Through the influences of Descartes to Ramachandran, phantom limbs have been considered as illuso... more Through the influences of Descartes to Ramachandran, phantom limbs have been considered as illusory feelings caused by neural processes in the brain that are related to body representation. Extending this view to the whole body suggests that the subjective experience of one’s body even without a physical basis would be constructed by neural processes. In fact, in discussing the mechanism of phantom limbs, Ramachandran clearly stated that the whole body is a phantom constructed by the brain for convenience. This is properly called the “body-in-the-brain” view. However, a detailed examination of phantom limbs in the present paper suggests almost the opposite view, although the brain can play an important role in the phenomena. I will first explain why the experience of moving phantom limbs cannot be reduced to motor imagery but should be regarded as a part of physical body movement. Thus, phantom limbs exist as a part of a patient’s body schema. Next, I will discuss the original experience in which one’s body itself is constituted. Drawing on Husserl’s idea of “sensing,” the discussion will clarify that the constituting process of the body involves the pre-reflective sense of self being located within the body. The phantom limb phenomenon illuminates the importance of the body’s physical dimension, making it possible to locate itself within the world through sensing. This paper defends this line of thought as the “body-in- the-world” view.
So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appear... more So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appears to me as something inseparable from myself. Through and with the body I act in the world, and through and from the body I perceive the world. However, this is not the case in the pathological condition known as depersonalization/ derealization disorder (DD). People with DD frequently claim that their self is disconnected from the body and their bodily actions feel like those of a robot. This symptom raises an important question about the paradigm of the embodied self, which is whether the union of body and self is contingent or not. In this paper, I describe the split between the self and body experienced in DD, then compare it with experiences of the full-body illusion, in which the self is perceived to be located out of the physical body. Through this comparison, it is made clear that the self in DD is not totally disembodied even though the basic sense of self has gone through a qualitative change.
My aim here is to describe how meaningful communication is generated from embodied interactions b... more My aim here is to describe how meaningful communication is generated from embodied interactions between the self and the other. In order to do so, first, I revisit and clarify Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality based on his texts. Intercorporeality is formulated as the reciprocal perception-action loop between the self and the other. Perceiving the other's action prompts the same action in the self (e.g., contagious yawning), or its possibility (e.g., smiling), and vice versa. It is the process underlying the understanding of intentions in another's actions. Then, I extend the notion of intercorporeality from the enactive perspective. Since we immediately grasp the intention of another's action through perceiving it, that action appears as such that affords us to react naturally in response. Thus, intercorporeality unfolds as the embodied interaction of action-reaction, which at a certain moment overrides the individual'sintentions and gains its own auto...
1 Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan Shogo Tanaka 3 Special Issue: Civilization Dialo... more 1 Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan Shogo Tanaka 3 Special Issue: Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan Yoichi Hirano, Nobukata Kutsuzawa, Shogo Tanaka 5 A Note on the Possibility of a “Civilization Dialogue”: From a Trans-Disciplinary Humanities Perspective Yoichi Hirano 11 The Takenouchi Mission and Western Culture: The Introduction of the Telegraph Nobutaka Kutsuzawa 17 The Far East in the Eyes of two Austrian Travellers in early Meiji period Peter Pantzer 23 Legitimacy of English Domination and Its Relationship with Linguistic and Cultural Diversity Yuki Takatori 29 The Beauty of Harmony: The Case of Albrecht Dürer’s Theory of Human Proportion Tomoko Nakamura 35 Reconsidering the Self in Japanese Culture from an Embodied Perspective Shogo Tanaka 41 Some Ideas on Civilization from the Cultural Psychology’s Viewpoint Luca Tateo
The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (inter... more The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorporéité) and elaborate it as a new theory of social cognition. As is well known, theory of mind has been the central issue in the field of social cognition for more than two decades. In reviewing the basic concepts involved in two major theories (theory theory and simulation theory), I make clear that both theories have been missing the embodied dimension because of their mind-body dualistic supposition. The notion of intercorporeality, in accordance with the recent interaction theory, stresses the role of embodied interactions between the self and the other in the process of social understanding. I develop this notion into two directions and describe the related process of social cognition: one is behavior matching and primordial empathy, the other is interactional synchrony and the sense of mutual understanding. Through these embodied interactions, intersubjective meanings are creat...
