frontiers of Kenya and the Sudan, and completely overran British Somaliland by August. By November 1940 the First South African Division (1st SA Div) deployed to the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, ready to launch offensive operations into Southern Abyssinia against the Mega-Moyale complex. The South African belief in mobile warfare found expression in the ensuing operation, where Maj Gen George E. Brink, the Division’s commander, essentially manoeuvred to fight during the offensive operations. This article critically discusses the objectives allotted to Brink for his offensive operations in Southern Abyssinia. The objectives allocated to the Division are measured against the overall successes of the
South African operations in the south of Abyssinia during 1941.
The South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) during the First World War largely ... more The South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) during the First World War largely depended on the access to, the availability of, and control over all water sources within the operational area. The Union Defence Force (UDF) appreciated the strategic nature of water before the invasion of GSWA in 1914, as it was well-known that no permanent water sources existed along all possible routes of advance into the country. Fears over German sabotage and poisoning of the available water resources remained a constant concern to the South African defence planners throughout the campaign. As such, adequate water supplies fit for both human and animal consumption, became a strategic military concern. This necessitated the defence force to adopt a number of ways to meet this growing demand. Bore holes were sunk across the operational area, and fresh water was transported across the Kalahari Desert by motor vehicles, and via shipping from Cape Town. In essence, the provision of safe drinking water, to some extent, dictated the pace of the South African campaign in GSWA.
By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-boats (BdU) realised that the ‘sinki... more By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-boats (BdU) realised that the ‘sinking results’ of the North Atlantic had decreased immensely. The successes of the Allied anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic precluded the successful employment of the German submarines in said waters. It was realised that the ‘sinking potential’ of the Cape Town–Freetown convoy route, in terms of tonnage, had increased exponentially by the latter half of 1942. This sudden increase was a direct result of the successful German submarine operations in the North Atlantic during 1939–1942. The first German submarine offensive in South African waters during 1942, Operation Eisbär, was aimed at striking a devastating blow to shipping off the South African coast. By the end of December 1942, an estimated 310 864 tons of shipping had been sunk through Operation Eisbär and the first U-cruiser operation alone. The success of Operation Eisbär led to a further two German submarine offensives being launched by the BdU in South African waters during the remainder of the Second World War, with a number of opportunistic attacks also made by submarines travelling to the Far East. This article has three specific aims. First, to discuss the Union Defence Force’s (UDF) threat perception and operational readiness in terms of the maritime defence of its coast, and the merchant shipping that rounded it, over the period September 1939 to October 1942. Second, to explain the nature and extent of the German submarine operations in South African waters between October 1942 and February 1945. Last, the South African and Allied counter-measures to the German submarine threat off the South African coast will be discussed. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, private and official correspondence, and a host of secondary sources, the background, nature, successes and failures of the German submarine operations, and the South African counter-measures are elucidated.
The historical sources detailing South Africa’s participation in the First World War are vast, an... more The historical sources detailing South Africa’s participation in the First World War are vast, and range from official publications to regimental histories, private diaries and first-hand accounts. The Department of Defence (DOD) Documentation Centre is the custodian of all military archival material generated since the inception of the Department on 1 July 1912. Nonetheless, the material in the repository remains underutilised, despite the number of researchers who have worked or those who are now working on the military history of the Union Defence Force (UDF) during the Afrikaner Rebellion, as well as the campaigns fought in German South West Africa (GSWA), German East Africa (GEA), the Middle East and Europe. The centennial commemoration of the First World War gave rise to an increase in both professional and amateur military historical research, and a resurgence in First World War studies globally. A large number of researchers are expected to consult the First World War material at the Documentation Centre. An increase in interest in a variety of themes relating to South Africa and South African participation in the war is already detected. This article reports on a review of the Documentation Centre’s First World War holdings in relation to South Africa’s participation in the war by using Deneys Reitz, of Commando fame as a lens to illustrate the range of information available to researchers.
The formation of 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div), during February 1943, afforde... more The formation of 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div), during February 1943, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the chance to expand its military capabilities to that of armoured warfare. An armoured division further offered South Africa the opportunity to equip the UDF with modern fighting equipment and to master the art of combined warfare. Actual deployment in Italy differed vastly from the training which the division received in North Africa, for Italy was arguably, largely “untankable”. The Division’s first battle occurred at Celleno, on 10 June 1944, where it was able to “prove” itself by securing its first victory. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the Battle of Celleno is only superficially covered. Primary sources are however abundant, thus adding to the rich history which is available on the Division. This article analyses the Battle of Celleno, fought by 11 SA Armoured Brigade, in the context of the notion of “first battles”. Emphasis will be placed on the training received prior to deployment, the Battle of Celleno, the lessons that were learned by the division at Celleno, and the way these influenced future operations in Italy. The Division’s combined-arms approach is also evaluated, with specific emphasis on changing patterns of leadership, command, and employment of the Division after Celleno.
