Comparative Military Systems

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”.

Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia.

Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems.

Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine.

Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear.

The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”.

Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army.

Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.

Bousquet’s landmark book examines the impact of key technologies and scientific ideas on the theory and practice of warfare and the handling of the perennial tension between order and chaos on the battlefield. Spanning the entire modern era, from the Scientific Revolution to the present, it offers a systematic account of modern warfare as the constitution of increasingly complex assemblages of bodies and machines whose integration rests upon a military assimilation of scientific thought.

Reflecting the pervasive influence of scientific conceptual frameworks upon warfare, modern armies have been successively organised by reference to the paradigmatic technologies of the clock, engine, computer, and network. Conversely, major scientific developments and technological breakthroughs have become intertwined with the experience of war, especially since the Second World War’s unprecedented mobilisation of scientific rationality and technical expertise. This increasingly tight symbiosis between science, technology, and war is at the heart of both the tremendous powers and enduring pathologies displayed by the contemporary military machine.

In this new and revised edition, Bousquet extends the analysis to encompass the latest developments in the scientific way of warfare in the midst of renewed great power competition and a wave of technological innovation in artificial intelligence and robotics.

Major General Orde Charles Wingate formed his Long-Range Penetration Groups, or 'Chindits' in order to carry out operations against Japanese lines of communication and other vulnerable points behind their lines in occupied Burma in 1942.  These units, as of necessity, worked dispersed, in rough country, with no lines of communication of their own and just a limited number of radios to exercise command and control.  Wingate overcame these deficiencies via resupply by airdrop and by intensive training with the intention of enforcing a common tactical doctrine and procedures for many other important activities, so they could perform to his satisfaction without supervision from above.  He also practised a clear form of 'mission command' tolerating a high level of initiative from his subordinate commanders and allowing them to find their own solutions to any tactical problems they encountered.

Scientific methods and concepts have been exerting a powerful influence on the exercising of armed force since the Scientific Revolution and the dawn of the modern era. In association with the respective technologies of the clock, engine and computer, the scientific theories of mechanism, thermodynamics, and cybernetics have all in turn been recruited to shape distinct approaches to the challenges of imposing order on the chaos of the battlefield. Today, it is on the basis of the new sciences of chaos and complexity that the latest regime of the scientific way of warfare is being erected. Chaoplexic warfare draws on the study of nonlinear phenomena of self-organization to propose a radical decentralization of armed forces through the adoption of the network form. For all its present flaws, network-centric warfare and its operational concepts of self-synchronization and swarming mark an important step on the path to chaoplexic warfare.

* Pay and conditions for Russian servicemen, especially those on contract service, have seen substantial recent improvements.

* Continuing high-profile reporting of rights abuses and violence masks initiatives taken to improve rights and welfare.

* The move to one-year conscript service will disrupt the system of dedovshchina; but it is unlikely to uproot this kind of bullying altogether as it is not a purely military phenomenon in Russia.

* The Russian Armed Forces are not adapting fast enough to the challenges of recruiting professional servicemen.

Народное ополчение (милиция, милиционные силы от лат. militia) должно стать краеугольным камнем системы национальной безопасности новой, подлинной украинской Республики.

Миссия народного ополчения (милиционных сил) состоит в том, чтобы защищать интересы и права граждан, созданных ими общин и, шире, всего общества в чрезвычайных ситуациях, когда структуры централизованного государства в силу каких-то причин не в состоянии эти задачи решать.

Такими обстоятельствами могут быть:
• военные действия, стихийные бедствия и другие чрезвычайные ситуации, когда возможности государственных структур оказываются недостаточными и нуждаются в усилении;
• распад и фактическое исчезновение институтов государства в результате чрезвычайных ситуаций;
• целенаправленные посягательства со стороны государства на права и свободы граждан.

В силу своей природы самодеятельного негосударственного автономного и децентрализованного общественного института народное ополчение обладает максимальной устойчивостью к неблагоприятным обстоятельствам. Его невозможно обезглавить, поскольку у него нет управленческой вертикали. Оно маловосприимчиво к недостатку финансовых и прочих ресурсов в силу добровольного и безвозмездного характера участия в нём.

Народное ополчение — это последний резерв народа Украины, на который он может положиться в ситуации, когда у него не осталось больше союзников и друзей. Народное ополчение это и есть народ Украины, организованный и вооружённый, зримое воплощение его, народа, власти и права решать свою судьбу и судьбы своей страны.

The process of transformation of the Russian military, under way since 2008, is intended to turn the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the atrophied remnant of the Soviet Armed Forces into a usable military tool for the 21st century. This includes radical reform of command and control systems at all levels up to the supreme command.



