I studied philosophy and history at Tel-Aviv University before proceeding to pursue a Ph.D. at the University of Western Ontario. My dissertation (2004) 'Content and Its Probelms: A Critique of Contemporary Naturalistic Semantics' was supervised by Ausonio Marras (with Jill McIntosh and Chris Viger as readers). I taught at the University of Haifa for a brief period before moving to Johannesburg where I took Post-docs at Wits University and then the University of Johannesburg. In 2010 I moved to Seoul, Korea where I became a research professor at Kyung Hee University. In June 2018 I was appointed professor of philosophy at Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai campus, China. In my research and writing I focus on mental representation (alas, an unfashionable topic nowadays...), consciousness, embodied cognition, the relations between perception and representation, and the theoretical foundations of the cognitive sciences. My approach to these subjects takes into account the conceptual resources of complexity theory, emphasizing the dynamical, holistic, non-linear, action-oriented, and the profoundly non-mechanistic character of mental phenomena. Phone: 86 13527209545 Address: Department of Philosophy(Zhuhai) Sun Yat‐sen University Tangjiawan, Zhuhai 519082 Guangdong P.R. China
Journal of Consciousness Studies (special issue 'Is Subjectless Consciousness Possible', Guest-edited by Christian Coseru), 2024
The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are ... more The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode, and the dative mode, respectively. Taking John Locke as a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with respect to some contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories, and self-representational theories. I then move on to inquire can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience. While interesting connections are drawn in relations to affective neuroscience and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu (and to a certain extent Buddhist) philosophy.
(Chapter Two in...) CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS: Mind, Nature and Ultimate Reality. Edited by Itay Shani and Susanne K. Beiweis, Bloomsbury Academic 2022, 2022
In recent years, various authors commented on thematic affinities, as well as on some important d... more In recent years, various authors commented on thematic affinities, as well as on some important differences, between cosmopsychism and diverse positions within Hinduism (see Albahari 2020; Gasparri 2019; Ganeri 2020; Maharaj 2020; Vaidya 2020; and the articles in a recently published volume of the journal The Monist (2022, Vol. 105(1)). In his contribution to the present volume, “Cosmopsychism and Non-Śankaran Traditions of Hindu Non-dualism: In Search of a Fertile Connection” Shani follows suit, arguing that his own variant of cosmopsychism has much in common with the Parādvaita (or absolute advaita) of Kashmir Śaivism as well as with Sri Aurobindo’s Integral Advaita. One of the points of attraction that Shani identifies in these two positions is their unabashedly world-affirming attitude, which he contrasts with Advaita Vedānta in the mold of Śaṅkara. In addition to that, Shani’s paper raises the question what genus of cosmic monism is best motivated theoretically, thereby being the most suitable for cosmopsychism’s explanatory purposes. Presenting and defending a position which he describes as generative monism, he argues that here, too, there is much in common with the non-Śaṅkaran approaches of Aurobindo and of the Kashmir Śaivists.
Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. ... more Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. Much of the debate concerning the viability of panpsychist approaches to the metaphysics of mind is centered on the combination problem (CP). Intriguingly, the literature analyzing the combination problem displays two competing interpretations which differ in their modal force. According to the first interpretation, which we call the no-necessitation view (NN), CP is essentially equivalent to the hard problem of consciousness addressed against physicalism since it consists in a presumed lack of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we describe as the incoherence charge (IC), goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences do not, and cannot, combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely known and discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism (or, micro-reductive panpsychism). We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley
This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The ... more This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The bulk of the text consists of an argument in favor of the conclusion that cosmopsychism suffers from no insurmountable individuation problem (IND). I argue that the widespread tendency to view IND as a mirror-image of micropsychism’s combination problem (CP) is mistaken. In particular, what renders CP insolvable, namely, the commitment to the coupling of phenomenal constitution with phenomenal inclusion, is, from the standpoint of cosmopsychism, an entirely non-mandatory assumption. I proceed to show that severing this unhappy coupling is the key for defending cosmopsychism against the charge of theoretical incoherence. Moreover, I argue that successful defense against such accusation could be mounted regardless of whether or not we assume cosmic consciousness to be perspectival in nature. In addition, the paper touches upon another foundational issue: cautioning against the popular tendency to identify cosmopsychism’s monism with a mereological unity-in-diversity, and motivating an alternative conception which I call generative monism. Finally, as befitting this volume, I pause to reflect upon the question which schools of Hindu philosophy might tally best, and connect most fruitfully, with cosmopsychism as I understand it.
