My primary interests are in ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics and, lately, the philosophy of mind. I work in the history of philosophy from Kant onwards though I am also interested in contemporary debates in these areas.
In this paper, I argue that so called "systematic critiques" of the liberal conception of law in ... more In this paper, I argue that so called "systematic critiques" of the liberal conception of law in Catherine MacKinnon and Critical Race Theory which have traditionally been seen to reject liberalism should really be understood as subjecting the liberal conception of law as impartial and just to an immanent critique. Critical Race Theory and
I argue that the way philosophy conceives of the political subject fails to understand the populi... more I argue that the way philosophy conceives of the political subject fails to understand the populist subject. In Section I, I shall sketch an ambiguity in how Hobbes conceives of the political subject as both driven by the passions and yet capable of rationally subduing them. In Section II, I argue that these two different conceptions of the will lead to different models of political representation. In Section III, I offer an sketch of some of the ways the Hobbesian picture of the mind as fueled by the passions has been eschewed by modern liberal philosophy. Finally, in Section IV, I offer an account of two features of populism which seem to me to suggest that the Humean model of the will is appropriate to understand certain essential features of populist politics.
third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were ... more third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes.
F argues that the concept of race interferes with human social and political development because ... more F argues that the concept of race interferes with human social and political development because the concept leads to an internalization of inequality in both the black and the white psyche and hence misrecognition. A just social and political organization can only be born out of a struggle in which the black man asserts himself as both psychically and politically independent of the white man and hence as a source and also an object of recognition. This Fanon gives his general diagnosis of the problem of race in Black Skin, White Masks (1952) and proposes a solution in The Wretched of the Earth (1961). Keywords Fanon-Hegel-Race-Colonialism-Liberation Note on Terminology: F uses the term "le Noir" ("the black man") and "le Blanc" ("the white man") as dialectical terms which are in place until a "new humanism" which transcends these categories can be achieved.
In this paper, I argue for two claims. The first is that all social and political thinking lies a... more In this paper, I argue for two claims. The first is that all social and political thinking lies along a continuum and that the structure of each thought along the continuum is that of a basic desire for self-determination. Self-determination, I argued, occurs in a variety of ways including, importantly, at a variety of levels of intention. On the one hand, there are the relatively unreflective ways of understanding oneself as autonomous. I attributed this way of thinking of the Neo-Aristotelian conception of practical reason which is characteristic of conservatism. On the other side of the continuum, there is a rigoristic version of Kantian moral philosophy in which, to be autonomous, one must act exclusively from duty or from purely economic motivation. The second claims is that populism can be understood as a clash between different practical conceptions of autonomy which are brought into conflict as a result of the process of modern rationalization. This clash can, I argued, be clarified and also alleviated by appreciating that what the values which stand opposed in the "us vs. them" of populism and liberalism are based on a fundamentally similar conception of the value of autonomy but have come into conflict by sometime contingent historical processes which can be undone or steered in a different direction.