Keywords:
Union Defence Force; Italy; 6th South African Armoured Division; 11th South African Armoured Brigade; First battles; Celleno
The South African invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) in September 1914 was specifically ... more The South African invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) in September 1914 was specifically aimed at securing several strategic British war objectives. The invasion was the first time that the Union Defence Force (UDF) was deployed operationally in the event of war. The South African defence planners envisaged a limited military offensive in GSWA that would secure their strategic objectives in the least possible time. The outbreak of the Afrikaner Rebellion within South Africa, coupled with the harsh geography and climate of GSWA, dragged the conquest of the German colony well into 1915.
A large number of South African troops were captured by the Axis forces in the Western Desert aft... more A large number of South African troops were captured by the Axis forces in the Western Desert after the crushing defeat at Sidi Rezegh and the surrender of Tobruk. Prior to these severe reverses, South African troops had barely tasted defeat on the battlefield during the Second World War. Any illusions regarding fighting prowess and invincibility were short-lived and brutally dashed by the German Afrika Korps. Amidst the chaos and confusion that reigned at Sidi Rezegh, and searching questions asked of the defence of Tobruk, some thirteen thousand South African troops experience the surrealism of capture. For each of these men, the experience of capture differed. Most felt anger and frustration when confronted with their new status as prisoner-of-war. Mental shock, physical deprivation, and the stigma and shame associated with surrender would haunt them. This paper investigates the experiences of the South African servicemen shortly before, during, and after their moment of capture in the Western Desert.
Traditionally ungoverned spaces comprise physical, social, political, and economic areas where st... more Traditionally ungoverned spaces comprise physical, social, political, and economic areas where state control in its broadest sense are either absent, weak, or contested. During such instances, state control over a particular area, which includes the ability to provide safety, security and the provision of basic services, are surrendered to non-state actors. Once a non-state actor takes control of an ungoverned space, parallel government structures would often be established to ensure the provision of safety, security and basic services. As a result, states often view ungoverned spaces as holding a direct threat to their sovereignty, largely because such areas could provide safe havens for organised crime, and terrorist and insurgent movements to name a few. The Rehoboth Rebellion that broke out in German South-West Africa in April 1915, provides a unique lens through which to explore a case of a temporary ungoverned space in southern Africa during the First World War. The ungoverned space created by the Rehoboth Rebellion was largely the result of mounting pressure from the South African forces converging on Windhoek, as well as the punitive expedition launched by the German Schutztruppen to curb the internal revolt. This paper broadly investigates the ungoverned space created in the Rehoboth Gebiet during April 1915, by critically reflecting on key issues such as the absence of power, violence and counter-violence, self-determination, and criminal opportunism.
Deserts present formidable obstacles to military forces due to the harsh military operating envir... more Deserts present formidable obstacles to military forces due to the harsh military operating environment. The extreme climate, difficult and featureless terrain, lack of permanent water, and the absence of vegetation and human settlements, ensures that desert warfare remains a complex undertaking. The Western Desert campaign of 1940-1942 was largely characterised by a high degree of mobility and a hostile physical environment. During the clash of the motorised and mechanised formations in the Libyan Desert, best described as ‘bewildering actions’, the traditional concepts of fronts and flanks all but disappeared into a seeming complicated mass of confusion. The highly mobile nature of the campaign also meant that fighting units and supply columns often became intermingled, and so much so that the generals and their staffs were frequently spectators to battles that they could neither control nor understand. Moreover, the harsh terrain and climate of the Western Desert, would ultimately prove the single biggest obstacle during the conduct of operations. This paper discusses the broad impact of climate and terrain on warfare in the Western Desert over the period 1940 to 1942. It introduces the military operating environment of the Western Desert, before considering the impact of desert warfare on command, strategy, tactics, operations, and medical problems to name but a few.
German submarines effectively operated off the South African coast from 1941 to 1945, with the ma... more German submarines effectively operated off the South African coast from 1941 to 1945, with the main U-boat operations occurring between October 1942 and August 1943. Throughout the course of the war the U-boats were somewhat successful in these waters, and sunk in excess of 600,000 merchant tonnes. The Union War Histories Section, which formed part of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, was tasked to record the history of the South African involvement in the Second World War. During the research conducted for the book, War in the Southern Oceans, the Union War Histories staff entered into correspondence with some of the former German U-boat officers to gain a better understanding of the U-boat operations off the South African coast. The respondents included Günther Hessler, a senior staff officer at the Befehlshaber der U-Boote, as well as Walter Meyer and Carl Emmermann – a former U-boat officer and commander that were deployed to the Southern Oceans. These primary archival sources have been largely forgotten by military historians, despite their intrinsic value. A detailed analysis of these documents, however, provides key insights into the personal experiences of German submariners while operational in the Southern Oceans. This paper investigates the unique experience gained by the men aboard U-68 during the first sustained U-boat operation off the South African coast towards the end of 1942. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on a largely forgotten episode of naval history.