Previous conclusions on the nature of post-Soviet Russian military command and control systems may therefore no longer be valid. This is significant for Russia's overseas partners who wish to understand the nature of a potential Russian reaction to any challenge which can be interpreted as a military threat.



In particular, understanding of the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff needs to be updated following the dramatic contraction of both bodies and redistribution of their functions.



The emergence of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as an additional body exerting control over the military also needs to be considered, when examining how decisions affecting the Armed Forces are made at the highest level.



Lower down the chain of command, the creation of the new Joint Strategic Commands also bears directly on the nature of decision-making on employment of forces, in ways which appear still debatable even within Russia but which are of critical importance for close neighbours of Russia.



The example of the early stages of armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 could suggest that the Joint Strategic Commands are in part intended to ensure closer control over small units, in order to reduce the potential for independent and uncontrolled activity.



This paper seeks to introduce the new landscape of military decision-making in Russia, in order to raise key questions over the nature of the new command and control systems which are critical for a full understanding of how, when and in what manner Russia's Armed Forces may be used in the future.

Following the 1964 Army Mutinies in East Africa, Tanzania alone among the three nations affected recognized the fundamental opposition between the colonial military structure and the post-colonial African state. Acting upon this consideration, Tanzania proceeded to dismantle its current colonial holdover armed forces and instead build a new, nationally representative, non-aligned military that could be integrated effectively into the post-colonial state. This military became the Tanzanian Peoples’ Defense Force and its construction remains unique among the African states. This dissertation contends that the TPDF and its innovative construction served as not only a stable and effective military exercise, but also as a nation building exercise, and that the lessons gleaned from its history may be used to combat both the praetorian militaries and weak national identities that continue to afflict Africa.

The period 1940-41 saw British forces in North and East Africa, and the Middle East, defeat considerably larger Italian and Vichy French forces in the Western Desert, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Syria. A key factor in this was the use at the operational and tactical level of fast-moving mobile forces, operating dispersed and with considerable initiative devolved upon junior commanders. This has been put down to a range of influences - Liddell Hart, Percy Hobart, Eric Dorman-Smith, etc, but this paper demonstrates its origins in the 'small wars' practices of the inter-war years, upon which a major influence was Major General Callwell's much-cited, but not often read tome, 'Small Wars'.

Resumen

El presente artículo propone una revisión de los Planes de Defensa Nacional de México, centralizándonos en el Plan DN-III-E que se enfoca a la atención de la población civil afectada por fenómenos naturales y provocados por el hombre en el marco de las cinco misiones generales del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexica-nos. Este Plan considera el despliegue militar desde el nivel local hasta el nacio-nal como respuesta a las emergencias masivas que puede sufrir la población en coordinación con las autoridades civiles de protección civil.

Palabras clave: Defensa Nacional, Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas, Ejército Mexi-cano, Relaciones Civil-militares, protección civil.

Abstract

This is an analisis about the expansion of the military´s rol as guarantor of na-tional security by means of the national defense plan three (DN-III-E), ap-proached in the civil population assistance in emergency caused by natural phe-nomenon.

Key words: National Defense, Mexico´s Military, Mexican Armed Forces, Civil-military relations, population assistance.

* Western views of the Russian Armed Forces traditionally hold that Russian military pay is disastrously inadequate.

* But headline figures for Russian military pay scales bear little relation to what servicemen actually earn.

* This is because pay for all servicemen is made up of two parallel basic components, plus a large number of allowances, extras, and increments.

* It is therefore almost always misleading to generalise about Russian military pay.

To understand the problems involved in adapting to war, one must first come to grips with the complexities, ambiguities, and nature of war itself. This paper aims at theorizing multi-dimensionality of modern warfare antecedent’s non-state actors and state actor illuminated by Russia military capability to disrupt and deter Western activities and Eastern Europe infrastructure leveraged by the network grid of modern infrastructure as decisive point of victory. A framework for hybrid warfare (adaptive construct at war and peace time) set out a view of the character of conflict, depicts how military doctrine has to change because of constrains and influence by globalization, technology and encapsulated by national interest in the battle space today. The framework components are (values/national interest, warfare ecosystem. human capital, infrastructure, scenario and stakeholders) depicting war strategy (ends/ways/means) recognizing the limits of military expertise for collaboration;  where, environmental degradation and food security are decisive point of victory  that engage the most effective use of civilian buy-in during war campaign. The consequence of the ability of armed forces and war ecosystem to learn, adapt with distributed leadership capability and foresight to thrive on chaos because ‘hybrid warfare’ accentuate ‘anticipation war doctrine’, war or peace is not declared, but in the continuum that examines the ‘military capability’ of every nation including the ‘extra-terrestrial’ like US Space Force, sixth military branch by 2020. Methodology thrives on change and evolution like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have shown that irregular warfare breaks from traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should each contribute to the overall effort of modern warfare (multi-modality, simultaneity, fusion, and catastrophic).