Naturalism and Normativity in Hegel's Philosophy, Jun 8, 2019
The aim of this special issue is to tackle Hegel’s approach to the constitution of the normative ... more The aim of this special issue is to tackle Hegel’s approach to the constitution of the normative on the basis of natural premises and to investigate his original version of naturalism. In the ambit of the American analytical philosophy, scholars like Sellars, Brandom and McDowell have already pointed out that Hegel’s thought is based on the inferential analysis of the logical and pragmatic elements constituting the mind, reason, self-consciousness and the normative. More recently authors like Terry Pinkard, Michael Thompson and Robert Pippin have highlighted that the Hegelian philosophy leads to the investigation about the natural requisites and premises of the cognitive and intentional stances, pinpointing that a naturalistic method of scrutiny is in play. Hegel’s naturalism is therefore a novel version of naturalism enhancing our understanding of the cognitive, intentional and social human dispositions by addressing their dependence on natural elements like life, desires, instincts and perception. As a naturalist Hegel claims that philosophy deals with natural entities and that the occurrence in human life of non observational entities like mind, cognition, self-consciousness, etc. has to be explained as emerging from and depending on natural requisites that the empirical sciences can directly observe like organic and biological properties. The domain of the normative is, following Hegel, constituted by means of the self-conscious life, namely the capacity to articulate concepts and to constitute a social dimension based on norms and interpersonal interaction. Self-conscious life and the normative, namely the domain of freedom and autonomy, are not explained in his thought as irreducible to and independent from nature understood as the domain of causality, but rather as elements proper of a natural substratum with which they establish a mutual dependence. Briefly illustrated, his naturalism consists in keeping the difference between the normative and nature and, nonetheless, avoiding any sort of dualism or unsolvable contrast between them. The advantage of this approach is explaining these two ambits as reciprocally dependent: self-conscious life does not originate by the separation from nature, but rather by establishing and understanding its own bonds and dependence to nature. In contrast to other more naive versions of naturalism, which separate mind from nature by underlining the former’s emergent character, Hegel’s one maintains that the relation nature-mind is based on the mutual dependence between these two ontogenetic factors of human life and that the cognitive and social dispositions originate from the naturalization of logical and inferential categories of thinking. Consequently, understanding the normative requires a naturalized approach to the cognitive and social aspects constituting what Hegel calls Geist, namely the normative substance subjected to a historic evolution and deployed for explaining the logical structure of human civilization. Finally, this special issue intends to account for the naturalistic premises of normativity in order to extend our understanding of the philosophical category of naturalism and to enhance the comprehension of normativity from a naturalized perspective.
German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism
International Conference, Georgetown University, Washi... more German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism International Conference, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (December, 14th-16th 2017) Topic: Very recent inquires on Hegel's philosophy highlight the role of nature in the Hegelian understanding of human mind, spirit, social interaction, recognition, second nature and normativity. It may be assumed that Hegel is a naturalist as he follows the path and the project of the Aristotelian naturalism by dealing with the continuity between life and cognition, nature and spirit in several parts of his works. Hegel's naturalism represents a good theoretical perspective for the investigation of the arduous concept of spirit by relating it to the notion of nature and explaining it as emerging from natural prerequisites. Moreover, by means of this approach we could understand how Hegel explores the continuity of life and mind, which is an issue with relevant interdisciplinary consequences already addressed by the philosophy of biology, neurophysiology, evolutionary psychology and social theory. However, the topic of nature has also been very important and central within the entire philosophical tradition known as German classical philosophy to which Hegel's thinking belongs. His reflection on naturalism has been developed within this tradition and by the philosophical debates at that time. Therefore, the conference will address both the theme of naturalism in the German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and the relevant interdisciplinary and theoretical aspects it attains in the Hegelian philosophy.
I read Benjamin’s theory of aura and modern art through Kant’s two types of judgment, reflective ... more I read Benjamin’s theory of aura and modern art through Kant’s two types of judgment, reflective and determinative. This reading will allow us to understand Benjamin’s reconceptualization of aura, generally understood to expresses a loss or original unity as politically productive hope. In the third Critique Kant argues that there are two types of judgment, reflective judgments. Determinative judgments, in their theoretical use, subsume particulars which are given by the faculty of sensibility under rules of the faculty of the understanding, generating knowledge. In their practical use, determinative moral judgments subsume particular maxims under the categories of freedom, generating action. Determinative judgments in this way divide all of nature between them. My suggestion is that we read the distinction between determinative and reflective judgment as historical in the sense that reflective judgment lies at the core, as Kant himself says, of an original sensus communis in which the particular and the universal were in harmony with one another. This prehistory, however, lacked conceptual differentiation and thus contained rules neither for knowledge nor action. The afterlife of this original state of unity is expressed in the artwork’s aura and the ritual significance of art. Benjamin’s artwork essay in an attempt to show that the process of mechanical production which underlies capitalism as well as communism, has a politically emancipatory core, namely the ability to reconstitute the dialectical unity between unreflective aura and autonomy as reflective political emancipation and community. The idea is to show that humanity’s erstwhile unity with, and later domination over, nature can be productive of a unification of humanity and nature.