Op 7 September 1939, die dag ná Suid-Afrika oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar het, het die voormalig... more Op 7 September 1939, die dag ná Suid-Afrika oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar het, het die voormalige hoof van die Generale Staf van die Unieverdedigingsmag, Jack Collyer, 'n allessomvattende oorsig gegee oor die kommerwekkende toestand van Suid-Afrikaanse verdediging. Volgens Collyer was die Unieverdedigingsmag grootliks ongeorganiseerd, onopgelei, swak toegerus, sonder die nodige aangestelde leiers en opgeleide personeel, en gevolglik heeltemal onbevoeg om ontplooi te word vir die verdediging van die Unie. Hierdie referaat pas die teorie van militêre innovasie toe as ʼn lens om die toestand van Suid-Afrikaanse verdediging in die tussenoorlogse periode binne 'n strategiese konteks te ondersoek. Sodoende fokus die referaat spesifiek op die duidelike tekortkominge in terme van die Suid-Afrikaanse bedreigingspersepsie, verdedigingskemas en toekomstige oorlogsplanne gedurende die 1930's, veral teen die agtergrond van die verswakkende geostrategiese toestand in Europa. Daarmee hoop ek om ʼn nuwe analise te bied oor die unieke aard, organisering en tekortkominge van die Unieverdedigingsmag gedurende die tussenoorlogse periode.
The operational experience gained by South African soldiers during the First World War varied fro... more The operational experience gained by South African soldiers during the First World War varied from large sweeping operations in Africa and the Middle East, to the horrors of trench warfare on the Western Front. These experiences naturally influenced the so-called ‘lessons learnt’ by the Union Defence Force (UDF) during the war, which, though often misconstrued, had a determined effect on the post-war nature and organisation of the defence force. During the interwar years the UDF not only had to deal with an acute defence budget, and a concomitant shortage of men and military materiel, but it had to ensure that it could project offensive power across Africa, as part of the wider effort of the British Empire, in the event of a next global war. As a result of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia during 1936, the South African General Staff was forced to not only reassess its interwar defence schemes and accompanying threat perception, but draw up viable plans to meet any identifiable military threat in Africa. By drawing on the operational experience of former UDF officers that served in the African theatres during the First World War, the South African General Staff hoped to compile an appropriate manual on bush warfare with a view of the future deployment of Union troops across Africa. This paper analyses the changing nature of the South African defence schemes, threat perception and future war plans, by drawing on the operational experiences gained by the UDF in Africa during the First World War.
The formal establishment of the Ossewabrandwag Archive dates back to 1954 when a portion of the o... more The formal establishment of the Ossewabrandwag Archive dates back to 1954 when a portion of the official documentation of the Afrikaner nationalist movement was donated to the then Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (PU for CHE) for preservation. Amidst a general resurgence in contemporary historiography during the 1960s, the University of the Free State (UFS) also started an active drive to collate Ossewabrandwag archival material with the view of a scientific study of the movement. After a series of negotiations between the two universities in 1968, the UFS recognised that the official Ossewabrandwag Archive was located in Potchefstroom, and pledged its unconditional support to the PU for CHE in its efforts to expand the collections of the Ossewabrandwag Archive. The archival holdings of the Ossewabrandwag Archive grew throughout the 1970s, especially after an official research project was registered with the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 1975 to write up the history of the movement. This project, however, dragged along, and despite generous funding, and the appointment of a team of dedicated researchers, was only finalised in 1983. Despite this project, the majority of archival collections remained unsorted and was instead indexed on a library database in an attempt to ensure ease of access. This, along with an obtrusive ‘gatekeeper mentality’ about access to the archival collections, naturally affected contemporary research on the Ossewabrandwag movement. It is thus not surprising that this archive is somewhat unknown and underutilised to date, despite it valuable archival holdings. This paper explores the history, collections and management of the Ossewabrandwag Archive, in an attempt to reintroduce this valuable archive to both amateur and professional historians.