Keywords: Anticipation war doctrine,  Framework,  Hybrid warfare, Centre of gravity, Strategy, Space military, Internet of Things,  Innovative thinking , Methodology, War or peace  and  Information-dominant

The aim of the article is to present, analyze and understand the way in which cultural knowledge and the development of cross cultural competence contribute to the participants’ training for taking part into multinational joint missions, and also for the increase of their operational efficiency in order to accomplish the given tasks and, implicitly, of the planned objectives.
The article takes into consideration the training methods, stressing the need to understand the strategies and the principles of action, of the way in which cross-cultural competence is developed and checked, in direct connection with the risks and the situational awareness from the theater of operations from Afghanistan and also with a direct relationship, on one hand, among the participating actors and, on the other hand, the relationship between them and the local population.

Keywords: cross-cultural competence,
multiculturality, interrelationship, interoperability, Resolute Support Mission, cultural understanding.

IS BEYOND WHAT ANYBODY HAS ENVISIONED – SHALL WE START? 
LIKE THE ABILITY TO RENDER A COUNTRY INVULNERABLE TO GUNS, JETS AND MISSILES.  REDUCE ARMIES TO STICKS AND SWORDS. 
https://www.academia.edu/63683096/THE_BEST_WAY_TO_START_A_BUBBLE_PROJECT_DEC_21

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate’s own official writings on this subject reveals that long range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situation regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins’ doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

The article (or rather three articles) analyses the East Roman cavalry warfare from 410 until 641 and is based on a visiting lecture held at the University of Ottawa in 2010.  It provides an overview of the East Roman cavalry organization, recruitment, training, strategy, enemies and tactics.

In 2008, Russia halved the term of conscription into the armed forces from two years to one, while attempting to retain the overall size of the forces.

This 2006 CSRC paper noted that this plan implied doubling the number of conscripts drafted each year, but that demographic change in Russia meant there would not be enough healthy 18-year-olds to do this. A number of grounds for deferral of conscription were to be abolished, but this would still not provide anything like enough conscripts. Recruitment and retention on contract service appeared insufficient to fill the gap. Furthermore, the timing of the change-over to one-year conscription threatened major disruption and upheaval in the armed forces.

Appraisals of Russian military performance during the armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008 noted, among other deficiencies, poor performance in Information Warfare (IW). This led to calls in informed commentary for the creation of dedicated “Information Troops” within the Russian armed forces, whose  duties would include what we would define as cyber operations. This stemmed from a perception in parts of the Russian Armed Forces that the "information war" against Georgia had been lost.

No such entity has appeared in the Russian order of battle, but the public discussion and military comment is informative. Prospects for the appearance of “Information Troops” have been discounted both officially by the FSB and privately by Russian
military officers. Arguments put forward against a unit of this kind include the unsuitability of servicemen for advanced cyber operations, and the ready availability and deniability of talented civilian volunteers. But at the same time Russia’s EW troops are seeing their role and profile evolve in a manner which suggests they may be acquiring at least some IW capability.

The Russian approach to IW differs from our own, and there are  specific perceived internet vulnerabilities which further affect the Russian approach to cyber operations, and prompt Russian pushes for treaty arrangements governing cyberspace.

This paper draws on unclassified open-source media and interviews with serving Russian military officers to consider the Russian military view of cyber operations as a subset of information war, and the prospects for creation of “information troops” (whether given this name or not) in the context of ongoing Russian military transformation. Informal links with volunteer and co-opted cyber forces are also considered.

This article discusses and analyzes the structure and deployment of the coastal defense in South Zhili, including the detailed arrangements. It involves the deployment of points and surfaces of various prefectures and counties, guards and battalions, and garrisons, and lists the deployment of coastal defense and the scope of tasks related to the various defending sites around. The first section points out that the large defense structure was divided into riverine and coastal defense. The second section discusses specific defensive deployments. Based on the three routes of conventional maritime invasion by relying on wind direction and tide, the defenses of various riverine and coastal areas were also arranged accordingly, which were broadly divided into two major defense zones in the southern and northern Yangtze River. The core defending deployment part was made up of eleven guards and fifteen battalions. By reviewing the complex and intricate deployment of the coastal defense, we can see that starting from the marine invasions and harassments of the pirates during the Jiajing reign (1522-1566), under the urgent requirement of preserving the capital and the financial resources, the Ming state responded to the challenges rapidly by adjusting the deployment. A more rigorous system of coastal defense was further established along with the process of the unrest. By reviewing the transition of geographical pattern and deployment of the coastal defense, we can also find that the central and major defense forces were landed in the system of Garrisons Troops after the Jiajing reign, the system of Guard and Battalion was weakened and partially replaced. The role played by the system of Garrisons Troops in riverine and coastal defense in South Zhili has become increasingly evident: Chongming Assistant Regional Commander (Canjiang) was changed to Jinshan Assistant Regional Commander. Langshan Sub-Regional Commander (Fuzongbing) was stationed to manage officials in Tongzhou and Zhoujiaqiao along the waterways. In 1534, Squad Leader (Bazong) was added to guard many places. A more rational structure and deployment of the South Zhili coastal defense system was gradually formed during and after these challenges.


