Pavlos Koktsidis

Abstract: Negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus question have resumed amid a pressing geopolitical and economic reality. Greek and Turkish Cypriots adopt distinct interpretations of the United Nations – designated recipe for a bicommunal and bizonal federation in Cyprus. In the relative absence of major normative preconditions for settlement, including a lack of common vision and mutual trust, the pillar notions of federalism and consociationalism have been adapted to serve each side’s vital security concerns and to increase each side’s leverage in a future federal arrangement in Cyprus. This study conducted an opinion poll of young, educated Greek Cypriots to identify the preferred type of constitutional settlement in the context of a number of perceived motives, constraints, and preconditions. The findings of this survey reveal substantial consensus on the acceptance of a bizonal, bicommunal solution. Yet acceptance of a federal solution is subject to certain prerequisites. The study reveals the varying influence of current economic concerns on a prospective solution.

This article is the first part of a study exploring the success and limits of external non-military coercion in intrastate conflict. This part seeks to understand the conditions and methods that made non-military coercion a useful conflict management strategy in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The study aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of non-military coercion as a reasonable alternative to military forms of intervention. Empirical data were drawn from a series of elite interviews and documentary accounts collected in three subsequent field trips. The analysis separates the conflict into three distinct phases, emergence, escalation and settlement, to illustrate the influence of coercion on the decision-making calculus of conflict participants, and outlines the coordinated use of positive inducements and pressures to portray the positive influence of non-military coercion on the de-escalation of interethnic violence.

When ethnic groups negotiate self-government arrangements, ‘ethnic sovereignty’ lies boldly at the heart of their security considerations. The constitutional nature of self-determination and the extent of territorial control can determine the degree of ethno-territorial sovereignty attributed to groups. However, in competitive contexts influenced by fear and mistrust, groups interpret these pillar elements in ways that increase their own sense of security. The present study argues that legal and political positions on sovereignty in Cyprus are largely built around the competitive security assumptions held by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships, and explains how the divergent viewpoints and understandings of sovereignty reflect the underlying security fears and suspicion of parties. The analysis finds that the two ethnic leaderships in Cyprus have sought to accumulate a distinct ‘sovereignty capital’ in an effort to safeguard their own and overpower each other’s perceived secur...

Abstract: Negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus question have resumed amid a pressing geopolitical and economic reality. Greek and Turkish Cypriots adopt distinct interpretations of the United Nations – designated recipe for a bicommunal and bizonal federation in Cyprus. In the relative absence of major normative preconditions for settlement, including a lack of common vision and mutual trust, the pillar notions of federalism and consociationalism have been adapted to serve each side’s vital security concerns and to increase each side’s leverage in a future federal arrangement in Cyprus. This study conducted an opinion poll of young, educated Greek Cypriots to identify the preferred type of constitutional settlement in the context of a number of perceived motives, constraints, and preconditions. The findings of this survey reveal substantial consensus on the acceptance of a bizonal, bicommunal solution. Yet acceptance of a federal solution is subject to certain prerequisites. The study reveals the varying influence of current economic concerns on a prospective solution.

This article examines the escalation of protest mobilization into armed conflict in the Republic of Macedonia (2001). The analysis argues that violence occurred because of a timely collusion between proximate causes and permissive conditions (causes). The state's inherent fragility and the perpetuation of unresolved grievances provided ground for the utilization of opportunity structures by dissident contestants. The study looks into the influence of spillover effects through the lens of contagion and diffusion effects including political radicalization, disputed borderlands refugee flows, and rebel capacity, and provides an assessment of the conditions shaping the decision of the Albanian rebels to use violence. Drawing from a series of elite interviews and documents, the article offers a critical insight into how ethno-regional interdependencies render a largely non-violent conflict susceptible to escalation. The study finds that contagion, disputed borderlands, and the availability of existing operational networks have played a crucial, if not decisive, role in the decision of politically active Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia to use violence.