In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism... more In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism (PQ) occupies an interesting position. It is a distinct variant of neutral monism, as well as of protophenomenalism, and as such it strives to carve out a conceptual niche midway between physicalism and mentalism. It is also a brand of Russellian monism, advocated by its supporters as a less costly and less extravagant alternative to panpsychism. Being clearly articulated and relatively well-developed it constitutes an intriguing view. Nonetheless, the present paper takes a decisively critical stance towards PQ. In particular, it challenges it on two principal grounds. First, I argue that PQ's analysis of experience, and of the qualities tasked with constituting the phenomenal character of experience, is fundamentally flawed. Second, I argue that PQ's attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness as a function of reflective awareness is equally misguided. Along the way, the paper also points the shortcomings of previously established critiques of PQ. All in all, the discussion identifies some difficulties that are likely to generalize beyond PQ's specific circumstances, raising concerns regarding the viability of a "middle of the road" solution to the mind-body problem.
Journal of East-West Thought (Special Issue: Philosophy of Harmony: East and West), 2020
The paper begins with the assumption that in order to explain the efficacy of harmony as an organ... more The paper begins with the assumption that in order to explain the efficacy of harmony as an organizing force in human and natural affairs we must pay attention to the dynamic features characteristic of the growth and maintenance of harmonious forms. Two dynamic features are highlighted for their especial significance: revitalization, and self-surpassing. It is then argued that the two are substantively connected through the agency of creativity which, when given free reign, tends to preserve and fortify harmony by surpassing existing harmonious configurations. It follows that the impetus towards self-transcendence is a vital aspect of the growth, the sustenance, and the flourishing of harmony. I then argue that this urge towards self-transcendence can be broadly identified with Plato's notion of Eros. Nevertheless, I also argue that this affinity does not commit us to a rigid Platonic scheme of the sort criticized by Chenyang Li (2014) as harmony by conformity.
Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are ... more Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying on the central idea that the universe is imbued with a ubiquitous field of consciousness (UFC). This field is understood as a foundational dual-aspect component of the cosmos, the extrinsic appearance of which is physical in nature and the intrinsic manifestation of which is phenomenological in nature. We argue that this approach brings a new perspective into play, according to which the organizational characteristics of the NCC are indicative of the brain's interaction with and modulation of the UFC. Key insights from modern physics suggest that the modulation mechanism is identical with the fundamental mechanism underlying quantum systems, resulting in the conclusion that a coherently oscillating neural cell assembly acquires phenomenal properties by tapping into the universal pool of phenomenal nuances predetermined by the UFC, or more specifically, by entering into a temporary liaison with the UFC and extracting a subset of phenomenal tones from the phenomenal color palette inherent in the basic structure of the UFC. This hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence. Keywords: neural correlates of consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, ubiquitous field of consciousness, zero-point field, modulation mechanism, quantum systems, long-range coherence CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NCC Neuroscientific approaches to the study of consciousness assign pride of place to the task of progressively charting and analyzing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), i.e., the neural mechanisms jointly sufficient for eliciting specific types of conscious experiences (Crick and Koch, 2003; Tononi and Koch, 2008). The search for the NCC is motivated, in large part, by the belief that they are more than mere correlates, namely, that such neural mechanisms provide the causal-material basis for consciousness. Significantly, many neuroscientists also hold (or have
This paper is a critique of the radical enactivism of Daniel Hutto, Erik Myin, and their collabor... more This paper is a critique of the radical enactivism of Daniel Hutto, Erik Myin, and their collaborators, insofar as their approach pertains to the hard problem of consciousness. I argue that their valiant attempt to discard the hard problem is ultimately unsuccessful. More specifically, I argue that the hard problem of consciousness is best construed as a transcendental challenge and that no phenomeno-physical identity theory (however embodied and situated), and no "logic of identity", successfully eliminate this challenge. Finally, I argue that the theoretical stance adopted by Hutto, Myin, and their colleagues is inherently unstable in that it inadvertently blends strong deflationary currents with an implicit commitment to substantive metaphysical revisionism. Since deflationism and revisionism are discordant partners their forced union results in a position whose overall coherence is compromised. Such disequilibrium, I believe, is a general characteristic of radical enactivist approaches to consciousness, of which the position discussed on the present occasion is one prominent representative.