The Department of Defence Documentation Centre (Military Archives) in Pretoria is the repository ... more The Department of Defence Documentation Centre (Military Archives) in Pretoria is the repository of all military documents generated by the Union Defence Force (UDF), the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This makes it the foremost source of primary information for researchers of South African military history. However, an almost total ban on access to documents from 1 January 1970 onwards complicates research into later time periods. Historians of the world wars are limited only in their access to personnel files, but anyone researching post-1970 topics has to apply for access to documents through the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA). The traditional weapon in the armoury of the historian – the systematic trawling of archives – is thereby negated and the methodology of post-1970 historical research differs significantly from commonly accepted practices. Finding aids, the only access route to classified information in this analogue archive, offer only the briefest descriptions of the content of files, and researchers need almost esoteric intuition to identify documents that are even remotely relevant to their research. Additionally, a fee is payable for declassification, and the process can take several months to complete. This paper examines the theoretical workings of PAIA, and uses actual research examples as case studies to illustrate the practical implications of conducting research based on classified military documentation.
The aim of this presentation is to give a brief overview of the nature and organisation of the Ge... more The aim of this presentation is to give a brief overview of the nature and organisation of the German intelligence network in South Africa during the Second World War. I will first talk about the initial German contacts with South Africa, and in particular the Ossewabrandwag, between 1940 and 1941, whereafter I will use the case of Lothar Sittig to discuss the larger ambit of the maritime intelligence war waged in southern Africa. I will conclude with some general remarks on the effectiveness of the German intelligence network in South Africa during the Second World War. The erstwhile historian and archivist of the Ossewabrandwag , Piet van der Schyff, argued that two pertinent questions arise regarding the Ossewabrandwag and its possible contact with Nazi Germany during the war. First, was there definite contact between the Ossewabrandwag and Germany during the war? Second, if such contact existed, what was the nature and extent thereof? The answer to the first question is straightforward. The Ossewabrandwag maintained regular contact with Germany throughout the war. The second question, however, needs further investigation, especially as to how it related to the maritime intelligence war waged in southern Africa.
It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physica... more It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physical environment. Throughout history, key elements of geography have served as decisive factors in the conduct and outcome of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In each area of military operations, a number of geographic characteristics, unique to that area, combine to create a distinctive operational environment. The elements making this operational environment unique, provide useful tools in the study of the historical impact of climate and terrain on warfare. The deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre during 1940, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italians in Ethiopia and Somaliland. This shows that the East African operational environment, best described as complex and hybrid, distinctly influenced the operational deployment of the UDF throughout the campaign. From the sprawling deserts of the Northern Frontier District to the coastal plains of Somaliland and the mountainous bastions of central and northern Ethiopia, the East African climate and terrain served as key determinants during the planning and execution of the South African and Allied military operations throughout the campaign. This paper evaluates the influence of climate and terrain on the South African military deployment in East Africa during 1940-1941.
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo a rapid t... more With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo a rapid transformation from an ageing peacetime defence force to one that could project its offensive power across the African subcontinent. The formation of the 1st South African Division (1st SA Div) during 1940 and the subsequent deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre afforded the UDF the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian threat in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. It had been 21 years since the Union of South Africa had last been in a state of war, and the UDF’s first battle in East Africa is a prime tool with which to measure concepts such as force design, military innovation and the operational employment of forces, to name but a few. The Battle of El Wak, fought on 16 December 1940, was not only the UDF’s first battle in the East African campaign but also its first battle of the Second World War. This paper analyses the Battle of El Wak, fought by the 1st South African Brigade, against the theoretical notion of “first battles”. Emphasis is placed on the South African road to war, the planning for the East African campaign, the Battle of El Wak and the way this battle subsequently influenced the remainder of the UDF operations in East Africa. In doing so the South African offensive operations in the theatre is critically evaluated against the backdrop of the changing nature of the South African operations, the at times haphazard Anglo-South African relations during the campaign, the character and effectiveness of the Italian military forces, and the adverse influence of climate and terrain on the campaign in East Africa.
German submarines effectively operated off the South African coast from 1941 to 1945, with the ma... more German submarines effectively operated off the South African coast from 1941 to 1945, with the main U-boat operations occurring between October 1942 and August 1943. The U-boats operational in the South African waters during the war accounted for 114 Allied merchant ships sunk, which amounted to a total of 667 593 merchant tonnes lost. The Union War Histories Section, which formed part of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, was responsible to write-up the history of the South African involvement in the Second World War. During the research conducted for the book, War in the Southern Oceans, the Union War Histories staff entered into correspondence with some former German U-boat officers to gain a better understanding of the operations of the German Submarines along the South African coast during the war. The respondents included Günther Hessler, a senior staff officer at the Befehlshaber der U-Boote, Walter Meyer, an officer on board U-68, and Carl Emmermann, the commander of U-172. These primary archival sources have been largely forgotten by military historians despite their intrinsic value. A detailed analysis of these documents allows for an unprecedented, and unique, insight into the personal experiences of German submariners while operational in the Southern Oceans during the war. This paper aims to use the personal narrative provided by Walter Meyer to the Union War Histories Section, on his experiences aboard U-68 during Operation Eisbär, as a lens through which to investigate the personal experiences, and social composition, of German submariners in the Southern Oceans during the war.
