rex welshon

Nietzsche claims that all conscious experience, whether perceptual or interoceptive, affective or cognitive, is constrained by ineliminable limits imposed by the finite reach of our sensory organs and by the nature of subconscious cortical processing that precedes conscious experience. Characterizing these limits is the topic of Section I. That all conscious experience is limited suggests to him that the contents of even basic kinds of conscious experience, such as sensory perception and interoception, are perspectival. Perspectivism is not a single thesis but a set of claims, some of them having to do with causal or genetic issues, some of them having to do with justificatory issues, some of them having to do with issues surrounding truth. In Section II, we show that the causal genetic doctrine of perspectivism is grounded in, but not exhausted by, his reflections on perception and interoception. In addition to genetic perspectivism he also offers an epistemological version of pers...

An argument is developed for the conclusion that certain neurological conditions and disorders are directly relevant for understanding the self 's embodiment and the ownership of conscious experience enjoyed by such an embodied self. Since these neurological conditions and disorders provide evidence that there can be shifts of, and compromises to, ownership, they help identify neural substrates and realizers of such ownership. However, even if recent neuroimaging and neuropsychological nominees for neural substrates of ownership unity are core realizers of ownership, they are not its total realizers. Implications of the distinction between core and total realizers are discussed.

In the first section of this paper, I articulate Jaegwon Kim's argument against emergent down ward causation. In the second section, I canvas four responses to Kim's argument and argue that each fails. In the third section, I show that emergent downward causation does not, contra Kim, entail overdetermination. I argue that supervenience of emergent upon base properties is not sufficient for nomological causal relationsbetween emergent and base properties. What sustains Kim's argument is rather the claim that emergent properties realized by base properties can have no causal powers distinct from those base properties. I argue that this is false.

... et al., discussed earlier, supports an emphasis on the spatial cog-nition required by the basic kinds of stone knapping typical of ... This ability appears to be required when a knapper selects a platform with an appropriate angle for striking. ... The knappers imposed no overall shapes ...