Any author who manages to write a penetrating, thoughtful, and evocative book on an underapprecia... more Any author who manages to write a penetrating, thoughtful, and evocative book on an underappreciated topic deserves applause. Nimrod Bar-Am does this and much more. The problem which he takes upon himself to investigate is fascinating, original, and of considerable magnitude, for it is nothing less than the question "Is there a theoretical basis distinctive of communication studies as such?" Or to give the inquiry a more ontological slant, the question can be reformulated as follows: "is there a (non-trivial) common denominator to all communication phenomena, and, if so, could it serve as the ground for a conceptually unified field of study?" There is but little doubt that this type of inquiry is of paramount relevance for those who have keen interest in the theoretical foundations of the academic field of communication studies, or for those seeking a philosophical basis for understanding communication as a pervading multilayered and cross-disciplinary phenomenon. Yet, oddly enough, such general inquiry into the nature of communication and into the possibility of a unified field of communication studies is rare. Bar-Am explores this murky territory like a seasoned traveler whose abundant knowledge does not compromise a keen eye and an open heart, and he delineates the contours of the landscape in a manner which is detailed enough to provide substance yet also abstract enough so as to reflect the prefatory status of his query and invite future voyagers to conduct their own journeys down the path. In braving this trailblazing task, Bar-Am does us all good service, and his passion for his subject makes the reading not only intellectually gratifying but also sown with moments of pure joy.
Kastrup's attempt to undermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves... more Kastrup's attempt to undermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves much to be desired. In particular, it suffers from the following three difficulties. First, it is predicated on a misguided working definition of dichotomy. Second, it conflates the concept of matter with the putative denotation of that concept. Lastly, it effectively presupposes the refutation of materialism, making it pointless to argue (as he does) that materialism is epistemically more costly than idealism.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2018, 4,3, 390-410), 2018
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically inf... more The aims of this paper are twofold. First, to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically informed variant of cosmopsychism, namely, the view that the experiences of ordinary subjects are ultimately grounded in an all-pervading cosmic consciousness. Second, to demonstrate that this approach generates promising avenues for addressing familiar problems of phenomenal constitution. We use stochastic electrodynamics (SED) as the physical bedrock of our approach, supplementing it with key insights about the nature of consciousness long-emphasized in eastern philosophy and other wisdom traditions. We proceed to show that our approach substantiates an intriguing way of thinking about the dynamical emergence of ordinary consciousness from cosmic consciousness, identifying the latter with the vacuum state of quantum field theory. Finally, we argue that the present approach is well suited to address problems of phenomenal constitution, in particular as pertaining to the qualities and structure of experience, and to the generation of subjects.
This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a ... more This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and to the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalist accounts of consciousness.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 14, 2015, 827-849., 2015
The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the p... more The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended mind thesis according to which mentality extends, not only beyond brain, but beyond body as well. In this paper, we seek to dispel these three misconceptions by explaining what strong embodiment does and does not entail.
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2014, Vol. 35, 3, 107-132 .
Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection betw... more Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection between these two constitutive aspects – the informational and the phenomenal – is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One influential approach maintains that sentience ultimately reduces to sapience, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is a function of representational relations between mental states which, barring these relations, would not, and could not, be conscious. In this paper I take issue with this line of thought, arguing that neither of these salient aspects of consciousness reduces to the other. Instead, I offer an explanatory framework which takes both sentience and sapience as ontological fundamentals and explore how they co-evolve. In particular, I argue that while epistemic access cannot generate experience from scratch it does play a crucial role in constituting an important form of higher-order experience, namely, the capacity to experience a sense of ownership over one's experiential domain.