The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the South-West Africa (SWA) Government, ord... more The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the South-West Africa (SWA) Government, ordered the creation of a local youth movement during 1975. The primary aim of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ was to prevent the spread of communist propaganda, foster a sense of Kavango nationalism, and limit the political influence of the South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) amongst the local Kavango youth. The creation of this movement coincided with the start of the South African conventional military involvement in Angola during 1975, and the growing insurgency in northern SWA by the SWAPO. The South African government hence developed a total national strategy to combat this threat in the military, social, political, economic and educational spheres. The aim of this paper is to establish the reasons for the establishment of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’, and to investigate the development of this movement throughout 1975-1985. The effectiveness of this movement as a counterinsurgency tool within the framework of the South African total national strategy will also be analysed.
By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-Boats (BdU) realised that the “sinki... more By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-Boats (BdU) realised that the “sinking results’’ of the North Atlantic had decreased immensely. The successes of the Allied anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic precluded the successful employment of the German submarines in said waters. It was realised that the “sinking potential” of the Cape Town - Freetown convoy route, in terms of tonnage, had increased exponentially by the latter half of 1942. This sudden increase was a direct result of the successful German submarine operations in the North Atlantic during 1939-1942. The first German submarine offensive in South African waters during 1942, Operation Eisbär, was aimed at striking a devastating blow to shipping off the South African coast. By the end of December 1942 an estimated 310 864 tons of shipping had been sunk through Operation Eisbär alone. The success of Operation Eisbär led to a further two German submarine offensives being launched by the BdU in South African waters during the remainder of the Second World War, with a number of opportunistic attacks also made by submarines travelling to the Far East. This paper deals with the German Submarine Offensives off the South African Coast between1942 and 1945. It focusses on three key aspects of the maritime war off the South African coast: the maritime threat perception, the Axis maritime strategy in these waters, and the resulting U-boat offensives.
John Johnston (Jack) Collyer (1870-1941) began his military career with the Cape Mounted Riflemen... more John Johnston (Jack) Collyer (1870-1941) began his military career with the Cape Mounted Riflemen and saw operational deployments during both the South Africa War (1899-1902), as well as the two African campaigns of the First World War (1914-1918). Collyer had gained valuable military and organisational experience throughout his fifty years of military service in Africa and was considered to be highly talented, well-trained, and above all, battle-hardened. After the unification of South Africa in 1910, the Minister of Defence, Jan Smuts, selected Collyer to help him in the creation of a modern defence force based on western norms. As such Collyer played a vital part in the drawing up of the South African Defence Act and the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) during 1910-1912. Collyer served as the chief staff officer to both Louis Botha and Jan Smuts during African campaigns of the First World War, whereafter he assumed the post of adjutant-general (1915-1919) and chief of the general staff of the UDF (1917-1920). This paper will use Collyer’s career as a lens through which to view the military and organisational development of the UDF during its formative years.
The South African entry into the First World War, as part of the British war effort, required the... more The South African entry into the First World War, as part of the British war effort, required the invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) in order to secure strategic Imperial objectives. The initial invasion of GSWA was repulsed at Sandfontein during September 1914 and became the first operational reverse for the Union Defence Forces (UDF) during the First World War. However, in addition to a seemingly prevalent external German threat following this operational loss, South Africa faced a second, more serious, internal threat. The socioeconomic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly in rural Afrikaner society, in addition to the Union's entry into the war, which further magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown, triggered the outbreak of an Afrikaner Rebellion in September 1914. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted immediately from the invasion of GSWA to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion became the first conventional military deployment of the UDF within the borders of South Africa to suppress an internal revolt. The UDF harnessed its operational and tactical mobility by operating from the central position, along internal lines of communication, in order to swiftly deal with the rebel threat. This paper evaluates the military operations conducted by the UDF in the suppression of the 1914 Rebellion. The operational strategy and the tactics employed by the Union forces are analysed and explained in terms of military theory. As such, the Rebellion is used as a measure for the efficiency of the UDF and specifically in terms of military organisation, leadership, preparedness and operational effectiveness.
The outcome of the South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) largely depended on ... more The outcome of the South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) largely depended on the access to, the availability of, and control over the major water sources within the operational area. Prior to the invasion of GSWA, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had established that no permanent water sources existed along their possible routes of advance. Fears over German sabotage and poisoning of the available water resources remained a constant concern to the South African defence planners. As such, adequate water supplies fit for both human and animal consumption, became a strategic military concern, which necessitated the South African Engineering Corps (SAEC) to adopt a number of ways to meet this growing demand. Under the guise of the SAEC bore holes were sunk across the operational area, wells were dug in dry riverbeds and drinking water was condensed from sea water. In a further effort to ensure that the fighting forces had a continued supply of drinking water, water was transported across the Kalahari Desert by motor cars and via shipping from Cape Town. In essence the provision of safe drinking water dictated the pace of the South African advance during the entire campaign in GSWA. This paper provides a critical analysis on the impact that water had on the South African campaign in GSWA during 1914-1915, and explores the varied ways which in which the UDF dealt with this strategic military concern. In doing so, it uncovers an aspect of the South African campaign in GSWA which has received little or no scholarly attention, despite the fact that it was a crucial determinant of the campaign.