Key Words: South Zhili; Coastal Defense; Garrisons Troops; Guards and Battalions; Prefectures and Counties

The battle of Thermopylae was one of the most heroic battles ever fought in history, it was fought between an alliance of Greek city states and the persian empire in August or September 480 BC, it took place simultaneously with the naval battle at Artemisium at the narrow coastal pass of Thermopylae. It is known to be one of the greatest last stands in history.
This paper intends to analyse few of the many factors associated with the battle, one of them being the general strategy used by the defending Greek forces and the reasons for their defeat , the second being the role of the simultaneous Greek naval action and would the geography of the region could have provided advantage to the defending forces.

Se analiza cómo la guerra y la paz modificaron las fuerzas defensivas de las Canarias entre 1769-1799. También se estudian las principales fuerzas defensivas de las islas: las tropas regulares situadas en ellas, las fuerzas que iban de refuerzo, las milicias provinciales y el paisanaje.

DISCIPLINA: CONSTITUCIONALISMO GLOBAL, PROCESSOS CONSTITUCIONAIS E MUDANÇAS EM TEMPOS DE CRISE DO ESTADO DE DIREITO


“A DEMOCRACIA FRENTE À MILITARIZAÇÃO DA POLÍTICA”


Linha de Pesquisa 1.1 Jurisdição e Processos Constitucionais

Profª Drª CARINA BARBOSA GOUVÊA
Prof Convidado: PEDRO H. VILLAS BÔAS CASTELO BRANCO (IESP/UERJ)

Calendário 2020.1

Carga Horária: 60 h/a - 04 créditos

Início: A data de início será divulgada posteriormente. Todas as sessões serão realizadas as terças-feiras, das 10:00hs às 13:00hs


“A política comparada demostra que vivenciamos o declínio da democracia no contexto de crise dos sistemas democráticos com a desdiferenciação de papéis entre as instâncias estatais, que possa ser compreendida com o papel de equilíbrio entre a relação civil-militar.
A disciplina pretende estimular o debate crítico, utilizando-se dos contextos envolvendo o uso do “populismo” e da “militarização da política”, o que pode vir a acarretar retrocessos das garantias incrementais dos sistemas democráticos afetando diretamente as  garantias de direitos. São de relevância conjuntural, marcados pelas singularidades decorrentes dos respectivos desenhos institucionais, conjunturas políticas, com consequências diretas no plano de desenvolvimento.
O populismo identifica um fenômeno que é caracterizado pelo uso de mecanismos de mudança constitucional que pode caminhar no sentido inverso dos princípios democráticos e corroer a própria ordem democrática que são concebidos por meio do “véu da democracia” e,  deste contexto, pode vir a nascer a “militarização da política”.

Portanto, quando examinadas tais mudanças na perspectiva da política comparada, estas podem se revelar parte do processo progressivo da erosão democrática. Assim, a “militarização da política” constitui-se num indicador pelo qual se poderia avaliar o equilíbrio da relação civil-militar, intrínseco às democracias ocidentais.

A militarização da democracia, da política, da sociedade, será analisada minunciosamente visando estabelecer distinções com intuito de verificar a possibilidade de alçar esta concepção a um conceito capaz de servir de ferramenta teórica voltada à compreensão da inflexão na natureza e funções exercidas pelas Forças Armadas.

Para tanto, serão estabelecidas distinções como militarização e militarismo com objetivo de mapear a extensão semântica de ambos os termos, procurando-se, assim, identificar as teorias e os sentidos que formam o ethos militar.  Desta maneira, seria possível perscrutar o sentido do papel político que motiva a ação de militares no âmbito governamental e especular em que medida há uma ação representativa relacionada a uma ideologia militarista.

Embora a participação de militares na política não seja novidade na história do Brasil, seu recente retorno à política, após mais de 30 anos de redemocrattização, suscita a necessidade de compreender o que significa uma instituição estatal voltada à defesa da pátria, dos poderes constitucionais, da lei e da ordem, reassumir um papel político e quais seriam as implicações da politização de militares em um regime democrático

Cabe, portanto, promover a reflexão sobre se seria exercido um papel moderador pelos militares, um papel de garantia dos poderes constitucionais e qual seria a relação/consequência que o emprego das Forças Armadas, com suas expertises, em operações de garantia da lei e da ordem, teria em relação à  política.