ABSTRACT Terrorism is one of the fears that influenced the economic, political and security transformations of contemporary societies. The effects of terrorism can be traced back to ancient Greece and evolved en par with societies through the centuries. The anarchist ‘propaganda by deed’ methodology was followed by other terrorist movements later on in history, as well as in the modus operandi of the terrorist organization in the last decade. So the question remains, so now what’s next? The Internet and its ‘natural habitat’ gave the possibility to develop what has been recognized as cyber-terrorism. The services provided by the Internet allow terrorists to adopt an entrepreneur approach to their business. New products are quickly sought and customised to achieve defined goals like any other enterprise. The Internet allows terrorists to spread their message to a far wider audience than that permitted by other non-Internet environments. Cyber-terrorism evolved from being the support infrastructure necessary to commit an attack to the attack itself. This lethal cocktail kindles the need to rethink the economic, political and security strategies in order to mitigate the effects of cyber-terrorism.

This article is the second part of a study on the success and limits of external non-military coercion in intrastate conflict. Based on theoretical and empirical data drawn from a series of elite interviews and documentary accounts in three consecutive field trips in the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia (2006–2009), the study finds that inducements, pressures and coordination have positively influenced the de-escalation of interethnic violence in FYR Macedonia, pressing towards a negotiated solution. Yet, despite the swift termination of violence, the lack of genuine willingness to reach a mediated-negotiated solution, the state's military incapacity to contain the rebellion, and the ensuing perceptions of injustice and enforcement have ultimately produced severe post-conflict resentment. Win–lose perceptions inhibit the meaningful implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the peace agreement, thus supporting a prolonged dependency on external pressure and widening the separation between the two major ethnic communities.

The Eastern Mediterranean has existed geographically throughout the ages. However, developments in the 21st century have necessitated viewing it conceptually as a distinct "new" region with specific characteristics. Comprised by Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Turkey, the region is assuming increased significance in world affairs. Stability and security in contemporary Eastern Mediterranean is drastically affected by an emerging regional complex consisting of state and non-state entities in search of security. Evidently, regional dynamics and energy challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean have a direct effect on Europe’s security as a whole.

When ethnic groups negotiate self-government arrangements, ‘ethnic sovereignty’ lies boldly at the heart of their security considerations. The constitutional nature of selfdetermination and the extent of territorial control can determine the degree of ethnoterritorial sovereignty attributed to groups. However, in competitive contexts influenced by
fear and mistrust, groups interpret these pillar elements in ways that increase their own sense of security. The present study argues that legal and political positions on sovereignty in Cyprus are largely built around the competitive security assumptions held by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships, and explains how the divergent viewpoints and
understandings of sovereignty reflect the underlying security fears and suspicion of parties.The analysis finds that the two ethnic leaderships in Cyprus have sought to accumulate a distinct ‘sovereignty capital’ in an effort to safeguard their own and overpower each other’s perceived security intentions in the event of federal collapse, making thus the attainment of settlement in Cyprus particularly elusive.

The present study introduces a revised adaptation of the “ethnic security dilemma” theory to explain the nature of antagonisms between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in negotiations for resolving the Cyprus Question. The proposed theory accounts for security positions adopted by parties under conditions of fear and uncertainty. The indistinguishability of offensive-defensive positions and the perceived windows of opportunity have turned the negotiating process into a competitive cost-benefit problem marked by their distinct security considerations. Furthermore, the study develops a loss-framed negotiations model to illustrate likely choices when perceived costs outweigh the importance of prospective gains. The analysis concludes that although parties could be better off by cooperating, suspicion and distrust encourages defection by creating fears of prospective losses with regards to security.