In this paper, I argue that so called "systematic critiques" of the liberal conception of law in ... more In this paper, I argue that so called "systematic critiques" of the liberal conception of law in Catherine MacKinnon and Critical Race Theory which have traditionally been seen to reject liberalism should really be understood as subjecting the liberal conception of law as impartial and just to an immanent critique. Critical Race Theory and
I argue that the way philosophy conceives of the political subject fails to understand the populi... more I argue that the way philosophy conceives of the political subject fails to understand the populist subject. In Section I, I shall sketch an ambiguity in how Hobbes conceives of the political subject as both driven by the passions and yet capable of rationally subduing them. In Section II, I argue that these two different conceptions of the will lead to different models of political representation. In Section III, I offer an sketch of some of the ways the Hobbesian picture of the mind as fueled by the passions has been eschewed by modern liberal philosophy. Finally, in Section IV, I offer an account of two features of populism which seem to me to suggest that the Humean model of the will is appropriate to understand certain essential features of populist politics.
third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were ... more third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes.
F argues that the concept of race interferes with human social and political development because ... more F argues that the concept of race interferes with human social and political development because the concept leads to an internalization of inequality in both the black and the white psyche and hence misrecognition. A just social and political organization can only be born out of a struggle in which the black man asserts himself as both psychically and politically independent of the white man and hence as a source and also an object of recognition. This Fanon gives his general diagnosis of the problem of race in Black Skin, White Masks (1952) and proposes a solution in The Wretched of the Earth (1961). Keywords Fanon-Hegel-Race-Colonialism-Liberation Note on Terminology: F uses the term "le Noir" ("the black man") and "le Blanc" ("the white man") as dialectical terms which are in place until a "new humanism" which transcends these categories can be achieved.
In this paper, I argue for two claims. The first is that all social and political thinking lies a... more In this paper, I argue for two claims. The first is that all social and political thinking lies along a continuum and that the structure of each thought along the continuum is that of a basic desire for self-determination. Self-determination, I argued, occurs in a variety of ways including, importantly, at a variety of levels of intention. On the one hand, there are the relatively unreflective ways of understanding oneself as autonomous. I attributed this way of thinking of the Neo-Aristotelian conception of practical reason which is characteristic of conservatism. On the other side of the continuum, there is a rigoristic version of Kantian moral philosophy in which, to be autonomous, one must act exclusively from duty or from purely economic motivation. The second claims is that populism can be understood as a clash between different practical conceptions of autonomy which are brought into conflict as a result of the process of modern rationalization. This clash can, I argued, be clarified and also alleviated by appreciating that what the values which stand opposed in the "us vs. them" of populism and liberalism are based on a fundamentally similar conception of the value of autonomy but have come into conflict by sometime contingent historical processes which can be undone or steered in a different direction.