Além disso, torna-se necessário fazer uma análise a respeito da natureza e funções atribuídas às Forças Armadas nas Constituições brasileiras e estrangeiras.

Por fim, intenta-se reunir  teórico-conceituais e um aporte histórico a fim de que sejam propostos mecanismos constitucionais que venham a criar condições de despolitização e/ou que evitem a politização das Forças Armadas permitindo, assim, que se dediquem, sobretudo, à sua finalidade precípua de defesa da pátria.     
A disciplina propõe a discussão destas dimensões políticas no sistema comparado e interno, a partir das tradições e clivagens formadas no contexto plural dos sistemas democráticos, tendo como foco a investigação em: populismo e suas relações com o desenvolvimento e erosão  no sistema democrático; militarização da política e sua repercussão na relação civil-militar democrática; superposições e desdiferenciações entre as funções estatais; mecanismos de contenção nas constituições para impedir rupturas destrutivas da identidade constitucional; instrumentos de despolitização e/ou que evitem a politização) das Forças Armadas.

Ao final da disciplina os alunos deverão estar aptos para analisar criticamente as seguintes hipóteses:

- Qual a natureza e funções atribuídas às Forças Armadas nas Constituições brasileiras e estrangeiras?
- Quais os desafios a politização das Forças Armadas e a militarização da política representariam para o direito constitucional e para as instituições democráticas?
- Poderia se atribuir um papel de poder moderador às Forças Armadas? E qual seria a relação/consequência que o emprego das Forças Armadas, com suas expertises, em operações de garantia da lei e da ordem, teria em relação à  política?
- As insuficiências e deficiências no texto constitucional criariam condições para a militarização da política? Quais mecanismos constitucionais poderiam ser adotados para desmilitarizar a política e despolitizar e/ou evitar a politização das Forças Armadas?
- O emprego recorrente das Forças Armadas no plano interno da nação revelaria uma distorção no uso do último recurso da soberania estatal? 
- A participação dos militares na política contemporânea brasileira derivaria do desgaste das instituições e da “criminalização da política” entendia estar reduzida à corrupção, à cleptocracia?
- A teoria da profissionalização, que concebia os militares como instrumento da política e não protagonistas da política, teria esmorecido? 
- Movimentos populistas e líderes populistas apresentariam inclinações militaristas? Isso estaria ocorrendo no Brasil?
- O direito constitucional seria uma ferramenta capaz de fazer frente a um processo de militarização da política?

Dans cette étude prosopographique, je me propose de présenter un certain nombre de personnalités françaises ayant contribué au débat sur la motorisation et la mécanisation des armées. Leur action a connu parfois un rayonnement à l'échelle européenne. Dans le sillage des pionniers de la Grande Guerre, une pléiade d'officiers s'efforce de penser l'adaptation de l'outil militaire - personnels et armements - issu de la période de conflagration, dont aucune institution ne sort inchangée. En exploitant les dossiers individuels des officiers conservés au SHD Vincennes, je m'efforcerai de mettre en parallèle articles publiés dans des revues et appréciations de la hiérarchie, croisant littérature ouverte et archives. Dans les parcours de chacun de ces hommes, il sera peut-être possible d'estimer le moment d'entrée en contact avec cet engin alors contesté qu'est le char de combat. L'état-major prend le parti de le considérer comme une arme supplémentaire, subordonnée à l'infanterie, compatible avec les habitudes tactiques éprouvées. L'héritage du vainqueur de Verdun, incarné par le maréchal Pétain, a dans une certaine mesure tendance à freiner les innovations, du fait du vieillissement de cadres inamovibles, et du corsettement réglementaire auquel doit se plier tout officier qui souhaite publier sur les événements de la guerre mondiale. Cependant, des généraux relativement âgés mais clairvoyants, comme Buat et Maitrot, pressentent les nouvelles formes de combat induites par l'utilisation de machines sur le champ de bataille, alors que d'autres plus jeunes demeurent hermétiques aux courants novateurs, souvent associés à l'excentricité insulaire des Britanniques. J'essaierai de restituer la dynamique d'émergence et de diffusion des idées à travers les strates générationnelles. Peu de partisans de la modernisation prennent place parmi les rédacteurs des deux grands textes doctrinaux qui balisent la période étudiée, l'Instruction provisoire sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités de 1921 et l'Instruction sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités de 1936. Si comme l'assure la Revue Militaire française dans l'immédiat après-guerre,  les militaires français sont les plus qualifiés pour assumer la direction intellectuelle des diverses armées du monde, cette volonté se heurte à la réalité du terrain, européen ou colonial (la conflit du Rif, où les Français se trouvent malmenés par des adversaires d'un niveau de développement très inférieur en ce qui concerne l'art de la guerre), et surtout au manque de renouvellement conceptuel  et matériel. Cette étude sera l'occasion d'évoquer les servitudes et grandeurs du métier d'officier à une époque dominée par la rigueur budgétaire et une dévalorisation de l'armée. Ce sera l'occasion de mettre en valeur une galaxie de noms un peu oubliés du grand public qui ne retient que la figure de De Gaulle comme promoteur du char, allant à l'encontre d'une hiérarchie réputée sclérosée. Il s'agit de restituer la situation de l'époque dans toute sa complexité institutionnelle, technique et naturellement humaine.