On the 1 st of July 2013, Croatia is set to become the 28 th member of the EU after the successful closure of a prolonged process of accession negotiations, which started back in March 2005. Two decades after the end of the Yugoslav wars, and during a time when many in Western Europe grumble about the " reckless " EU enlargement that goes on autopilot, Croatia is believed to have implemented all of its commitments that would secure entry pass into the European community. In fact, Croatia has gone through an often bumpy and exceptionally demanding road in order to adopt standard institutional and administrative reforms, and settled a number of non-acquis issues raised by the European Council, such as full cooperation with the ICTY over the prosecution, and later acquittal, of indicted with war crimes fugitive general Ante Gotovina and special police force commander Mladen Markac. Furthermore, Croatia was pressed to overcome a long-standing maritime border dispute with Slovenia in the Gulf of Piran, which in December 2008 resulted in a temporary stalling of entry negotiations due to the Slovenian blockade. In a sudden turn of events, the European Commission's October 2012 progress report raised additional concerns over the readiness of Croatia to enter the EU, and requested further efforts to be made in ten policy areas. 1 Also, the European Commission had recently succumbed to grievances by the German Bundestag, which raised a few additional, though minor points for Croatia to accomplish swiftly before its accession in July. Previous issues over Romania and Bulgaria's accession process created a worrying precedent for Europe's cohesion, which in turn raised concerns over Croatia's EU entry to alarming levels. In an effort to minimize post-accession turbulence, the Commission urged the Croatian government to undertake imminent action to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of the judicial system. The Commission pinpointed the necessity to strengthen the pursuit of cases related to war-crimes, to ensure the effective prosecution of those involved with cases related to organized crime and to reinforce legislative measures in the fight against corruption. Furthermore, the Commission highlighted a series of outstanding political matters that required additional reform, including the protection of minorities, the safe return of refugees, and the protection of human rights. 2 In the end, Croatia has ultimately succeeded in making these changes and to pass through this process of constant adjustment and review, obtaining a final accession date.

A fresh surge of intensified diplomatic activity has recently come to shake the swampy waters in relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council in the Brussels Enlargement Summit (December 13-14) defined a more rigorous framework for launching accession talks with FYROM without delivering a definite negotiations start date sending a mixed message to both Skopje and Athens. The EU Council adopted a non-static conclusion defining an accelerated pace to revitalize FYROM's integration with a view of reassessing progress in spring 2013. Despite the explicit reference to the country's notable reforms progress, the Council's decision acknowledged for the first time FYROM's obligation to achieve a meaningful restoration of good neighbourly relations with Bulgaria and Greece. After an explicit objection set forth by Greece and Bulgaria, reportedly backed by France, Spain, Portugal, Malta and Romania, the Council's decision alleviated pressures exerted by Commissioner Stefan Fule who insisted on giving a date to Skopje without any provision to resolve the outstanding name dispute with Greece. i In search for Greece's consent for opening accession talks with FYROM, the Council's conclusion embraced the Greek name-related objection as an essential step for opening accession talks. In the carefully-phrased agreement text, the EU underlined that the Council will examine implementation of reforms, as well as steps taken to promote good neighbourly relations and to reach a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue under the auspices of the UN. ii The agreement's conclusion reiterates that " a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue... remains essential. " Briefly, the decision suggests that if there is an agreed solution on the name issue by spring 2013, and if there are 'concrete actions and results' from high level meetings with Bulgaria until April, the goal to start accession talks with FYROM in 2013 remains alive. iii The Greek government commended the Council's conclusion as a quasi non son (condition without which you cannot) for FYROM's entry negotiations and it was swiftly hailed by PM Antonis Samaras as a major positive development towards the achievement of a 'fair and sustainable' compromise. iv Speaking in Brussels, FYROM's Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski voiced his disappointment about the decision and blamed Greece for allegedly blocking FYROM's EU path while his party-fellow President Ivanov stressed his embitterment with Balkan divisions still influencing the outcomes of EU meetings. v Yet despite the seeming disappointment expressed by FYROM's top-notch politicians, the EU is apparently committed to searching for an imminent solution to break the deadlock between Skopje and Athens. However, the major issue stems from the wording of the set conclusions; for 'essential' does not of course mean 'sine qua non'. In fact, the Council's decision has only delayed FYROM's European bid offering a fresh chance for agreeing a mutually accepted solution on the name issue prior to the launching of FYROM's accession talks. Be it as it may, the manifested rush by Commissioner Fule to integrate FYROM into the European family could well override a possible failure reaching a solution on the name dispute with Greece. In the event of a non-agreement with Greece, it remains to be seen whether and how the EU takes the pending name dispute into FYROM's early stage negotiations. Besides, 'warning-shots' were fired prior to the Council's meeting by Stefan Fule on the appropriateness of resolving the name dispute in the early stage of the negotiation process which according to him " could create the necessary momentum for solving the dispute rather than merely addressing it. " vi The setting a tighter time-framework signalled the Commission's resolve to renew efforts for entry talks in the forthcoming candidacy review session, possibly without even having a definite solution on the name dispute at hand. The Commission, and Commissioner Fule in particular, believes that keeping FYROM indefinitely in the waiting room risks further stoking dangerous ethnic tensions between the Slavic population and the Albanian minority, linking the upsurge in ethnic clashes this year to a continued lack of progress in Skopje's bid to join the EU and NATO. Unsurprisingly, this argument is similar to Skopje government's thesis.