Naturalism and Normativity in Hegel's Philosophy, Jun 8, 2019
The aim of this special issue is to tackle Hegel’s approach to the constitution of the normative ... more The aim of this special issue is to tackle Hegel’s approach to the constitution of the normative on the basis of natural premises and to investigate his original version of naturalism. In the ambit of the American analytical philosophy, scholars like Sellars, Brandom and McDowell have already pointed out that Hegel’s thought is based on the inferential analysis of the logical and pragmatic elements constituting the mind, reason, self-consciousness and the normative. More recently authors like Terry Pinkard, Michael Thompson and Robert Pippin have highlighted that the Hegelian philosophy leads to the investigation about the natural requisites and premises of the cognitive and intentional stances, pinpointing that a naturalistic method of scrutiny is in play. Hegel’s naturalism is therefore a novel version of naturalism enhancing our understanding of the cognitive, intentional and social human dispositions by addressing their dependence on natural elements like life, desires, instincts and perception. As a naturalist Hegel claims that philosophy deals with natural entities and that the occurrence in human life of non observational entities like mind, cognition, self-consciousness, etc. has to be explained as emerging from and depending on natural requisites that the empirical sciences can directly observe like organic and biological properties. The domain of the normative is, following Hegel, constituted by means of the self-conscious life, namely the capacity to articulate concepts and to constitute a social dimension based on norms and interpersonal interaction. Self-conscious life and the normative, namely the domain of freedom and autonomy, are not explained in his thought as irreducible to and independent from nature understood as the domain of causality, but rather as elements proper of a natural substratum with which they establish a mutual dependence. Briefly illustrated, his naturalism consists in keeping the difference between the normative and nature and, nonetheless, avoiding any sort of dualism or unsolvable contrast between them. The advantage of this approach is explaining these two ambits as reciprocally dependent: self-conscious life does not originate by the separation from nature, but rather by establishing and understanding its own bonds and dependence to nature. In contrast to other more naive versions of naturalism, which separate mind from nature by underlining the former’s emergent character, Hegel’s one maintains that the relation nature-mind is based on the mutual dependence between these two ontogenetic factors of human life and that the cognitive and social dispositions originate from the naturalization of logical and inferential categories of thinking. Consequently, understanding the normative requires a naturalized approach to the cognitive and social aspects constituting what Hegel calls Geist, namely the normative substance subjected to a historic evolution and deployed for explaining the logical structure of human civilization. Finally, this special issue intends to account for the naturalistic premises of normativity in order to extend our understanding of the philosophical category of naturalism and to enhance the comprehension of normativity from a naturalized perspective.
German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism
International Conference, Georgetown University, Washi... more German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism International Conference, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (December, 14th-16th 2017) Topic: Very recent inquires on Hegel's philosophy highlight the role of nature in the Hegelian understanding of human mind, spirit, social interaction, recognition, second nature and normativity. It may be assumed that Hegel is a naturalist as he follows the path and the project of the Aristotelian naturalism by dealing with the continuity between life and cognition, nature and spirit in several parts of his works. Hegel's naturalism represents a good theoretical perspective for the investigation of the arduous concept of spirit by relating it to the notion of nature and explaining it as emerging from natural prerequisites. Moreover, by means of this approach we could understand how Hegel explores the continuity of life and mind, which is an issue with relevant interdisciplinary consequences already addressed by the philosophy of biology, neurophysiology, evolutionary psychology and social theory. However, the topic of nature has also been very important and central within the entire philosophical tradition known as German classical philosophy to which Hegel's thinking belongs. His reflection on naturalism has been developed within this tradition and by the philosophical debates at that time. Therefore, the conference will address both the theme of naturalism in the German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and the relevant interdisciplinary and theoretical aspects it attains in the Hegelian philosophy.
I read Benjamin’s theory of aura and modern art through Kant’s two types of judgment, reflective ... more I read Benjamin’s theory of aura and modern art through Kant’s two types of judgment, reflective and determinative. This reading will allow us to understand Benjamin’s reconceptualization of aura, generally understood to expresses a loss or original unity as politically productive hope. In the third Critique Kant argues that there are two types of judgment, reflective judgments. Determinative judgments, in their theoretical use, subsume particulars which are given by the faculty of sensibility under rules of the faculty of the understanding, generating knowledge. In their practical use, determinative moral judgments subsume particular maxims under the categories of freedom, generating action. Determinative judgments in this way divide all of nature between them. My suggestion is that we read the distinction between determinative and reflective judgment as historical in the sense that reflective judgment lies at the core, as Kant himself says, of an original sensus communis in which the particular and the universal were in harmony with one another. This prehistory, however, lacked conceptual differentiation and thus contained rules neither for knowledge nor action. The afterlife of this original state of unity is expressed in the artwork’s aura and the ritual significance of art. Benjamin’s artwork essay in an attempt to show that the process of mechanical production which underlies capitalism as well as communism, has a politically emancipatory core, namely the ability to reconstitute the dialectical unity between unreflective aura and autonomy as reflective political emancipation and community. The idea is to show that humanity’s erstwhile unity with, and later domination over, nature can be productive of a unification of humanity and nature.