In his recent book 'Reinventing the Sacred' renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffm... more In his recent book 'Reinventing the Sacred' renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffman offers an avenue for the revival of the sacred and for reconciling sacredness with a robust scientific outlook (Kauffman 2008). According to Kauffman God is a human cultural invention, and he urges us to reinvent the sacred as the ceaseless creativity in nature. I argue that Kauffman’s proposal suffers from a major shortcoming, namely, being at odds with the nature, and content, of authentic experiences of the sacred, experiences which point invariably in the direction of a reality which transcends human imagination and capacity for cultural innovation. Correspondingly, I point in the direction of an alternative approach to the revival of the sacred rooted in what I call the path of direct spiritual awareness. I argue that, while being in better accord with the phenomenology of religious experience, this realist alternative to Kauffman’s constructivism also avoids the unpleasant symptoms which often accompany traditional theism, namely, dogmatism, irrationalism, and incompatibility with a scientifically-minded metaphysics.
New Ideas in Psychology.Vol. 31, 2013, 2, 151-165.
"Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the
notion... more "Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the
notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However,
whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human
sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to
a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must
therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and,
arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate
a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior
approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between
these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements
not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to
embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life."
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 12, 2013, 1, 1-26.
This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely int... more This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world – a conclusion which follows from a theory I develop in section one. Yet, in contradistinction with radical externalism, and in agreement with the internalist orthodoxy, MAE defends the view that mental states are situated invariably inside our heads. This is done, inter alia, by developing a novel hypothesis regarding the vehicles of content (in section 3), and by criticizing arguments in support of mental states externalism (section 4). The result, I believe, is a coherent theoretical alternative worthy of serious consideration.
Journal of Consciousness Studies (special issue 'Is Subjectless Consciousness Possible', Guest-edited by Christian Coseru), 2024
The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are ... more The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode, and the dative mode, respectively. Taking John Locke as a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with respect to some contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories, and self-representational theories. I then move on to inquire can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience. While interesting connections are drawn in relations to affective neuroscience and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu (and to a certain extent Buddhist) philosophy.
(Chapter Two in...) CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS: Mind, Nature and Ultimate Reality. Edited by Itay Shani and Susanne K. Beiweis, Bloomsbury Academic 2022, 2022
In recent years, various authors commented on thematic affinities, as well as on some important d... more In recent years, various authors commented on thematic affinities, as well as on some important differences, between cosmopsychism and diverse positions within Hinduism (see Albahari 2020; Gasparri 2019; Ganeri 2020; Maharaj 2020; Vaidya 2020; and the articles in a recently published volume of the journal The Monist (2022, Vol. 105(1)). In his contribution to the present volume, “Cosmopsychism and Non-Śankaran Traditions of Hindu Non-dualism: In Search of a Fertile Connection” Shani follows suit, arguing that his own variant of cosmopsychism has much in common with the Parādvaita (or absolute advaita) of Kashmir Śaivism as well as with Sri Aurobindo’s Integral Advaita. One of the points of attraction that Shani identifies in these two positions is their unabashedly world-affirming attitude, which he contrasts with Advaita Vedānta in the mold of Śaṅkara. In addition to that, Shani’s paper raises the question what genus of cosmic monism is best motivated theoretically, thereby being the most suitable for cosmopsychism’s explanatory purposes. Presenting and defending a position which he describes as generative monism, he argues that here, too, there is much in common with the non-Śaṅkaran approaches of Aurobindo and of the Kashmir Śaivists.
Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. ... more Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. Much of the debate concerning the viability of panpsychist approaches to the metaphysics of mind is centered on the combination problem (CP). Intriguingly, the literature analyzing the combination problem displays two competing interpretations which differ in their modal force. According to the first interpretation, which we call the no-necessitation view (NN), CP is essentially equivalent to the hard problem of consciousness addressed against physicalism since it consists in a presumed lack of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we describe as the incoherence charge (IC), goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences do not, and cannot, combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely known and discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism (or, micro-reductive panpsychism). We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley
This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The ... more This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The bulk of the text consists of an argument in favor of the conclusion that cosmopsychism suffers from no insurmountable individuation problem (IND). I argue that the widespread tendency to view IND as a mirror-image of micropsychism’s combination problem (CP) is mistaken. In particular, what renders CP insolvable, namely, the commitment to the coupling of phenomenal constitution with phenomenal inclusion, is, from the standpoint of cosmopsychism, an entirely non-mandatory assumption. I proceed to show that severing this unhappy coupling is the key for defending cosmopsychism against the charge of theoretical incoherence. Moreover, I argue that successful defense against such accusation could be mounted regardless of whether or not we assume cosmic consciousness to be perspectival in nature. In addition, the paper touches upon another foundational issue: cautioning against the popular tendency to identify cosmopsychism’s monism with a mereological unity-in-diversity, and motivating an alternative conception which I call generative monism. Finally, as befitting this volume, I pause to reflect upon the question which schools of Hindu philosophy might tally best, and connect most fruitfully, with cosmopsychism as I understand it.
In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism... more In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism (PQ) occupies an interesting position. It is a distinct variant of neutral monism, as well as of protophenomenalism, and as such it strives to carve out a conceptual niche midway between physicalism and mentalism. It is also a brand of Russellian monism, advocated by its supporters as a less costly and less extravagant alternative to panpsychism. Being clearly articulated and relatively well-developed it constitutes an intriguing view. Nonetheless, the present paper takes a decisively critical stance towards PQ. In particular, it challenges it on two principal grounds. First, I argue that PQ's analysis of experience, and of the qualities tasked with constituting the phenomenal character of experience, is fundamentally flawed. Second, I argue that PQ's attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness as a function of reflective awareness is equally misguided. Along the way, the paper also points the shortcomings of previously established critiques of PQ. All in all, the discussion identifies some difficulties that are likely to generalize beyond PQ's specific circumstances, raising concerns regarding the viability of a "middle of the road" solution to the mind-body problem.
Journal of East-West Thought (Special Issue: Philosophy of Harmony: East and West), 2020
The paper begins with the assumption that in order to explain the efficacy of harmony as an organ... more The paper begins with the assumption that in order to explain the efficacy of harmony as an organizing force in human and natural affairs we must pay attention to the dynamic features characteristic of the growth and maintenance of harmonious forms. Two dynamic features are highlighted for their especial significance: revitalization, and self-surpassing. It is then argued that the two are substantively connected through the agency of creativity which, when given free reign, tends to preserve and fortify harmony by surpassing existing harmonious configurations. It follows that the impetus towards self-transcendence is a vital aspect of the growth, the sustenance, and the flourishing of harmony. I then argue that this urge towards self-transcendence can be broadly identified with Plato's notion of Eros. Nevertheless, I also argue that this affinity does not commit us to a rigid Platonic scheme of the sort criticized by Chenyang Li (2014) as harmony by conformity.
Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are ... more Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying on the central idea that the universe is imbued with a ubiquitous field of consciousness (UFC). This field is understood as a foundational dual-aspect component of the cosmos, the extrinsic appearance of which is physical in nature and the intrinsic manifestation of which is phenomenological in nature. We argue that this approach brings a new perspective into play, according to which the organizational characteristics of the NCC are indicative of the brain's interaction with and modulation of the UFC. Key insights from modern physics suggest that the modulation mechanism is identical with the fundamental mechanism underlying quantum systems, resulting in the conclusion that a coherently oscillating neural cell assembly acquires phenomenal properties by tapping into the universal pool of phenomenal nuances predetermined by the UFC, or more specifically, by entering into a temporary liaison with the UFC and extracting a subset of phenomenal tones from the phenomenal color palette inherent in the basic structure of the UFC. This hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence. Keywords: neural correlates of consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, ubiquitous field of consciousness, zero-point field, modulation mechanism, quantum systems, long-range coherence CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NCC Neuroscientific approaches to the study of consciousness assign pride of place to the task of progressively charting and analyzing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), i.e., the neural mechanisms jointly sufficient for eliciting specific types of conscious experiences (Crick and Koch, 2003; Tononi and Koch, 2008). The search for the NCC is motivated, in large part, by the belief that they are more than mere correlates, namely, that such neural mechanisms provide the causal-material basis for consciousness. Significantly, many neuroscientists also hold (or have
This paper is a critique of the radical enactivism of Daniel Hutto, Erik Myin, and their collabor... more This paper is a critique of the radical enactivism of Daniel Hutto, Erik Myin, and their collaborators, insofar as their approach pertains to the hard problem of consciousness. I argue that their valiant attempt to discard the hard problem is ultimately unsuccessful. More specifically, I argue that the hard problem of consciousness is best construed as a transcendental challenge and that no phenomeno-physical identity theory (however embodied and situated), and no "logic of identity", successfully eliminate this challenge. Finally, I argue that the theoretical stance adopted by Hutto, Myin, and their colleagues is inherently unstable in that it inadvertently blends strong deflationary currents with an implicit commitment to substantive metaphysical revisionism. Since deflationism and revisionism are discordant partners their forced union results in a position whose overall coherence is compromised. Such disequilibrium, I believe, is a general characteristic of radical enactivist approaches to consciousness, of which the position discussed on the present occasion is one prominent representative.
Any author who manages to write a penetrating, thoughtful, and evocative book on an underapprecia... more Any author who manages to write a penetrating, thoughtful, and evocative book on an underappreciated topic deserves applause. Nimrod Bar-Am does this and much more. The problem which he takes upon himself to investigate is fascinating, original, and of considerable magnitude, for it is nothing less than the question "Is there a theoretical basis distinctive of communication studies as such?" Or to give the inquiry a more ontological slant, the question can be reformulated as follows: "is there a (non-trivial) common denominator to all communication phenomena, and, if so, could it serve as the ground for a conceptually unified field of study?" There is but little doubt that this type of inquiry is of paramount relevance for those who have keen interest in the theoretical foundations of the academic field of communication studies, or for those seeking a philosophical basis for understanding communication as a pervading multilayered and cross-disciplinary phenomenon. Yet, oddly enough, such general inquiry into the nature of communication and into the possibility of a unified field of communication studies is rare. Bar-Am explores this murky territory like a seasoned traveler whose abundant knowledge does not compromise a keen eye and an open heart, and he delineates the contours of the landscape in a manner which is detailed enough to provide substance yet also abstract enough so as to reflect the prefatory status of his query and invite future voyagers to conduct their own journeys down the path. In braving this trailblazing task, Bar-Am does us all good service, and his passion for his subject makes the reading not only intellectually gratifying but also sown with moments of pure joy.
Kastrup's attempt to undermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves... more Kastrup's attempt to undermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves much to be desired. In particular, it suffers from the following three difficulties. First, it is predicated on a misguided working definition of dichotomy. Second, it conflates the concept of matter with the putative denotation of that concept. Lastly, it effectively presupposes the refutation of materialism, making it pointless to argue (as he does) that materialism is epistemically more costly than idealism.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2018, 4,3, 390-410), 2018
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically inf... more The aims of this paper are twofold. First, to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically informed variant of cosmopsychism, namely, the view that the experiences of ordinary subjects are ultimately grounded in an all-pervading cosmic consciousness. Second, to demonstrate that this approach generates promising avenues for addressing familiar problems of phenomenal constitution. We use stochastic electrodynamics (SED) as the physical bedrock of our approach, supplementing it with key insights about the nature of consciousness long-emphasized in eastern philosophy and other wisdom traditions. We proceed to show that our approach substantiates an intriguing way of thinking about the dynamical emergence of ordinary consciousness from cosmic consciousness, identifying the latter with the vacuum state of quantum field theory. Finally, we argue that the present approach is well suited to address problems of phenomenal constitution, in particular as pertaining to the qualities and structure of experience, and to the generation of subjects.
