In dec. 1970, Boston University Centre for Philosophy and History of Science together with the He... more In dec. 1970, Boston University Centre for Philosophy and History of Science together with the Hegel Society of America organized a joint conference on the theme 'Hegel and the Sciences'. Now, fourteen years later, the result of the conference comprising of some of the contributed papers is available to us under the able editorship of Cohen and W artofsky. The articles are conveniently grouped under three parts. The first treats Hegel's understanding and 'critique' of the sciences of his period i.e., his philosophy of nature. The second part deals with Hegel's notion of science and its methoqology. The third is about the (in)famous Hegelian logic: dialectics and its relation to logic and mathematics of our own time. Gerd. Buchdal's sensitive and sympathetic 'Conceptual Analysis and Scientific Theory in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' is an attempt to explicate Hegel's relation to some of the physical theories of his time as they dealt with phenomena like gravitation, free fall, matter• and force and especially optical ones. Though in no way playing down Hegel's, at times bizarre and incompetent, criticisms of scientific theories, Buchdal succeeds in not belittling the complexity and nuances of Hegel's philosophy •of nature. Instead of an arrogant ignoramus who criticized scienti~ic theories without ever reading them, as the received view has it, Hegel who emerges from this article is someone who attempts to "see certain very general scientific concepts articulated within a logical framework, to which they become thereby tied, in order to see how much can be sala about a given concept within such a local context". (p. 14-15). von Engelhardt's article on Hegel's philosophy of nature substantiates this picture by looking at the latter's understanding of the chemistry of his time. About the reproach "that Hegel" showed contempt for empirical study and neglected it" (p. 53), says von Engelhardt, it is simply "indefensible". Where Hegel did criticize the dominant scientific theories of his time, it was born not out of "low esteem for Mathematics, scorn for experimentation and rejection of technology" (ibid.), but out of the belief that an "adequate conceptual grasp and explanation of nature is ... only possible for a science that does not deny resting on metaphysical conditions, that does claim to be without presupposi
This anthology consists mainly of essays authored by well-known and not-so-well-known Popperians.... more This anthology consists mainly of essays authored by well-known and not-so-well-known Popperians. Conceived as a sort of Festschrift to G. Radnitzky, it includes articles written by non-Popperians like Griinbaum and Feyerabend as well. Radnitzky is an important thinker who deserves to be honored, and those who have done so by contributing to this anthology are themselves first-class thinkers in the broad domain of philosophy of sciences. Despite the best of the motives, the efforts of these fine thinkers has nevertheless resulted in something which is worse than a mediocre anthology. Most articles are tired and listless, dull and boring, tedious and repetitive; Together,they hardly say anything that is new, significant or interesting. And this makes the absence of wit and style even more glaring. This is not in any measure due to the personal shortcomings of any of these thinkers.-It has more to do with the brand of thinking they all tirelessly campaign for: Popperianism. It-has become a hal1~ mark of Popperianism, in the last decade or more, to simply keep recycling the same ideas, in more or less the same form in which they were adumbrated thirty and odd years ago by Sir Karl Popper. Andersson's article, which leads the collection, begins by pleading for critical rationalism. We are told that relativism and dogmatism are not the oIlly alternatives open to us, in both science and politics, but that there is. a third choice viz. "a criticist position according to which ... problems are solved by a combination of creative imagination and critical thought" (p. 9). I really wonder, when I read platitudes like these which abound in this anthology, Who could disagree with the idea that "creative imagination" and "critical thinking" are required to solve problems? Agassi's contribution is true to the vague, meandering pseUdo-conversational style which he has unfortunately come to adopt as his own. As usual, there are casual and caricatural references to other thinkers and their ideas, simple-minded rebuttals and a lot of flag-waving. What we need, says Agassi~ "is to institutionalize and educate for the love of learning and the respect for it" (p. 27). Any dissenters?-Hans Albert shows that-the old-rationalistic ideal of arriving at new, absolutely certain knowledge by means ofa "rational heuristic in the sense of an algorithm for the growth of knowledge has not ... stood up to criticism". He 'conjectures' that the "sacrifice of the classical idea of a final foundation makes possible a reorientation of methodological thought" (p. 43). Andersson, in his second contribution, asks how one can accept fallible test statements~ He shows that Popper has already answered this question, and that both Kuhn and Lakatos were wrong in their understanding of Popper: Kuhn because "he thought that Popper did not say anything about this question", which he evidently did; Lakatos because ev~n though he "knew that Popper says that _ test statements are-accepted by decision", he "thought that this decision has to be conventional and arbitrary" (p". 63). Bartley has certainly become less interesting to read since he returned to the folds of Popperianism. He looks anew at the demarcation problem in its most general form as a question of demarcating a good idea from a bad one.