The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central... more The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central issue in the field of social cognition has been theory of mind (ToM), and there has been debate regarding its nature as either theory-theory or as simulation theory. Insights from phenomenology have brought a second-person perspective based on embodied interactions into the debate, thereby forming a third position known as IT. In this article, I examine how IT can be further elaborated by drawing on two phenomenological notions-Merleau-Ponty's intercorporeality and Kimura's aida. Both of these notions emphasize the sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual aspects of social understanding and describe a process of interpersonal coordination in which embodied interaction gains autonomy as an emergent system. From this perspective, detailed and nuanced social understanding is made possible through the embodied skill of synchronizing with others.
So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appear... more So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appears to me as something inseparable from myself. Through and with the body I act in the world, and through and from the body I perceive the world. However, this is not the case in the pathological condition known as depersonalization/ derealization disorder (DD). People with DD frequently claim that their self is disconnected from the body and their bodily actions feel like those of a robot. This symptom raises an important question about the paradigm of the embodied self, which is whether the union of body and self is contingent or not. In this paper, I describe the split between the self and body experienced in DD, then compare it with experiences of the full-body illusion, in which the self is perceived to be located 240 S. TANAKA out of the physical body. Through this comparison, it is made clear that the self in DD is not totally disembodied even though the basic sense of self has gone through a qualitative change.
The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central... more The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central issue in the field of social cognition has been theory of mind (ToM), and there has been debate regarding its nature as either theory-theory or as simulation theory. Insights from phenomenology have brought a second-person perspective based on embodied interactions into the debate, thereby forming a third position known as IT. In this article, I examine how IT can be further elaborated by drawing on two phenomenological notions—Merleau-Ponty's intercorporeality and Kimura's aida. Both of these notions emphasize the sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual aspects of social understanding and describe a process of interpersonal coordination in which embodied interaction gains autonomy as an emergent system. From this perspective, detailed and nuanced social understanding is made possible through the embodied skill of synchronizing with others.
The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorp... more The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorporéité) and elaborate it as a new theory of social cognition. As is well known, theory of mind has been the central issue in the field of social cognition for more than two decades. In reviewing the basic concepts involved in two major theories (theory theory and simulation theory), I make clear that both theories have been missing the embodied dimension because of their mind–body dualistic supposition. The notion of intercorporeality, in accordance with the recent interaction theory, stresses the role of embodied interactions between the self and the other in the process of social understanding. I develop this notion into two directions and describe the related process of social cognition: one is behavior matching and primordial empathy, the other is interactional synchrony and the sense of mutual understanding. Through these embodied interactions, intersubjective meanings are created and directly shared between the self and the other, without being mediated by mental representations.
Through the influences of Descartes to Ramachandran, phantom limbs have been considered as illuso... more Through the influences of Descartes to Ramachandran, phantom limbs have been considered as illusory feelings caused by neural processes in the brain that are related to body representation. Extending this view to the whole body suggests that the subjective experience of one’s body even without a physical basis would be constructed by neural processes. In fact, in discussing the mechanism of phantom limbs, Ramachandran clearly stated that the whole body is a phantom constructed by the brain for convenience. This is properly called the “body-in-the-brain” view. However, a detailed examination of phantom limbs in the present paper suggests almost the opposite view, although the brain can play an important role in the phenomena. I will first explain why the experience of moving phantom limbs cannot be reduced to motor imagery but should be regarded as a part of physical body movement. Thus, phantom limbs exist as a part of a patient’s body schema. Next, I will discuss the original experience in which one’s body itself is constituted. Drawing on Husserl’s idea of “sensing,” the discussion will clarify that the constituting process of the body involves the pre-reflective sense of self being located within the body. The phantom limb phenomenon illuminates the importance of the body’s physical dimension, making it possible to locate itself within the world through sensing. This paper defends this line of thought as the “body-in- the-world” view.
So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appear... more So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appears to me as something inseparable from myself. Through and with the body I act in the world, and through and from the body I perceive the world. However, this is not the case in the pathological condition known as depersonalization/ derealization disorder (DD). People with DD frequently claim that their self is disconnected from the body and their bodily actions feel like those of a robot. This symptom raises an important question about the paradigm of the embodied self, which is whether the union of body and self is contingent or not. In this paper, I describe the split between the self and body experienced in DD, then compare it with experiences of the full-body illusion, in which the self is perceived to be located out of the physical body. Through this comparison, it is made clear that the self in DD is not totally disembodied even though the basic sense of self has gone through a qualitative change.