This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a ... more This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and to the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalist accounts of consciousness.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 14, 2015, 827-849., 2015
The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the p... more The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended mind thesis according to which mentality extends, not only beyond brain, but beyond body as well. In this paper, we seek to dispel these three misconceptions by explaining what strong embodiment does and does not entail.
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2014, Vol. 35, 3, 107-132 .
Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection betw... more Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection between these two constitutive aspects – the informational and the phenomenal – is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One influential approach maintains that sentience ultimately reduces to sapience, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is a function of representational relations between mental states which, barring these relations, would not, and could not, be conscious. In this paper I take issue with this line of thought, arguing that neither of these salient aspects of consciousness reduces to the other. Instead, I offer an explanatory framework which takes both sentience and sapience as ontological fundamentals and explore how they co-evolve. In particular, I argue that while epistemic access cannot generate experience from scratch it does play a crucial role in constituting an important form of higher-order experience, namely, the capacity to experience a sense of ownership over one's experiential domain.
In his recent book 'Reinventing the Sacred' renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffm... more In his recent book 'Reinventing the Sacred' renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffman offers an avenue for the revival of the sacred and for reconciling sacredness with a robust scientific outlook (Kauffman 2008). According to Kauffman God is a human cultural invention, and he urges us to reinvent the sacred as the ceaseless creativity in nature. I argue that Kauffman’s proposal suffers from a major shortcoming, namely, being at odds with the nature, and content, of authentic experiences of the sacred, experiences which point invariably in the direction of a reality which transcends human imagination and capacity for cultural innovation. Correspondingly, I point in the direction of an alternative approach to the revival of the sacred rooted in what I call the path of direct spiritual awareness. I argue that, while being in better accord with the phenomenology of religious experience, this realist alternative to Kauffman’s constructivism also avoids the unpleasant symptoms which often accompany traditional theism, namely, dogmatism, irrationalism, and incompatibility with a scientifically-minded metaphysics.
New Ideas in Psychology.Vol. 31, 2013, 2, 151-165.
"Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the
notion... more "Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the
notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However,
whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human
sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to
a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must
therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and,
arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate
a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior
approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between
these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements
not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to
embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life."
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 12, 2013, 1, 1-26.
This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely int... more This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world – a conclusion which follows from a theory I develop in section one. Yet, in contradistinction with radical externalism, and in agreement with the internalist orthodoxy, MAE defends the view that mental states are situated invariably inside our heads. This is done, inter alia, by developing a novel hypothesis regarding the vehicles of content (in section 3), and by criticizing arguments in support of mental states externalism (section 4). The result, I believe, is a coherent theoretical alternative worthy of serious consideration.
> Abstract • Despite some questionable decisions regarding its organization , this anthology is a... more > Abstract • Despite some questionable decisions regarding its organization , this anthology is an interesting read and a valuable general education resource concerning the intellectual history, and subsequent evolution, of systems theory. The book details early conceptual landmarks while emphasizing latter-day developments and applications, in particular in the context of cultural studies and the socio-economical sciences. While commenting on the book's form and content I also raise questions concerning systems theory's standing in relation to such themes as consciousness, constructivism, and the machine metaphor.
This is a review essay (aka, long review) of 'In Search of A Simple Introduction to Communication... more This is a review essay (aka, long review) of 'In Search of A Simple Introduction to Communication' by Nimrod Bar-Am (Springer, 2016).
Forthcoming in 'Philosophy of the Social Sciences'.
Cross-cultural Approaches to Consciousness: Mind, Nature, and Ultimate Reality (I. Shani and S.K. Beiweis, Eds. Bloomsbury Academic 2022), 2022
In recent years, various authors commented on thematic affinities, as well as on some important d... more In recent years, various authors commented on thematic affinities, as well as on some important differences, between cosmopsychism and diverse positions within Hinduism (see Albahari 2020; Gasparri 2019; Ganeri 2020; Maharaj 2020; Vaidya 2020; and the articles in a recently published volume of the journal The Monist (2022, Vol. 105(1)). In his contribution to the present volume, “Cosmopsychism and Non-Śankaran Traditions of Hindu Non-dualism: In Search of a Fertile Connection” Shani follows suit, arguing that his own variant of cosmopsychism has much in common with the Parādvaita (or absolute advaita) of Kashmir Śaivism as well as with Sri Aurobindo’s Integral Advaita. One of the points of attraction that Shani identifies in these two positions is their unabashedly world-affirming attitude, which he contrasts with Advaita Vedānta in the mold of Śaṅkara. In addition to that, Shani’s paper raises the question what genus of cosmic monism is best motivated theoretically, thereby being the most suitable for cosmopsychism’s explanatory purposes. Presenting and defending a position which he describes as generative monism, he argues that here, too, there is much in common with the non-Śaṅkaran approaches of Aurobindo and of the Kashmir Śaivists.