Murder. Rape. Looting. Cattle Theft. The South African troops who occupied the German farm of Kle... more Murder. Rape. Looting. Cattle Theft. The South African troops who occupied the German farm of Klein Nauas, in the Rehoboth Gebiet, during May 1915, found two disturbing German letters which alluded to the lawlessness which were present in this area after the outbreak of the German-Rehoboth War during April 1915. With accusations of Rehoboth Basters murdering German farmers, and firsthand accounts from farm workers on Klein Nauas accusing the Schutztruppe of murders and reprisals against Rehoboth-Basters and Nama alike, the UDF troops had to try and maintain some sort of law and order. The UDF troops were under orders to escort their German prisoners, and the remaining inhabitants, and the livestock of Klein Nauas, to the safety of Kalkfontein. During their journey to Kalkfontein, the South Africans had to, however, further deal with a case of rape by a German farmer of a Nama woman, whose husband had been murdered by the Schutztruppe. After reaching Kalkfontein, a German complaint was lodged with the UDF authorities claiming that the South African soldiers looted Klein Nauas and its surroundings, pillaging all of the cattle.This paper investigates the conditions that produced such social banditry, attempts to maintain the rule of law during war, and the UDF interpretation of the events that enfolded Klein Nauas during May 1915. In doing so, it uncovers a lesser known aspect of the South African Campaign in German South West African during the First World War.
Leisure time utilisation has forever played an undisputable role in the routine of soldiers aroun... more Leisure time utilisation has forever played an undisputable role in the routine of soldiers around the world. The Union Defence Force, during World War II, actively promoted physical exercise through the medium of sports. Rugby has been at the centrepiece of South African sporting events since the early twentieth century, and was thus naturally a popular pass time within the Union Defence Force. During World War II, whether busy with training, operational deployments or during interment in POW Camps, rugby served as a tool to unite, train and build the morale of the South African soldiers. Whilst serving time in North Africa, Italy and as far afield as the POW camps in Europe, the Springboks played numerous ‘official’ tests against the other Commonwealth Nations. This paper will strive to establish the importance of rugby as a tool to build Espirit De Corps amongst the soldiers of the Union Defence Force, whilst secondly examining the extent to which international tests were played during the entirety of the war. Lastly, the author will try to establish the extent to which the game of rugby was played across the colour bar in the Union Defence Force.
The building blocks of most official military histories can be found in a simple, often underutil... more The building blocks of most official military histories can be found in a simple, often underutilised document, known as the war diary. War diaries are ultimately kept by every military unit, and higher formation, so as to allow an accurate historical record that can be used in the reconstruction of fighting. War diaries, furthermore, contribute greatly to the official documents which can be used in the construction of classified historical narratives and published official histories. War diaries are generally completed month by month by units actively deployed in the field. The war diaries, ultimately, end up in a archive where historians can have ready access to them when conducting historical research. War diaries are an invaluable historical sources to historians, when fully understood and utilised. The tradition of keeping accurate war diaries dates back thousands of years. The British Army, however, standardised the format of the war diary, as we know it today, during the South African War 1899-1902. The war diaries which are specifically concerned with South Africa and its military campaigns are plentiful, and covers all major operational deployments from the First World War to the 21st Century Peacekeeping Deployments. This paper, firstly, strives to analyse the use of the war diary as a historical source by historians. Secondly, the paper will explore the content found within a selection of war diaries and provide insights as to how this information might be of help in the reconstruction of historical narratives. Thirdly, the paper will evaluate the problems associated with the utilisation of war diaries by historians. Lastly, the paper will provide a brief overview of the state of war diaries in the 21st century.