In dec. 1970, Boston University Centre for Philosophy and History of Science together with the He... more In dec. 1970, Boston University Centre for Philosophy and History of Science together with the Hegel Society of America organized a joint conference on the theme 'Hegel and the Sciences'. Now, fourteen years later, the result of the conference comprising of some of the contributed papers is available to us under the able editorship of Cohen and W artofsky. The articles are conveniently grouped under three parts. The first treats Hegel's understanding and 'critique' of the sciences of his period i.e., his philosophy of nature. The second part deals with Hegel's notion of science and its methoqology. The third is about the (in)famous Hegelian logic: dialectics and its relation to logic and mathematics of our own time. Gerd. Buchdal's sensitive and sympathetic 'Conceptual Analysis and Scientific Theory in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' is an attempt to explicate Hegel's relation to some of the physical theories of his time as they dealt with phenomena like gravitation, free fall, matter• and force and especially optical ones. Though in no way playing down Hegel's, at times bizarre and incompetent, criticisms of scientific theories, Buchdal succeeds in not belittling the complexity and nuances of Hegel's philosophy •of nature. Instead of an arrogant ignoramus who criticized scienti~ic theories without ever reading them, as the received view has it, Hegel who emerges from this article is someone who attempts to "see certain very general scientific concepts articulated within a logical framework, to which they become thereby tied, in order to see how much can be sala about a given concept within such a local context". (p. 14-15). von Engelhardt's article on Hegel's philosophy of nature substantiates this picture by looking at the latter's understanding of the chemistry of his time. About the reproach "that Hegel" showed contempt for empirical study and neglected it" (p. 53), says von Engelhardt, it is simply "indefensible". Where Hegel did criticize the dominant scientific theories of his time, it was born not out of "low esteem for Mathematics, scorn for experimentation and rejection of technology" (ibid.), but out of the belief that an "adequate conceptual grasp and explanation of nature is ... only possible for a science that does not deny resting on metaphysical conditions, that does claim to be without presupposi
This anthology consists mainly of essays authored by well-known and not-so-well-known Popperians.... more This anthology consists mainly of essays authored by well-known and not-so-well-known Popperians. Conceived as a sort of Festschrift to G. Radnitzky, it includes articles written by non-Popperians like Griinbaum and Feyerabend as well. Radnitzky is an important thinker who deserves to be honored, and those who have done so by contributing to this anthology are themselves first-class thinkers in the broad domain of philosophy of sciences. Despite the best of the motives, the efforts of these fine thinkers has nevertheless resulted in something which is worse than a mediocre anthology. Most articles are tired and listless, dull and boring, tedious and repetitive; Together,they hardly say anything that is new, significant or interesting. And this makes the absence of wit and style even more glaring. This is not in any measure due to the personal shortcomings of any of these thinkers.-It has more to do with the brand of thinking they all tirelessly campaign for: Popperianism. It-has become a hal1~ mark of Popperianism, in the last decade or more, to simply keep recycling the same ideas, in more or less the same form in which they were adumbrated thirty and odd years ago by Sir Karl Popper. Andersson's article, which leads the collection, begins by pleading for critical rationalism. We are told that relativism and dogmatism are not the oIlly alternatives open to us, in both science and politics, but that there is. a third choice viz. "a criticist position according to which ... problems are solved by a combination of creative imagination and critical thought" (p. 9). I really wonder, when I read platitudes like these which abound in this anthology, Who could disagree with the idea that "creative imagination" and "critical thinking" are required to solve problems? Agassi's contribution is true to the vague, meandering pseUdo-conversational style which he has unfortunately come to adopt as his own. As usual, there are casual and caricatural references to other thinkers and their ideas, simple-minded rebuttals and a lot of flag-waving. What we need, says Agassi~ "is to institutionalize and educate for the love of learning and the respect for it" (p. 27). Any dissenters?-Hans Albert shows that-the old-rationalistic ideal of arriving at new, absolutely certain knowledge by means ofa "rational heuristic in the sense of an algorithm for the growth of knowledge has not ... stood up to criticism". He 'conjectures' that the "sacrifice of the classical idea of a final foundation makes possible a reorientation of methodological thought" (p. 43). Andersson, in his second contribution, asks how one can accept fallible test statements~ He shows that Popper has already answered this question, and that both Kuhn and Lakatos were wrong in their understanding of Popper: Kuhn because "he thought that Popper did not say anything about this question", which he evidently did; Lakatos because ev~n though he "knew that Popper says that _ test statements are-accepted by decision", he "thought that this decision has to be conventional and arbitrary" (p". 63). Bartley has certainly become less interesting to read since he returned to the folds of Popperianism. He looks anew at the demarcation problem in its most general form as a question of demarcating a good idea from a bad one.
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Papers by S.N. Balagangadhara