Antonio Garcia

Since the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had been deployed to suppress a number of internal disturbances. These unrests varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised parts of the population, both in the Union and South West Africa (now Namibia). The uprisings in turn tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force. The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, although brave and tragic, provides a lens through which to investigate the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operation conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War. These operations occurred only months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Strike on the Witwatersrand. The reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern South West Africa. The consequences of this brief and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences. This article investigates the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.

This dissertation studies the First World War South African campaign in German South West Africa from 1914 until 1915. The campaign was characterised by the high mobility of the Union’s mounted soldiers which enabled swift advances and rapid envelopments. The German forces applied a defensive strategy relying on the lack of water and remoteness of the terrain to deter and prolong the Union’s invasion. The German force also relied on internal lines of communication to concentrate its forces on the Union’s advancing columns. The Union Defence Forces’s numbered approximately 50 000 compared to the German force of about 7 000. The campaign culminated on 9 July 1915 with the surrender of almost the entire German fighting force intact. This study analyses whether the victory can be attributed to the Union Defence Forces’s numerical superiority or the operational strategy and tactics which were applied during the campaign. It is argued that this operational strategy is congruent with the m...

The decision to strategically mandate offensive operations in the post-cold war peacekeeping era, is for the most part unchartered territory and will require forward thinking and some amount of trial and error.
This article is a continuation of the research published in my previous paper, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: Theory and Doctrine’. Where theory provides a construct for the
conduct of operations, doctrine should guide the execution of operations without being overly prescriptive (US, 2014: 70). Doctrine provides the ‘how to’ in the conduct of operations where concepts look to the
future of peacekeeping offensive operations.

During the Great War, aircraft were used primarily for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. The Union of South Africa's First World War campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA) allowed for South Africa's first employment of military aeroplanes in conventional warfare. The creation and employment of the South African Aviation Corps (SAAC) within the Union Defence Force (UDF) provided ground forces with a substantial force multiplier in terms of forward reconnaissance. The aerial reconnaissance allowed General Louis Botha and his subordinate commanders to gain a better understanding of the tactical picture and facilitated the battle concept. This paper discusses the role and impact of aerial operations during the GSWA campaign. The campaign was characterised by sweeping envelopments which were executed by the Union's commandos. During the latter part of the campaign aeroplanes provided the UDF with intelligence in terms of the location and concentration of German forces, which assisted in their final encirclement. Opsomming Gedurende die Eerste Wêreldoorlog was vliegtuie hoofsaaklik gebruik vir verkenningsdoeleindes, en om vuurleiding te gee vir artillerie. Die eerste keer wat die Unie van Suid-Afrika militêre vliegtuie aangewend het in ʼn konvensionele rol, was tydens die veldtog in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (DSWA). Die stigting en operasionele aanwending van die Suid-Afrikaanse Vliegkorps, as deel van die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM), het die magstruktuur en aanwending van die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe ter velde positief beïnvloed, veral in terme van die vergroting van die operasionele verkenningsektor. Sodoende het Generaal Louis Botha en sy stafoffisiere ʼn beter

This essay explores the themes of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping offensive operations and Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). As the character of conflict changes, there is an increased international focus on IEDs. The traditional threat of ERW has been further complicated by the preponderance of IEDs in war-affected countries. The UN is thus adapting its conventional approach in dealing with mines and UXOs to the complexities of asymmetric warfare where IEDs have increasingly become the weapon of choice for non-state actors.

The study reported in this article explored the nexus between military theory and history. Military theory attempts to quantify, qualify and illuminate the often unpredictable phenomenon of war. The article consists of two parts: the theory of manoeuvre warfare and the history of the 1914-1915 South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA). The GSWA campaign has been described in many ways as a secondary theatre within the greater geostrategic chess game of the First World War. The objective of this analysis was to question whether the South African victory resulted from vast numerical superiority or from the operational concepts, which the South Africans applied in the execution of the campaign.

The ability to negotiate various types of terrain is essential for army landward based operations. During offensive ground operations the commander and staff has to determine which routes to take as part of the advance and attack. While the commanders at the respective levels consider the strategic, operational and tactical situation the engineer officer has to determine the trafficability/negotiability of the terrain throughout the theatre of operations. This terrain negotiability data is presented to the commander who then uses it as one of the bases for developing her operational plans. The process of determining terrain negotiability within the SA Army is principally done by the commander and staff and this process involves the manual and often haphazard calculation of trafficable areas on overlays which are superimposed on hardcopy maps. There is a growing need and opportunity for GIS based negotiability mapping. The aim of this paper is to suggest a GIS based terrain negotiability model for the South African Army.