20 Battles: Searching for a South African Way of War 1913-2013, 2023
Favouring manoeuvre over attrition and often punching above their
weight, South African soldiers... more Favouring manoeuvre over attrition and often punching above their weight, South African soldiers have become known for their tenacity, dash and ability to defy the odds. Their unique directive command style has also helped them to excel in defining battles and operations, from the campaign in German South West Africa in 1915 to the crossborder operations in Angola during the Border War. In 20 Battles, military historians Evert Kleynhans and David Brock Katz investigate the evolution of South Africa’s armed forces over a century from 1913 to 2013. They track the evolution of the doctrine and structure of the defence force, uncovering historical continuity and the lessons learned from past battles and operations. What is clear is that when South African soldiers have the freedom to operate according to their manoeuvre doctrine, as they had in East Africa in 1916 and southern Ethiopia in 1941, they can achieve stunning results. But when hemmed in by rigid doctrine and a topdown command style, as at Delville Wood in 1916 and Tobruk in 1942, the results can be tragic. 20 Battles combines both battlefield drama and crisp analysis and in the process provides a much-needed perspective on the South African way of war
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The all-encompassing nature and extent of the maritime war waged off southern Africa during the Second World War have been far more extensive than suggested in traditional sources. A key understanding of the maritime war is, in effect, incomplete without separate detailed discussions about the opposing Axis and Allied maritime strategies off the coast of southern Africa, the wartime shipping quandaries experienced by the Union of South Africa, and the South African coastal defences. The Axis maritime operations in southern African waters, the so-called maritime intelligence war, and the extended anti-submarine war waged in these waters are equally integral to the discussion.
This dissertation aims to provide a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the coast of southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. The study investigates this inclusive topic through the aforementioned research objectives. The study does not fall into the general ambit of a regimental, campaign or personal military history. Instead, it straddles the strata of war and offers fresh insights into an episode of the South African military history uncommonly investigated by contemporary military historians.
The dissertation finds that the Axis and Allied maritime operations off the southern African coast were complex in nature, especially regarding the several strategic, military and economic aspects that have always underpinned them. Moreover, in gaining an understanding of these complex operations, the study reveals the general interrelatedness between the rival Axis and Allied maritime strategies and operations around the southern African coast. Previous studies have failed to recognise this interrelatedness, and have instead offered a one-sided, compartmentalised discussion on single aspects associated with the maritime war waged off southern Africa. This study thus distances itself from previous academic and popular historiography on the subject. It offers, rather, a fresh, in-depth discussion underpinned by extensive archival research, access to previously classified material, and a wealth of secondary sources.
troops were made prisoners of war (pow) by the Axis forces in the Western Desert. These troops were first interned in pow transit camps in North Africa, before being shipped to more permanent camps in Italy and later Germany. A large number of the South African captives decided to accept their newfound fates and make their internment as ‘pleasant’ as possible. However, a small nucleus of South African servicemen either tried to evade capture altogether, or, when captured, actively tried to escape. The first large scale attempts of escape and evasion by South African servicemen therefore occurred in North Africa between 1941 and 1942. This article provides an exploratory investigation into the varied experiences of the South African soldiers that either evaded capture altogether or escaped from internment in North Africa.
The entry of the Union of South Africa into the First World War, as well as the subsequent invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA), served as a trigger to the Afrikaner Rebellion. In September 1914 the Union Defence Force (UDF) suffered a major reverse at the Battle of Sandfontein. However, in addition to the German threat, South Africa faced a second, more serious internal threat. The socio-economic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly among rural Afrikaners, magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown. The Union’s entry into the war was a step too far for many Nationalist Afrikaners and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the rebellion. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion brought about the first counterinsurgency operation of the UDF within the borders of South Africa. By harnessing its operational and tactical mobility, and operating from the central position and along internal lines of communication, the UDF swiftly dealt with the rebel revolt. This article evaluates the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF in suppressing the Afrikaner Rebellion.
KEYWORDS: South Africa, First World War, Union Defence Force, Afrikaner Rebellion, insurgency, counterinsurgency
This chapter has three specific aims. First, to investigate the reasons behind the establishment of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ in 1975, by providing a brief historical background to the South African counterinsurgency campaign in northern SWA. Second, to explain the nature, extent and the development of this youth movement between 1975 and 1985, with a specific focus on the role that the Institute for African Studies at the PU for CHE played in the formative years of the movement. Last, the chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of this youth movement, as a counterinsurgency tool, within the framework of the South African counterinsurgency strategy deployed in northern SWA during the so-called ‘Border War’. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, from both governmental and private institutions, as well as private and official correspondence, along with a host of secondary sources, the background, nature and development of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ are elucidated. In doing so, the chapter uncovers an aspect of the South African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA which has received little or no scholarly attention to date.
South African operations in the south of Abyssinia during 1941.
The all-encompassing nature and extent of the maritime war waged off southern Africa during the Second World War have been far more extensive than suggested in traditional sources. A key understanding of the maritime war is, in effect, incomplete without separate detailed discussions about the opposing Axis and Allied maritime strategies off the coast of southern Africa, the wartime shipping quandaries experienced by the Union of South Africa, and the South African coastal defences. The Axis maritime operations in southern African waters, the so-called maritime intelligence war, and the extended anti-submarine war waged in these waters are equally integral to the discussion.