Studies currently show the Northern Sea Route (NSR) will be navigable year-round by 2030. Shipping traffic has risen steadily for the past decade, and projections show that trillions of USD in goods will flow through this passage in the not too distant future. Russia, China, and the United States all have considerable interest in the Arctic, and the expansion of the Norther Sea Route provides either a nexus for cooperation, or a flashpoint for conflict. This report updates U.S. understanding of Arctic expansion, the central importance of Alaska and the Aleutians, and the critical role of infrastructure in great power competition as viewed through the lens of Civil Affairs experts. Onsite assessments were conducted by functional specialists attached to the 351 Civil Affairs Command at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Individual Readiness Training (IRT) program. The assessments where researched, collated, and presented by the 351 Civil Information Management Cell (CIM). The quality of the information provided was such that the U.S. Department of Defense recognized the 351 Civil Affairs Command with the IRT mission of the year award.

Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out of proportion with their size and that if conducted by conventional units may have disproportionate negative impact on policy.  The aim of Special Forces is to deliver high precision at lower risk and cost than might otherwise be possible.
The very need for Special Forces has been questioned.  The author has been told at various times that Special Forces leech away the best people from the rest of an army, that there is nothing they do in general war that a well-trained infantry unit cannot do, that their role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism would be performed better by armed police, and that they survive and prosper thanks to the ‘elite force’ image they project, yet which has been their undoing more than once thanks to the hubris it can generate.  The paper is an unapologetic rebuttal of those arguments and a case for Special Forces being a vital strategic asset performing functions others cannot.

Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another (in this case, artificial) agency.

Zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen hatten Deutschland und Litauen eine gemeinsame Grenze und territoriale Ansprüche, die die Gefahr eines militärischen Konflikts nicht ausschlossen. Politische Spannungen hat es zwischen Litauen und Deutschland viele gegeben, permanent schwirrten Gerüchte über einen möglichen Aufstand der deutschen Memelländer und die Gefahr eines Anschlusses des Memelgebietes an Deutschland. Als Polen am 17.-19. März 1938 Litauen ein Ultimatum zur Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen stellte, befürchtete die 2. Stabsabteilung der litauischen Streitkräfte, dass während eines polnischen Angriffs auch Deutschland seine Wünsche zu Ungunsten
Litauens verändern könnte. Laut dem Plan der Wehrmacht "Flottenparade“ sollten an einem Angriff etwa 15 verschiedene Kriegsschiffe teilnehmen, wobei schon am 18. März 1938 Einheiten der Wehrmacht die Bereitstellungszonen in Ostpreußen beziehen sollten. Am 20. März 1939 verlangte Deutschland die Rückgabe des Memelgebiets und am 23. März besetzte Deutschland es. Am 25. September 1939 wurde in Berlin das Projekt eines "Sicherheitsabkommens“ mit Litauen vorbereitet, auf dessen Grundlage Litauen faktisch zu einem Protektorat Deutschlands geworden wäre, während Hitler am selben Tag die Anordnung Nr. 4 unterschrieb, nach der in Ostpreußen genügend Streitkräfte in Bereitschaft gehalten werden sollten, um Litauen im Falle eines bewaffneten Widerstands sofort zu besetzen.

An Aggregation of Lion Hunters:
The Boer Way of War in the Second Anglo-Boer War.

