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Designing high-performance algorithms for computation- ally hard problems is a difficult and often time-consuming task. In this work, we demonstrate that this task can be automated in the context of stochastic local search (SLS) solvers... more
Designing high-performance algorithms for computation- ally hard problems is a difficult and often time-consuming task. In this work, we demonstrate that this task can be automated in the context of stochastic local search (SLS) solvers for the propositional satisfiability problem (SAT). We first introduce a generalised, highly param- eterised solver framework, dubbed SATenstein, that in- cludes components gleaned from or
We introduce a class of mechanisms, called bidding clubs, that allow agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. Bidding clubs invite a set of agents to join, and each invited agent freely chooses whether to accept the invitation or... more
We introduce a class of mechanisms, called bidding clubs, that allow agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. Bidding clubs invite a set of agents to join, and each invited agent freely chooses whether to accept the invitation or to participate independently in the auction. Agents who join a bidding club flrst conduct a \knockout auction" within the club; depending
Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expres- sive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific indepen- dence between players' utility functions. Ac- tions are represented as nodes in a graph G,... more
Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expres- sive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific indepen- dence between players' utility functions. Ac- tions are represented as nodes in a graph G, and the payoff to an agent who chose the action s depends only on the numbers of other agents who chose actions connected to s. We
In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NP-complete in the general case. We... more
In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NP-complete in the general case. We propose two methods of overcoming this ...
ABSTRACT Behavioral game theory seeks to describe the way actual people (as compared to idealized, ``rational'' agents) act in strategic situations. Our own recent work has identified iterative models (such as quantal... more
ABSTRACT Behavioral game theory seeks to describe the way actual people (as compared to idealized, ``rational'' agents) act in strategic situations. Our own recent work has identified iterative models (such as quantal cognitive hierarchy) as the state of the art for predicting human play in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games [Wright and Leyton-Brown 2012]. Iterative models predict that agents reason iteratively about their opponents, building up from a specification of nonstrategic behavior called level-0. The modeler is in principle free to choose any description of level-0 behavior that makes sense for the given setting; however, in practice almost all existing work specifies this behavior as a uniform distribution over actions. In most games it is not plausible that even nonstrategic agents would choose an action uniformly at random, nor that other agents would expect them to do so. A more accurate model for level-0 behavior has the potential to dramatically improve predictions of human behavior, since a substantial fraction of agents may play level-0 strategies directly, and furthermore since iterative models ground all higher-level strategies in responses to the level-0 strategy. Our work considers ``meta-models'' of level-0 behavior: models of the way in which level-0 agents construct a probability distribution over actions, given an arbitrary game. We evaluated many such meta-models, each of which makes its prediction based only on general features that can be computed from any normal form game. We evaluated the effects of combining each new level-0 meta-model with various iterative models, and in many cases observed large improvements in the models' predictive accuracies. In the end, we recommend a meta-model that achieved excellent performance across the board: a linear weighting of features that requires the estimation of five weights.
The papers in these proceedings were presented at the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'12), held June 4-8 in Valencia, Spain. Since 1999 the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce (SIGecom) has sponsored the... more
The papers in these proceedings were presented at the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'12), held June 4-8 in Valencia, Spain. Since 1999 the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce (SIGecom) has sponsored the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications for electronic commerce. The natural focus of the conference is on computer science issues, but the conference is interdisciplinary in nature, including research in economics and research related to (but not limited to) the following three non-exclusive focus areas: TF: Theory and Foundations (Computer Science Theory; Economic Theory) AI: Artificial Intelligence (AI, Agents, Machine Learning, Data Mining) EA: Experimental and Applications (Empirical Research, Experience with E-Commerce Applications) In addition to the main technical program, EC'12 featured four workshops and five tutorials. EC'12 was also co-located with the Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems...
Although some algorithms are better than others on average, there is rarely a best algo-rithm for a given problem. Instead, different algorithms often perform well on different problem instances. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is most... more
Although some algorithms are better than others on average, there is rarely a best algo-rithm for a given problem. Instead, different algorithms often perform well on different problem instances. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is most pronounced among algo-rithms for ...
ABSTRACT We benchmark a sequential model-based optimization procedure, SMAC-BBOB, on the BBOB set of blackbox functions. We demonstrate that with a small budget of 10xD evaluations of D-dimensional functions, SMAC-BBOB in most cases... more
ABSTRACT We benchmark a sequential model-based optimization procedure, SMAC-BBOB, on the BBOB set of blackbox functions. We demonstrate that with a small budget of 10xD evaluations of D-dimensional functions, SMAC-BBOB in most cases outperforms the state-of-the-art blackbox optimizer CMA-ES. However, CMA-ES benefits more from growing the budget to 100xD, and for larger number of function evaluations SMAC-BBOB also requires increasingly large computational resources for building and using its models.
ABSTRACT Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on manipulation of voting methods studies (1)... more
ABSTRACT Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on manipulation of voting methods studies (1) limited solution concepts, (2) limited preferences, or (3) scenarios with a few manipulators that have a common goal. In contrast, we study voting in plurality elections through the lens of Nash equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that any number of agents, with arbitrary different goals, could all be manipulators. This is possible thanks to recent advances in (Bayes-)Nash equilibrium computation for large games. Although plurality has numerous pure-strategy Nash equilibria, we demonstrate how a simple equilibrium refinement---assuming that agents only deviate from truthfulness when it will change the outcome---dramatically reduces this set. We also use symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria to investigate the case where voters are uncertain of each others' preferences. This refinement does not completely eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. However, it does show that even when agents manipulate, plurality still tends to lead to good outcomes (e.g., Condorcet winners, candidates that would win if voters were truthful, outcomes with high social welfare).
Research Interests:
ABSTRACT We consider the optimization of revenue in advertising auctions based on the generalized second-price (GSP) paradigm, which has become a de facto standard. We examine several different GSP variants (including squashing and... more
ABSTRACT We consider the optimization of revenue in advertising auctions based on the generalized second-price (GSP) paradigm, which has become a de facto standard. We examine several different GSP variants (including squashing and different types of reserve prices), and consider how to set their parameters optimally. One intriguing finding is that charging each advertiser the same per-click reserve price ("unweighted reserve prices") yields dramatically more revenue than the quality-weighted reserve prices that have become common practice. This result is robust, arising both from theoretical analysis and from two different kinds of computational experiments. We also identify a new GSP variant that is revenue optimal in restricted settings. Finally, we study how squashing and reserve prices interact, and how equilibrium selection affects the revenue of GSP when features such as reserves or squashing are applied.
In this paper we introduce temporal action graph games (TAGGs), a novel graphical representation of imperfect-information extensive form games. We show that when a game involves anonymity or context-specific utility independencies, its... more
In this paper we introduce temporal action graph games (TAGGs), a novel graphical representation of imperfect-information extensive form games. We show that when a game involves anonymity or context-specific utility independencies, its en- coding as a TAGG can be much more compact than its direct encoding as a multiagent influence diagram (MAID). We also show that TAGGs can be understood
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in sym- metric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to "compact" representations, meaning that the number of players can be... more
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in sym- metric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to "compact" representations, meaning that the number of players can be exponential in the representation size. We show that in the general case, where utility functions are represented as arbitrary circuits, the problem of decid- ing
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to "compact" representations, meaning that the number... more
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to "compact" representations, meaning that the number of players can be exponential in the representation size. We show that in the general case, where utility functions are represented as arbitrary circuits, the problem of deciding the existence

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