This dissertation aims to provide a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the coast of southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. The study investigates this inclusive topic through the aforementioned research objectives. The study does not fall into the general ambit of a regimental, campaign or personal military history. Instead, it straddles the strata of war and offers fresh insights into an episode of the South African military history uncommonly investigated by contemporary military historians.
The dissertation finds that the Axis and Allied maritime operations off the southern African coast were complex in nature, especially regarding the several strategic, military and economic aspects that have always underpinned them. Moreover, in gaining an understanding of these complex operations, the study reveals the general interrelatedness between the rival Axis and Allied maritime strategies and operations around the southern African coast. Previous studies have failed to recognise this interrelatedness, and have instead offered a one-sided, compartmentalised discussion on single aspects associated with the maritime war waged off southern Africa. This study thus distances itself from previous academic and popular historiography on the subject. It offers, rather, a fresh, in-depth discussion underpinned by extensive archival research, access to previously classified material, and a wealth of secondary sources.
troops were made prisoners of war (pow) by the Axis forces in the Western Desert. These troops were first interned in pow transit camps in North Africa, before being shipped to more permanent camps in Italy and later Germany. A large number of the South African captives decided to accept their newfound fates and make their internment as ‘pleasant’ as possible. However, a small nucleus of South African servicemen either tried to evade capture altogether, or, when captured, actively tried to escape. The first large scale attempts of escape and evasion by South African servicemen therefore occurred in North Africa between 1941 and 1942. This article provides an exploratory investigation into the varied experiences of the South African soldiers that either evaded capture altogether or escaped from internment in North Africa.
The entry of the Union of South Africa into the First World War, as well as the subsequent invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA), served as a trigger to the Afrikaner Rebellion. In September 1914 the Union Defence Force (UDF) suffered a major reverse at the Battle of Sandfontein. However, in addition to the German threat, South Africa faced a second, more serious internal threat. The socio-economic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly among rural Afrikaners, magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown. The Union’s entry into the war was a step too far for many Nationalist Afrikaners and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the rebellion. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion brought about the first counterinsurgency operation of the UDF within the borders of South Africa. By harnessing its operational and tactical mobility, and operating from the central position and along internal lines of communication, the UDF swiftly dealt with the rebel revolt. This article evaluates the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF in suppressing the Afrikaner Rebellion.
KEYWORDS: South Africa, First World War, Union Defence Force, Afrikaner Rebellion, insurgency, counterinsurgency
This chapter has three specific aims. First, to investigate the reasons behind the establishment of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ in 1975, by providing a brief historical background to the South African counterinsurgency campaign in northern SWA. Second, to explain the nature, extent and the development of this youth movement between 1975 and 1985, with a specific focus on the role that the Institute for African Studies at the PU for CHE played in the formative years of the movement. Last, the chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of this youth movement, as a counterinsurgency tool, within the framework of the South African counterinsurgency strategy deployed in northern SWA during the so-called ‘Border War’. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, from both governmental and private institutions, as well as private and official correspondence, along with a host of secondary sources, the background, nature and development of the ‘Kavango Jeugbeweging’ are elucidated. In doing so, the chapter uncovers an aspect of the South African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA which has received little or no scholarly attention to date.
South African operations in the south of Abyssinia during 1941.
Keywords:
Union Defence Force; Italy; 6th South African Armoured Division; 11th South African Armoured Brigade; First battles; Celleno
This paper aims to use the personal narrative provided by Walter Meyer to the Union War Histories Section, on his experiences aboard U-68 during Operation Eisbär, as a lens through which to investigate the personal experiences, and social composition, of German submariners in the Southern Oceans during the war.
U-boat offensives.
(1917-1920). This paper will use Collyer’s career as a lens through which to view the military and organisational development of the UDF during its formative years.
weight, South African soldiers have become known for their tenacity,
dash and ability to defy the odds. Their unique directive command
style has also helped them to excel in defining battles and operations,
from the campaign in German South West Africa in 1915 to the crossborder operations in Angola during the Border War.
In 20 Battles, military historians Evert Kleynhans and David Brock
Katz investigate the evolution of South Africa’s armed forces over a
century from 1913 to 2013. They track the evolution of the doctrine
and structure of the defence force, uncovering historical continuity
and the lessons learned from past battles and operations.
What is clear is that when South African soldiers have the freedom
to operate according to their manoeuvre doctrine, as they had in
East Africa in 1916 and southern Ethiopia in 1941, they can achieve
stunning results. But when hemmed in by rigid doctrine and a topdown command style, as at Delville Wood in 1916 and Tobruk in 1942,
the results can be tragic.
20 Battles combines both battlefield drama and crisp analysis
and in the process provides a much-needed perspective
on the South African way of war