My aim here is to describe how meaningful communication is generated from embodied interactions b... more My aim here is to describe how meaningful communication is generated from embodied interactions between the self and the other. In order to do so, first, I revisit and clarify Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality based on his texts. Intercorporeality is formulated as the reciprocal perception-action loop between the self and the other. Perceiving the other's action prompts the same action in the self (e.g., contagious yawning), or its possibility (e.g., smiling), and vice versa. It is the process underlying the understanding of intentions in another's actions. Then, I extend the notion of intercorporeality from the enactive perspective. Since we immediately grasp the intention of another's action through perceiving it, that action appears as such that affords us to react naturally in response. Thus, intercorporeality unfolds as the embodied interaction of action-reaction, which at a certain moment overrides the individual'sintentions and gains its own auto...
1 Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan Shogo Tanaka 3 Special Issue: Civilization Dialo... more 1 Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan Shogo Tanaka 3 Special Issue: Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan Yoichi Hirano, Nobukata Kutsuzawa, Shogo Tanaka 5 A Note on the Possibility of a “Civilization Dialogue”: From a Trans-Disciplinary Humanities Perspective Yoichi Hirano 11 The Takenouchi Mission and Western Culture: The Introduction of the Telegraph Nobutaka Kutsuzawa 17 The Far East in the Eyes of two Austrian Travellers in early Meiji period Peter Pantzer 23 Legitimacy of English Domination and Its Relationship with Linguistic and Cultural Diversity Yuki Takatori 29 The Beauty of Harmony: The Case of Albrecht Dürer’s Theory of Human Proportion Tomoko Nakamura 35 Reconsidering the Self in Japanese Culture from an Embodied Perspective Shogo Tanaka 41 Some Ideas on Civilization from the Cultural Psychology’s Viewpoint Luca Tateo
The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (inter... more The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorporéité) and elaborate it as a new theory of social cognition. As is well known, theory of mind has been the central issue in the field of social cognition for more than two decades. In reviewing the basic concepts involved in two major theories (theory theory and simulation theory), I make clear that both theories have been missing the embodied dimension because of their mind-body dualistic supposition. The notion of intercorporeality, in accordance with the recent interaction theory, stresses the role of embodied interactions between the self and the other in the process of social understanding. I develop this notion into two directions and describe the related process of social cognition: one is behavior matching and primordial empathy, the other is interactional synchrony and the sense of mutual understanding. Through these embodied interactions, intersubjective meanings are creat...
The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central... more The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central issue in the field of social cognition has been theory of mind (ToM), and there has been debate regarding its nature as either theory-theory or as simulation theory. Insights from phenomenology have brought a second-person perspective based on embodied interactions into the debate, thereby forming a third position known as IT. In this article, I examine how IT can be further elaborated by drawing on two phenomenological notions-Merleau-Ponty's intercorporeality and Kimura's aida. Both of these notions emphasize the sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual aspects of social understanding and describe a process of interpersonal coordination in which embodied interaction gains autonomy as an emergent system. From this perspective, detailed and nuanced social understanding is made possible through the embodied skill of synchronizing with others.
So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appear... more So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appears to me as something inseparable from myself. Through and with the body I act in the world, and through and from the body I perceive the world. However, this is not the case in the pathological condition known as depersonalization/ derealization disorder (DD). People with DD frequently claim that their self is disconnected from the body and their bodily actions feel like those of a robot. This symptom raises an important question about the paradigm of the embodied self, which is whether the union of body and self is contingent or not. In this paper, I describe the split between the self and body experienced in DD, then compare it with experiences of the full-body illusion, in which the self is perceived to be located 240 S. TANAKA out of the physical body. Through this comparison, it is made clear that the self in DD is not totally disembodied even though the basic sense of self has gone through a qualitative change.
The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central... more The aim of this article is to develop an interaction theory (IT) of social cognition. The central issue in the field of social cognition has been theory of mind (ToM), and there has been debate regarding its nature as either theory-theory or as simulation theory. Insights from phenomenology have brought a second-person perspective based on embodied interactions into the debate, thereby forming a third position known as IT. In this article, I examine how IT can be further elaborated by drawing on two phenomenological notions—Merleau-Ponty's intercorporeality and Kimura's aida. Both of these notions emphasize the sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual aspects of social understanding and describe a process of interpersonal coordination in which embodied interaction gains autonomy as an emergent system. From this perspective, detailed and nuanced social understanding is made possible through the embodied skill of synchronizing with others.