This chapter presents a philosophical and conceptual model to determine the South African Army’s approach to future operations and war. In the pursuit of understanding the SA Army deployment strategy, ‘how do we fight’, this chapter puts forward a conceptual model comprising two constructs, an SA Army Capstone Concept (SAACC) and an SA Army Future Operating Concept (SAAFOC).  This conceptual model considers the security trends present in the current strategic moment.

The process of determining terrain negotiability within the South African Army (SA Army) is principally done by the commander and staff and this process involves the manual and often haphazard calculation of trafficable areas on overlays which are superimposed on hardcopy maps. With the advent of ever-increasing technological sophistication there is a growing need and opportunity for GIS-based negotiability mapping.1 The aim of this chapter is to propose a GIS-based terrain negotiability model for the South African Army.

This book is a work of military theory. It aims to address current and future conceptual questions about conflict and force employment for the South African (SA) military and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in those instances where it takes an offensive role. The United Nations has for the first-time mandated offensive peacekeeping operations. This comes at a time when Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are increasingly exposed to complex and challenging security contexts.
This work provides an analysis of South Africa’s approach to missions and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). It proposes a conceptual model for force generation and force employment. MONUSCO is currently the only UN offensively mandated peacekeeping operation. The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) is the sharp tactical component of MONUSCO tasked with the neutralising of armed groups. South Africa is a TCC, and thus holds a key strategic role in achieving the mission’s objectives.

This book is a work of military theory. It aims to address current and future conceptual questions about conflict and force employment for the South African (SA) military and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in those instances where it takes an offensive role. The United Nations has for the first time mandated offensive peacekeeping operations. This comes at a time when Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are increasingly exposed to complex and challenging security contexts.

The First World War moulded the global landscape and had a lasting effect on much of the world. Where the majority of international research focusses on the European theatre, Antonio Garcia explores one of the peripheral campaigns of the Great War. South Africa’s First World War campaign in German South West Africa was a daring military undertaking epitomised by manoeuvre and rapidity.

Antonio takes a novel approach in comparing the campaign to manoeuvre warfare theory. Manoeuvre theory is based on the principles of mobility, rapidity and surprise which attempts to achieve victory with the least loss of resources and in the shortest time possible. In order to achieve a rapid victory against the German forces, the South African soldiers were pushed to the limits of exhaustion to achieve the Union of South Africa’s strategic objectives.

The campaign in the deserts of German South Africa became the setting for adventure and war, where Briton, Boer and People of Colour served together as a Dominion of the British Empire. Blacks, Coloureds and Indians fought for the hopes of better political franchise, an ambition which was not to be achieved until 80 years later. The book addresses the complex political dynamics in South Africa at the time of the Great War, the deep division between Afrikaners and British South Africans and the Afrikaner Rebellion. 

With the backdrop of political difficulties and a lack of overwhelming support for the entry into the Great War, the Botha government needed a quick result so as to maintain the delicate balance of power. Antonio provides an analysis on the campaign through the lens of military theory so as to determine how the swift victory was achieved. The book answers the question of whether the campaign was won through numerical superiority or through the use of a superior operational strategy. The victory was the first campaign victory led by a British Dominion.

Louis Botha (1862-1919) is a towering figure on the South African historical landscape. Raised as a farmer in Natal and the Free State, he rose to prominence through a combination of military service and government office and became successively the premier Boer combat general and later a British lieutenant general, premier of the Transvaal Colony, and then the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa. Botha’s influence on South Africa, and the wider British Empire, is recorded in the five existing biographies. While these works explain aspects of his life, they do not provide a comprehensive academic study.

This dissertation bridges this gap by providing a critical examination of the political and military career of Louis Botha, in a full-length portrait. It is, at the same time, a reappraisal, providing a fresh look at the man who helped shape modern South Africa. It offers new insights into his life and highlights both the positive and the negative aspects of his dealings. The man lionised for his military prowess, political nous, and governing competence, was at the same time badly flawed, wavering at times, and making crucial errors, side-lining whole sectors of South African society and sacrificing people of colour on the altar of ‘white’ unity.  Botha was very human, imperfect, inconsiderate, and insecure, but he was also charming, attractive, emotionally intelligent, and confident. Botha was thus a complex man, general, administrator, politician, visionary leader, patriarch and racist who lived by the norms of his time, while moulding the agenda for a modernising South Africa.