Yashodhan Ghorpade

— I examine the causal effects of long-term exposure to conflict, measured at the micro level, on households' receipt of remittances , among households residing in areas affected by the 2010 floods in Pakistan. Using a dataset of 7802 households, representative of all flood-affected areas of Pakistan in 2010, I employ IV estimation to overcome the endogeneity of conflict exposure and remittance receipts, and control for a range of confounding factors. I find that, contrary to the literature from country-level case studies, long-term exposure to conflict reduces households' likelihood of receiving any remittances at all, as well as the average amounts of remittances received. However for households in the lowest food consumption expenditure quintile, conflict has a positive effect on the likelihood of remittance receipts, which provides evidence for the existence of heterogeneous effects as well as a significant micro–macro gap in understanding the causal effects of conflict on remittance receipts.

I examine the causal effects of long-term exposure to conflict, measured at the micro level, on households' receipt of remittances. Using IV estimation to overcome the endogeneity of conflict exposure and remittance receipts, and controlling for a range of confounding factors, I find that, contrary to the literature from country-level case studies, long-term exposure to conflict reduces households' likelihood of receiving any remittances at all, as well as the average amounts of remittances received. The negative effects of long-term conflict exposure on remittances are also stronger for groups that are more likely to use such receipts to invest, rather than for consumption, which suggests that remittances are lower in conflict-affected areas due to the higher risk and insecurity of investments. While existing studies treat conflict only as a source of hardship that creates the need for remittances motivated by altruism, I find that conflict may discourage investment-focused remittances by dampening the investment climate and compelling a revaluation of remitters' continuing and long-term financial interests in their violence-affected origins, alluding to a significant micro-macro gap in the literature on conflict and remittances.

This paper explores the determinants and valuations of children’s work and schooling choices drawing on primary mixed-methods research in the gemstone polishing industry of Jaipur, India. In addition to
economic and demographic factors, the gendered expectations of children’s futures shapes their work and schooling outcomes. For boys, work is additionally driven by the need to acquire training for future employment and wages, and simultaneously complements, and competes with formal schooling. They can work at workshops,
acquire higher skills, and can aspire to become skilled craftsmen whereas girls work at home on low-skill activities mainly to supplement household income.

I examine how prior exposure to conflict affected household-level access to cash transfer programmes in the aftermath of the massive 2010 floods in Pakistan. Using IV-estimation to correct for the endogeneity of conflict exposure and access to aid, I find that conflict reduced household access to two large government-run cash transfer programmes – the Citizens Damage Compensation Programme (CDCP) – I, and the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). Distinguishing violence from rebel control, and exploiting the Taliban's avowed opposition to girls' schooling and their ability to reduce female primary enrolment, I attempt to identify areas likely to be under Taliban influence, which are otherwise unobserved across data sources. Using residuals derived from the community-level estimation of female primary enrolment rates (after including a wide range of supply and demand side determinants of girls' school enrolment), I mark out areas with more/ less likely Taliban presence. I find that the presence of Taliban and affiliate groups drives the negative effect of conflict on access to cash transfers. This suggests that attempts by the state to expand its footprint in rebel-held areas through social protection may be resisted by rebel groups, resulting in lower programme coverage. The lower access to the transfers in conflict-affected areas translates as the complete exclusion of villages from the programmes, as well as lower average rates of intra-village coverage.

ABSTRACT In a detailed case study of traditional wholesale markets for vegetables in India (in the state of Uttarakhand), we find several important governance problems at horticulture wholesale markets: marketing regulations are ineffective, widespread confusion of roles exists between brokers and wholesalers and few services are being delivered in return for the money paid to brokers and wholesale market authorities. Licensing schemes and political muscle seem to be used to ensure that the system continues in its current form and that the development of closer vertical coordination, which is required in modern markets but generally bypasses brokers, is hindered.