The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorp... more The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorporéité) and elaborate it as a new theory of social cognition. As is well known, theory of mind has been the central issue in the field of social cognition for more than two decades. In reviewing the basic concepts involved in two major theories (theory theory and simulation theory), I make clear that both theories have been missing the embodied dimension because of their mind–body dualistic supposition. The notion of intercorporeality, in accordance with the recent interaction theory, stresses the role of embodied interactions between the self and the other in the process of social understanding. I develop this notion into two directions and describe the related process of social cognition: one is behavior matching and primordial empathy, the other is interactional synchrony and the sense of mutual understanding. Through these embodied interactions, intersubjective meanings are created and directly shared between the self and the other, without being mediated by mental representations.
Extended Call for Papers: Any topic on phenomenology-based research, including psychology, educat... more Extended Call for Papers: Any topic on phenomenology-based research, including psychology, education, nursing, psychiatry, and philosophy, is welcome as a conference presentation.
The. book:
-Treats religious experience in the light of post-classical phenomenology
-Draws con... more The. book:
-Treats religious experience in the light of post-classical phenomenology
-Draws connections between the constitutive phenomenology and the naturalistic understanding of Homo religious
-Contributes towards an articulation of a descriptive psychology of religious experiencing
-Sets new directions for religious experience as a subject of philosophical research
draws connections between the constitutive phenomenology and the naturalistic understanding of Homo religious
For a long time, the philosophically difficult topic of religious experience has been on the sidelines of phenomenological research (with a notable exception of Anthony Steinbock, who focused on mysticism). The book The Problem of Religious Experience: Case Studies in Phenomenology, with Reflections and Commentaries brings together preeminent as well as emerging voices in the field, with fresh views on the topic. Originating from dialogues of the Society for the Phenomenology of Religious Experience, these two volumes cover a spectrum of phenomenological approaches, with a thematization of the field in the form of case studies. Contributions from theology, comparative religion, psychology and the philosophy of religion come together in the commentaries and meta-narrative written by Olga Louchakova-Schwartz (the editor). Volume I,The Primeval Showing of Religious Experience, examines religious experience with regard to its lived "interiority", in light of the problem of theego cogito, including the recent research on the embodiment of subjectivity and phenomenological materiality. Volume Ialso sheds light on religious experience in regard for the problems of its constitution, passive synthesis, the world, and otherness.Volume II, Doxastic Perspectives in the Phenomenology of Religious Experience, addresses the phenomenology of revelation, shows how different approaches treat the question of essence in religious experience (i.e., what is it that makes religious experience religious?), and demonstrates how religious experience contributes to the psychological horizon of meaning. The book identifies the "growing edges" in the phenomenological research of religious experience and is useful for psychologists, philosophers, and theologians alike.
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-Treats religious experience in the light of post-classical phenomenology
-Draws connections between the constitutive phenomenology and the naturalistic understanding of Homo religious
-Contributes towards an articulation of a descriptive psychology of religious experiencing
-Sets new directions for religious experience as a subject of philosophical research
draws connections between the constitutive phenomenology and the naturalistic understanding of Homo religious
For a long time, the philosophically difficult topic of religious experience has been on the sidelines of phenomenological research (with a notable exception of Anthony Steinbock, who focused on mysticism). The book The Problem of Religious Experience: Case Studies in Phenomenology, with Reflections and Commentaries brings together preeminent as well as emerging voices in the field, with fresh views on the topic. Originating from dialogues of the Society for the Phenomenology of Religious Experience, these two volumes cover a spectrum of phenomenological approaches, with a thematization of the field in the form of case studies. Contributions from theology, comparative religion, psychology and the philosophy of religion come together in the commentaries and meta-narrative written by Olga Louchakova-Schwartz (the editor). Volume I,The Primeval Showing of Religious Experience, examines religious experience with regard to its lived "interiority", in light of the problem of theego cogito, including the recent research on the embodiment of subjectivity and phenomenological materiality. Volume Ialso sheds light on religious experience in regard for the problems of its constitution, passive synthesis, the world, and otherness.Volume II, Doxastic Perspectives in the Phenomenology of Religious Experience, addresses the phenomenology of revelation, shows how different approaches treat the question of essence in religious experience (i.e., what is it that makes religious experience religious?), and demonstrates how religious experience contributes to the psychological horizon of meaning. The book identifies the "growing edges" in the phenomenological research of religious experience and is useful for psychologists, philosophers, and theologians alike.