This paper advances four principal theses. First, that the concept of coherence carries a theoret... more This paper advances four principal theses. First, that the concept of coherence carries a theoretically important and historically influential connotation which is largely ignored at the present, namely, that of serving as a regulative ideal guiding inquiry, and theory choice, in metaphysics. Second, that this connotation can be revived to good effect with regard to a considerable range of metaphysical controversies of contemporary relevance and concern. Third, that within the context of this metaphysically-oriented sense of coherence there is a vital need to distinguish clearly between two competing kinds of coherence — internal and external — each of which is associated with a metaphysical orientation fundamentally opposite to the other. Fourth, that there are strong reasons to conclude that the efficacy of coherence as a comprehensive regulative ideal requires a fundamental commitment to the notion of internal coherence.
Panpsychism has reestablished itself as a legitimate stance on the mind-body problem. Yet, it rem... more Panpsychism has reestablished itself as a legitimate stance on the mind-body problem. Yet, it remains unclear precisely what metaphysical commitments this view involves and where, exactly, it fits relative to the coordinates of the traditional space of positions regarding the metaphysics of mind. This paper is meant to contribute to an improved clarification of these issues. In particular, it is argued that while many panpsychists stress the continuity of their view with physicalism, or materalism, this association is misguided. When properly conceived, panpsychism (or at any rate Russellian panpsychism) is either a form of dualism or of idealism. Of these two, idealism is motivated as providing the most natural and compelling interpretation.
Cross Cultural Approaches to Consciousness: Mind, Nature, and Ultimate Reality, 2022
Uniting analytic philosophy with Buddhist, Indian, and Chinese traditions, this collection marks ... more Uniting analytic philosophy with Buddhist, Indian, and Chinese traditions, this collection marks the first systematic cross-cultural examination of one of philosophy of mind’s most fascinating questions: can consciousness be conceived as metaphysically fundamental? Raising new questions, it provides a more global and holistic understanding of consciousness, presenting a stimulating and original contribution to contemporary consciousness studies and the metaphysics of mind.
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their modal force. According to the first interpretation, which we call the no-necessitation view (NN), CP is essentially equivalent to the hard problem of consciousness addressed against physicalism since it consists in a presumed lack of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we describe as the incoherence charge (IC), goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences do not, and cannot, combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a
more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely known and discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism (or, micro-reductive panpsychism). We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley
notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However,
whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human
sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to
a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must
therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and,
arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate
a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior
approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between
these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements
not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to
embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life."
their modal force. According to the first interpretation, which we call the no-necessitation view (NN), CP is essentially equivalent to the hard problem of consciousness addressed against physicalism since it consists in a presumed lack of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we describe as the incoherence charge (IC), goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences do not, and cannot, combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a
more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely known and discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism (or, micro-reductive panpsychism). We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley
notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However,
whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human
sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to
a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must
therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and,
arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate
a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior
approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between
these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements
not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to
embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life."
Forthcoming in 'Philosophy of the Social Sciences'.
In addition to that, Shani’s paper raises the question what genus of cosmic monism is best motivated theoretically, thereby being the most suitable for cosmopsychism’s explanatory purposes. Presenting and defending a position which he describes as generative monism, he argues that here, too, there is much in common with the non-Śaṅkaran approaches of Aurobindo and of the Kashmir Śaivists.
consciousness studies and the metaphysics of mind.