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International Conference, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (December,
14th-16th 2017)
Topic: Very recent inquires on Hegel's philosophy highlight the role of nature in the Hegelian understanding of human mind, spirit, social interaction, recognition, second nature and normativity. It may be assumed that Hegel is a naturalist as he follows the path and the project of the Aristotelian naturalism by dealing with the continuity between life and cognition, nature and spirit in several parts of his works. Hegel's naturalism represents a good theoretical perspective for the investigation of the arduous concept of spirit by relating it to the notion of nature and explaining it as emerging from natural prerequisites. Moreover, by means of this approach we could understand how Hegel explores the continuity of life and mind, which is an issue with relevant interdisciplinary consequences already addressed by the philosophy of biology, neurophysiology, evolutionary psychology and social theory. However, the topic of nature has also been very important and central within the entire philosophical tradition known as German classical philosophy to which Hegel's thinking belongs. His reflection on naturalism has been developed within this tradition and by the philosophical debates at that time. Therefore, the conference will address both the theme of naturalism in the German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and the relevant interdisciplinary and theoretical aspects it attains in the Hegelian philosophy.
My suggestion is that we read the distinction between determinative and reflective judgment as historical in the sense that reflective judgment lies at the core, as Kant himself says, of an original sensus communis in which the particular and the universal were in harmony with one another. This prehistory, however, lacked conceptual differentiation and thus contained rules neither for knowledge nor action. The afterlife of this original state of unity is expressed in the artwork’s aura and the ritual significance of art.
Benjamin’s artwork essay in an attempt to show that the process of mechanical production which underlies capitalism as well as communism, has a politically emancipatory core, namely the ability to reconstitute the dialectical unity between unreflective aura and autonomy as reflective political emancipation and community. The idea is to show that humanity’s erstwhile unity with, and later domination over, nature can be productive of a unification of humanity and nature.
International Conference, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (December,
14th-16th 2017)
Topic: Very recent inquires on Hegel's philosophy highlight the role of nature in the Hegelian understanding of human mind, spirit, social interaction, recognition, second nature and normativity. It may be assumed that Hegel is a naturalist as he follows the path and the project of the Aristotelian naturalism by dealing with the continuity between life and cognition, nature and spirit in several parts of his works. Hegel's naturalism represents a good theoretical perspective for the investigation of the arduous concept of spirit by relating it to the notion of nature and explaining it as emerging from natural prerequisites. Moreover, by means of this approach we could understand how Hegel explores the continuity of life and mind, which is an issue with relevant interdisciplinary consequences already addressed by the philosophy of biology, neurophysiology, evolutionary psychology and social theory. However, the topic of nature has also been very important and central within the entire philosophical tradition known as German classical philosophy to which Hegel's thinking belongs. His reflection on naturalism has been developed within this tradition and by the philosophical debates at that time. Therefore, the conference will address both the theme of naturalism in the German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and the relevant interdisciplinary and theoretical aspects it attains in the Hegelian philosophy.
My suggestion is that we read the distinction between determinative and reflective judgment as historical in the sense that reflective judgment lies at the core, as Kant himself says, of an original sensus communis in which the particular and the universal were in harmony with one another. This prehistory, however, lacked conceptual differentiation and thus contained rules neither for knowledge nor action. The afterlife of this original state of unity is expressed in the artwork’s aura and the ritual significance of art.
Benjamin’s artwork essay in an attempt to show that the process of mechanical production which underlies capitalism as well as communism, has a politically emancipatory core, namely the ability to reconstitute the dialectical unity between unreflective aura and autonomy as reflective political emancipation and community. The idea is to show that humanity’s erstwhile unity with, and later domination over, nature can be productive of a unification of humanity and nature.