The 7th Doctoral Student Conference (DSC2012) was organised by SEERC, with consistency to the common aim of the former conferences, to bring researchers from different countries closer and to explore collaborative links between disciplines, for testing the ground for innovative ideas and for engaging the wider academic community.

This book takes stock of the lessons to be learned from the experiences of different countries on their way to a transition into a unified Europe. It demonstrates how the project of a unified Europe is a social pilot project that is unique in human history, both with respect to the sheer number of people involved and with respect to the cultural diversity it aims to turn into a progressive advantage. With no historical experience at hand, the transition into a unified Europe is an exploratory process, often risky but sometimes also surprisingly successful. To improve the chances of establishing a successful unification it is particularly important that we learn from the mistakes made so far; and that we learn rapidly, since the forces working against the pilot project of Europe will gain power very fast if the unification success slows down. And as the recent developments in Greece show, the vision of the final goal itself can well change during this exciting quest. Apart from providing the pieces of a mosaic on which a more general theory can be built, this book can be read as a collection of experiences – mistakes as well as triumphs – which should help the European learning process. The structure of the book mirrors Europe's diversity: specific country studies are combined with more general chapters, and quantitatively oriented econometric work is combined with qualitatively oriented sociological studies.

Critical discussion of social implications of contemporary transformations in Europe ▶ Analytical contributions from economics, political science, security studies, European studies and sociology ▶ Presents work from experts from across Europe and the US This edited volume discusses critically the social implications of current structural transformations in Europe within the broader context of the global financial crisis. Experts from across Europe and the US discuss challenges and solutions to political and economic stability, security, growth, governance and integration on a country and regional level, especially focusing on vulnerable Southern and Eastern European states. New economic, political and security processes and realities are examined closely, with the aim to describe them in a coherent framework. Drawing on carefully selected interdisciplinary research, this collection offers fresh insights into the social repercussions of the transition from traditionally established practices and perceptions to new forms of collaboration, integration and governance.

The heterogeneous practices adopted by politicized ethnic groups and the variations in the types and intensity of mobilization pose a significant question for conflict analysts. Why is it then that only some aggrieved ethnic groups have resorted to violence, while others have primarily endorsed political methods to achieve their political ends? The proposed study builds a conceptual framework of violent conflict that allows scholars to look at variables related to opportunity structures. The study assumes that the decision of aggrieved ethnic groups to use organized violence depends on the perception of structural conditions conducive to the emergence of violence: i) ethno-spatial factors; ii) operational factors; iii) external support and legitimacy; and iv) expected state responses. Opportunity structures have influenced the violent trajectory of the Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in varying degrees, establishing some clear congruency of theoretical directions with empirical findings. However, a comparative examination of variables across conflicts is important for identifying and explaining non-agreeable cases of violent and non-violent conflict.