Few expected the inconsequential Boer Republics to survive let alone to overwhelm the might of the British Empire when war broke out on the 11 October 1899. It started well enough for the Boers who enjoying a significant numerical advantage and fielding 33 000 highly mobile mounted infantry faced a British frontline strength of 13 000 soldiers. Jan Smuts, President Kruger’s right-hand-man and one of the few Boer leaders with an inspired grasp of strategy, devised a bold war-winning plan. Boer forces would seize the slight window of opportunity and taking advantage of British unpreparedness, and their significant numerical advantage would conduct a lightning campaign.  Smuts boldly proposed the invasion of Natal coupled with a daring strike to grab the Port of Durban. Occupying Natal would cut the British railway to Rhodesia and place the entire empire in jeopardy. Boer audaciousness was sure to attract the attention of foreign powers and rouse inert Cape Afrikaners looking for an opportunity to pounce on a weakened British Empire. It was masterful if perhaps somewhat fanciful, but it offered the Boers a glimmer of hope to defeat the enemy.

The friction of inept Boer generalship whittled away Smuts’s daring plan. Generals Joubert and Cronje were satisfied to lay siege to Mafeking, Kimberly and Ladysmith and repeat the same strategy of the First Anglo-Boer War. The strategic offensive coupled with the tactical defence yielded magnificent victories in the First Anglo-Boer War. Now the momentum was lost through uninspired strategy and lacklustre leadership. The much hoped-for Cape Afrikaner rising evaporated as the British grew stronger by the day.  Transports landed thousands of troops and supplies in Durban and Cape Town and swiftly redressed the numerical imbalance. Initial and brilliant Boer successes on the tactical level were not fundamental enough to swing a strategic victory, and the chance of winning the conventional war lay in tatters.

This paper examines Boer military doctrine at the three levels of war and explores why superior mobility and exceptional tactical abilities ultimately failed to deliver a strategic victory.

Warfare is an important and common subject in discussions on mercantilism. However, the idea of a mercantilist (type of) warfare rarely appears in the specialized literature. This article begins with a historiographical review of the uses of mercantilist warfare. It identifies mercantilist warfare has been used mostly as a name and not as a proper concept for social scientists. In the final section, I make the case for the usefulness of mercantilist warfare as a concept by providing an explicit definition and identifying four historical periods that highlight how mercantilist warfare changed over time: emergence (c.1500-c.1650), consolidation (c.1650-1815), hegemonic stability (1815-1871), and crisis (1871-1914).

Russia’s Baltic Fleet, and troops based in Kaliningrad Region, have been absorbed into an entirely new military command structure as part of the ongoing overhaul of the Russian Armed Forces. With effect from 1st September 2010, the Baltic and Northern Fleets, Kaliningrad, and the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts have been amalgamated into a new Western Military District, with headquarters in St Petersburg.

It is now just over two years since Russia embarked on the most radical programme of military reform it had seen since the end of the Soviet Union, and in many respects since long before that. The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 provided the impetus for the long-overdue creation of a distinct form for the Russian military, as opposed to a continuing existence as a pale remnant of the Soviet Armed Forces. The process of transformation now under way has affected the military, and individual servicemen, at all levels from the General Staff to newly-enlisted conscripts, and the emerging form of the new Russian forces fully justifies their claim to a “new look”.

Hilokuah,  Hafeni  Hangula.  The  training  of  officers  in  the  Namibian  Army  and  that  of  the Brazilian  Army:  analysis of the  possible benefits  to the  Namibia  Army  that may  be  gained  by the  training  of  the  Namibian  cadets  at  the  Military  Academy  of  Agulhas  Negras.  Resende: AMAN, 2018. Monograph. This  study  addresses  the  training  of  officers  in  the  Namibian  Army  and  in  the  Brazilian  Army with  a  main  objective  of  analyzing  the  potential  benefits  to  the  Namibian  from  the  training  of Namibian  cadets  at  AMAN,  and  to  compare  the  training  of  officers  in  the  two  friendly  nations, with  the  intention  of  exploring  the  skills  and  knowledge  that  these  Namibian  cadets  will acquire  upon  completing  the  course  at  AMAN  and  how  they  may  be  applied  for  benefit  of  the Namibian Army. The  study  uses  a  bibliographical  methodology  to present an overview of  how the  training  of  officers  in  each  of  the  countries  is  conducted  and  analyzes  the  main  objectives of  the  training  in  each  country,  as  well  as  the  competencies  that  combatants  officers  trained  at AMAN  are  posed  to  acquire  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  officers’  formation  course.  Finally,  it is  concluded  that  the  Namibian  Army  does  stand  to  benefit  from  the  training  of  its  cadets  at AMAN,  however  there  are  certain  aspects  that  can  to  be  improved  for  the  benefit  of  all  the involved parties.
Keywords: Officer Training,  Benefits, Skills/  Competencies, Namibian  Army,  Brazilian  Army, AMAN.

he organization of command in the mechanized section on M80A infantry fighting vehicle is defined by the regulations and
textbooks of mechanized units. The problem that is not covered in the
regulations is the organization of subordination of soldiers of the
mounted crew when performing tasks outside the vehicle. The regulations stipulate in principle that command is executed by single seniority
and subordination, but that the mechanized section commanders organize their crews in the way they think is appropriate, in accordance
with a certain mission and tasks. The decision-making on transfering
commanding competencies and organization of subordinates in the
chain of subordination within the mechanized section is a dilemma
even for experienced commanders of mechanized units because this is
defined by general principles of performing activities, whereby it is not
known where the riflemen, sniper and machine gunners should be
when they are outside the fighting vehicle.
During preparation and execution of activities, the mechanized section commander should adapt the model of subordination in relation to
task, space, time and other factors that occur in combat operations.
Thus, it can happen that the commander or deputy commander divides
the mounted part of the mechanized section into several smaller units
(groups, teams) in order to perform some task.
The research performed by the analysis of content in regulations
and textbooks, observing the way of work during the performance of
activities, anticipating possible situations and discovering examples of
good practice of the mechanized section commanders, the models
presented in this paper have been formed.
After studying literature and questioning professional military personnel, the results of the research are the models of subordination in
the mechanized section when the mounted part of the section is outside the vehicle. The analyzed models are divided into groups of models, where the dismounted part of the section is divided into: 1) basic
model, 2) two groups and 3) three groups.

Nel 424 a.C. il generale spartano Brasida sottrasse agli Ateniesi la piazza di Anfipoli, posta tra la Penisola calcidica e la Tracia-onde privare la rivale dei lacedemoni di un'im-portante scalo per i commerci di materie prime dal Ponto Eusino e di un territorio ricco di legname per la flotta-, valendosi dell'appoggio di alcuni sostenitori della causa spartana in città. Nelle sue Storie, Tucidide tiene a sottolineare l'importanza, vitale per la riuscita dell'operazione, della cooperazione fornita a Brasida da alcune popolazioni e città del territorio circostante, oltre che da quei residenti in Anfipoli che provenivano dalla città di Argilo (Tucidide, Le storie, a cura di Guido Donini, Torino 2005, IV, 102-108, pp. 721-727). Quasi venti secoli dopo, il re di Francia Enrico II di Valois, acceso persecutore delle fedi religiose non conformiste nel proprio Regno, stipulava a Chambord un trattato di allean-za con i principi protestanti di Germania (gennaio 1552), impegnandosi a sostenerli mili-tarmente ed economicamente contro il comune nemico, l'imperatore Carlo V d'Asburgo, rivale del re Cristianissimo per l'egemonia in Europa. La conseguenza immediata della cooperazione tra Parigi e i luterani tedeschi fu l'occupazione senza colpo ferire da parte delle truppe francesi dei vescovadi di Toul, Verdun e soprattutto Metz, località strategica che, rapidamente fortificata, resistette ad un assedio in forze mosso dall'Asburgo tra il 1552 e il 1553: un'operazione sfortunata quanto costosa per gli imperiali, che vi esauri-rono gran copia di risorse umane e finanziarie. Nello stesso 1553, giovandosi dell'aiuto della flotta del Sultano ottomano, suo alleato, il re Cristianissimo suscitava una rivolta tra i sudditi corsi di Genova-esasperati dalle malversazioni del Banco di San Giorgio, che di fatto governava la loro isola in regime proto-coloniale, nel nome della città ligure-, in modo da indurre quest'ultima ad una pace separata con la Francia, privando così Carlo V di un alleato essenziale, per la posizione geografica del piccolo Stato ligure e per il sostegno finanziario prestato dal suo patriziato mercantile e bancario allo sforzo bellico imperiale in Europa e nel Mediterraneo.

Le regard est un non-dit et une valeur de passage pour des militaires qui espèrent avoir des offres de grande importance de la part d'un avion capable de passer devant l'ennemi et avec des notions très élevées de rapidité. L'entente des militaires est de mettre en oeuvre des accords pour exercer des demandes vers des vols de grande entente et non pas des actes de suicides collectifs entre militaires et avec des rareté de soin pour éveiller des doutes vers des population extrêmement protégées et sans nouvelles des politiciens agacés et rejetés par des citoyens qui espèrent trouver une entente pour peupler un pays avec des outils et non pas avec des survols de grande envergure pour établir une meilleur activité et forcer des économies pour effondrer un voisin qui est malmené et rejeté dans un système d'espionnage volontaire et de haut niveau pour s'approprier la mission violente d'être détesté par des chefs très puissants et aussi puissants que la Russie. L'ordre est de faire chuter les ambitions trop élevées avec des appareils furtifs qui estiment être de recommandation militaire et non pas d'usage virulent de politiciens qui sont très maladroits et qui sont d'une force de compromis pour des citoyens qui resteront des paysans très malmenés dans leur propre pays…